I. The State Political Security Bureau, within the territory of the Soviet areas and in accordance with the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, shall operate under the jurisdiction of the People’s Committee of the Provisional Central Government, carrying out functions such as investigation, suppression, and elimination of all counterrevolutionary organizations and activities—whether political or economic—as well as the detection and apprehension of bandits and other criminal elements.

II. The tasks, organization, and scope of work of the State Political Security Bureau differ markedly from those of the Anti-Counterrevolutionary Committees established in regions recently seized by uprising forces or newly occupied by the Red Army. The mission of the latter is to harness the revolutionary power of the worker–peasant masses so that, during and immediately after an uprising, all overt counterrevolutionaries and their activities are arrested and referred to the Anti-Counterrevolutionary Committee for disposition. These committees are elected by the insurgent masses and function under the leadership of the Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Committee—the commanding body of the uprising. They may maintain their own armed detachments to execute orders to detain, guard, and, where necessary, execute counterrevolutionary offenders. The duration of an Anti-Counterrevolutionary Committee’s existence depends on the timing of the establishment of local Soviet power and the degree to which it has been consolidated.

III. The task of the State Political Security Bureau is to employ its centralized, systematic organizational structure, together with the trust and assistance of the revolutionary masses, to conduct regular, methodical efforts to resist, expose, and eradicate all counterrevolutionary organizations and actions—both overt and clandestine—in order to safeguard and strengthen Soviet power. In new Soviet areas currently undergoing development, the work typically proceeds through a phase involving Anti-Counterrevolutionary Committees. Where such committees are active, the State Political Security Bureau should establish a formal supervisory relationship with them and gradually transform them into subordinate organs.

IV. The organizational principle of the State Political Security Bureau is complete centralization; it operates under the authority of a committee. The Director of the Bureau serves as chairman of this committee and may attend meetings of the People’s Committee with the right to speak. The power to appoint, remove, and discipline members of the Bureau rests with the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and its Presidium. One member of the Bureau shall be an inspector from the Supreme Court.

V. The State Political Security Bureau maintains representative offices in the provincial Soviet governments and the Central Military Commission, directing the work of its local branches and units within the Red Army. Branches are established at both provincial and county levels, also under committee supervision. The head of each branch serves as its chairman. Within the Red Army, special envoys are appointed by the Central Military Commission or by military committees in other Soviet areas, down to the regimental or divisional level. The Bureau and its higher-level branches may also directly dispatch special envoys to certain institutions. The authority to appoint, remove, and discipline branch heads, committee members, and special envoys resides exclusively with the State Political Security Bureau. Decisions regarding the lowest-ranking special envoys, however, are made by the provincial and military committees, subject to final approval by the Bureau.

VI. Except in cases of exceptional impediments, the hierarchical relationship within the State Political Security Bureau follows a consistent vertical chain of command. Subordinate units must unconditionally obey the directives of their superiors. While the various branches and special envoys receive political guidance from the respective local government authorities or from the military-political leaders of the Red Army, their heads may participate in presidium meetings of the provincial and county Soviets, they remain strictly subordinate to the Bureau in terms of operational matters. Local governments and Red Army command bodies have no authority to alter or suspend the Bureau’s orders; any objections must be submitted to the People’s Committee for resolution.

VII. The State Political Security Bureau delegates to its local branches and Red Army representatives the responsibility for investigating and handling all counterrevolutionary cases, but the ultimate decision-making authority rests with the Bureau itself. Only within the limits authorized by the Bureau may the branches render independent judgments. Special envoys, likewise, are restricted to carrying out tasks assigned by their superiors, except in situations of immediate emergency—for example, when counterrevolutionaries or their organizations are planning an uprising. In such instances, they may seek assistance from local authorities or Red Army units to effect arrests and dismantle conspiracies, subsequently reporting to their superiors for ratification.

