Issues Concerning the Work of the Fourth Front Red Army[1]

(July 21, 1935)

Regarding the Fourth Front Red Army, starting from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area, with respect to the expansion and consolidation of the Red Army, the development and consolidation of the two Soviet areas, and the countless defeats inflicted on the enemy, on the whole the line has not been problematic, but there have been shortcomings and errors. Shortcomings in military command will be discussed separately by the Military Commission. When smashing the enemy’s fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign in Hubei-Henan-Anhui, there was insufficient preparation, no readiness to fight, and the fighting was poorly conducted. In Tongnanba, after repelling Liu Xiang’s troops, abandoning the area following victory was a serious error.

The leadership of the Fourth Front Red Army exhibited deficiencies and errors in establishing political power, failing to strictly understand the close relationship between establishing political power and building the Red Army. The proposal of a Northwest Federal Government was erroneous both organizationally and theoretically.

[1] On July 21 and 22, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting at Luhua to discuss issues concerning the work of the Fourth Front Red Army. The meeting heard a report by Zhang Guotao on the Fourth Front Red Army’s struggle against the enemy and the strategic principles for countering “encirclement and suppression” campaigns in the two Soviet areas of Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Tongnanba. This is part of Mao Zedong’s speech at the meeting.

Photograph

The former site of Mao Zedong’s residence at Mao’ergai.