The CPC Central Committee’s Resolution on Summing Up the Struggle Against the Enemy’s Five “Encirclement and Suppression” Campaigns — After hearing Comrade X’s report on the summary of the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns and Comrade XX’s supplementary report, the expanded Politburo meeting concluded that Comrade X’s report was fundamentally incorrect.  (1) In the Party Central Committee’s resolution concerning the enemy’s five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, it had clearly pointed out that these campaigns represented an even more brutal offensive by imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries against the Soviet revolutionary movement.
At the same time, it also noted that within this intense class showdown, the internal weaknesses of imperialism and the Kuomintang, coupled with a new intensification of the revolutionary situation, led to a favorable shift in the balance of class forces domestically, resulting in the correct conclusion that “during the five ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaigns, we possessed all the conditions for achieving decisive victory more fully than ever before” (July 20, 1933 Central Committee Resolution). However, in his report, Comrade X excessively exaggerated objective difficulties, attributing the failure to crush the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns in the central Soviet area solely to the overwhelming strength of imperialist and Kuomintang reactionary forces, while simultaneously underestimating the current revolutionary situation.
This inevitably led to the opportunist conclusion that the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns could never be defeated.  (2) Based on its own accurate assessment, the Party Central Committee formulated specific tasks for resisting the enemy’s five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
A year-and-a-half of arduous struggle against these campaigns undeniably proved the correctness of the Party Central Committee’s political line.
Particularly under the direct leadership of the Central Committee, the Party organizations in the central Soviet area achieved unprecedented success in mobilizing broad masses of workers and peasants to participate in the revolutionary war.
The campaign to expand the Red Army became a mass upsurge.
Activists from among the workers and peasants were mobilized to take up arms at the front lines, totaling over 100,000 individuals, thereby greatly expanding the size of the Red Army.
Model Young Communist Leagues began to serve as a standing reserve force for the Red Army, and mass armed organizations of the Young Communist Leagues experienced tremendous development.
Under the slogan “Everything for Victory at the Front,” the Party successfully met the Red Army’s needs for finances, food, and all other material supplies.
The deepening of class struggle within the Soviet areas, the economic construction of the Soviets, and the thorough improvement of relations between the Soviet government and the masses further stimulated the enthusiasm and initiative of the broad masses to join the revolutionary struggle.
All of these factors created highly favorable conditions for completely crushing the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns; however, in his report, Comrade X clearly underestimated these very favorable conditions.
Such underestimation likewise inevitably resulted in the conclusion that we were incapable of defeating the “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.  (3) It should be pointed out that there remain many serious shortcomings in our work… The Party’s leadership over the broad masses of workers and peasants in the White Areas in their anti-imperialist and anti-Kuomintang struggles, as well as in their daily struggles, has yet to show significant progress.
The development of guerrilla warfare and the work of undermining the morale of the Nationalist army soldiers remain weak.
Furthermore, the mutual coordination and cooperation among the various Soviet-area Red Armies under a unified strategic command are still inadequate.
These weaknesses undoubtedly affected the operations to resist the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns and constituted major reasons why those campaigns could not be crushed.
Nevertheless, it would be entirely wrong to assume that the existence of these weaknesses is the fundamental reason why the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns could not be defeated.
Yet, in both his report and conclusions, Comrade X exaggerated these shortcomings in our work and made fundamentally erroneous assessments regarding military leadership and strategy, without acknowledging or admitting them.
As a result, we have been unable to understand where exactly the failure lies—why our main Red Army forces had no choice but to leave the central Soviet area and why we were unable to crush the “encirclement and suppression” campaigns within that very area.
This concealment has masked the disastrous consequences stemming from our erroneous strategic and tactical lines in military leadership.
No matter how brave and capable the Red Army may be, no matter how exemplary the rear services, and no matter how strong the support of the broad masses, if we fail to employ correct strategies and tactics in our military leadership, then securing decisive victory in war remains impossible.
The fundamental reason why the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns could not be crushed in the central Soviet area lies precisely here.  (4) After suffering defeat in the previous four “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, Chiang Kai-shek and his imperialist military advisors within the Kuomintang realized that engaging us in combat inside the Soviet areas using a “long-range thrust” strategy would be extremely disadvantageous.
Therefore, during the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, they adopted a strategy of protracted warfare combined with fortress warfare, aiming to gradually deplete our living forces and material resources, tighten the encirclement around our Soviet areas, and ultimately seek a decisive battle to annihilate our main forces.
Under such circumstances, our strategic line ought to have been one of active defense—concentrating superior forces, selecting the enemy’s weak points, and decisively destroying portions or even large segments of the enemy through mobile warfare, thus systematically dismantling the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaign.
However, in the course of resisting the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, we instead adopted a purely defensive posture (or even a strictly static defense), replacing mobile warfare with positional and fortress warfare, and supporting this purely defensive strategic line with the so-called tactic of “short, sharp assaults.”
