Directive on Guerrilla Actions

(October 1934)

Chapter One: Overview

(A) Tasks of Guerrilla Units

Depending on their operational environment, guerrilla units have the following tasks:

(1) Guerrillas Operating Behind Enemy Lines: Their fundamental mission is to, through proactive and vigorous actions of their own, annihilate or weaken any enemy forces within their capacity, disrupt the enemy’s rear areas, ignite class struggle among the workers and peasants, progressing to armed uprisings and the establishment of Soviet power, propagate new guerrilla units and lead them in developing guerrilla warfare, expand and strengthen their own forces so that guerrilla units evolve into new Red Army detachments, and through all these efforts coordinate with the main Red Army forces to smash the enemy’s offensives against the Soviet areas and strive for the victory of the revolution across vast regions and eventually throughout all of China.

(2) Guerrillas on the Borders of Soviet Areas: During enemy encirclement campaigns and blockades against Soviet areas, the joint fundamental task of all independent regiments, independent battalions, guerrilla units, and guerrilla groups is to employ all their active operations to coordinate with the Red Army’s actions, defend the Soviet areas, annihilate or weaken the attacking enemy, and smash the encirclement and blockade. When the enemy’s plans for encirclement and blockade suffer defeat, they shall coordinate with the Red Army’s victorious advance, actively develop guerrilla warfare on all fronts of the Soviet areas toward enemy-occupied territories and White-controlled regions, annihilate enemies within those areas, restore Soviet areas, and expand them.

(B) Organization of Guerrilla Units

(1) Depending on their tasks and in adaptation to the needs of specific circumstances, guerrilla units shall be organized into several forms: independent regiments, independent battalions, guerrilla units, and guerrilla groups (though independent regiments and battalions are no longer designated as guerrilla units, their nature still places them within the category of guerrilla forces).

A. Independent Regiments
These are divided into two types: fully structured and under-structured. A fully structured independent regiment comprises three battalions, each with three companies. The regimental headquarters may also include a machine-gun platoon and a special duties company. Total personnel range from 1,000 to 1,500.

An under-structured independent regiment shall have at least four companies, each directly subordinate to the regimental headquarters. If there are five to six companies, they shall be organized into two battalions, each of three companies. If there are seven companies, one company shall be directly under the regimental headquarters, and the remaining six shall form two battalions. If there are eight companies, they form three battalions: two with three companies each and one with two companies. Total personnel range from 500 to 900.

Companies are normally organized into three platoons. If numbers are insufficient, one company in the regiment may be permitted to lack one platoon; otherwise, all must consist of three platoons.

Platoons are organized into three squads, with each squad comprising nine members (including the squad leader).

B. Independent Battalions
Generally equivalent to a single battalion of an independent regiment, that is, consisting of three companies. However, a large independent battalion may have four companies, while a small one may have only two. The organization of companies is the same as those in an independent regiment.

C. Guerrilla Units
Any single unit, ranging from one platoon to one company in strength, is designated a guerrilla unit. The organization of platoons and squads within a guerrilla unit is the same as in independent regiments. However, if a guerrilla unit has fewer than 35 personnel, platoons are not formed, and all squads are directly subordinate to the unit headquarters.

To widely develop guerrilla warfare and develop and defend Soviet areas, in all areas close to the enemy, small guerrilla units of about 35 personnel may be formed for every two or three townships. Large guerrilla units of about 100 personnel may be formed for each district.

D. Guerrilla Groups
(1) Armed mass units, composed of three to fifteen persons who, in principle, are not detached from production, are called guerrilla groups. They are organized on a village basis or based on a collective unit, selecting motivated worker and peasant activists who volunteer.

(2) Each guerrilla detachment shall, in accordance with its establishment, appoint the necessary command personnel and support staff. Independent regiments and independent battalions shall each have a political commissar. Companies within independent regiments and battalions, as well as guerrilla units, shall each have a political instructor. However, support staff and all non-combat personnel must be kept to a minimum to prevent the force from becoming top-heavy.

(3) Cadres (military and political command personnel at all levels) of guerrilla detachments must not only be of worker or peasant background in terms of social origin, or be revolutionary elements with a history of struggle; they must also meet the following conditions: loyalty to the interests of workers and peasants, obedience to the guidance of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, obedience to orders from superiors, and be resolute, alert, and able to endure hardship and fatigue. When selecting guerrilla cadres, efforts must be made to ensure they meet these conditions; when educating guerrilla cadres, their adherence to these conditions must be strengthened.

Cadres who demonstrate disloyalty or irresolution (hypocrisy and vacillation) in their actions must be purged from guerrilla units.

(4) The composition of guerrilla personnel must comprise workers, hired farm laborers, poor peasants, activists, and the most class-conscious worker elements. All landlords, rich peasants, merchants, bosses, exploiters, and other such elements must be resolutely barred from joining guerrilla units.

A review must be conducted of the current composition of guerrilla personnel. If any exploitative elements are found to have infiltrated guerrilla units, they should be dealt with immediately. Only those specific individuals who have demonstrated in past struggles a genuine and firm commitment to fighting for the interests of workers and peasants may be permitted to remain in the guerrilla unit.

Kuomintang warlords and gentry-landlords often exploit elements lacking class consciousness, training them and then dispatching them to areas near guerrilla zones with the aim of infiltrating guerrilla units to carry out counterrevolutionary sabotage. Leaders of guerrilla units must resolutely and correctly handle such counterrevolutionary elements, as well as those guerrilla members already influenced by them, dealing with each case on its merits. When handling these cases, it is necessary to mobilize all members to regard such counterrevolutionaries with animosity and to struggle against them, and to use these incidents to constantly alert guerrilla personnel, thereby raising their class vigilance and level of consciousness.

If such elements are present among guerrilla unit cadres, their handling must be even more decisive, rigorous, and methodical.

(5) At the outset, the weapons of guerrilla detachments are usually single-shot rifles, jingals, bird guns, spears, broadswords, indigenous cannons, firecracker cannons, and locally made landmines. Subsequently, in the course of their own battles, they capture various modern weapons (repeat rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, bayonets, etc.) from the enemy to arm themselves. Guerrilla detachments can and should equip themselves with many good weapons, but these must be resolutely taken from the enemy. The same applies to the resolution of issues concerning clothing and provisions.

(C) Development of Guerrilla Units into Red Army Forces

In order to overcome even larger enemies and strive for still greater victories, guerrilla detachments must regard their own expansion as a regular task. The leader of every guerrilla unit must at all times draw up practical plans to develop his guerrilla group into a guerrilla unit, that unit into an independent regiment or battalion, and that independent regiment or battalion into a regular Red Army force.

When a detachment has expanded, or when several smaller detachments have been combined into a larger one, thereby broadening its scope of action and increasing its burden of tasks, the leaders of each guerrilla unit must pay attention to mobilizing the masses to form new guerrilla units to take over their former roles. To this end, the expanded guerrilla detachments should, where possible, provide all necessary assistance (such as command cadres and some experienced members) to the new guerrilla units.

Guerrilla units must also make every effort to organize local guerrilla units in areas where there is a need and a possibility but where none had previously been organized. To accomplish this, they can dispatch small detachments (such as a squad or a platoon) from their own forces to locations where guerrilla units should be formed, serving as the nucleus for those units. From there, they should mobilize large numbers of motivated worker and peasant activists to rally around this nucleus, forming a unit capable of combat as quickly as possible.

In the process of developing into a Red Army force, beyond increasing in quantity, guerrilla units must also, during lulls in operations, seize available time to temper themselves, train themselves, strive assiduously to learn and improve their military skills and tactics, and strengthen the unit’s political education. Only thus can they ensure the completion of the guerrilla unit’s fundamental tasks and steadily advance on the path toward becoming a Red Army.

