*This is a speech delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong in August 1933 at a conference on economic development convened for the seventeen counties of southern Jiangxi.

The fierce development of the revolutionary war demands that we mobilize the masses and immediately launch campaigns on the economic front, undertaking all necessary and feasible economic development endeavors.

Why? All our work at present should be directed towards securing victory in the revolutionary war, first and foremost, the complete victory in smashing the enemy’s fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign; ¹ towards securing the material conditions to guarantee the supply and provisions of the Red Army; towards improving the livelihood of the masses, thereby further inspiring their enthusiasm for participating in the revolutionary war; towards organizing the broad masses on the economic front, educating them, and thus gaining new mass strength for the war; and towards consolidating the alliance of workers and peasants through economic development, strengthening the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants, and reinforcing the leadership of the proletariat. For all these purposes, economic development work is necessary. This is something every revolutionary worker must clearly recognize.

In the past, some comrades believed that they were already too busy with the revolutionary war to find time for economic development work. So, whenever they saw anyone discussing economic development, they would denounce it as “Right deviationism.” They held that in a revolutionary war environment, there was no possibility of carrying out economic development, and that such work must await the final victory of the war, when there would be a peaceful and tranquil environment. Comrades, these views are incorrect. Those comrades who cling to these views fail to understand that if economic development is not undertaken, the material conditions for the revolutionary war cannot be guaranteed, and the people will grow weary in the course of a prolonged war. Look: the enemy is enforcing an economic blockade, speculators and reactionaries are sabotaging our financial and commercial systems, and the external trade of our red areas is severely obstructed. If we do not overcome these difficulties, will not the revolutionary war suffer greatly? Salt is very expensive and sometimes unavailable. Grain is cheap in autumn and winter but terribly expensive in spring and summer. These circumstances immediately affect the livelihood of workers and peasants and prevent its improvement. Does this not impact the fundamental line of the worker-peasant alliance? If the masses of workers and peasants become dissatisfied with their livelihood, will this not affect our work in expanding the Red Army and mobilizing the masses to participate in the revolutionary war? Therefore, the view that economic development should not be carried out in the environment of the revolutionary war is extremely erroneous. Those who hold this view often say that everything should be subordinated to the war, but they do not realize that if economic development is abandoned, this is not subordinating to the war but weakening it. Only by launching work on the economic front and developing the economy of the red areas can the revolutionary war secure a fairly substantial material foundation, can we smoothly carry out our military offensives and deal powerful blows to the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” campaigns; only then can we have the strength to expand the Red Army, extend our front lines thousands of li, and enable our Red Army, utterly free from worry, to attack Nanchang and Jiujiang under favorable conditions in the future, reducing its burden of finding provisions and allowing it to concentrate single-mindedly on fighting the enemy; only then can our broad masses achieve a fair measure of satisfaction in their livelihood and more gladly join the Red Army and engage in all kinds of revolutionary work. Only by doing all this can we truly claim to be subordinating to the war.

At present, among revolutionary workers in various places, many still do not understand the importance of economic development work in the revolutionary war, and many local governments have not yet focused their discussions on economic development issues. The organizations of the national economy departments of various local governments remain weak—some have not even found a department head, or have appointed people of lesser ability to make up the numbers. The development of cooperatives is only in its initial stages, and work on adjusting grain supplies has been taken up in only some areas. The task of economic development has not yet been publicized to the broad masses everywhere (this is extremely critical), nor has an atmosphere of fervent struggle for economic development been created among the masses. These conditions all stem from neglect of the importance of economic development. Through the discussions of our comrades at this conference and the transmission of its results after your return, we must create an atmosphere of enthusiastic economic development among all government workers and among the broad masses of workers and peasants. Everyone must understand the importance of economic development in the revolutionary war, and strive to promote the purchase of economic development bonds, foster the cooperative movement, construct granaries widely, and build reserves for famine relief. Each county should establish a branch grain-adjustment bureau, ² and important districts and key market towns should set up sub-branches. On the one hand, we must enable grain within the red areas to flow from surplus regions to deficit regions, so that it does not pile up in some places while being unavailable in others, with prices too low in some areas and too high in others; on the other hand, we must export our surplus grain in a planned (not unrestricted) manner, free from exploitation by middlemen speculators, in order to purchase essential goods from the white areas. Everyone must work hard to develop agricultural and handicraft production: produce more farm tools, produce more lime to increase next year’s harvests, and restore the former output of special products such as tungsten ore, timber, camphor, paper, tobacco leaves, ramie cloth, mushrooms, and peppermint oil, exporting them in large quantities to the white areas.

