I. The Current Situation and Its Characteristics

The further imperialist aggression against China, particularly the Japanese imperialist occupation of North China and the de facto creation of a "North China State," the deepening of the total collapse of the national economy, the floods and droughts afflicting the entire country, and the breakdown and devastation of the rural economy have created a gravely serious political situation in China. The reactionary rule of the Kuomintang cannot eliminate or temporarily weaken the fundamental causes of the Chinese revolution; on the contrary, it has further intensified them. The Kuomintang’s rule is weakening and collapsing.

The revolutionary struggles of the worker and peasant masses in the White areas persist. Although many of these struggles often display a spontaneous character and large-scale mass struggles of a nationwide nature have not yet erupted widely, such struggles are universally latent, creating a situation in which great events will soon occur.

Although the Soviet revolutionary movement has suffered partial losses because several Soviet areas in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River have temporarily become guerrilla zones, extensive guerrilla warfare continues to be tenaciously maintained in these areas. The Red Army along the Hunan-Jiangxi border and the Fujian coast has won many victories. After smashing one column of Chen Quzhen, the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps have now wiped out another column under Zhang Zhenhan, consolidating their original Soviet base areas. The vigorous activities of the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth, and Twenty-Ninth Red Armies in the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu provinces, and especially the joining of the two main forces—the First and Fourth Front Armies—in northwestern Sichuan, have created prospects for tremendous victories in the development of the Chinese Soviet movement in the Northwest. All this shows that the revolutionary situation in China still exists and proves that the Soviet revolution has not declined but continues to develop.

With unprecedented hatred and frenzy, the Kuomintang is attacking the revolutionary struggles of the worker and peasant masses in the White areas, particularly the Soviet revolution. The absolute weakening of the Kuomintang’s reactionary ruling power drives it with even greater zeal to further sell out China and, under the direct command of the imperialists, to assault the Soviet revolution. The development of the First and Fourth Front Armies in the Northwest is causing the warlords of North China to participate even more directly and actively in the struggle to encircle and attack the Soviet areas and the Red Army. To pursue us methodically, intercept us, and especially block us in an attempt to wear down our effective strength, to use blockhouse tactics to seal us off, to force us into unfavorable territory, and then to seek a decisive battle with our main forces—this is the basic strategic policy of Chiang Kai-shek’s counterrevolution.

However, the enemy is encountering great difficulties in its offensive against us: the troops are far from the military, political, and economic centers; transportation is inconvenient; supply is difficult; there is internal disunity and conflict; troops are depleted, exhausted, suffering from cold and hunger, and becoming increasingly dissatisfied and prone to defeatism; and financial expenditures are proving unprecedentedly insufficient. On the other hand, the revolutionary struggles of the people throughout the country, the development of Soviet areas and the Red Army in various regions, and especially the joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies have greatly inspired the toiling worker and peasant masses across China, strengthening their confidence in the victory of the revolution. As a result of the joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies, the exchange of revolutionary war experience, and the unification of command, the combat effectiveness of the Red Army has increased not only in quantity but also in quality. The activities of the First and Fourth Front Armies in northwestern China will greatly promote the struggles of the minority nationalities in the Northwest against imperialism and the Kuomintang, further sharpen the agrarian revolutionary struggle in the vast northwestern region, and enormously expand the influence of the Communist Party, the Soviets, and the Red Army. At the same time, China’s northwestern provinces are the areas where the forces of China’s reactionary rule and imperialism are weakest, and geographically they are close to the Soviet Union, the motherland of the world’s proletariat, and the Mongolian People’s Republic. This further creates favorable conditions for the development of the Soviets and the Red Army. The correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its appropriate strategic and tactical policies make us firmly confident that we can certainly completely smash the enemy’s offensive against us and create and consolidate a Soviet base area in the Northwest.