(D) Establishment of Base Areas by Guerrilla Units

(1) Every guerrilla unit operating behind enemy lines must select a suitable area within its operational range to serve as a permanent base. Deep within this area (at a location of military significance), they shall store provisions, conceal spoils of war, and place sick and wounded personnel; it also serves as a place for the guerrilla unit to rest and await opportunities. Additionally, they may secure tactically significant points in the directions of their main operations to serve as temporary bases, relying on these points to more smoothly attack the enemy and, at the same time, to facilitate the defeat of enemy “encirclement campaigns” against them. The selection of a guerrilla unit’s base is determined by the local enemy situation, terrain, the condition of the masses, and the guerrilla unit’s own strength. However, bases are typically chosen in mountainous or forested areas. Under special circumstances, small guerrilla units may select areas within lakes, marshes, or river inlets.

(2) The task of establishing a military base by a guerrilla unit is equivalent to the task of establishing a Soviet area. Only by advancing along the road toward establishing Soviet areas can a genuine base be created. Therefore, once a guerrilla unit has selected a base area, it must use its resolute actions to annihilate the reactionary armed forces present locally and nearby, ignite mass class struggle, confiscate and redistribute land, suppress internal counterrevolution, establish mass Red Guard units, Young Pioneer units, and guerrilla units, and establish Soviet power, so as to consolidate this base. Moreover, it must vigorously develop guerrilla warfare and mass struggles in the most advantageous directions to expand this base. It must be remembered: a guerrilla unit cannot survive without a base; and without mobilizing mass struggles, eliminating reactionary forces, and establishing Soviet political power, the creation and consolidation of a base are impossible.

(3) Fulfilling the task of establishing a Soviet area requires arduous work and a considerable amount of time. The initial phase is to transform it into a guerrilla zone. Striking at reactionary forces, propagating to the masses, organizing mass struggles, and drawing the masses to believe in the necessity and possibility of overthrowing the rulers, seizing land, and establishing political power, and then resolutely launching into action—these are the central tasks of the initial period. Taking into account that some locations (enemy communication arteries, areas near major cities, etc.) will likely remain situated as guerrilla zones for a relatively long time, plans by guerrilla units to transform such places into Soviet areas should be carefully considered.

(E) Fundamental Principles of Guerrilla Unit Actions

All actions undertaken by guerrilla units (both behind enemy lines and on the borders of Soviet areas) to fulfill their tasks must not deviate from the following two fundamental principles:

(1) Close integration with the masses. Therefore, guerrilla units must first enforce strict discipline on themselves, and then actively win over the worker and peasant masses, causing them to abandon all class enemies and shift over to their side, or at minimum, ensure they do not oppose the guerrilla unit. They must also use every means to disintegrate enemy forces, striving to win over White Army soldiers and min-tuan (corps) members to break away from their officers and mutiny, joining the guerrilla unit.

(2) Placing oneself in an active position. Therefore, the military operations of guerrilla units must strive for suddenness, decisiveness, and secrecy; hesitation, vacillation, and exposing oneself are all things to be vigorously avoided.

Chapter Two: Guerrilla Warfare

Section 1: Key Points

(F) Objectives of Guerrilla Unit Combat Operations

In general terms, these are as follows:

(1) Annihilate landlord armed forces;

(2) Annihilate small enemy army detachments;

(3) Intercept defeated enemy troops;

(4) Harass or pin down large enemy groupings and enemy troops holding fortified positions;

(5) Raid enemy transport convoys, requisition squads, and grain-seizing squads;

(6) Raid enemy supply depots;

(7) Seize and destroy enemy storage facilities for ammunition, food supplies, clothing, and other equipment;

(8) Raid enemy automobiles, trains, and boats; destroy motor roads and railways; and, when necessary, destroy ordinary marching routes;

(9) Destroy enemy telephone and telegraph lines;

(10) Raid forts, stockaded villages, earthen-walled strongholds, and towns where the enemy garrison is weak;

(11) Undertake reconnaissance duties for the Red Army.

(G) To Achieve the Above Objectives, a Guerrilla Unit’s General Combat Plan Should Include the Following Items:

(1) Attacking enemy forces at rest;

(2) Attacking enemy forces on the move;

(3) Disrupting the enemy’s rear;

(4) Dealing with enemy encirclement campaigns and pursuit;

(5) Matters concerning marching, bivouacking, provisioning, and hygiene.

(H) In Order to Execute Its Tasks and Formulate Combat Plans, a Guerrilla Unit Must Understand Its Environment. Constant and Reliable Investigation and Reconnaissance Must Be Conducted Regarding the Following Matters:

(1) Enemy Situation: The stationing of enemy forces (min-tuan and army units), their strength in personnel, numbers of weapons, combat effectiveness, the capabilities of their commanders, enemy intentions, etc.

(2) Terrain: The shape, location, and names of mountains and rivers; locations of bridges and crossing points; numbers of boats; shape and location of villages and fields, etc.

(3) Roads: Highways and byways in the vicinity; famous towns and villages along the roads; distances in li between sections, etc.

(4) Administrative Divisions: Location of counties; the division into districts within a county, the names and locations of districts; the division of nearby townships, etc.

(5) Condition of the Inhabitants: Population figures for nearby areas; the state of exploitation; the struggle sentiment of the worker and peasant masses, etc.

Military and political personnel of the guerrilla unit who have investigated and reconnoitered the above matters should ideally record them. Terrain, roads, and administrative divisions should be drawn into simplified maps. These situations should be explained to the commanders and operatives of the various sub-units.

(9) Wherever a guerrilla unit goes, it immediately attracts the enemy’s attention; therefore, the guerrilla unit must possess a high degree of agility. Once a guerrilla commander has understood the local situation, he must swiftly make a decision and formulate his own combat plan — rapidly attacking a particular enemy force (such as a local militia unit or a certain White Army contingent) or quickly withdrawing himself.

If a guerrilla unit lacks agility and halts for too long near the enemy, the enemy will already be prepared. If the guerrilla commander then still regards the situation as perfectly safe or wavers indecisively, the danger of being attacked becomes all the greater. Therefore, a high degree of agility — swiftly understanding the situation and making a decision — is a crucial link in enabling the guerrilla unit to seize the initiative and avoid falling into any passive state.

(10) Ensuring that the guerrilla unit’s agility consistently possesses correctness and does not become erroneous action depends on the guerrilla commander’s correct judgment of the situation. The guerrilla unit should resolutely attack every enemy against which a victory is possible given the balance of forces, but should resolutely avoid any battle with no assurance of victory. Deciding whether to attack or to avoid depends not only on a full understanding of the situation, but also on the guerrilla commander’s ability to make correct analyses and judgments concerning the known situation. If the guerrilla commander’s analysis and judgment of the situation are wrong, erroneous actions will result: either overestimating the enemy’s strength and distrusting one’s own, thereby forgoing achievable victories — and if a guerrilla unit commits such erroneous actions repeatedly over a period, it will weaken that unit’s operational capacity and may even affect the unit’s survival — or underestimating the enemy’s strength and taking a casual, guerrilla-like attitude toward combat, thereby suffering unnecessary losses. Both of these situations will cause the guerrilla unit to lose its initiative and bring enemy pressure upon itself. Therefore, for the guerrilla unit to constantly keep the initiative in its own hands and prevent agility from becoming error, it must, before deciding upon every combat plan, deliberately make a correct judgment: resolutely attacking the enemy when a favorable opportunity arises, and, if not, resolutely avoiding combat to preserve its own strength.

