Telegram from the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission to Zhang Guotao*
(January 22, 1935)

In order to select favorable conditions and strive for greater prospects of development, it has been decided that our field army shall shift to western Sichuan, planning to cross the Yangtze upstream from Luzhou. If there are no obstacles, the crossing northward can be accomplished around mid-February. It is anticipated that there will be many fierce battles along the way. The realization of this strategic policy is closely related to your actions. In order to facilitate close coordination in operations between the Fourth Front Army and the field army before Chiang Kai-shek’s enemy forces have fully entered Sichuan to carry out their “encirclement and suppression,” and to first crush the Sichuan enemy, we suggest: you should actively operate on the eastern front with mass armed forces and independent divisions and regiments to pin down Liu’s enemy forces, while concentrating the main force of the Red Army to attack on the western front. Because our army has entered Sichuan, Liu Xiang no longer has the possibility of attacking you. If you attack Liu’s enemy forces, there is also little assurance of victory, the distance for coordinated operations with our army is relatively far, and the direction for the development of the Soviet area is also less favorable; on the western front, there is internal strife within Tian’s troops, Deng’s troops will be transferred south, and Yang, Li, and Luo have few troops and weak strength, so the assurance of victory is greater, coordination with our army is closer, and the development of the Soviet area is also favorable. Therefore, you should rapidly assemble your forces and complete preparations for the offensive, and in the very near future, launch an offensive west of the Jialing River. Regarding the disposition of forces and the objectives of the attack, it is appropriate to use one part of the forces toward the line of Yingshan as the auxiliary direction; and take the line of Cangxi, Langzhong, and Nanbu as the main direction. In the main direction, concentrate the main force, break through the gaps and weak points in the enemy’s fortifications to penetrate behind enemy lines, seek out the enemy in the vast unfortified zones, and encircle and annihilate them in mobile warfare. If, according to the development of the battle situation, you can enter the area of Xichong, Nanchong, and Pengxi, then the coordination with our army will be most favorable. At the same time, we must anticipate that the enemy may use a relatively small force to pin down the Fourth Front Army by utilizing fortifications, and, taking advantage of the moment when the field army has not yet gained a firm foothold,

shift their main force to launch a sudden assault, in order to achieve the effect of destroying us one by one. Therefore, you should promptly decide on your operational policy and reply by telegram.