193710215 The Communist Party and the War of Resistance Against Japan Question: What specific stances did the Chinese Communist Party take before and after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War?
Answer: Before the war broke out, the Chinese Communist Party repeatedly warned the entire nation that a war with Japan was inevitable.
All talk of “peaceful resolution” and the evasive maneuvers of Japanese diplomats were merely smokescreens to conceal their preparations for war.
We consistently emphasized that only by strengthening the united front and implementing revolutionary policies could we wage a victorious national liberation war.
Most importantly, the Chinese government had to democratize in order to mobilize all sectors of society into the anti-Japanese resistance.
We firmly pointed out the errors of those who placed their trust in Japan’s “guarantees of peace,” believed that war could still be avoided, or thought it possible to resist without mobilizing the people.
The outbreak of the war and its subsequent course have proven the correctness of our views.
On the very day following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Communist Party issued a nationwide manifesto calling on all parties, groups, and social classes to unite in resisting Japanese aggression and to reinforce the national united front.
Shortly thereafter, we published the Ten Major Programmes for National Salvation Through Resistance, outlining the policies the Chinese government should adopt during the war.
When the Second United Front was established, we released another important declaration.
All of these documents demonstrate our unwavering commitment to strengthening the united front and conducting the war through revolutionary means.
During this period, our guiding principle was “a total, nation-wide war.”

The Situation and Lessons of the War of Resistance Question: Based on your observations, what results has the war produced so far?
Answer: There are two main aspects.
First, Japanese imperialism has engaged in siege warfare, territorial conquest, rape, looting, arson, and massacre, bringing the threat of national subjugation to its most acute point for the Chinese people.
Second, the majority of the Chinese population has come to a profound realization: only by further uniting and launching a full-scale, people’s war can the crisis be averted.
At the same time, this has prompted peace-loving nations around the world to recognize the necessity of resisting the Japanese threat.
These are the outcomes that have already emerged.

Question: What do you believe Japan’s objectives are?
And to what extent have they been achieved?
Answer: Japan’s plan, in its initial phase, was to occupy North China and Shanghai; subsequently, it aimed to seize other regions as well.
However, because China’s resistance has thus far been limited to efforts by the government and the military alone, the Japanese forces have quickly captured Hebei, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces, while Shanxi is now also in grave danger.
Only by mounting a unified, people-centered resistance can this dire situation be salvaged.

Question: In your opinion, has China’s resistance achieved any successes?
And if so, what lessons can be drawn from it?
Answer: I would like to discuss this at greater length.
To begin with, there have indeed been significant achievements.
These include: first, this current war is unlike any previous imperialist invasion of China—it truly encompasses the whole country.
It is a revolutionary war.
Second, the war has brought about a degree of unity across the nation, breaking down the previous fragmentation.
The cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party forms the foundation of this unity.
Third, it has aroused international sympathy.
Whereas previously many countries looked down upon China for its perceived lack of resistance, they now respect and admire China’s steadfast defiance.
Fourth, it has inflicted heavy losses upon the Japanese forces.
The depletion of Japanese resources amounts to tens of millions daily, and although precise figures are unavailable, casualties must also be substantial.
If in the past the Japanese could easily seize the four northeastern provinces with little effort, they now face bitter, bloody battles to gain even a single inch of Chinese territory.
Japan originally sought to satisfy its grand ambitions in China, but prolonged resistance will inevitably lead to the collapse of Japanese imperialism itself.
From this perspective, China’s resistance not only serves to save itself but also fulfills a great responsibility within the global anti-fascist front.
The revolutionary nature of the War of Resistance is further evident in the fifth point: the lessons learned from this war have been dearly bought with land and human lives.
Over several months of fighting, China’s many weaknesses have been exposed, particularly in the political sphere.
Although the geographical scope of the war is nationwide, the composition of those participating remains narrow.
Large segments of the populace are still, as in the past, restricted by the government from taking up arms, which is why this war cannot yet be considered a true people’s war.
A struggle against Japanese imperialism that excludes the masses is doomed to failure.
Some argue that “this is already a comprehensive war,” but this merely reflects the breadth of the areas involved, not the inclusiveness of the participants.
In reality, the resistance is still largely confined to the government and its military, lacking genuine popular participation.
The loss of vast territories and repeated military setbacks over the past few months are primarily attributable to this very deficiency.
While the current war possesses a revolutionary character, its revolutionarity is incomplete because it has not yet become a people’s war.
This also constitutes a problem of unity.
Although relations among China’s various political parties have improved compared to earlier times, they remain far short of the necessary level of cohesion.
Most political prisoners have yet to be released, and restrictions on party activities have not been fully lifted.