(11) The guerrilla commander must take into account that, within his area of operations (border areas, newly established areas, White areas), the eyes and ears of the enemy are many. In order to ensure the guerrilla unit’s constant initiative in winning battles, he must be adept at concealing his own military movements as much as possible. Feints, taking circuitous routes, relocating encampments, spreading rumors, attacking in the east but striking in the west, maintaining secrecy, and so on — these are all methods for the guerrilla unit to conceal itself and deceive the enemy. Letting only oneself know the enemy, but never letting the enemy know oneself, is one of the principles of guerrilla warfare.

It must be remembered: no matter how adept one is at agility, no matter how correct one’s plan, if the enemy learns of it first, there will still be no victory.

(12) The characteristic of guerrilla operations is to constantly and systematically attack the enemy, rather than to deploy defenses and wait for the enemy’s attack. The guerrilla unit’s main method of attacking the enemy is the raid. Only through raids can one catch the enemy unprepared, throw him into a passive position, and allow the guerrilla unit to achieve a great victory.

Section 2: Raiding a Stationary Enemy

(13) The principles for raiding a stationary enemy are to have secret and thorough preparations, and swift and sudden actions.

(14) Before deciding on a raid plan, use various means to ascertain the following matters:

1. The strength of the enemy force to be raided, its combat effectiveness, its disposition, the degree of its alertness, and the order of its sentry rotations.
2. Whether there are other enemy forces nearby; if so, their strength, how many li they are from the enemy to be raided, whether they can reinforce the enemy to be raided, from which direction they would come to reinforce, and whether there are telephone or telegraph lines connecting the two enemy forces.
3. What roads and paths lead to the intended raid site, and what concealed approaches exist.

Reconnaissance of the above matters must be conducted by secret methods. The more reliable the reconnaissance, the more correct the raid plan, and the greater the likelihood of the raid’s success.

(15) Selection of the time for the raid:

1. At night: This is the best time for a raid. First, exploiting the darkness of night, marching to close with the enemy best allows for concealment; second, using the darkness of night for the charge best allows one to amplify one’s own momentum while the enemy panics; third, reinforcement by nearby enemies is difficult. Hence, raids should mostly be chosen for nighttime, and learning night combat becomes essential homework for the guerrilla units.
2. At daybreak: This is the second most favorable time for a raid, essentially involving a night approach and daybreak assault. Because a night approach facilitates concealing oneself, and a daybreak assault facilitates distinguishing between friend and foe, under conditions of swiftly resolving the battle, enemy reinforcements also do not arrive as quickly as they would in a raid conducted during the day; moreover, it is conducive to launching raids on the enemy from a long distance (such as mounting a raid from 60 to 70 li away). Therefore, for guerrilla units that still lack experience in night fighting, choosing this timing is good. But one point must be noted: the time for commencing the charge should, as far as possible, be before the enemy gets out of bed.
3. During the day: Raids in the daytime often fail to achieve good results. Because the enemy can easily reconnoiter, he is thus easily on guard, and also easily runs away. Hence, daytime raids should rarely be used. However, they can be employed under the following circumstances: (a) The enemy is corrupt, not vigilant, weak in strength, and has no fortifications or blockhouses — or, if there are any, they are extremely poor; (b) The enemy is far from the guerrilla unit and unaware of its news, and the guerrilla unit raids him from afar; (c) There are no reinforcing enemies, or if there are, they are weak; (d) At a time when a great fog obscures the sky or heavy rain pours down. Under such circumstances, a daytime raid may succeed.

(16) No matter what time the raid is set for, the intention to raid must be completely concealed from the enemy. Therefore, before the raid, the guerrilla commander must attend to the following matters:

1. Keep the raid plan strictly secret. Not only must no resident learn of it, but even his own subordinates should not be informed too early; only when a certain moment arrives should they be told the matters they need to know. (Under the pretext of secrecy, one must not fail to inform subordinates of the matters they need to know for the raid action; yet, under the pretext of informing, one must not disclose matters that need not be told.)
2. Use the residents to spread false information, masking the direction of the guerrilla unit’s movement.
3. Seek reliable poor workers and peasants as guides, but do not let them know the intention to raid.
4. First march a day in a false direction, then suddenly raid the intended enemy on the second day. This method can be used in places where the enemy’s eyes and ears are many.

(17) The approach march of the raiding force:

When the raiding force marches toward the raid objective, it must attend to the following items:

1. Choose concealed paths.
2. Maintain strict silence during the march.
3. Send a small reconnaissance element at the head of the marching column to conduct reconnaissance and security.
4. March as quickly as possible.

(18) Actions upon reaching the vicinity of the raid objective:

When the guerrilla unit reaches the vicinity of the raid objective, that is, a point not far from the enemy’s security line, it should immediately concentrate the troops under concealment and prepare to attack. The commander, leading the commanders of the sub-units, swiftly reconnoiters the enemy’s disposition — if at night, listening and observing the enemy’s movements — and immediately indicates to the sub-unit commanders the main direction and secondary directions of the attack, deploys the forces, and assigns combat missions to the sub-units.

The disposition of forces is determined by the size of the unit. If the guerrilla unit conducting the raid numbers only several dozen men, the commander personally leads the largest force to break in and raid from the direction where the enemy’s disposition is weakest (preferably from the enemy’s rear), while dispatching the smallest force to a direction not far away to play a pinning role.

If the raiding force is a large guerrilla unit, an independent regiment, or an independent battalion, the force should be divided into two or three detachments to raid simultaneously from two or three directions.

However, in implementing this method, the following conditions must be observed: (1) Do not divide forces equally. Deploy a relatively large force in one main direction, and relatively smaller forces in the other one or two secondary directions. (2) Do not divide forces when still far away. Forces should be divided at a point roughly two li [from the enemy security line] at night and about five li in daytime, so as to ensure that the assault times from all directions are synchronized and that no direction loses its way at night. (3) Cut off the enemy’s line of retreat. Among the two or three directions, one must face the enemy’s main retreat route, to block the enemy from escaping that way, and to be able to intercept and destroy the enemy when he flees. The main objective of the raid is to destroy the enemy and disarm him; this can only be achieved by using encirclement or turning movement to cut off his main retreat route. (4) Agree upon recognition signals, so that during the chaos of the charge, friend can be clearly distinguished from foe. All these methods should be roughly stipulated before setting out on the march, based on the situation then known; at this moment, they are reviewed in accordance with on-site observation and altered only if there are discrepancies.

If there is concern about enemy reinforcements from a certain nearby direction, a small number of men should be dispatched to a designated location to provide security.

All necessary actions upon reaching the vicinity of the raid objective must be completed in the shortest possible time, so as to rapidly transition to the attack and the charge. One must never halt for too long, lest the enemy discover and strengthen his defense, making our attack difficult, or seize the opportunity to flee, leaving us to grasp at emptiness.