II. The Basic Task After the Joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies

After the joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies, the armed forces of the Soviet revolution have been greatly strengthened, and prospects for great victories in the Soviet revolution have unfolded. On June 18, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee resolved: "After the joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies, our strategic policy is to concentrate our main forces and advance northward, to annihilate large numbers of the enemy in mobile warfare, first to capture southern Gansu, so as to create a Soviet base area in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu, place the Chinese Soviet movement on a more solid and broader foundation, and strive for victory in China’s northwestern provinces and ultimately throughout the whole of China." This resolution is undoubtedly correct.

The creation of a Soviet base area in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu is the historic task confronting the First and Fourth Front Armies. The establishment of this base area will not only serve as a rear area for Red Army operations but also become the territory of a Soviet state that advances and develops the entire Chinese revolution. Its existence will encourage the oppressed toiling worker and peasant masses throughout China to rise up and struggle against imperialism and the Kuomintang. Its exemplary role will show the people throughout the country the path to political and economic liberation. It will be a nucleus that unites all revolutionary forces in China and a source from which the seeds of revolution can be spread throughout the entire country.

The fundamental and crucial responsibility of the Red Army is to create such a base area in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu and the vast northwestern region. Completely smashing the encirclement and blockade by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and annihilating large numbers of the enemy’s effective forces are the prerequisite for creating this base area. It is impossible to create a new Soviet area peacefully. Only by devoting all efforts and sacrifices to winning the revolutionary war and subordinating all interests to the supreme interest of the revolutionary war can we create a Soviet base area in the Northwest and achieve the victory of the Soviets throughout China.

To establish a consolidated Soviet base area, we must deepen the peasant agrarian struggle and thoroughly resolve the land question. We must go through the stage of revolutionary committees to establish genuine Soviet power of the workers and peasants. We must universally establish people’s self-defense armed forces such as the Red Guards, Young Pioneers, independent divisions, regiments, and guerrilla units. We must severely suppress counterrevolutionaries. In order to transform counterrevolutionary-ruled areas into truly revolutionary Soviet areas, we must persistently carry out all the policies mentioned above.

III. Strengthening Party Leadership in the Red Army

To fulfill the historic task of creating a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet area, we must further strengthen the Party’s absolute leadership within the First and Fourth Front Armies and elevate the prestige of the Party Central Committee in the Red Army. The Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army grew and developed under the sole, absolute leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Without the Communist Party of China, there would be no Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and no Soviet revolutionary movement.

After the joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies, some individual comrades in the Red Army, seeing the Central Soviet Area transformed into guerrilla zones, the reduction in the strength of the First Front Army, and errors and weaknesses in certain Party work, have come to believe that the political line of the Party Central Committee is incorrect. This view is entirely erroneous. However, the Political Bureau holds that the Party should provide clear explanation and education to those individual comrades who are uncomprehending or skeptical.

The Fifth Plenary Session (held in January 1934) clearly stated in its resolution: "After the Fourth Plenary Session, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, under the conditions reported, has faithfully carried out the line of the Comintern and the Fourth Plenary Session, persistently struggled against all opportunist tendencies and vacillations, smashed various brands of opportunism, and initiated a thorough transformation of all Party work in practical work, achieving many important successes and victories." Ideologically, it pointed out: "Since the Fourth Plenary Session, the Party has steeled itself in resolute two-line struggle, achieving ideological Bolshevik firmness and unity, and finally embarking on the path of Bolshevization." It must be pointed out that the resolution of the Fifth Plenary Session received the endorsement of the Comintern.

The Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau in Zunyi reiterated that the political line of the Party Central Committee is correct: Based on its correct assessment, the Party Central Committee set forth the specific tasks for opposing the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign. The arduous year-and-a-half-long struggle against the "encirclement and suppression" proved that the political line of the Party Central Committee is undoubtedly correct. In particular, the Party organizations in the Central Soviet Area, under the direct leadership of the Central Committee, achieved unprecedented success in mobilizing the broad masses to participate in the revolutionary war. The Enlarged Meeting also pointed out that the main reason the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign could not be smashed within the Central Soviet Area, forcing the main Red Army forces to withdraw and leading to losses, was that the Party committed the error of pure defense militarily. This military error was, for the general political line of the Party Central Committee as a whole, an isolated error; and even for the person primarily responsible for it, it was not an error of the entire political line but a partial, serious error.