VIII. The State Political Security Bureau, along with its branches and special envoys, serves as the official investigative arm responsible for receiving and processing all counterrevolutionary cases. Local residents, government agencies, Party organizations, the Communist Youth League, various revolutionary groups, and the Red Army all bear the duty to provide information and make reports to the Bureau. When required, local governments and the Red Army must furnish armed support and temporarily place themselves under the Bureau’s direction. Interactions between local governments, Red Army command structures, and the Bureau’s branches and special envoys are limited to horizontal coordination; only when necessary may the branches and envoys share select intelligence with their counterparts in government and the military, strictly within the parameters prescribed by the Bureau. Closer ties are maintained with Red Army command bodies to ensure that undesirable elements are promptly purged, thereby preventing counterrevolutionary activities from taking root.

IX. Generally, the authority to arrest and interrogate counterrevolutionary suspects and accused individuals rests with the Political Security Bureau. Other government agencies, Party organizations, the Communist Youth League, and all revolutionary groups are prohibited from conducting independent arrests or interrogations, and especially from meting out summary executions. Exceptions may be made in emergencies—for instance, if counterrevolutionaries or their organizations are found to be preparing an uprising or attempting to flee—whereupon other agencies or even the general populace may voluntarily deliver such individuals to the Bureau, though only for purposes of apprehension. Should the Bureau obtain sufficient evidence implicating high-ranking officials concealed within government departments, the Red Army, or various revolutionary organizations, it may notify the most senior official in question prior to execution, arranging for the appointment of a replacement. Even if the official objects, they may not obstruct the operation and can only lodge a protest with higher authorities. If the Bureau determines that no suitable replacement can be identified within a given agency, it must first inform the head of the superior authority before proceeding.

X. Sentencing and execution of counterrevolutionary offenders generally fall under the jurisdiction of the judicial organs, with the Political Security Bureau acting in the capacity of prosecutor. However, during periods of civil war and the expansion of the Soviet movement, and with the permission of the People’s Committee, the State Political Security Bureau may, pursuant to law, pronounce and carry out penalties against certain categories of counterrevolutionaries.

XI. The worker–peasant democratic regime’s principles for punishing counterrevolutionaries are defined along class lines. Members of exploiting classes—landlords, gentry, former officials, capitalists, factory owners, and rich peasants—who have committed overt counterrevolutionary offenses are to be subjected to severe punishment. By contrast, ordinary workers, Red Army combatants, tenant farmers, poor peasants, middle peasants, and independent laborers who, while coerced or deceived into joining or supporting counterrevolutionary actions or organizations, have not demonstrably surrendered to counterrevolutionary leaders, shall, in principle, be afforded opportunities for rehabilitation. Such measures range from public admonition and warning to confinement, expulsion from the army, and ultimately arrest and temporary deprivation of civil rights. The harshest penalty for counterrevolutionaries belonging to hostile classes is death; lesser punishments include imprisonment, hard labor, or expulsion beyond the boundaries of the Soviet area. Worker–peasant individuals who voluntarily confess after being coerced or deceived into counterrevolutionary activity shall be fully pardoned. Those who come forward following discovery or denunciation shall likewise receive lenient treatment, and any persons already detained should be released. Confessors from hostile classes will be judged according to their degree of complicity, and a period of review shall be imposed. During this interval, they shall not be permitted to move freely, and their sentences will be lighter than those otherwise warranted.

XII. The working principles of the State Political Security Bureau are divided into two distinct systems: investigation and enforcement (which includes examination and re-examination of collected materials). These two systems are separate and do not report to one another. The investigative division shall maintain an extremely sophisticated and intricate network of operations, while the enforcement division shall possess its own armed contingent.

XIII. All actions of the State Political Security Bureau shall be governed by law; pending the establishment of a supreme court under the Provisional Central Government, such matters shall be handled directly by the People’s Committee.

XIV. Until other Soviet areas are connected to the Central Soviet Area, the State Political Security Bureau may delegate its full authority over the political security organs of those regions to the executive presidium of the respective provincial government for direct exercise. This same principle applies within the Central Soviet Area when, due to objective disruptions, local branches become temporarily cut off from the central Bureau.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee; Zhang Guotai, Vice-Chairman; Xiang Ying, Secretary-General. Selected Legal Documents of the Base Areas during China’s New Democratic Revolution, Volume III. Social Sciences Press, 1981.  Outline of the Organization of the State Political Security Bureau of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Wen Jiang.