(19) Action during the charge:

1. Commence the charge suddenly at the prearranged time. If attacking simultaneously from two or more directions, the circumstances in the main direction (terrain, roads, etc.) must be calculated, and the minimum time required for the force in the main direction to reach the line of departure for the charge must be taken as the common time for all directions to begin the charge.
2. Make no sound, do not fire guns, do not cry out to kill; use bayonets, spears, and broadswords to rush into the enemy’s disposition in one surge, close with the enemy’s body, and start slashing — thus settling the enemy. If using hand grenades (when hand grenades are available), do not throw them too far. Approach close and hurl them at the massed enemy, and seizing the moment of the explosion, advance with cold steel to resolve the battle.
3. Only on pinning directions may a small number of firearms be used to fire at the enemy, the purpose being to draw the enemy toward that direction, making it easier to secure victory on the assault direction.
4. If the enemy stubbornly resists by relying on buildings, set the buildings on fire to compel surrender. If he still refuses to surrender, take advantage of the chaos when part of the building is burning to scale the wall from another part of the building, break in, and disarm him. If unable to break in, burn the enemy to death. Therefore, before setting out, if it is assessed that the enemy may stoutly defend buildings, fire-starting materials (kerosene, bundles of straw tied to long poles, etc.) should be prepared and brought along. Before setting out, if reconnaissance reveals that the enemy has bamboo spikes, outer trenches, or earthen enclosures, then bring straw, planks, ladders, and the like, so as to pass through obstacles and climb into the earthen enclosures.
5. Pursuit. If the raid succeeds and part or most of the enemy flees in disarray, settle them by using swift pursuit methods. Generally, pursuit should not go too far; only when there is no concern about nearby enemies may the pursuit extend somewhat farther.

(20) Actions after the raid:

1. If the raid succeeds: Immediately assemble the troops, and along with the collected wounded and the concentrated prisoners and booty, etc., move to a position in the direction of the approach route, occupy a position, concentrate and reorganize, and strictly guard against counterattacks by surviving enemy remnants and raids by nearby enemy reinforcement units. After the main force is concentrated, dispatch a small detachment and the necessary working personnel to the combat site to collect the wounded left behind, check on prisoners and spoils scattered about, requisition supplies, and capture local despots. Regarding the handling of prisoners: Guerrilla units in the enemy’s rear should single out the important prisoner officers, especially the fascists, who are hated by the soldiers, and immediately execute them by firing squad; for prisoner soldiers, simply give them a short speech and immediately release them. Guerrilla units on the borders of Soviet areas should take prisoners back to the rear for processing. If the situation is tense, the time for these post-battle tasks must be shortened as much as possible so that the guerrilla unit can swiftly and victoriously withdraw. Only when the enemy has been destroyed, or the remnants have lost the ability to counterattack, and there are no enemy concerns nearby, can a relatively prolonged period be permitted for distributing property to the local worker and peasant masses and for conducting concise and forceful political propaganda. No matter what, the guerrilla unit should not camp there overnight. When the guerrilla unit withdraws, it can first move in a false direction, then switch to the true direction, making it difficult for the enemy to pursue.

2. If the raid does not succeed: If the enemy occupies a position and stubbornly resists with no prospect of resolving the battle, one should immediately disengage from battle and withdraw in a planned manner. At this time, the commander must make a prompt decision without the slightest hesitation. If the enemy launches a counterattack or pursuit, a small guerrilla unit, thanks to its lightness, may first withdraw separately along different routes, then reassemble at a prearranged assembly area. An independent regiment or battalion should deploy a covering force on favorable terrain in the direction of withdrawal to suppress the enemy’s pursuit and cover the main force’s withdrawal along separate routes to the prearranged assembly area. The covering force may withdraw only after the main force has completed its withdrawal. No matter what, the withdrawal must be planned and orderly. The covering force must collect the wounded left behind. The prearranged assembly area is originally prepared for use in case of failure; it should be stipulated when the raid order is issued, and is usually designated as the bivouac area from the previous night.

(21) Raiding fortresses, stockaded villages, earthen enclosures, and cities:

Guerrilla units have the responsibility to raid fortresses, stockaded villages, earthen enclosures, and cities garrisoned by weak landlord forces or small numbers of enemy troops. However, in carrying this out, the following methods must be adopted as appropriate:

1. Approach secretly at night, and taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, quietly climb in.

(2) If detected by the enemy, switch to a small detachment to attack from another direction to divert their attention, while the main force infiltrates through a weakly guarded point.

(3) During the day, disguise as enemy troops so that the defending enemy mistakes you for friendly forces, and seize the opportunity to infiltrate.

(4) Defeat them in field combat, pursue them closely, and take advantage of the momentum to infiltrate.

(5) If none of these methods achieve infiltration, the enemy holds firm and refuses to come out, and our guerrilla forces are strong enough with an absolute necessity to eliminate this enemy, the infiltration plan can be changed to a siege plan and assault by tunneling and blasting. However, this is only to be carried out when absolutely necessary by guerrilla units on the borders of the Soviet area.

(22) Harassing or Pinning Down the Enemy:

When the Red Army is engaged in combat with the enemy, guerrilla units or small guerrilla groups near the enemy’s encampment may carry out harassing actions to exhaust enemy forces and cause panic. The most suitable times are at dusk, midnight, or dawn. The number of personnel involved in each action should be small to allow rotation; the actions must be swift to avoid losses, and they should approach the enemy’s encampment to suddenly open fire and create alarm.

When the Red Army is in combat with the enemy, guerrilla units or groups may, under the Red Army’s intention, take on the task of pinning down part of the enemy forces. The key is to make a show of strength and deploy diversionary tactics, leading the enemy to mistakenly believe they are facing the Red Army and thus disperse their forces to deal with the guerrillas, without necessarily entering into serious combat.

Section 3: Attacking Enemy Forces on the Move

(23) Guerrilla units must not only be adept at using assault tactics to eliminate and strike stationary enemy forces but also be skilled in employing assault tactics to eliminate and strike enemy forces on the move. This is because red guerrilla units behind enemy lines and along the borders of the Soviet area frequently observe the movement of enemy detachments, large or small, along with their baggage. Attacking enemy forces on the move by mastering the two primary methods of assaulting a moving enemy—“ambushing” and “sudden raiding”—to deal them unexpected blows at any time and place is one of the important tasks of guerrilla units.

(24) Ambushing is an effective method whereby guerrilla units plan to conceal themselves in ambush along a roadside and launch a sudden assault on advancing enemy troops and their baggage, thereby eliminating or striking these enemies and seizing their supplies. Among these, if it is known in advance that the enemy will come by a certain road, lying in wait for that enemy and attacking as soon as they arrive is called a “waiting ambush.” If it is unknown which road the enemy will take, or the enemy has no intention of moving, dispatching a unit to lure the enemy and attacking immediately when they arrive is called a “luring ambush.”

(25) In ambushing, reconnaissance must be given priority:

(1) Without reconnaissance and a clear understanding of the enemy situation, setting an ambush is fundamentally impossible. Inaccurate reconnaissance, mistakenly taking a large enemy force for a small one, will lead to errors in ambushing; expecting the enemy to take one road when they take another will result in the ambush being in vain.

(2) To ensure accurate reconnaissance, guerrilla units should, on the one hand, use residents who support and sympathize with them to approach the enemy’s station or marching encampment from multiple directions, obtaining necessary information from enemy soldiers and laborers (size of the unit, weapons, combat effectiveness, type of baggage, and when and by which road they will move). On the other hand, they should dispatch their own trained reconnaissance squads to conduct direct reconnaissance, as relying solely on reports from residents can easily lead to errors.

(3) The information obtained from reconnaissance must be carefully analyzed to reach a correct judgment and make a firm decision to ambush.

(4) Strict secrecy must be maintained. On the one hand, ensure that dispatched reconnaissance personnel do not inadvertently leak information; on the other hand, block traffic around your own stationing area to prevent the enemy from gleaning any intelligence about the guerrilla forces. Otherwise, the enemy might launch a preemptive raid on the guerrillas, or set up a counter-ambush against them during the ambush. It must be remembered: whether behind enemy lines or along the Soviet area border, enemy spies are numerous.