Consequently, the enemy’s strategy of protracted warfare and fortress warfare succeeded in achieving its objectives: our main Red Army suffered certain losses and was forced to withdraw from its base in the central Soviet area.
It must be emphasized that this approach stands in stark contrast to the fundamental principles of strategic and tactical action required for the Red Army to secure victory.  (5) At the present stage of the Chinese civil war, given that we have yet to witness large-scale uprisings by urban workers or mutinies among Nationalist troops, that our Red Army remains severely understrength, that our Soviet areas still constitute only a small portion of China, that we lack specialized weaponry such as aircraft and artillery, and that we are engaged in interior-line warfare—when the enemy launches attacks and conducts “encirclement and suppression” campaigns against us—the proper strategic line for us is, indeed, to adopt a defensive posture that seeks to transition into counterattack rather than mere passive defense.
While pure defense can indeed weaken the enemy to some extent and allow us to hold onto territory for a time, it cannot ultimately crush the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns or secure final victory.
Only by transitioning from defense to counterattack—at both the operational and strategic levels—and launching offensives to achieve decisive victories, thereby massively eliminating the enemy’s living forces, can we truly defeat the enemy, safeguard our Soviet areas, and advance the Soviet revolutionary movement.
Under this strategic framework, when we have not yet identified or exploited the enemy’s vulnerabilities, we should not immediately engage the attacking enemy in battles where victory is uncertain.
Instead, we ought to use secondary forces—such as guerrilla units, mass armed groups, independent battalions and regiments, and portions of the main Red Army—to distract or lure the enemy on multiple fronts.
Primarily, mobile warfare should be employed to contain the enemy, while the main forces retreat to a safe distance or move to the enemy’s flanks and rear, quietly assembling in preparation for seizing a favorable opportunity to strike.
In interior-line warfare, when the enemy advances with overwhelming superiority, the Red Army’s retreat and concealment can exhaust the enemy, induce arrogance and carelessness, leading to mistakes and exposing weaknesses—precisely the conditions necessary for launching a successful counterattack and securing decisive victory.
It is imperative to carefully analyze and assess the enemy situation so as to deploy our forces appropriately and at the right moment.
We must avoid needlessly mobilizing our forces and entering into combat simply because the enemy is provoking us or staging feints, which only serves to exhaust ourselves and squander opportunities to achieve decisive victories in specific directions.
To secure victory, when the enemy advances according to its plan, we do not need to block its path directly; rather, we should allow it to approach to a suitable distance and then encircle and destroy it—essentially luring the enemy deeper.
For the sake of ultimate victory, we must be prepared to temporarily relinquish portions of Soviet territory, and even have our main forces temporarily leave their Soviet bases, knowing full well that once we eliminate the enemy and crush its “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, we will not only reclaim the lost territories but also expand the boundaries of the Soviet areas.
All of these measures are intended to enable the Red Army to actively and favorably respond to enemy attacks and “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, thereby avoiding passivity and adverse outcomes.
However, during the five campaigns, these principles were consistently disregarded.
The Comintern was absolutely correct in its telegram dated November last year: “It seems that, at present, the plans and steps adopted by the military command are almost invariably dictated by the enemy.
The enemy constantly provokes us, forcing us to make unnecessary reorganizations of our forces.
As a result, our forces, due to constant reshuffling, are unable to participate effectively in combat.
We believe that we should defeat the enemy wherever we have already secured certain victories, rather than attempting to defeat the enemy simultaneously across the entire front.”
Those who advocated a purely defensive stance were unable to comprehend this instruction from the Comintern; consequently, this mindset persisted not only prior to November last year but continued until the main Red Army withdrew from the Soviet areas.
By willingly placing themselves in a passive position, proponents of pure defense neither sought nor attempted to defeat the enemy simultaneously across all fronts; instead, they merely aimed to prevent the enemy from advancing on every front.
The slogan “Not a single inch of Soviet territory shall be yielded,” though politically correct, becomes entirely misguided when mechanically applied to military matters—especially at the strategic level—and serves only to mask the true nature of a purely defensive approach.  (6) To secure decisive victory, it is absolutely essential to pursue decisive engagements on the battlefield.
Given the current imbalance of forces, the enemy overwhelmingly outnumbers us, often deploying several times—even dozens of times—more troops than we do.
However, this does not necessarily pose a threat to us.
Because the enemy operates on the exterior line, adopting a strategy of encirclement and coordinated attacks from multiple directions, this creates opportunities for us to defeat the enemy piecemeal.
Operating on the interior line strategically allows us to benefit from what might otherwise be considered exterior-line operations—that is, using a portion of our forces to pin down one or several enemy axes while concentrating our main strength to encircle and annihilate another axis.
By employing this method to defeat the enemy in stages, we can effectively dismantle its “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Within the context of interior-line warfare, only by concentrating superior forces to launch exterior-line operations can the Red Army consistently maintain the initiative, whereas the enemy is compelled to adopt a passive stance, ultimately derailing its entire plan.