As for the relationship between the government and the people, between the army and the populace, and between officers and soldiers, conditions remain extremely strained—marked more by division than by solidarity.
This is one of the most fundamental issues.
Without resolving it, victory in the war cannot be achieved.
Furthermore, military errors have been a major cause of troop losses and territorial setbacks.
Much of the fighting has been defensive in nature—a tactic known in military jargon as “pure defense”—which offers no prospect of success.
To prevail, both politically and militarily, we must adopt policies that differ markedly from the current ones.
This is the lesson we have learned.

Question: Then, what specific political and military conditions are required?
Answer: Politically, the existing government must be transformed into a representative, unified government—one that is democratic yet centralized—and implement the necessary revolutionary policies.
First, the people must be granted freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, and armed resistance, thereby making the war truly a people’s war.
Second, improvements in the people’s living standards are essential, including abolishing exorbitant taxes and levies, reducing rents and interest rates, improving the treatment of workers and lower-ranking soldiers, providing preferential benefits to families of anti-Japanese veterans, and offering relief to disaster victims and refugees, among other measures.
Third, the government’s finances should operate on the principle of reasonable burden-sharing: those who have means should contribute accordingly.
Fourth, foreign policy must be made more proactive.
Fifth, cultural and educational policies need reform.
Sixth, collaboration with traitors must be severely punished.
This issue has now reached an extremely serious stage: traitors are running rampant—some infiltrate the front lines, others sow discord behind enemy lines, and some even masquerade as patriots while falsely accusing genuine patriots of treason and instigating their arrest.
Truly suppressing such elements requires the active participation of the people working in concert with the government.
Militarily speaking, comprehensive reforms are also necessary, primarily shifting from a purely defensive strategy to an offensive one; replacing outdated military structures with new ones; changing from coercive mobilization methods to techniques that inspire voluntary enlistment; moving from fragmented command arrangements to unified leadership; and transforming troops from a state of indiscipline and detachment from the people into disciplined units operating on principles of self-awareness.
Additionally, the focus should shift from relying solely on regular army operations to developing extensive guerrilla warfare alongside regular forces.
All of these political and military conditions are outlined in our Ten Major Programmes.
These policies are entirely consistent with the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, his Three Great Policies, and his testament.
Only by implementing them can the war be won.

Question: How does the Communist Party intend to put these programmes into practice?
Answer: Our approach involves tirelessly explaining the current situation, forging alliances with the Kuomintang and other patriotic factions, expanding and consolidating the Anti-Japanese National United Front, mobilizing all available resources, and striving for victory.
The current Anti-Japanese National United Front remains quite narrow, and it urgently needs to be broadened—specifically, by realizing Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s call to “arouse the masses” and incorporating lower-class citizens into the front.
As for consolidating the united front, we advocate adopting a common platform to guide the actions of all parties and groups.
We agree to use Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary Three Principles of the People and his Three Great Policies, along with his testament, as the shared platform for the united front.
However, this platform has yet to be officially recognized by all parties, especially the Kuomintang, which has not yet endorsed the adoption of such a comprehensive framework.
The Kuomintang has partially embraced Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s nationalism, as evidenced by its participation in the resistance against Japan.
But neither democracy nor people’s livelihoods have been implemented, creating a severe crisis in the ongoing resistance.
Given the urgency of the current situation, it is high time for the Kuomintang to fully embrace the Three Principles of the People; otherwise, it may be too late.
It is the Communist Party’s responsibility to persistently explain and persuade the Kuomintang and the wider public to genuinely adopt the revolutionary Three Principles of the People, the Three Great Policies, and Dr. Sun’s testament, ensuring their thorough implementation nationwide to expand and solidify the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

The Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance Question: Could you please provide some information about the Eighth Route Army?
Many people are interested in its strategic and tactical approaches, as well as its political work.
Answer: Since the Red Army reorganized into the Eighth Route Army and advanced to the front lines, there has been considerable attention paid to its operations.
Let me give you a general overview.
Starting with the combat situation.
Strategically, the Eighth Route Army is currently centered in Shanxi Province.
As you know, the Eighth Route Army has achieved numerous victories, including the Battle of Pingxingguan, the recapture of Dingxiang, Pinglu, and Ningwu counties, the recovery of Laiyuan County, the occupation of Zijing Pass, and attacks targeting three major Japanese supply routes between Datong and Yanmen Pass, between Wuyi and Pingxingguan, and between Shuoxian and Ningwu.
These operations have effectively encircled Japanese forces in Shanxi from multiple directions, leaving them surrounded by the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese units.