(26) Next, attention must be paid to selecting the area:

A good ambush area helps guerrilla units exert their maximum power, while the enemy is restricted by the terrain and finds it difficult to maneuver, or may even be left helpless. An ambush area is suitable if it meets the following conditions:

(1) Good concealment: enabling the guerrilla forces to easily see the enemy while the enemy cannot easily see them;

(2) Favorable terrain: enabling the guerrilla forces to easily attack the enemy while the enemy cannot easily attack them.

(27) Executing the Ambush:

(1) Advancing: First, do not advance too early. Advancing too early leaves the guerrilla forces in ambush for a prolonged period, reducing alertness and caution, easily exposing intentions, and increasing the risk of detection by the enemy. Do not advance too late either; being too late means there is no time to set the ambush. Second, the approach route must be concealed, often taking small paths or trackless mountain and valley routes.

(2) Setting the Ambush: This mainly involves deploying forces according to the size of the guerrilla unit and the terrain conditions. Typically, in critical or hazardous spots, deploy a pinning force to hold down part of the enemy, with its strength not exceeding 30 percent of the entire unit. In areas favorable for assault, deploy an assault force, which serves as the main force for resolving the engagement, with its strength not less than 70 percent of the entire unit. In locations where other enemy threats are a concern, deploy a security force, usually consisting of a reconnaissance team of seven to fifteen personnel. Only independent regiments and battalions may, when necessary, assign a security force of about one platoon to avoid dispersing strength.

In the ambush plan, if it is definitively known that the enemy is a small unit, block its vanguard, cut off its retreat, and aim to annihilate the entire enemy force. If it is known that the enemy is a large unit, let its vanguard pass, or even let the main body pass, specifically targeting the rear guard. These must all be arranged in advance.

The signal to launch the attack, the direction and movement routes for each sub-unit’s attack, must all be communicated to the commanders of each sub-unit beforehand.

During the ambush, maintain extreme concealment and silence; no smoking, no talking, and no random peeking are allowed.

(3) Battlefield Observation: Establish two observation posts. The first is set up ten to fifteen li from the enemy’s approach route, where a responsible person with three to four messengers is dispatched to observe the enemy’s approach and continuously report to the commander. Based on these reports, the commander re-evaluates the disposition of forces. If it does not match the enemy situation, the entire disposition or certain parts of it are immediately changed.

This observation post is not withdrawn until the enemy has completely passed. The second observation post is set within the ambush area, where the commander personally observes in order to issue the signal to commence the attack at the appropriate moment.

(4) Launching the Attack: First, the timing for launching the attack must be chosen well. This requires the commander to seize a moment during the enemy’s advance that is most advantageous for the attack; at the same time, all members of the unit must obey the commander’s unified orders and refrain from acting independently, which might lead to premature detection. Second, the attack actions must be swift and fierce. When the moment arrives and the commander issues the signal, the troops should immediately act, catching the enemy off guard. At this time, the pinning force firmly holds the enemy down, while the assault force charges fiercely toward the enemy, opens intense fire, and follows up with a charge, swiftly resolving the engagement. Any hesitation or timidity is disadvantageous.

(5) Successful Engagement: Immediately assemble the unit, collect the wounded, handle prisoners, gather spoils of war, and withdraw quickly. If only part of the enemy force has been eliminated, the withdrawal must be especially swift; otherwise, there is a risk of facing an enemy counterattack.

(6) Unsuccessful Engagement: If the engagement encounters stubborn enemy resistance with no prospect of victory, withdraw from the fight promptly. Continuing to fight stubbornly when the situation is known to be unfavorable is a foolish approach. At such times, the commander must exercise maximum resourcefulness.

(7) Another Kind of Decisive Judgment: The commander’s decisiveness must also be demonstrated at other times—namely, before launching the attack, if it is discovered that the enemy’s strength is excessively formidable or that the ambush plan has been detected by the enemy and they have already occupied positions, leaving no chance of success, the attack should be halted and a decisive retreat made to preserve one’s own strength.

(8) However, there is one type of ambush: Its purpose is not to annihilate the enemy but to inflict casualties and disrupt their march. In such cases, regardless of the enemy’s numbers or whether the ambush is detected, the mission must be carried out. The unit conducting this type of ambush should be small, the locations multiple, and the actions alert and agile. If done this way, the mission can usually be accomplished.

(9) Ambushing enemy stragglers, messengers, foraging personnel, scouts, or other individual or small groups of personnel is a task suited for guerrilla groups. Such opportunities are frequent and should not be missed.

(28) Ambushing Enemy Transport Units, Requisition Squads, and Grain-Seizing Squads:

Guerrilla units and groups that ambush enemy transport units, requisition squads, and grain-seizing squads are usually successful, because transport units move clumsily, while requisition and grain-seizing squads must disperse to carry out their tasks.

(1) Setting an Ambush for a Transport Unit: The guerrilla unit should be divided into two parts: one part prepares to engage the enemy’s escort force, while the other part prepares to seize or destroy the transported goods. When the enemy transport unit moves into the ambush area, first fire on its vanguard, causing the entire transport column to halt, scattering the porters in panic. Then drive off or eliminate the escort force, seize the transported goods, and destroy whatever cannot be taken away. If it is necessary to prevent the transport unit from retreating, a small number of personnel should be sent to fire on its rear guard.

(2) Setting an Ambush for a Requisition Squad: This can be done before the enemy approaches a village: the guerrilla unit lies in ambush at a point the enemy must pass, and as soon as they arrive, launches an attack to wipe them out. Or it can be done when the enemy enters the village and disperses to requisition from various households: this is the most advantageous time, as the vast majority of the requisition squad is scattered and not easily assembled. Or it can be done when the enemy has finished requisitioning and is returning fully laden: this is used when the first two methods cannot be implemented due to prior preparations by the guerrilla unit. Regardless of when the ambush is set, the guerrilla unit must use sudden action to raid the enemy’s escort force in order to achieve the objective.

(3) Setting an Ambush for a Grain-Seizing Squad: This follows the same methods as ambushing a requisition squad and can be carried out at three timings—when the enemy first arrives, while they are cutting grain, or when they are returning—based on the specific circumstances.

(29) Ambushing Automobiles, Trains, and Watercraft:

(1) Ambushing Automobiles: The location should be chosen at a bend or a slope. At such places, lay stones or logs across the road, dig traps, or plant landmines (with traps and landmines disguised on top), causing the vehicle to crash, overturn, or be blown apart. The guerrilla unit lies in ambush at a concealed spot nearby. When the automobile arrives, one small sub-unit blocks the vanguard, another small sub-unit cuts off the retreat, and the main force in the middle captures the vehicle, seizes its occupants and cargo, and destroys the vehicle. The driver is propagandized and released. If there is an escort within, disarm them swiftly. Guerrilla units and groups operating near enemy automobile roads must learn and practice the tactics of raiding automobiles, in order to disrupt the enemy’s plan to use automobiles to transport and attack the Soviet Red Army.

(2) Ambushing Trains: Bends, slopes, places with high embankments, depressions, and tunnel entrances are all good ambush locations. Methods: Loosen or dismantle a section of the track so that the train derails when it arrives; or block the rails with large stones or logs to crash the train and stop its advance. The guerrilla unit divides into three parts: one part occupies positions to resist the train’s escort force; one part takes positions beside the tracks to fire on the carriages; and one part enters the carriages to seize weapons, capture occupants and cargo, and finally set the carriages ablaze. Although railways are not highly developed in China, the imperialists and the Kuomintang use existing rail lines for attacks on the Soviet Red Army. Therefore, guerrilla units and groups along railway lines have the responsibility of sabotaging railways and raiding trains.