Unfortunately, leaders adhering to a purely defensive approach tended to disperse their forces widely—particularly among the three main corps—in order to resist the enemy’s advances on all fronts.
This fragmentation left our forces constantly in a weakened state, spread thin across the board, and made it exceedingly easy for the enemy to defeat us piecemeal.
During the five campaigns, numerous major battles—for example, the battles of Xunkou, Tuan Village, Jianning, and Wenfang—failed to yield decisive victories largely because our main forces were not concentrated.
The primary task assigned to the Red Army by advocates of pure defense was to halt the enemy’s advance and attempt to eliminate portions of it through “short, sharp assaults,” rather than striving to seize the initiative or achieve decisive victory.
As a result, the Red Army managed to eliminate only a minuscule number of enemy troops, and the Soviet areas ultimately fell victim to enemy ravages.  (7) Engaging in mobile warfare is precisely where our Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army excels.
From the very outset of the enemy’s five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns (October two years ago), the Comintern instructed us: “Our operations should not be conducted in a positional manner; instead, we ought to conduct mobile warfare on the enemy’s flanks.”
In a subsequent telegram dated November last year, the Comintern reiterated: “It is abundantly clear, based on past experience, that our units have already achieved numerous great victories in mobile warfare, whereas they have been unable to succeed in direct assaults against the enemy’s fortified positions.”
These instructions from the Comintern are entirely correct.
Although, under the enemy’s fortress-based strategy during the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, we did not have the same opportunities to launch large-scale mobile operations as we did during the first, second, third, and fourth campaigns when the enemy advanced rapidly, the potential for mobile warfare nevertheless remained.
In fact, this was repeatedly demonstrated in battles such as Xunkou, Tuan Village, General Hall, Jianning, Hubang, and Wenfang—especially during the 19th Route Army Incident.
However, due to fear of the enemy’s fortress strategy and Comrade Hua’s theory of “short, sharp assaults,” we shifted from mobile warfare to positional warfare during the fifth campaign.
This positional approach, however, benefited only the enemy and was profoundly detrimental to the current state of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army.
Attacking enemy fortifications should be categorically rejected under current technological conditions.
Such actions may only be justified in cases where the fortification is poorly constructed or isolated, in order to strike enemy reinforcement units or to disrupt enemy troop movements.
The frequent and reckless attempts to assault fortifications during the fifth campaign, which invariably yielded no results, are hardly surprising, as they reflect a cavalier attitude toward warfare.
The persistent underestimation of the potential for mobile warfare, coupled with a deliberate separation of the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign from the earlier first, second, third, and fourth campaigns, served to deny past experiences with mobile warfare, reject the tactic of luring the enemy into vulnerable positions for annihilation, and ultimately necessitate a refusal to follow the Comintern’s sound directives.
This was a natural consequence for those who championed pure defense and short, sharp assaults.  (8) Due to an overestimation of the importance of ritualistic formalities and an underestimation of the potential for mobile warfare, a theoretical framework emerged positing that victory could only begin at the tactical level—that only tactical victories could evolve into operational successes, which in turn would bring about strategic changes beneficial to us (as evidenced by Comrade Hua’s articles and letters from Comrades X and X addressed to Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai). There arose the notion that “under a fortress-based strategy, one can only achieve numerous small victories, never a resounding, sweeping triumph” (see Comrade X’s speech to the Politburo and Comrade X’s article in the Red Star Daily). Consequently, it was believed that only dispersing forces to resist and launching short, sharp assaults could effectively counter the fortress strategy.
All of these opportunistic strategic and tactical theories and practices prevalent during the revolutionary war utterly collapsed during the fifth campaign.
We cannot deny that fortress warfare introduced new difficulties in crushing the enemy’s five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns (though initially dismissed as empty leftist rhetoric, as seen in Comrade X’s article in the Red Star Daily); nor can we ignore the necessity of preparing the Red Army with appropriate technical means—such as aircraft and artillery—as well as, crucially, inciting uprisings among worker and peasant soldiers stationed within enemy fortifications to overcome future, even more formidable fortresses.
Nevertheless, under current conditions, fortress warfare can indeed be defeated.
Fortress warfare fatigues and disperses enemy forces, fostering their dependence on fortifications; once deprived of these fortifications, the enemy loses confidence in its ability to prevail.
Simultaneously, the enemy finds itself unable to advance toward us without relying on fortifications, nor can it construct sufficient fortifications nationwide to effectively restrict Red Army movements.
All of these factors create favorable conditions for overcoming fortress warfare.
Therefore, our Red Army’s approach to defeating fortress warfare remains rooted in mobile warfare—developing guerrilla operations along, before, and behind the enemy’s fortified lines to complement Red Army actions, as well as intensifying movements among Nationalist soldiers.