We can confidently assert that Japanese forces in North China will henceforth encounter the strongest resistance they have ever faced.
Any attempt to dominate Shanxi will inevitably run into unprecedented difficulties.
Turning to tactical matters, we have adopted strategies that differ significantly from those employed by other Chinese forces, focusing on flanking and rear-area operations against the enemy.
This approach stands in stark contrast to straightforward frontal defenses.
While frontal assaults are sometimes necessary—after all, we must maintain pressure on the enemy—we place the primary emphasis on flanking maneuvers, employing enveloping tactics to strike at the enemy’s rear and flanks.
Such attacks are far more effective because they disrupt the enemy’s ability to coordinate and respond, often leading to the complete collapse of their formations.
Moreover, frontal engagements tend to result in higher casualties among our own troops.
Therefore, we rely heavily on maneuver warfare and guerrilla tactics, avoiding all passive, static battle plans.
When large numbers of troops engage in maneuver warfare, supported by guerrilla units, victory becomes much more attainable.
Secondly, let us consider political work.
One aspect that makes the Eighth Route Army particularly distinctive is its robust political work system.
The core principles of this system are threefold: first, fostering unity between officers and soldiers.
This involves eradicating feudal remnants, abolishing corporal punishment, establishing a culture of self-discipline, and promoting camaraderie based on shared hardships and joys.
By treating prisoners of war with dignity and humanity, we not only uphold the moral integrity of our troops but also win the trust of the local population.
Second, maintaining close ties with the masses.
Despite occasional shortcomings, our efforts to build relationships with civilians have yielded tangible results.
Soldiers and villagers alike have formed bonds of mutual respect and support, which in turn strengthens morale and enhances operational effectiveness.
Third, refraining from coercive recruitment methods.
Instead, we actively encourage voluntary enlistment by highlighting the justness of our cause and dispelling misconceptions about military service.
This approach has proven far more effective than forced conscription.
Although parts of Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Shanxi have already fallen, we remain undeterred.
We firmly urge all units to coordinate closely with friendly forces and fight to the bitter end to defend Shanxi and reclaim lost territory.
The Eighth Route Army will continue to act in unison with other Chinese units, steadfastly holding the line in Shanxi.
This is of great significance not only for the overall war effort but also for the broader campaign in North China.
At this point, Mao paused and pointed out on a map the Eighth Route Army’s recent operational zones in Shanxi, where the unit had achieved multiple military victories.
He then explained the general strategic and tactical rationale behind the Eighth Route Army’s flanking and rear-area operations.
Question: Do you think these strengths of the Eighth Route Army could be applied to other Chinese forces as well?
Answer: Absolutely.
The Kuomintang’s forces share essentially the same spirit as the Eighth Route Army today.
This tradition dates back to the early 1910s, when the Chinese Communist Party began organizing new-style armies.
Initially consisting of just two regiments, these forces quickly united many disparate units under their banner and secured their first victory against Chen Juming.
Over time, this nucleus expanded into a full-fledged army, influencing countless other units and ultimately playing a pivotal role in the Northern Expedition.
At that time, the army exhibited a fresh, dynamic spirit: officers and soldiers, as well as soldiers and civilians, were generally united, driven by a fervent revolutionary zeal.
The army also established a system of party representatives reporting to the political department—an innovation unprecedented in Chinese military history—which helped redefine its identity.
Following the 1917 Revolution, the Red Army continued to evolve, eventually giving rise to the Eighth Route Army we know today.
This lineage has endowed the army with a unique spirit, reflected in its combat methods, which align naturally with its political ethos—no longer passive or rigid, but rather proactive, vigorous, and aggressively offensive—allowing it to achieve success in the Northern Expedition.
Today, the anti-Japanese battlefield urgently calls for precisely such an army.
It does not necessarily require hundreds of thousands of troops; even a force numbering in the hundreds of thousands can successfully confront and defeat the Japanese invaders.
The transformation of the Spanish Republican Army could serve as a valuable reference for us.
Question: Isn’t the policy of treating enemy prisoners with leniency potentially ineffective under the discipline of the Japanese military?
For example, once returned, the Japanese often execute them, and the rest of the Japanese army remains unaware of the purpose of your policy.
Answer: That is impossible.
The more executions occur, the greater the sympathy among Japanese soldiers for our troops.
Such actions cannot be concealed from the soldiers’ eyes.
Our policy remains steadfast.
Even though the Japanese have openly threatened to deploy poison gas against the Eighth Route Army, we will not alter our prisoner-of-war policy.
We continue to treat Japanese soldiers and all those coerced into serving as our brothers—without insult or reproach—explaining to them the shared interests of our two peoples and then releasing them.