(3) Ambushing Watercraft: Guerrilla units and groups have the responsibility to raid watercraft used by the enemy to transport troops and supplies for attacks on the Soviet Red Army, but civilian ships are excluded from this. When setting the ambush, the guerrilla unit divides into two parts: the main part prepares to meet the bow of the vessel, while the secondary part prepares to intercept the stern. When the enemy vessel arrives, the guerrilla forces emerge from ambush to occupy a raised spot or a bend along the riverbank, and suddenly open fire on the vessel as it enters the ambush sector. They order the vessel to steer toward their own bank and cease fire only when the vessel signals compliance. After docking, personnel and cargo on board are dealt with separately—official ships are destroyed, civilian ones released, and boatmen are given goods and money. If there is an enemy escort on board, use firepower to suppress and force them to surrender.

(30) Launching Sudden Raids on Encountered Enemy Forces:

Besides planned ambushes, guerrilla units may also encounter enemy forces on the march, in which case the method of combat is to mount a sudden raid.

A sudden raid depends on the size and strength of the enemy force.

When a guerrilla unit foresees the possibility of encountering the enemy (an anticipated encounter), the commander, along with a disguised reconnaissance group, should travel three to five li ahead of the main force (with the political commissar leading the main body) so as to personally observe the enemy situation and seize the initiative. If the encountered enemy is weak and inferior, seize the advantage of the first move, make a decisive decision, and exploit the opportunity to launch a sudden raid. This kind of sudden raid should be an ambush-like surprise attack: quickly move the guerrilla unit to the enemy’s flank, deploy in a concealed position, suddenly open fire on the advancing enemy, follow up with a charge, and resolve the engagement in one sweep. If the enemy retreats and there are no other enemy threats nearby, pursue them closely to annihilate them completely, but do not pursue too far.

If the encountered enemy is strong and powerful, avoid combat and withdraw rapidly without the slightest hesitation. For all unexpected encounters and enemies of unknown situation, avoid engagement to preclude needless losses.

When suddenly facing a strong enemy that is both difficult to overcome and hard to evade, first use firepower to halt the enemy’s advance, then promptly retreat.

In encounter battles, the swiftest decision and maximum agility are required; hesitation and indecision are dangerous.

(31) Using surprise attacks to directly assist the Red Army in combat:

When the Red Army is engaged in battle with enemy forces, guerrilla units that are not far from the battlefield should carry out surprise attacks near the enemy’s lines to help the Red Army achieve victory. During combat, the enemy’s rear services are critically important. Guerrilla units and guerrilla squads should conduct surprise strikes in the enemy’s immediate rear against their supply trains, field hospitals, staff offices, and all personnel not involved in the fighting, causing panic and disruption. This will compel the enemy to divert a portion of their reserve forces to deal with the guerrillas, thereby weakening the enemy engaged on the front line and directly assisting the Red Army.

Guerrilla forces may also challenge enemy reserve units near the front line. This does not require engaging in serious combat; merely drawing the enemy’s troops and attention to themselves substantially aids the Red Army’s operations.

When the enemy is retreating, guerrilla units and guerrilla squads should continuously attack the retreating forces along the way, throwing the enemy into panic and confusion and increasing their losses.

Section 4: Disrupting the Enemy’s Rear

(32) In attacking the Soviet Red Army, the enemy relies on various means of transportation and communication to link their rear with the front lines, concentrating large quantities of supplies to support the front. If the enemy’s transportation is obstructed and their supplies suffer losses, this will immediately affect their offensive forces. Therefore, disrupting the enemy’s transportation, communications, and all military equipment and supplies is one of the important tasks of guerrilla forces.

(33) When carrying out sabotage tasks, guerrilla forces must pay attention to the following points:

(1) Be familiar with the situation, use the terrain, appear suddenly, and withdraw quickly.

(2) Divide into a work team and a cover team. The work team carries out the sabotage. The cover team positions itself in a direction where enemy forces might appear, and opens fire to suppress them if they advance toward the work area. Therefore, the cover team must have sufficient strength and be prepared to engage the enemy. If a small number of enemy troops emerge, they should be dealt with decisively. Close communication and liaison must be maintained between the two teams. When the work is completed, a prearranged signal is used to notify the cover team, and both teams quickly assemble at a designated location, covering their tracks and departing swiftly.

(3) The best time for carrying out specialized sabotage work is usually at night. However, during ordinary guerrilla combat, sabotage efforts should also be linked whenever possible.

(4) The destruction of ordinary roads and bridges must be assessed based on the situation. Sabotage should only be carried out if it will have a direct and significant impact on the enemy’s movement and cannot be utilized by the Red Army. The significance of the sabotage should also be explained to the local population; otherwise, it may easily provoke their dissatisfaction.

(5) When capturing enemy supplies, aside from taking what is needed for the guerrillas’ own use and assisting the Red Army as much as possible, the rest should be distributed as widely as possible to the local populace. Whatever cannot be distributed should be destroyed.

(34) The following simple methods of sabotage can be carried out by guerrilla forces, drawing on their own experience:

(1) Cutting telegraph and telephone lines:

Whether telephone or telegraph lines, it is best to cut them at key points where the lines cross rivers, valleys, or midway between two communication stations, making it difficult for the enemy to repair. Telegraph poles should be burned, and the wires taken away or thrown into the water.

(2) Destroying bridges:

Destroying wooden and pontoon bridges: For wooden bridges, the method is to tie straw, dry firewood, resinous pine, or other flammable materials to the bridge supports and set them alight to burn the entire bridge. This is the most difficult to repair. An alternative is to remove the bridge planks, leaving only the supports. A further option is to dismantle sections at both ends where the planks meet the banks, or to remove several sections from the center. One of these three methods can be chosen based on the situation. For pontoon bridges, the primary method is to use fire; a secondary method is to dismantle one or both ends, allowing the bridge materials to drift away with the current. Other river-crossing equipment should be burned or thrown into the river.

Destroying stone bridges: The quickest method is to fill black powder into the crevices of the bridge stones (slightly enlarged by chiseling), pack it tightly, insert a fuse, and ignite to cause a collapse. The explosive point should be at the center of the bridge; for long bridges, each segment should be blasted. If no explosives are available, use picks to dismantle it.

(3) Destroying roads and railways:

Destroying roads: Excavate part of the roadbed, primarily at bends and on uphill and downhill sections. Since the enemy uses roads extensively for transportation, destroying roads is an important task.

Destroying railways: The main method is to dismantle the rails. The technique is: pull out the dog spikes so that the rails detach from the sleepers. Next, remove the bolts so the rail ends separate. Alternatively, hollow out the sand and soil beneath the sleepers or block up tunnels. These actions will cause trains to derail and overturn upon arrival. Destroying railway bridges, especially iron bridges, has an even greater impact; use explosives for this. Telegraph poles along the route should be chopped down and burned. Station signals, switch devices, crossing gates, water towers, and especially rolling stock should all be dismantled, blown up, or burned as much as possible.

(4) Destroying military depots and warehouses:

The method is to use fire. It is best to infiltrate the building and set it ablaze. Alternatively, use a long pole to ignite and set fire to the eaves. Another method is to place several pounds of black powder into a cloth bag or bamboo basket (not packed too tightly), wrap it with a mixture of sulfur and rosin, put it all into a box or kerosene can, run a long fuse from the black powder bag to outside the container, ignite it, and throw it through a window to achieve destruction by fire.

Section 5: Dealing with Enemy Encirclement and Pursuit

(35) Guerrilla forces operating behind enemy lines, by actively waging guerrilla warfare, mobilizing the masses to struggle, and disrupting the enemy’s transportation and rear-area organs, directly shake the rule of the landlord-capitalist class, weaken and disperse the enemy’s offensive strength against the Soviet Red Army. Therefore, the enemy will not let the guerrillas go unchecked. Depending on the strength of the guerrilla forces and the extent of the damage they inflict, the enemy will mobilize available forces to carry out encirclement and pursuit against the guerrillas, attempting to exterminate them and protect their own rear. Such situations must be anticipated by guerrilla leaders.