After the Zunyi Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau corrected the Party Central Committee's military errors, the military leadership has undoubtedly been entirely correct. Consequently, the First Front Army has won many great victories since the Zunyi Meeting and fulfilled the strategic policy predetermined by the Party Central Committee.

We must make every comrade clearly understand: Whether the Party's general line is correct depends upon whether the Party has correctly evaluated the many basic questions of the Chinese revolution, whether it has correctly assessed the current situation, and whether it has correctly put forward and carried out the various tasks in tactics and strategy. The question of military command is one among these many questions. If the Party is basically correct in the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution, that is, Marxist-Leninist, yet commits an error in military affairs for a certain period, then this error is only a partial error for the Party, though it is a serious political error.

Regarding the reasons for the reduction in the strength of the First Front Army, the Party fully developed self-criticism throughout the whole Party at the Zunyi Meeting. The Party did not conceal in the slightest the errors it had committed. Although there has been great improvement in military command after the Zunyi Meeting, it is beyond question that certain weaknesses still exist in practical work. What should be particularly pointed out here is the weakness of political work in the units. In particular, the General Political Department did not do everything possible to provide timely guidance and impetus to the lower-level political departments, resulting in the latter not receiving strong leadership. The struggle against Right deviation was not developed on a large scale. After the joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies, the opportunity was not seized to timely consolidate the First Front Army.

Obviously, it is incorrect to misinterpret a partial error of the Party as a total error, to misinterpret certain weaknesses in the Party's practical work as errors in the line, and to fail to give due recognition to the unprecedented great cause the Party has accomplished. Therefore, the Party must promptly explain and correct such misunderstandings, so that all Party members and Red Army commanders and fighters unite as one around the Party Central Committee. This is the guarantee for future victory.

IV. Fraternal Unity Between the First and Fourth Front Armies

The fraternal unity of the First and Fourth Front Armies is an essential condition for fulfilling the historic task of creating a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet area and establishing the Chinese Soviet Republic. Any tendency, whether deliberate or inadvertent, to undermine the unity and solidarity of the First and Fourth Front Armies is harmful to the Red Army and beneficial to the enemy.

Certain individual problems that have currently arisen within the First and Fourth Front Armies are primarily due to insufficient mutual understanding and the lack of a correct assessment of the two Front Armies.

The 18,000-li Long March of the First Front Army is an unprecedented great undertaking in Chinese history. Encircled, pursued, intercepted, and blocked by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang armies of seven or eight provinces, enduring a long march entirely without rest, experiencing untold hardships, hunger, and cold, yet all the commanders and fighters of the First Front Army, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Military Council, with consistent and astonishing heroism and determination, fought countless bloody battles against the enemy, broke through the enemy's encirclement, shattered his pursuit, interception, and blocking operations, wiped out many units of Chiang Kai-shek and other warlords, and crossed the natural barriers of the Xiang River, Wu River, Jinsha River, and Dadu River, finally achieving the predetermined objective of joining forces with the Fourth Front Army, thereby completely foiling the plans of Chiang Kai-shek and others to attack us.