In essence, mobile warfare defeats fortress warfare by annihilating large contingents of enemy troops as they advance within fortified zones, while outside these zones, when the Red Army transitions to operate in open, unfortified terrain, it compels the enemy to abandon its fortifications and engage in mobile warfare alongside us.
As long as we skillfully, creatively, and flexibly apply the strategic and tactical principles of mobile warfare, we shall surely shatter the enemy’s fortress-based strategy.
Moreover, only sound strategic guidance can properly lead operational campaigns and effectively implement tactics to defeat fortress warfare and crush “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Pure defense and “short, sharp assaults,” which rely primarily on tactical acumen rather than sound strategic leadership, represent nothing more than capitulation to fortress warfare and are ultimately incapable of dismantling it.  (9) Regarding the issue of prolonged warfare versus swift decisive engagements, the understanding held by proponents of pure defense is equally flawed.
It must be clearly understood that the Chinese civil war is not a short-term conflict but rather a protracted, enduring struggle in which the Soviet revolution continuously develops and consolidates itself through repeated defeats of enemy “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Accordingly, under favorable conditions, we should wholeheartedly transition from defense to counterattack and offense, annihilating the enemy and crushing “encirclement and suppression” campaigns (as exemplified by the second, third, and fourth campaigns, as well as the Guangchang campaign prior to the fifth). Conversely, in unfavorable circumstances, we may temporarily retreat to preserve our living forces and later transition back to counterattack and offense when conditions improve (as observed after the Guangchang campaign of the fifth campaign). This constitutes the fundamental principle.
However, it is equally important to recognize another principle: in order to sustain a protracted war, we must strive for swift decisive engagements in every “encirclement and suppression” campaign and every battle.
This is because, under the current balance of power between ourselves and the enemy, adopting a protracted-war strategy for each “encirclement and suppression” campaign and every battle is highly detrimental to our interests.
When the enemy employs a protracted-war strategy against us (as in the case of the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign), we must counter with sound strategic guidance, disrupting the enemy’s plans and securing decisive victories within the limited timeframe available to us, thereby crushing the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Comparing our human, material, and armament resources with those of the Kuomintang (a practice known as “fighting the enemy through attrition,” as described in Comrade X’s article in the Red Star Daily) betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of protracted warfare.
In reality, we are at an absolute disadvantage in these respects, and such numerical comparisons only serve to reinforce the opposite conclusion: that protracted warfare offers us no prospect of victory.
Precisely because we must wage a protracted civil war while simultaneously pursuing swift decisive engagements in every “encirclement and suppression” campaign and every battle, we must carefully deliberate and formulate our strategic and operational plans.
The purely defensive strategy adopted during the fifth campaign was fundamentally flawed; under this erroneous strategy, numerous battles—including Maodingsan, Sanxifang, Pingliao, and Guangchang—were fought in similarly misguided ways, and the Red Army must avoid engaging in any battles where victory is uncertain.
Even if a particular engagement seemed justified at the time, we must promptly abandon it should circumstances subsequently turn against us.
Fomenting uprisings is a grave sin, and similarly, recklessly initiating battles is equally reprehensible.
Given the need to balance protracted warfare with swift decisive engagements, we must provide the Red Army with adequate rest, recuperation, and training—essential prerequisites for securing victory in war.
The claim that no rest or training was possible during the fifth campaign is unfounded; it merely reflects the inevitable conclusion reached by proponents of pure defense and short, sharp assaults.
Likewise, the notion that invigorating Red Army operations means subjecting them to ceaseless fighting without prioritizing rest and training is equally erroneous.
Without adequate rest and training, soldiers cannot perform at their best.
Furthermore, it is inappropriate to hastily establish numerous new division-level units before the main force has been sufficiently reinforced.
New units should only be created after the main force has been strengthened.
Deploying newly formed divisions composed entirely of inexperienced recruits to fight independently is unacceptable; such divisions should include veteran cadres and, whenever possible, be initially placed under the command of established units to cultivate combat experience.
Unnecessary, cumbersome, top-heavy organizational structures and equipment are likewise unsuitable; efforts should be made to keep deployments as lean as possible, reinforcing company-level units and strengthening leadership below the divisional level.
The coexistence of two opposing theoretical frameworks—one advocating for protracted warfare and the other for swift decisive engagements—is inherently contradictory and must be resolved.
To wage victorious battles, the Red Army’s unwavering spirit of sacrifice is absolutely essential—this is a hallmark of class-armament warfare and forms the foundation of revolutionary war victories.
Such sacrifices pave the way for triumph, yet they come at a cost.
This principle, however, does not apply to mindless, self-destructive fighting; only by preserving our living forces can we genuinely safeguard our Soviet areas.
Without a robust Red Army, the Soviet areas cannot be sustained.
With a strong Red Army, even if parts of a Soviet area are temporarily lost, they can ultimately be restored, and new Soviet areas can only be established with the support of a capable Red Army.