Fellow guerrilla comrades must understand: the greater the number of enemy forces diverted, the greater the evidence of the guerrillas’ successful activities, and the greater the assistance rendered to the Red Army. It must also be understood that guerrillas must not only carry out planned attacks on the enemy and sabotage their transportation and rear-area organs but must also have a definite plan to defeat the enemy’s encirclement and pursuit. If the guerrillas cannot overcome the enemy’s encirclement and pursuit, they will be unable to continue developing guerrilla warfare; nor will they be able to genuinely establish base areas, open up new Soviet territories, and grow into a Red Army force. Furthermore, it must be understood that encirclement and pursuit will occur frequently, and at times the guerrillas’ environment will be extremely difficult. Only by defeating encirclement and pursuit and overcoming any difficult environment can the guerrillas achieve complete victory.

For guerrilla forces on the borders of Soviet areas, as they are direct combat auxiliaries to the main Red Army forces, the enemy’s measures against the guerrillas are directly connected to their attacks on the Red Army and their efforts to prevent the Red Army from linking up. Therefore, the guerrillas’ response to enemy encirclement is directly included within our overall plan to smash the enemy’s encirclement, and the guerrillas carry out their own tasks under the Red Army’s overall mission.

(36) Guerrilla commanders must continuously assess the situation of both the enemy and ourselves, anticipate what enemy actions will be triggered by their own activities at any given moment, and discern what plans the enemy currently has against the guerrillas (as deduced from enemy movements). Based on this information, they must formulate their own plans to counter encirclement. When making their plans, guerrilla forces must adhere to the following principles:

(1) Seize the initiative and avoid letting the enemy gain the advantage of striking first.

(2) Closely rely on the masses, mobilize and arm the masses, and resolutely oppose the enemy’s encirclement.

(3) Unite the cadres and fighters. Constantly explain the enemy and our situation to them, oppose incorrect tendencies arising from changes in the situation, and prepare for the hardest battles.

(4) Resolutely suppress counter-revolutionaries and strictly guard against sabotage and mutiny by counter-revolutionary elements within.

(5) Concentrate the main forces in action without dispersing strength; fight under conditions that ensure a chance of victory and avoid unnecessary losses; employ skillful, flexible maneuvers to defeat the enemy.

(6) Ensure supplies of material resources such as food and money.

(37) Guerrilla forces should employ the following methods when fighting against enemy forces conducting encirclement:

(1) Attack the enemy before they advance, thereby disrupting their offensive plan. This method is best used when the enemy is not strong and lacks solid fortifications. When the enemy deploys several converging attack routes, first eliminate the weakest one. Such operations should apply the various methods described in Chapter 2, Section 2.

(2) Allow the enemy to advance to a suitable location and then destroy them while they are on the move. This method is best used when the enemy has strong fortifications unfavorable for a guerrilla attack. Such operations should apply the various methods described in Chapter 2, Section 3.

(3) Dispatch small detachments outside the enemy’s encirclement line to disrupt the enemy’s rear and disperse their forces. This is a supplementary method, carried out by local small guerrilla units, and should not involve dividing the main force.

(38) When strong enemy troops break into a Red area to search out and engage the guerrillas, or when several enemy columns coordinate a simultaneous advance, and the guerrilla battle situation is unfavorable with no certainty of victory by continuing the fight, the guerrilla forces may and should break away from these enemies, move beyond the encirclement line, preserve their own effective strength, and actively and deliberately draw the enemy away, thereby smashing the encirclement.

After moving beyond the encirclement line, the guerrillas can operate over a wider area, developing guerrilla warfare there and establishing new base areas. A local small guerrilla force should be left in the original area to continue developing the struggle. When opportunities arise, the main guerrilla force can return to operate in the original area. By employing such elusive, flexible, and vigilant tactics, the guerrillas can render many enemy offensive units helpless. Through such actions, the guerrillas can find numerous opportunities to eliminate weaker enemy forces and expand their own strength.

However, it is necessary to strictly prevent unnecessary and unplanned actions. It must be remembered: being flexible and vigilant does not mean aimless and unplanned flight.

(39) Guerrilla forces must have a planned approach to deal with large-scale enemy long-distance pursuit:

When the enemy conducts long-distance pursuit, even if their forces are powerful, they often cannot cope with guerrilla forces that are locally grown, because such guerrillas are familiar with the terrain and have close ties with the masses, while the enemy does not. Enemy long-distance pursuit is often employed against guerrilla forces that have come from afar and are unfamiliar with the local situation. Therefore, guerrilla forces pursued by a strong enemy must have resolute plans and clever methods to break away from these enemies. First, the guerrilla leader must strengthen their own determination and use that determination to unite their subordinates, calmly plan the methods for breaking away from pursuit, and overcome any wavering sentiments among the subordinates (which tend to arise especially after suffering enemy blows, during exhausting marches, or when supplies are scarce). The leadership art of the guerrilla commander is most needed and demonstrated in such especially difficult times. This is the most critical matter. Second, even while being pursued by the enemy, during marches they must make every effort to approach the masses, carefully inquire among them about the enemy situation and terrain nearby and in the direction of advance, and do their utmost to recruit workers and peasants into their ranks, thereby gaining a better understanding of the situation and using them as guides. For guerrillas, approaching the masses and understanding the situation is like a fish finding water or a blind person gaining sight. This is the second critical matter. Third, use the best methods of concealment (such as circling around, walking on remote paths, setting false trail markers, departing late at night from a campsite, and, when circumstances permit, hiding and then circling back to suddenly insert themselves behind the enemy and move in the opposite direction) and disguise (changing uniforms, sometimes pretending to be enemy forces, etc.), and when necessary, adopt the most intensive marching methods (e.g., covering over a hundred li in a day). Employing these methods can usually cause the pursuing enemy to suddenly lose track of the guerrilla force and be forced to halt their pursuit. Fourth, after breaking away from enemy pursuit, immediately select a good place to settle, win the support of the masses, develop guerrilla warfare, and annihilate the enemy. At this point, the guerrilla force will have again created a new operational environment for itself.

When the guerrilla force has clearly ascertained that the enemy pursuing them is weak, consisting of landlord armed forces or a small White Army unit, they must meticulously select the most appropriate time and place and use an ambush to deliver a sudden, unexpected blow to stop the enemy’s pursuit. This means adopting a counter-attack tactic against the pursuing enemy. The employment of this tactic must be particularly cautious: first, clarify the enemy situation and estimate with certainty that they can be defeated; second, the timing and location of the ambush must be precisely right; third, exert the greatest effort to raise the entire unit’s spirit for a decisive battle, and during execution use the most resolute and swift actions to destroy the enemy in a single blow from the guerrilla force. A lightly undertaken counter-attack with decisive implications, without heeding these conditions, is impermissible.

Section 6: Matters Concerning Marching, Camping, Supplies, Hygiene, Etc.

(40) Matters to pay attention to during marches:

(1) Walk more on hidden, small paths, and less on main roads; walk more on different routes, and less on familiar ones. When necessary, methods such as circling around, departing late at night, forced marches, and sometimes even covertly circling behind the enemy to move in the opposite direction can be used.

When necessary, use disguise (pretending to be enemy forces) so that the enemy cannot identify them as guerrillas. However, this should only be done when necessary, and its significance must be explained to the unit members.