However, this in no way denies the losses the First Front Army suffered during the 18,000-li Long March. After leaving the Central Soviet Area, during this period (ten months), the First Front Army suffered considerable reduction not only in numbers (the errors in military leadership before the Zunyi Meeting bear the greatest responsibility) but also in quality, due to physical fatigue, lack of rest time, and, even more so, the lack of thoroughness in political work. This is manifested in laxness of unit organization, weakening of discipline, the partial growth of guerrilla-ism and warlord habits, and the development among some cadres of weariness, irresponsibility, and Right-leaning pessimism, despair, and corresponding thoughts. This has led to a considerable weakening of the units' combat effectiveness. Failure to see these weaknesses of the First Front Army, or exaggerating them and failing to analyze their sources, will inevitably lead to either a "Left" or a Right assessment of the First Front Army. A "Left" assessment may conceal the passivity in the practical work that is currently necessary to consolidate the units, intensify the struggle against Right deviation, and strictly enforce discipline. A Right assessment may lead to a lack of confidence in the strength of the First Front Army. Comrades of the First Front Army should exert their utmost efforts to consolidate their units, learn from the Fourth Front Army's bravery and skill in battle, and firmly believe that so long as they obtain a reasonable period of rest and reorganization, supplementation, and expansion, they can certainly make great progress, and they must never be discouraged by the current considerable reduction in numbers and partial losses. Comrades of the Fourth Front Army should give the First Front Army the most sincere and fraternal assistance.

The Party leadership of the Fourth Front Army was fundamentally correct in its basic line and implemented the line of the Communist International and the Central Committee following the Fourth Plenary Session. It was precisely because of this that a powerful and steadfast Red Fourth Front Army was created, achieving great victories in numerous battles and establishing the E-Yu-Wan and Nanba Soviet areas. The Fourth Front Army is valiant and adept in combat, unafraid of hardship, enduring toil, obedient to orders, and disciplined in observing regulations, along with many other distinctive strengths—most notably, its vigorous offensive spirit and fighting morale within the troops, which the First Front Army should now learn from. However, the Fourth Front Army must never become complacent over this but should further enhance its own strengths and absorb the rich experience of the First Front Army in aspects of strategy and tactics as well as Red Army construction, in order to achieve even greater progress and become an ironclad workers’ and peasants’ Red Army.

It is imperative that every comrade of the First and Fourth Front Armies understand that both are integral parts of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and are under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Among us there exists only class-based fraternity and mutual assistance, with no divisions or antagonisms. Only in this way can the unity and solidarity of the First and Fourth Front Armies be consolidated and enduring, enabling them to merge into one cohesive force to annihilate the enemy.

V. On the Basic Party Guidelines Toward Ethnic Minorities

The convergence of the First and Fourth Front Armies is taking place in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities such as the Fan and Yi peoples. As the Red Army operates in China’s northwestern territories in the future, it will invariably remain in close contact with ethnic minorities everywhere. Therefore, winning over the ethnic minorities under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Soviet Government is of decisive significance for the victorious future of the Chinese revolution.

The fundamental guideline of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Soviet Government toward ethnic minorities is to unconditionally recognize their right to national self-determination, that is, their political freedom to separate at will from the oppressor nation, namely the Han nationality. The Communist Party of China and the Chinese Soviet Government shall, in practical terms, support their movements for national independence and liberation, oppose imperialism and the Kuomintang, and oppose their internal traitors, collaborators, local officials, lamas, and their own exploiting classes.

Taking into account the degree of class differentiation and the conditions of socio-economic development among the ethnic minorities, we cannot everywhere adopt the Soviet form to organize national political power. Among some ethnic groups, during the initial stages of struggle, there may exist the possibility of a national united front apart from a small number of upper-class elements. In such circumstances, the forms of people’s republics and people’s revolutionary governments may be adopted. Among other ethnic groups, or during deeper stages of class struggle, the forms of organizing workers’ and peasants’ Soviets or labor Soviets may be employed. Generally, organizing Soviets under the workers’ and peasants’ democratic dictatorship is not appropriate.