Under the principle of protracted warfare, we must guard against two potential pitfalls that may arise after successfully crushing the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns through counteroffensive operations: one is conservatism born out of fatigue and an overestimation of enemy strength.
This conservative mindset leads to complacency and inertia, preventing us from transitioning from counterattack to offense, annihilating more enemies, expanding Soviet areas, and strengthening the Red Army—effectively depriving us of the opportunity to prepare adequately for the next round of “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
The other is adventurism stemming from an overestimation of our own victories and an underestimation of enemy strength.
This adventurous spirit drives us to launch fruitless offensives (such as ill-considered or unnecessary attacks on central cities) and even causes previously won victories to be nullified or abandoned.
It also results in excessive sacrifices among Red Army personnel and the abandonment of critical tasks aimed at expanding the Red Army, developing Soviet regions strategically, and consolidating gains.
Ultimately, this prevents us from achieving the comprehensive preparations necessary to continue crushing the enemy’s subsequent “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Therefore, countering these two erroneous tendencies represents a grave challenge facing the Party in its strategic offensive endeavors—specifically, between the two “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Under the principle of swift decisive engagements, we must also address panic-driven reactions, imprudent initial strategic decisions, the misguided belief that a preemptive strike guarantees victory, or excuses such as “there isn’t enough time for thorough preparation,” which lead to neglecting all necessary preparations within the available timeframe for addressing the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns—all of which fall under the category of impulsive, hasty decision-making.
Swift decisive engagements require the fulfillment of all essential conditions—superior strategic planning, competent operational leadership, proficiency in mobile warfare, timely execution, and concentration of forces—in order to annihilate enemy forces.
Only by eliminating the enemy’s troops can the battle be brought to a swift conclusion, and the enemy’s offensive and “encirclement and suppression” campaigns reduced to rubble.  (10) Expanding internal fissures among adversaries and leveraging them to our advantage—enabling us to transition to counterattack and offense—constitutes one of the key strategic approaches to defeating the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
The 19th Route Army Incident in Fujian played a pivotal role in crushing the enemy’s five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
At that time, the Party Central Committee adopted a correct political line by exploiting the internal contradictions within the Kuomintang, concluding an armistice agreement with the 19th Route Army to encourage it to oppose Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek.
However, Comrade X and others, blinded by empty leftist rhetoric, pursued a diametrically opposed strategy at the strategic level, failing to recognize that capitalizing on the 19th Route Army Incident—both politically and militarily—was one of the most crucial factors in defeating the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Instead, they erroneously believed that continuing to operate on the eastern front and striking at the rear of the 19th Route Army’s forces under Chiang Kai-shek’s command amounted to aiding the 19th Route Army.
Consequently, they ordered the Red Army’s main forces to march westward in a futile effort to attack fortifications in the Yongfeng region.
By missing this golden opportunity and failing to acknowledge the significance of the 19th Route Army’s Provisional Government at the time, which was indeed beneficial to us, particularly in terms of directly coordinating with the 19th Route Army’s operations by striking at Chiang Kai-shek’s rear, we missed a valuable chance to advance our own interests and crush the enemy’s five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
This was not because the 19th Route Army was a revolutionary force; on the contrary, it was merely one faction within the counterrevolutionary camp.
This faction sought to perpetuate the rule of the landlord-bourgeoisie through deception and arbitrary propaganda, even masquerading as socialism.
Only by demonstrating to the worker-peasant soldiers deceived by the 19th Route Army through concrete actions that we supported any anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang Kai-shek struggle could we more easily expose the 19th Route Army’s warlord-like deceit and persuade them to join our side in the common anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang Kai-shek struggle.
It was only by adopting a strategy of direct coordination with the 19th Route Army that we could seize this critical opportunity to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek’s main forces—a condition that had never existed in previous battles.
Regrettably, we failed to capitalize on this advantage, a lapse that is hardly surprising given the goals of those advocating pure defense, whose sole purpose was to resist the enemy’s advances, viewing any exploitation of internal conflicts and contradictions as a risky endeavor leading to counterattacks and offensives.  (11) Similarly, errors were made at the conceptual level regarding the withdrawal from the central Soviet area.
First and foremost, when it became increasingly apparent—or perhaps ultimately impossible—that securing decisive victories through interior-line warfare within the central Soviet area was no longer feasible (from May to July 1934, following the Guangchang campaign), we should have promptly adjusted our strategic direction, implementing a strategic retreat to preserve the lives of our main Red Army forces.
In vast, unfortified territories, we should seek favorable opportunities to transition to counterattack, crush “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, establish new Soviet areas, and thereby safeguard existing ones.
On June 15, the International Secretariat had already pointed out: “Mobilizing new armed forces has not yet exhausted resources in the central region.
The resilience of the Red Army units and the supportive rear-area environment also do not warrant panic.
Even regarding the withdrawal of the main Red Army forces from the Soviet areas, this step is solely intended to conserve vital strength and protect them from potential enemy attacks.