(2) A disguised reconnaissance squad (for example, dressed as porters) is positioned at the head of the marching column. Its tasks are: (A) to scout the enemy's routes; (B) when on a raiding mission, if pedestrians heading in the same direction are spotted, overtake them and detain them at the rear to prevent any leakage of information; (C) if individual enemy scouts or sentries are detected, and if on a raiding mission, either report to the commander and take a detour to avoid detection (when feasible); if not on a raiding mission, capture or attack them in all cases; (D) when encountering enemy forces, immediately report to the commander and, based on the mission and the situation, quickly decide on a course of action: either launch a sudden assault or evade them; (E) set up road markers (the commander must instruct a designated person in the rear guard unit to collect the markers).

The reconnaissance squad should be a standing unit, formed of seven to fifteen members depending on the size of the guerrilla force, composed entirely of alert, brave, and composed members of the guerrilla unit, with a capable cadre serving as squad leader. At night, the reconnaissance squad advances one to two li ahead of the main force; during the day, it advances three to five li ahead. Good communication and liaison must be maintained between the reconnaissance squad and the guerrilla commander.

When there are concerns about enemy activity to the rear, a small number of scouts are dispatched to march behind the rear guard unit to reconnoiter the enemy situation.

(3) The commander's position during a march: When there are concerns about enemy activity ahead, the commander marches alongside the commander of the leading unit, leaving the political instructor (or political commissar) and the deputy to lead the main body; when there are concerns about enemy activity to the rear, the commander marches with the commander of the rear guard unit; when there are concerns about enemy activity on the flanks, the commander remains with the main body.

(4) Guides: During the day, two are needed—one with the reconnaissance squad and one with the vanguard unit; at night, one per unit. This does not apply when the route is familiar.

(5) Guerrilla forces during a march generally require only short rest breaks and not long ones; during rest breaks, choose concealed forested areas to avoid exposing their position.

(6) When passing through an enemy blockade line, make a rigorous march plan. Pay special attention to the following points: (i) Investigate clearly in advance the number of enemy blockhouses, their locations, the distances between them, the enemy's disposition, and which routes exist to allow the guerrilla forces to pass through. (ii) The passage must be made at night; inform the commanders of all units and the soldiers in advance of all matters to be noted during the crossing, and conduct rehearsals of nighttime crossing maneuvers beforehand. (iii) Prearrange a rallying point for after the crossing and inform all unit commanders; if contact is lost, each unit proceeds independently to the designated location to assemble. (iv) Prepare measures for dealing with detection by the enemy. (v) The highest-ranking cadres of the force (the guerrilla commander, political instructor, independent regiment commander, political commissar, chief of staff, and general Party branch secretary) are temporarily assigned to various units to strengthen leadership. (vi) If enemy blockhouses are dense and the guerrilla force is too large to pass through in a single column, a multi-route passage method can be used, dividing the force into several small teams that infiltrate between the numerous blockhouses and assemble at the designated location.

(41) Matters to be noted when encamping:

(1) The principle for arranging a guerrilla encampment is to allow the troops to rest while also maintaining the capability to defend against contingencies.

(2) First, select the encampment site and arrange the security posts based on the situation. If there are no enemies within a two-day march in all directions, if the local residents support the guerrilla forces and can enforce a news blackout externally, and if the terrain is complex and strategically defensible, then the guerrilla forces may encamp in local villages, with only concealed sentries (these must always be posted, drawn from the reconnaissance squad) being sufficient as security.

If these conditions are lacking or incomplete, great care must be taken in selecting the encampment site and setting up security posts. (i) Do not encamp in large villages; if the situation is critical, encamp in forested areas outside the village. (ii) Ideally, change the encampment site every night to make it impossible for the enemy to track the guerrillas. If the situation is critical, change the encampment site twice in one night—first set up an encampment at one location, then a few hours later quietly move to another location, with the two sites about ten li apart. If the enemy comes to attack, they will find an empty decoy encampment. (iii) Enter the encampment site at dusk or after dusk. (iv) Deploy concealed sentries in all directions and post military sentries on important routes. Independent regiments and battalions must deploy platoon or company sentry posts on important routes, and a military sentry post must be positioned on a commanding height immediately adjacent to the encampment site. (v) The encampment site must always be backed by a hill or good forested land. (vi) Security posts must be concealed yet must afford a view of all approaches from every direction.

(3) Regardless of the circumstances, as soon as the force reaches the encampment site (even late at night), the commander must lead the commanders of all units to personally inspect the terrain, the roads (those the enemy might use and those intended for our own withdrawal), and the emergency assembly ground; personally set up the security posts; and personally instruct all units on how the troops are to act in the event of an enemy situation. Do not neglect this inspection and instruction due to fatigue.

(4) Regardless of the circumstances, troops must encamp together in a concentrated group, aside from those assigned to security duties. If there are many houses in a village, the guerrilla force should occupy only the essential ones, and those must be conducive to defending against the enemy. Do not seek convenience by occupying extra houses or picking the best houses. The commander must sleep together with the soldiers and not look for a separate room; the messenger must remain at the commander's side.

(5) Regardless of the circumstances, maintain combat readiness. Firearms and packs must be placed close at hand. If the situation is critical, do not sleep undressed or with the ammunition belt removed; loopholes can also be made in the walls for firing. Prearranged warning signals must be set for an enemy raid.

(6) Actions to counter an enemy raid:

Upon receiving the alarm of an enemy raid, immediately lead the troops to the emergency assembly ground along the pre-designated route, and conduct a roll call of personnel and check of weapons. The security detachment must resist the enemy to cover the assembly of the main force and may only withdraw upon receiving the commander’s order. Whatever the case, the withdrawal must be orderly. At night, maintain strict silence and composure; do not make noise, do not fire rifles (except for the security detachment), and do not panic or move chaotically, lest the enemy detect where the guerrilla assembly ground is and along which route they are withdrawing.

If the attacking enemy has already broken through the security posts so that they cannot be withdrawn quietly, immediately make use of nearby positions to resist the enemy until the entire force has assembled at the assembly ground, and only then withdraw in an orderly fashion.

If the enemy has surrounded the buildings and the guerrilla forces are still inside them, the commander must immediately dispatch a portion of the force to fire outward from the walls, windows, and prepared loopholes to prevent the enemy from closing in and rushing into the buildings, while assembling the remaining forces as a reserve. At this time, the commander must, on the one hand, direct the resistance and, on the other, explain to the unit commanders and soldiers the necessity and possibility of resolute defense and preparation for a breakthrough, while simultaneously observing the enemy situation keenly to identify their weakest point. One must realize that in a night raid, the enemy will find it difficult to burst into the rooms all at once. As long as the commander has determination, exercises command, and can rally the subordinates, it is entirely possible to break out of the encirclement. Once the enemy situation is clarified, the troops are assembled, and the weak point is identified, a sudden counter-charge should be launched immediately, smashing through the enemy’s weak point. If the enemy is not strong, this can often drive them back or destroy a portion of them, allowing the guerrilla forces to return victoriously to their original positions.

If the encampment site is lost during a sudden enemy raid and some members are captured or have failed to withdraw from the buildings, the guerrilla forces should immediately attempt to retake the encampment site in order to rescue those comrades. This objective can often be achieved, because the enemy, having just secured a victory, is frequently in a state of disarray after the engagement and often neglects security, not anticipating a counter-attack by the guerrillas.

If the enemy attacks during the day, it becomes even easier for the guerrilla forces to observe the enemy situation and identify their weak points. As long as the guerrilla forces can rapidly assemble their troops, make good use of the terrain, and timely and resolutely launch a counter-assault and counter-charge, they can also drive off the enemy.