Before the convergence of the First and Fourth Front Armies, the Fourth Front Army achieved considerable results in helping the Fan people organize guerrilla forces, in establishing revolutionary political power, and in initiating class struggle within the Fan people. However, currently establishing a Northwestern Soviet Federal Government is premature. This is because, at present, the fundamental guideline toward ethnic minorities should first assist their independence movements and establish their independent states. The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic should openly call upon the Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, and other ethnic groups to rise up and struggle for the establishment of their own independent states, and provide concrete, practical assistance to such struggles. After they have established independent states, it will then be possible—and indeed appropriate—to form, based on the principle of their voluntariness, a genuine Chinese Soviet federation of ethnic equality and national unity together with the Chinese Soviet Republic. Only at such a time will the strategy of federation be correct.

On many other issues, the theories and methods of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin on the national question serve as our most reliable weapons for resolving problems concerning ethnic minorities. Only by adhering to these theories and methods can we maintain a clear guideline and line in our work. Studying Marx’s, Lenin’s, and Stalin’s theories and methods on the national question is an urgent task for our entire Party at present.

VI. Present Core Tasks

To create the new Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet area, our present core tasks should be:

(1) Immediately carry out propaganda and agitation within the First and Fourth Front Armies to elevate the troops’ fighting morale, confidence in victory, and spirit of enduring hardship, preparing to annihilate large numbers of the current enemy and achieve complete victory in all campaigns of the northward strategic advance, thereby realizing the strategic policy of the Party Central Committee.

(2) Utilize and seize the time to reorganize the troops, conduct military and political education and training, in order to strengthen the combat effectiveness of the forces.

(3) To reinforce the Party’s leadership in the Red Army, it is essential to further solidify the political commissar system, strengthen Party organizations and the work of political departments within the Red Army, and deepen the focus of political work into companies and Party branches.

(4) Greatly enhance and tighten discipline within the First Front Army; strict measures must be adopted to ensure the enforcement of discipline. At the same time, comrades of the Fourth Front Army must understand that Red Army discipline rests primarily not on coercion but on class consciousness, greatly fostering a spirit of class fraternity and submission to discipline among Party members and between Red Army commanders and fighters.

(5) Intensify basic class education for all Party members and Red Army commanders and fighters, enabling them to remain resolute and unwaveringly struggle for the Soviet revolution to the end under all kinds of complex and changing circumstances. Establish Red Army universities and senior Party schools to train large numbers of military and political cadres.

(6) Work among the Fan people must undergo a swift transformation. The General Political Department should collect experiences and lessons from Fan-area work across various regions to educate its cadres. Employ all methods to persuade the Fan masses to return home, organize Fan guerrilla units, launch Fan people’s struggles, and establish Fan revolutionary governments. It is essential to select a portion of outstanding Fan individuals and provide them with class and national education to cultivate their own cadres. After the main forces of the Red Army arrive in regions such as Gansu, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Ningxia, even greater efforts must be directed toward the Hui and Mongol peoples.

(7) Extensive work in White areas, primarily in adjacent White areas, should now begin in a planned manner. Launching the struggles and guerrilla warfare of the broad worker and peasant masses in White areas, responding to and coordinating with the actions of the Red Army, and creating guerrilla zones and new Soviet areas are our urgent tasks at present. The Party Central Committee must utilize all means to strengthen Party leadership in the White areas of the three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu. At the same time, concerning struggles in central cities, industrial areas, and rural regions of the lower Yangtze River basin, as well as northern, southern, and southwestern China, efforts must be vigorously strengthened in terms of organizational and leading capacity on the basis of past work and within the new favorable environment.

(8) Work among the soldiers of the White armies must begin immediately to disintegrate the Kuomintang forces. Local White army work committees must extensively [XXX] work groups with [XXX] materials ([XXX] slogans) and simple directives suited to the current environment, so that every Red Army commander and fighter understands the work of disintegrating White armies [XXXX] department, the importance of this work, and how to carry out White army work. (As in the original manuscript)

(9) The work of the Military Affairs Commissions of Sichuan-Xikang Province and Ningxia Province must be strengthened, enabling us to truly centralize the leadership of local and guerrilla warfare. These regions must become a part of the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet area. After the Red Army reaches northern Shaanxi, even greater efforts must be made to establish and strengthen local [XXX] work.