Those who refuse to return may choose to serve in the Eighth Route Army.
Should an “International Brigade” emerge on the anti-Japanese front in the future, they could join our ranks and take up arms against Japanese imperialism.
Question: Are you prepared for the possibility of being attacked with poison gas?
Answer: Due to material constraints, we currently lack any defensive weapons.
However, we are seeking assistance from Chairman Chiang Kai-shek.
Commander-in-Chief Zhu De is preparing to issue a declaration in response to the Japanese North China Area Army headquarters, asserting that Japan’s fascist acts of genocide will inevitably lead to its own destruction.
The Issue of Surrenderism in the War of Resistance Question: As far as I know, while Japan continues its war, it simultaneously projects an image of peace in Shanghai.
What, then, are Japan’s true objectives?
Answer: After reaching certain milestones, Japanese imperialism will revert to pursuing three primary goals: first, to launch a massive aerial bombardment; second, to carry out indiscriminate massacres using chemical weapons; and third, to spread propaganda portraying Japan as a benevolent savior, thereby deceiving the world into believing that surrender is the only viable option.
The underlying danger lies in the proliferation of such deceptive narratives, which could sow doubt and division within our ranks.
What, then, are the potential consequences of this scenario?
Answer: There are essentially two possibilities: either we overcome surrenderism, or surrenderism prevails, plunging China into chaos and causing the anti-Japanese front to fracture.
Question: Which of these scenarios is more likely?
Answer: The vast majority of the Chinese people are committed to resisting to the very end.
Among the upper echelons of society, there may be individuals who succumb to surrenderist tendencies, but the resolute majority will undoubtedly rise up in opposition and continue the struggle alongside the people.
This, of course, would be a tragic development for the Chinese anti-Japanese front.
I am convinced that surrenderists lack the support of the masses and will ultimately be defeated by the power of the people, enabling the war to endure and ultimately secure victory.
Comrade Ba Shi seems to have already grasped this truth, as evidenced by his remarks on October 9th and his response to Roosevelt’s declaration, in which he reiterated the imperative of continuing the fight until the very last person and the very last bullet remain.
The Chinese Communist Party firmly supports Mr. Chiang Kai-shek’s stance on this matter and rejects all surrenderist tendencies that seek to sow doubt and division.
As for the general populace, our slogan should be “to shed the last drop of blood in defense of the motherland.”
This sentiment aligns perfectly with the spirit of Mr. Chiang’s address.
Regarding surrenderism, we must publicly highlight its dangers while simultaneously organizing the masses to actively oppose surrenderist movements.
Surrenderism originates from a sense of national defeatism—the belief that China, having suffered a series of defeats, is no longer capable of resisting Japan.
However, failure is often the mother of success; it provides invaluable lessons that form the foundation for future victories.
Defeatists, however, focus solely on the failures of the resistance, ignoring its achievements and failing to recognize that even within defeat lie the seeds of eventual triumph, just as victory contains elements of prior hardship.
By reminding the people of the ultimate prospects of victory and emphasizing the temporary nature of setbacks and difficulties, we can inspire them to persevere.
Ultimately, victory will belong to those who never give up.
Once surrenderism loses its mass base—that is, when it can no longer manipulate the populace—the anti-Japanese front will be able to consolidate.
Democracy and the War of Resistance Question: What exactly does the “democracy” mentioned in the Communist Party’s programme entail?
Doesn’t it seem contradictory to speak of a “wartime government”?
Answer: The “democratic centralism” we advocate does not represent an inherent contradiction.
Rather, it reflects a practical approach.
Between democracy and centralism, there is no insurmountable chasm; both are essential for governance.
On the one hand, the government we envision must genuinely represent the will of the people.
It must enjoy the broad support and endorsement of the entire Chinese populace, and the people themselves must be free to express their support for the government and influence its policies—this is the essence of democracy.
On the other hand, centralized administrative authority is indispensable.
Once policies desired by the people have been approved through democratic institutions and entrusted to a government elected by the people, it is the government’s responsibility to implement them faithfully, provided that such implementation does not contravene the principles already agreed upon by the electorate.
Only in this way can governance proceed smoothly and efficiently—this is the meaning of centralism.
By combining democratic and centralized elements, we can avoid the extremes of either system.
No one disputes that a government that is both democratic and centralized is better suited to the demands of wartime governance.
However, the question remains: how can we reconcile these seemingly conflicting principles?
The answer lies in historical precedents.
Throughout history, governments have generally fallen into one of two categories: those that are democratic and centralized, or those that are purely centralized.
The latter type represents an extreme position—one that prioritizes centralization above all else.
