The Left Route Army Should Change Course and Move Northward[1]

(September 8, 1935)

Comrades Zhu, Zhang, and Liu:

At present, the operations of the Red Army are at a most critical juncture, requiring us to consider and decide this issue prudently yet swiftly. After careful consideration, we conclude as follows:

1. If the Left Route Army[2] moves southward, the prospects will be extremely unfavorable. Because:

[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and others to Zhu De, General Political Commissar of the Red Army Zhang Guotao, and Chief of the General Staff Liu Bocheng. From August 4 to 6, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting at Shazuo near Mao'ergai and adopted the "Resolution of the Central Committee on the Political Situation and Tasks After the Joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies," reaffirming the strategic policy set at the Lianghekou Meeting. After the meeting, the Central Committee, in accordance with the "Xia (He) Tao (He) Campaign Plan," decided to reorganize the First and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army into a Right Route Army and a Left Route Army, which would jointly move northward under the unified leadership of the Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. The Right Route Army was led by Frontline Commander-in-Chief Xu Xiangqian, Political Commissar Chen Changhao, and Chief of Staff Ye Jianying, with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu, and others accompanying it. The Left Route Army was led by Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, and Liu Bocheng. The Left and Right Route Armies set out from Zhuokeji, Mao'ergai, and other places respectively, arriving successively in the Aba and Baxi areas by late August. On the 20th, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting at Mao'ergai and adopted the "Supplementary Decision on the Current Strategic Policy," demanding that the main force of the Red Army swiftly move north to seize the Tao River basin centered on Minzhou, and criticizing Zhang Guotao's erroneous proposal for the main force to cross the Yellow River westward and penetrate the remote regions of Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. Zhang Guotao refused to implement the Central Committee's northward policy, and on September 9, without authorization, ordered the Right Route Army to move south, splitting from and attempting to endanger the Central Committee. After urgent consultations, the Central Committee decided to quickly withdraw from the danger zone, and in the early hours of the 10th, led the First Army, Third Army, and the Military Commission Column of the Right Route Army to move northward first.

[2] The Left Route Army, comprising the Fifth and Ninth Armies of the First Front Army of the Red Army, and the Thirty-first, Thirty-second, and Thirty-third Armies of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army.

A. The terrain favors enemy blockade and is unfavorable for our attack. Over a thousand li south of Danba, and over seven hundred li south of Maogong,[1] the terrain consists entirely of snow-capped mountains, primeval forests, and narrow defiles. From Kang, Lu, Tian, Lu, Ya, Ming, Qiong, Da[2] all the way to Maofu[3] area, enemy fortifications are already complete, and our army has absolutely no possibility of capturing them.

B. The economic conditions absolutely cannot sustain a large army. Over a thousand li along the Dadu River basin, places like Mao'ergai[4] amount to no more than a single Moximian.[5] Suichong[6] has a population of just over 8,000, with very little grain to begin with; Maofu's grain is already exhausted. A large army stationed here faces the danger of starvation.

C. From Aba south to Mianning, the entire area is inhabited by minority nationalities. In this region, our army faces attrition without any replenishment. This problem is already extremely severe and absolutely cannot be allowed to continue.

D. The northern front is blockaded by the enemy, leaving no strategic line of retreat.

2. Therefore, we earnestly hope that you, brothers, will deliberate carefully and prudently, make a firm resolution, and after replenishing grain supplies at Aba and Zhuokeji,[7] change course and advance northward. Even if there are considerable reductions in personnel during the march, the rich and populous region of southern Gansu offers hope for replenishment. In terms of terrain, economy, population, and strategic lines of retreat, there are prospects for victory. Even compared to the previous proposition of going to Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, this is far superior to the Xikang[8] region.

3. At present, Hu's enemy forces dare not move rashly; it will take time for the two units under Zhou and Wang[9] to arrive; the enemy on the northern front remains weak.

[1] Maogong, old county name, present-day Xiaojin County, Sichuan Province.
[2] Kang, Lu, Tian, Lu, Ya, Ming, Qiong, Da refer to Kangding, Luding, Tianquan, Lushan, Ya'an, Mingshan, Qionglai, and Dayi in Sichuan.
[3] Mao refers to Maogong. Fu refers to Fubian, a village name, located in the northern part of present-day Xiaojin County, Sichuan Province.
[4] Mao'ergai, a village name, located in the western part of Songpan County, Sichuan Province.
[5] Moximian, a village name, located in the southern part of Luding County, Sichuan Province.
[6] Sui refers to Suijing, old county name, present-day Jinchuan County, Sichuan. Chong refers to Chonghua, a village name, located in the southern part of Jinchuan County, Sichuan Province.
[7] Zhuokeji, located in the southern part of present-day Ma'erkang County, Sichuan Province.
[8] Xikang, old province name, encompassing the western part of present-day Sichuan Province and the eastern part of the Tibet Autonomous Region, abolished in 1955.
[9] Zhou refers to Zhou Hunyuan, then Commander of the Second Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang "Bandit Suppression" Forces. Wang refers to Wang Jun, then Commander of the Third Army of the Third Column of the Third Route Army of the Kuomintang "Bandit Suppression" Forces.

We, your younger brothers, also propose to detach a portion of the Right Route Army to set out first and coordinate operations with the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Armies, drawing the enemy to pursue them, thereby facilitating our Left Route Army's entry into Gansu and opening up a new situation.

All the above is conceived purely from the perspective of the overall situation, future prospects, and the balance of interests. We earnestly hope that you, brothers, will seize the moment and make a resolute decision, which will be a blessing for the revolution.

Enlai, Luofu, Bogu, Xiangqian
Changhao, Zedong, Jiaqiang[1]

22:00, September 8

Beginning in late August 1935, Mao Zedong and others led the Right Route Army of the Red Army across the desolate and uninhabited grasslands.

[1] Luofu, i.e., Zhang Wentian, then member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, assuming overall responsibility within the Party. Bogu, i.e., Qin Bangxian, then member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Xiangqian, i.e., Xu Xiangqian. Changhao, i.e., Chen Changhao. Jiaqiang, i.e., Wang Jiaxiang, then alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.


Specimens of some wild vegetables eaten by the Red Army during the Long March and a palm-fiber vest used for warmth.