During discussions at the 13th Plenary Session of the International Executive Committee and the 5th Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee concerning the prospects of the struggle, the current international situation, and the Red Army’s flexible strategies, the overarching theme was to prioritize preserving vital strength and consolidating/expanding capabilities under new conditions, in anticipation of launching large-scale offensives against imperialism and the Kuomintang.”
At this critical juncture, our strategic direction was evidently flawed.
The “strategic plan for May, June, and July” did not even broach this issue.
Although the “strategic plan for August, September, and October” did raise the matter and initiated preparations for withdrawing from the Soviet areas, the fundamental principles of the new plan still contradicted the original strategic direction: “Continue defending the Soviet areas with all available forces to achieve major operational victories,” “Develop guerrilla warfare and strengthen auxiliary activities to effect strategic changes.”
These remained the first and second provisions of the new plan’s foundational principles.
The crucial issue of preserving vital strength was completely overlooked, yet this very oversight formed the basis for the strategic decision to withdraw from the Soviet areas.
Coupled with the adoption of positional warfare, this operational misstep inflicted severe damage on the Red Army.
The contradictory stance of simultaneously preparing for a breakout while “continuing to defend the central Soviet areas with all forces” perfectly encapsulated the panic-stricken response of those advocating pure defense when faced with the inevitability of change.
More importantly, the manner in which we carried out this withdrawal—characterized by Comrade Hua as essentially a panicked flight and a house-moving operation—led to a series of unfortunate consequences.
For instance, this massive transformation was never explained to party cadres or Red Army commanders as directed by the International Secretariat.
Nor was the matter brought up for discussion at the Politburo meeting.
The political objectives underlying this mass mobilization involving millions of people were deemed insignificant.
As for the main Red Army forces, they were transferred from the Soviet areas to White Areas, from positional warfare to mobile warfare, without being granted the requisite rest and recuperation or proper training, but rather dispatched in haste.
Questions regarding the rationale behind the withdrawal from the central Soviet area, the current mission, and the destination remained shrouded in secrecy.
Consequently, it was impossible to elevate the morale and enthusiasm of the Red Army soldiers, both practically and politically.
This constituted a grave error.
The cumbersome organization of the Military Commission’s central column and the rear echelons of each corps severely hampered marching operations, turning all combat units into escort detachments and slowing down movements, causing delays and loss of precious time to reach designated locations.
This fundamentally ignored the fact that the Red Army’s strategic shift would encounter fierce opposition from the enemy, as well as the arduous challenges of long-distance marches, during which the Red Army would engage in countless grueling encounters with pursuing and intercepting enemy forces before achieving its objectives.
All these organizational, political, and military blunders—particularly the failure to align strategic direction with the principle of seeking decisive engagements with the enemy at the appropriate and advantageous moment—left the Red Army frequently in a passive position, vulnerable to enemy attacks, and unable to mount effective counterblows.
As a result, the planned breakout turned into a mere escort operation rather than an independent, bold offensive.
Despite frequent verbal declarations of “preparing for war,” in practice, apart from escort missions, the Red Army was predominantly engaged in “avoiding war.”
This stifled the Red Army’s morale, leaving soldiers chronically fatigued and deprived of even brief moments of rest, ultimately leading to unprecedented attrition.
Consequently, the rightful slogan of “counterattack” was effectively obscured by Comrade X and others, serving as a cover for their avoidanceist tactics, rather than being prepared for genuine counteroffensive victories when the opportunity arose.
Thus, the fundamental mission of utilizing the Red Army’s strategic shift to compel the enemy to alter its entire plan for attacking the central Soviet area—to safeguard the central Soviet area, crush the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, establish a base in Hunan, and above all, maintain the Red Army’s vital strength—remained unfulfilled.
All of these issues stemmed directly from the strategic adoption of avoidanceist policies.
This strategic avoidance originated from a flawed premise: namely, that the Red Army must first arrive at a designated location (Xiangxi), unpack its belongings, and only then launch a counteroffensive to annihilate the enemy; otherwise, it would be impossible.
Even when confronting pursuing enemy forces (such as the Zhou and Xue columns), the Red Army hesitated to engage in combat, waiting until they were separated and exhausted.
The root cause of this erroneous perception lay in a failure to recognize that the current operational environment did not permit such simplistic, haphazard, and direct approaches.
It also stemmed from an overestimation of the capabilities of pursuing enemy forces.
Little did they realize that such straightforward, casual, and direct methods might prove viable in brief, non-critical engagements involving small units, but were entirely impractical for the Red Army’s massive strategic redeployment across thousands of miles during the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Battles that are unnecessary or lack a clear opening to exploit should be avoided, whereas those that present a tangible opportunity to strike should never be shied away from.
The failure of this breakout operation to fulfill its intended purpose can be attributed primarily to these principled errors, which persisted until the very end of the breakout campaign.