For instance, during the reign of Emperor Louis George in Britain, the government imposed strict controls on public discourse regarding the war.
Any gathering or expression of dissent was strictly prohibited, even though Parliament still existed.
However, this parliament merely rubber-stamped budgets for imperial expansion, serving the interests of a small clique of imperialists.
Consequently, the gap between the government and the people widened, resulting in a regime characterized by absolute centralization and a complete absence of democracy.
Yet, history also records revolutionary wars—for example, the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution.
In Spain, the current conflict has sparked intense debate over whether the war should be classified as a conventional battle or as a revolutionary struggle.
Ultimately, the decision rests with the government, which must weigh the merits of each approach.
In this particular case, the government opted for a non-revolutionary solution, citing concerns about stability and the potential for unrest among the populace.
Nevertheless, voices advocating for a revolutionary approach persisted, driven by a desire to channel public sentiment toward meaningful change.
Thus, the government was compelled to reconsider its stance and embrace a more radical path.
This episode underscores the importance of balancing centralization with democracy.
Only when a government directly reflects the will of the people can it function effectively.
Such a government should not fear opposition to its policies; instead, it should be concerned about apathy toward the war.
The nature of the war, in turn, determines the relationship between the government and the people—this is a principle deeply rooted in history.
Question: So, what steps do you propose to implement this new political system?
Answer: The key lies in cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.
Question: Why is that?
Answer: Over the past fifteen years, the relationship between the two parties has been the decisive factor shaping China’s political landscape.
Their collaboration from 1915 to 1917 led to the first revolutionary victory, while their subsequent split in 1917 plunged the country into a decade of turmoil.
However, we bear no responsibility for that split; we were simply forced to turn our attention to resisting Kuomintang oppression.
Through persistent efforts, we have managed to establish a basis for cooperation.
The real challenge now lies in both sides acknowledging a common platform and acting upon it.
Establishing a new political system is an integral part of this process.
Question: How can this new system be established through cooperation between the two parties?
Answer: We are proposing reforms to government institutions and the military.
To address the current emergency, we suggest convening a provisional national congress.
The delegates to this congress should be selected according to a proportional representation scheme, drawing from anti-Japanese parties, military units, and civic organizations, as advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1914.
This congress would serve as the nation’s highest authority, empowered to determine the direction of the national salvation, adopt a constitutional outline, and elect a government.
We believe that the resistance has reached a critical juncture, and only a swift convocation of such a representative and authoritative body can salvage the situation.
We are currently discussing this proposal with the Kuomintang, hoping to secure their approval.
Question: Doesn’t the Communist Party advocate for universal suffrage?
Answer: Indeed, we do.
Universal suffrage is the only mechanism capable of fully reflecting the will of the people.
A provisional national congress represents a rapid solution because it allows us to bypass the current electoral system, which lacks guarantees of genuine popular representation.
At present, there is no reliable method to ensure that elections truly reflect the will of the people.
Under these circumstances, it is preferable to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s original vision of each constituency nominating its own representatives.
Of course, this approach serves merely as a bridge toward universal suffrage, but it remains the best option available at present.
Question: Based on your assessment, do you think the Kuomintang will agree to this proposal?
Answer: Given the current national crisis, many enlightened members of the Kuomintang have long advocated for such a measure.
Chairman Chiang Kai-shek himself has previously expressed support for democracy, and numerous figures from various sectors—including leaders of the resistance—are likewise convinced of its necessity.
I see no reason why the Kuomintang would reject this proposal.
If they do agree, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang will enter a phase of closer cooperation, which holds great promise for both the nation and its people.
Question: Hasn’t the National Government announced the suspension of plans to convene a national congress?
Answer: That announcement was justified.
The suspension referred to the Kuomintang’s earlier intention to hold a national congress based on a rigid, hierarchical structure that offered virtually no room for genuine popular representation.
Such a congress would have lacked legitimacy and failed to reflect the will of the people.
We, as a diverse coalition of political forces, strongly opposed that proposal.
The provisional national congress we are now proposing, however, is fundamentally different.
Following the convening of this congress, we will have a clear mandate to undertake crucial reforms—transforming government institutions, modernizing the military, and mobilizing the populace—to create the necessary preconditions for a renewed phase of resistance.
End of Volume II of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 1944 Edition Volume III of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 1947 Edition Collection of Mao Zedong’s Speeches on National Salvation, 1939 Edition Women’s Liberation, Issues 2–3, 1937 Edition Three Essays on the Sino-Japanese War || On the Current Situation of the War of Resistance and Its Lessons and Keys to Victory Gao Yuan Publishing House, 1937 Edition Conversation with British Journalist Bertrand Three Persons Three