(10) Establish an organizational system of the Security Bureau and intensify the struggle against counterrevolution.

(11) Recruit the best cadres from the Fourth Front Army Party to participate in the responsible work of the Party Central Committee and other military and political organs.

(12) Adopt necessary measures to strengthen leadership over other Soviet areas and guerrilla zones, enabling the actions of all aspects to achieve better mutual response and coordination.

VII. The Prospects of Victory for the Soviet Revolution and the Two-Line Struggle

In the process of creating the new Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet area, we will inevitably encounter many difficulties. The enemy will not relax against us; they will surely intensify their combat strength to launch offensives against us. At the same time, high mountains, great rivers, and grasslands... will undoubtedly bring us many hardships. Nonetheless, so long as we implement the line of the Party Central Committee and bring forth our creative spirit, we can overcome these difficulties.

Within the troops, we must resolutely combat all forms of right-wing opportunistic wavering. Such wavering arises from an overestimation of the enemy’s strength—exaggerating the enemy’s power while failing to see the weakening of the enemy’s internal forces—and simultaneously from an underestimation of ourselves. This wavering manifests concretely in doubts about the strategic policy determined by the Party Central Committee, a lack of courage to advance boldly, and an attempt to avoid the enemy by withdrawing from battle, a lack of confidence in creating new base areas, fear of the difficulties in work among ethnic minorities, and a lack of resolve to carry out arduous work among the ethnic minorities. This wavering manifests concretely in a distrust of the strength of the First and Fourth Front Armies, a failure to understand the great significance of their convergence, and even a fundamental doubt about the combat effectiveness of one’s own troops. This wavering manifests concretely in expressions of pessimism and despair, passivity, irresponsibility, and self-abandonment when encountering certain difficulties. It further manifests in incorrect assessments of the current situation, doubts about the existence of the revolutionary situation, and inferences of a downturn in the Soviet movement, leading to pessimism and despair about the revolutionary prospects.

These right-wing opportunistic waverings clearly exist within the troops and are partially growing. This poses the greatest danger to the task of creating base areas. Launching the struggle against right-wing opportunism is one of the central tasks at present. In this struggle, it is essential to carefully explain to every Party member and Red Army commander and fighter the current situation and the prospects of our victory, convincing them that although the Soviet revolution now confronts some difficulties, the Soviet revolution is bound to triumph. The struggle against erroneous tendencies must be closely linked with the transformation of the most concrete and practical work. The struggle against counterrevolution must be intensified alongside the struggle against erroneous tendencies, opposing any leniency or tolerance toward counterrevolutionary activities.

In the struggle against right-wing deviations, we must not for a moment relax our guard against "Left"-leaning empty talk. This "Left" deviation manifests concretely in substituting "bragging" for a correct analysis of the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. Consequently, it still results in an excessively "Left" assessment of the current situation, the outcome of which leads either to reckless adventurism in underestimating the enemy or to veiling one’s own fear of the enemy, which is the essence of "Right" opportunism.

The Party must use Marxism-Leninism to educate our Party members and Red Army commanders and fighters, calmly assessing the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and the current situation. Only such a correct assessment can enable us to correctly formulate the Party’s tasks and slogans. Marxists-Leninists uphold truth and oppose deception.

Since the primary aim of the two-line struggle is to educate all Party members and Red Army commanders and fighters to fulfill the historical tasks they bear with all their efforts and sacrifices, only for the incurable opportunists does the Party hesitantly resort to disciplinary sanctions.

The tasks before us are arduous, but we are confident that under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Military Affairs Commission, the First and Fourth Front Armies will be able to accomplish these tasks, create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Northwestern Soviet area, and achieve the victory of the Soviet revolution throughout China.