When the Red Army reached the border between Hunan and Guizhou and found itself in unfavorable conditions, it still mechanically insisted on advancing toward the 116th Corps’ territory, refusing to adjust its actions and strategy in accordance with the changing circumstances.
Upon reaching the Wujiang River region, the Red Army again failed to adapt its plans to the new situation, choosing instead to propose a counteroffensive to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek’s pursuing forces along the Sichuan-Guizhou border, while merely carrying out minor operations to neutralize local bandits in Guizhou.
Although these two egregious errors were corrected thanks to the firm opposition of the majority of Politburo members, Comrade Hua and others merely reaffirmed their longstanding tendency toward opportunistic behavior at the strategic level.
The future of the purely defensive approach lies either in reckless, all-out desperation or in sheer flight; there is no other viable path forward.  (11) The expanded Politburo meeting concluded that all evidence demonstrates that our adherence to a purely defensive military strategy constitutes the primary reason why we have been unable to crush the enemy’s five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.
Any attempts to justify erroneous military leadership through appeals to the Party’s correct line (such as Comrade X’s report and Comrade Hua’s speech) are futile.
The expanded Politburo meeting regarded this purely defensive military stance as a manifestation of a specific form of right-wing opportunism within the Party, a phenomenon that should be vigorously combated and thoroughly investigated throughout the entire Party.
Any attempts to transform this struggle into a baseless personal dispute must be severely punished.  (13) Furthermore, the expanded Politburo meeting determined that Comrade X, particularly Comrade Hua, exhibited extremely egregious misconduct: the entire work of the Military Commission was monopolized by Comrade Hua alone, completely dismantling collective leadership within the Commission.
Disciplinary measures were rampantly abused, self-criticism was virtually nonexistent, and dissenting voices within the Military Commission were not only ignored but actively suppressed through various oppressive tactics.
Lower-ranking officers were stripped of their autonomy and creativity.
Under the guise of transforming strategic and tactical approaches, numerous invaluable experiences and lessons learned from past revolutionary battles were summarily discarded and branded as “guerrilla warfare,” despite the fact that the majority of members within the Military Commission had repeatedly voiced correct opinions and engaged in heated debates on multiple occasions.
For Comrade Hua and Comrade X, however, these efforts were entirely in vain.
All of these actions resulted in an extraordinarily abnormal state of affairs within the Military Commission.
Simultaneously, the Politburo acknowledged that both the Secretariat and the Politburo itself had been grossly negligent in their oversight of the Military Commission’s leadership.
The Secretariat and the Politburo devoted the vast majority of their attention to expanding the Red Army and ensuring its material supply, achieving unprecedented success in these areas.
However, they paid scant attention to strategic and tactical matters, delegating this responsibility to a handful of comrades—primarily Comrade X and Comrade Hua.
As a result, we lacked a clear understanding of how command decisions in warfare related to the overall outcome of the conflict.
Errors in military command could render even the most outstanding rear-area support efforts entirely futile.
The Politburo recognized its own culpability in this regard and acknowledged that the Secretariat bore greater responsibility, as several important decisions and strategic plans had been approved by the Secretariat.
Nevertheless, the expanded Politburo meeting specifically highlighted Comrade X’s grave negligence in this regard.
As the representative of the Central Leadership overseeing the work of the Military Commission, he not only failed to promptly rectify the strategic errors committed by Comrade Hua in operational command and the resulting abnormal conditions within the Military Commission, but actively defended and even encouraged the continuation of these erroneous practices.
The expanded Politburo meeting concluded that Comrade X should bear primary responsibility for these shortcomings.
However, in his concluding remarks, Comrade X refused to acknowledge the criticisms leveled by the vast majority of his colleagues or to admit his own mistakes.
It is worth noting that these errors do not represent a flaw in Comrade X’s overall political line, but rather constitute a serious political transgression.
Nonetheless, if these errors persist and continue to escalate, they will inevitably evolve into a comprehensive distortion of the entire political line.
The expanded Politburo meeting resolved that, in order to crush the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns and establish new Soviet areas, it is imperative to thoroughly rectify the historical errors in military leadership and to improve the manner in which the Military Commission exercises its leadership.  (14) Finally, the expanded Politburo meeting affirmed that, although our past mismanagement of military affairs prevented us from crushing the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns within the central Soviet area and forced our main Red Army forces to withdraw, suffering partial losses in the process, our valiant main Red Army units still endure.
We enjoy favorable conditions among the masses, the Party’s correct leadership, relatively advantageous geographical and material resources, widespread popular support nationwide, and the synergistic victories achieved alongside the Fourth Front Army and the 116th Corps.
Coupled with sound operational command, we firmly believe that, with the concerted efforts of all comrades and Red Army commanders, we can overcome these difficulties.
Meanwhile, the challenges facing the enemy have significantly increased.
Our operational theater now lies far removed from the reactionary stronghold of the Nanjing government, and Chiang Kai-shek’s years-long reliance on fortified zones has come to an end.
