Supplementary Decision Concerning the Present Strategic Policy[1]

(August 20, 1935)

After hearing Comrade Mao Zedong’s report, the Political Bureau makes the following supplementary decision to the “Decision Concerning the Present Strategic Policy” of June 28:

(1) Under the present concrete circumstances of the enemy and ourselves, in order to carry out the basic decision of June 28 concerning the present strategic policy, our main forces are required to rapidly seize and occupy the Tao River basin (mainly the area on the eastern bank of the Tao River) with Minzhou as the center, and, relying on this area, to attack eastward so as to gain the vast territory of Shaanxi-Gansu, which will serve as a powerful pillar and base area for the continued development of the Chinese Soviet movement.

(2) This decision proceeds from the following reasons and considerations: The Shaanxi-Gansu region is advantageous for development both at present and in the future, and, relying on our existing strength, it is entirely possible to achieve this. These reasons and considerations are:

a. Politically, we can achieve coordination, concerted action, and merger with the 25th and 26th Armies and the guerrilla areas of Tongnanba, and provide assistance, organization, and leadership to the guerrilla movements unfolding in this region, linking up the Soviet areas and guerrilla zones existing along the Shaanxi-Gansu border to form a contiguous Soviet area. This will enable us to rapidly create a consolidated Soviet base area in a short period, which can swiftly become the leading center of the revolutionary movement in northwestern China as well as in the whole of China.

b. Regarding the enemy situation, in this region there are several warlord systems. Although they are jointly attacking us, contradictions and conflicts exist among themselves. The enemy’s general

[1] This decision was drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong.

combat effectiveness is weak, and their morale is low. In particular, the Northeast Army has just been transferred from Hebei, from before the blade of Japanese imperialism, and the soldiers of the reorganized 19th Route Army harbor anti-imperialist sentiments and discontent—these are precisely favorable conditions for our revolutionary work. The Northeast Army and the Shaanxi-Gansu forces lack experience in fighting the main Red Army. The enemy is generally far from their military-strategic and political-military centers. All these factors provide us with favorable conditions to defeat the enemy one by one through flexible maneuver and to win major victories.

c. Regarding the conditions of the resident population, in this region, due to successive years of uninterrupted deep agricultural crisis, famine, heavy taxes, and land concentration, the preconditions for a great peasant revolution are rapidly maturing, and peasant struggles and guerrilla movements against taxes and for land have already unfolded. This enables us, among the basic Han masses locally, to provide organization and leadership to these spontaneous peasant struggles, raise their level of consciousness, and lead them onto the path of Soviet revolution, while also facilitating the expansion and growth of the Red Army. This will give great impetus and impetus to the movements for national liberation and the establishment of their own people’s republics among the non-Han masses (Hui, Mongol, Tibetan) residing in and adjacent to this region, and through our assistance, initiation, and leadership, we can rapidly win over these movements and merge them into the mighty tide of the Soviets.

d. Regarding material conditions, this region is a comparatively wealthy area in the Northwest, capable of ensuring the material supply needs of our existing and continuously expanding forces.

(3) In order to realize this strategic decision, the present campaign is a crucial juncture of decisive significance. Any negligence or misstep in the present campaign will make the realization of the entire strategic plan difficult, or even lead to its failure. Therefore, in the present campaign, we must strive to control the Tao River, first of all the area on its eastern bank, and smash the enemy’s plan for a Lanzhou-Songpan blockade line, so as to place ourselves in a favorable position for maneuver and facilitate the continued defeat of the enemy. Concentrating the maximum main forces on this main direction, resolute and daring combat, and flexible and ingenious maneuver are the guarantees for victory in this campaign. The opportunist capitulation to difficulties and the choice of the path of least resistance will not only forfeit victory in this campaign but also render the realization of the strategy impossible.

(4) The Political Bureau holds that at present it is inappropriate and extremely disadvantageous to cross the Yellow River westward with our main forces and penetrate deep into the remote regions of Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang[1] (however, the Political Bureau does not reject, and deems it necessary, to dispatch a detachment to operate in this region), because:

a. The national liberation struggles of the non-Han nationalities (the Hui, Mongol, and Tibetan nationalities) are brewing and developing, but the total and prolonged penetration of this region by the Han Red Army will inevitably give rise to misunderstandings, ill-feeling, and even hostile attitudes among these nationalities—which, under conditions of difficulty in grain and supply, will become more acute. The Party’s basic policy in the national movement should be to arouse the mass national liberation struggles from below, and absolutely not to impose forced Sovietization.

b. This action objectively exactly suits the enemy’s demands. The enemy is exerting full pressure to force us into disadvantageous regions, while he can construct overlapping blockade lines and blockhouses along the Yellow River, preventing our subsequent development toward China proper and cutting off our links with other Soviet areas, the Red Army, and the national revolutionary movement. This disadvantageous situation will inevitably arise so long as we have not yet militarily and politically guaranteed the overcoming of blockhouse blockades.

c. The natural and material conditions are unfavorable. If large Red Army forces operate in this region for a long period, they will encounter enormous difficulties.

It is evident that if we presently adopt this policy, it will cause the Soviets and the Red Army to suffer losses and will restrict their development. Therefore, the Political Bureau holds that adopting this policy at present is mistaken and is a dangerous retreat policy. The political source of this policy is Right opportunism, which fears the enemy, exaggerates the enemy’s strength, and loses confidence in our own strength and in victory.

The Political Bureau calls upon all Party members and Red commanders and fighters, with Bolshevik firmness and with the unique valor of the workers’ and peasants’ Red Army, to unite under the Central Committee’s line, annihilate the enemy, realize the Sovietization of Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu, and establish a solid and unshakable foundation for Soviet China.

[1] Referring to Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.