Internal contradictions and disunity within the warlord clique have further intensified.
Most importantly, Chiang Kai-shek’s main forces have been substantially weakened during the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, particularly under the dual pressures of imperialist partitioning of China and the Kuomintang’s treasonous policies.
The nation’s economy has collapsed on an unprecedented scale, prompting the general public to more clearly recognize that only the Soviets can save China, thereby increasing sympathy for and support of the Soviet revolutionary movement, even to the point of actively participating in the struggle for Soviet power.
All of these factors contribute to our ability to crush the enemy’s new “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, establish new Soviet bases, and revitalize the national Soviet movement.
It must be emphasized that the current environment presents serious challenges to both the Party and the Red Army: imperialism and the reactionary Kuomintang warlords will never relent in their efforts to undermine us.
As we stand on the eve of a new round of enemy “encirclement and suppression” campaigns, the central Red Army is currently stationed in Yunnan Province, specifically in the Baizhou region, where no existing Soviet areas remain and we must rebuild from scratch.
Our victories must be hard-won through arduous struggle, and establishing new Soviet areas cannot be accomplished without bloodshed.
The central question before us now is how to defeat the armies of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Chiang Kai-shek.
To accomplish this, the Red Army’s actions must be characterized by a high degree of flexibility.
The fundamental principles of revolutionary warfare have already been established, and the implementation of operational tasks requires the flexible application of these principles.
The Red Army’s expertise in mobile warfare was significantly diminished during the five campaigns due to prolonged positional warfare, whereas today, commanders at all levels are expected to possess advanced skills in mobile warfare tactics.
Therefore, a decisive and rapid transition from positional warfare tactics (such as “short, sharp assaults”) to mobile warfare tactics constitutes a critical undertaking.
Combatants, especially new recruits, must receive the necessary technical training.
In terms of political work, everything must be adapted to the demands of the current mobile environment to ensure the successful completion of each combat mission.
The Red Army must also take time to rest and recuperate between engagements and undergo substantial expansion.
Disciplining oneself rigorously and maintaining close ties with the broad masses of working farmers are essential; the Red Army must become even more integrated with local communities and significantly strengthen its outreach to residents.
The Red Army should serve as both a propagandist and organizer of the Soviet movement.
The current environment calls upon Party and Red Army leaders to make every possible effort to concretely and effectively resolve these fundamental issues.
Work among Party members in White Areas must be established and reinforced.
The methods used to lead mass struggles in White Areas must undergo a thorough transformation.
Efforts to undermine the morale of Nationalist troops must truly get underway.
Expanding guerrilla warfare represents one of the Party’s most pressing priorities at present.
In the central Soviet areas of Xianggan, Xiang’e-gan, and Minzhe-gan, the Party must steadfastly uphold its leadership of guerrilla warfare, transforming traditional working methods to better suit the new environment.
Finally, the 116th Corps and the Fourth Front Army must forge closer ties and strengthen their leadership roles to achieve unified action and mutual coordination across the entire Red Army.
The expanded Politburo meeting expressed confidence that we are capable of fulfilling these daunting tasks.
Successfully completing these tasks will guarantee new victories in the revolutionary war ahead.
These new victories will enable the central Red Army to establish new Soviet bases across the vast regions of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, restore existing Soviet areas, integrate Red Army units and Soviet areas nationwide into a cohesive network, and channel the revolutionary struggles of workers and peasants across the country toward a grand, triumphant revolution.
The expanded Politburo meeting emphasized that the Chinese Soviet Revolution boasts a profound historical lineage; it cannot be eradicated nor defeated by the enemy.
The transformation of the Xianggan and Minzhe-gan Soviet areas into guerrilla zones represents merely a temporary setback within the broader Soviet revolutionary movement.
This setback in no way justifies panic or despair regarding the forward momentum of the Chinese Soviet Revolution.
In fact, the Kuomintang’s attempts to temporarily halt the development of the Soviet revolutionary movement are themselves futile.
The victories achieved by the 116th Corps and the Fourth Front Army, the vigorous activity of the central Red Army across Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, along with the revolutionary struggles of workers and peasants nationwide, collectively demonstrate that the Chinese Soviet Revolution is steadily advancing.
The expanded Politburo meeting clarified that the Party’s past errors in military leadership constitute only a partial deviation from its overall political line.
These errors do not warrant pessimism or despair.
The Party courageously exposed these errors, learning from them and improving its ability to lead revolutionary battles toward complete victory.
Following this exposure, the Party did not weaken but instead grew stronger.
The expanded Politburo meeting urged all comrades to embrace Bolshevik firmness and resolutely oppose all forms of panicky, pessimistic, right-wing opportunism, beginning with the rejection of purely defensive strategies.
Furthermore, the expanded Politburo meeting called on all Party members to unite as one around the Central Leadership, dedicating themselves wholeheartedly to the Central Committee’s overarching political line, confident that victory will ultimately belong to us.
A history
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