Looking at the volume of our import-export trade, grain is our largest single export item. Every year, we export about three million dan of grain—the average for each of our three million people would be exporting one dan of grain in exchange for the import of essential goods, and this is certainly not an underestimate. Who handles this trade? It is entirely conducted by merchants, who in the process inflict ruthless exploitation. Last year, peasants in the counties of Wan’an and Taihe sold their grain to merchants for five jiao a dan, while the merchants transported it to Ganzhou and sold it for four yuan a dan, reaping a sevenfold profit. Consider also that three million people consume about nine million yuan worth of salt and wear about six million yuan worth of cloth each year. In the past, needless to say, these imports of salt and cloth, worth fifteen million yuan, were all handled by merchants, and we paid no attention to it. The exploitation by merchants in this process is indeed enormous. For instance, merchants buy salt in Meixian at one yuan for seven jin, transport it to our area, and sell it at one yuan for twelve liang. Is this not terrifying exploitation? We can no longer ignore such things; in the future, we must certainly take them in hand. Our Foreign Trade Bureau must make great efforts in this regard.

How shall the three million yuan of economic development bonds be used once issued? We intend to use them as follows: one million yuan to provide funds for the Red Army’s combat expenses, and two million yuan to lend to cooperatives, grain-adjustment bureaus, and foreign trade bureaus as capital. Of this, a small portion will be used to develop production, and the greater part to develop import-export trade. Our aim is not only to develop production, but also to sell our products at appropriate prices for export and to purchase salt and cloth from the white areas at low prices, distributing them to the masses. In this way, we shall break the enemy’s blockade and resist merchant exploitation. We aim to steadily develop the people’s economy, greatly improve the livelihood of the masses, significantly increase our fiscal revenue, and firmly establish the material foundation for the revolutionary war and economic development.

This is a great task, a great class struggle. But let us ask: can this task be accomplished in the intense environment of war? I think it can. We are not saying we should build a railway to Longyan, nor, for the time being, a motor road to Ganzhou. We are not saying grain should be sold entirely through a state monopoly, nor that the fifteen-million-yuan salt and cloth trade should all be managed by the government with merchants excluded from any part. We neither say nor do such things. What we propose and are doing is to develop agricultural and handicraft production, export grain and tungsten ore, import salt and cloth, and begin with a capital of two million yuan supplemented by the equity contributions of the masses. Are these things that should not be done, cannot be done, or are impossible to accomplish? We have already begun this work, and we have achieved results. This year’s autumn harvest increased by twenty to twenty-five percent over last year, surpassing the projected increase of two-tenths. In handicrafts, the production of farm tools and lime is in the process of recovery, and tungsten ore production has begun to revive. The production of tobacco, paper, and timber has also begun to show some life. Grain adjustment has yielded considerable results this year, and the import of salt has also been initiated to some extent. These achievements form the very foundation upon which we are confident of future development. Is it not a manifestly erroneous view to say that economic development is possible only after the war is concluded and cannot be undertaken now? Hence, it is also clear that at the present stage, economic development must be carried out around the central task of the revolutionary war. The revolutionary war is the central task at present; economic development endeavors serve it, revolve around it, and are subordinated to it. The view that economic development is already the center of all tasks, to the neglect of the revolutionary war, and that economic development should be pursued detached from the war, is likewise an erroneous one. Only after the civil war has ended can it be said—and only then should it be said—that economic development is the center of all tasks. To attempt, in the midst of the civil war, those peaceful economic development endeavors that are meant for the future but not for the present, and that the future environment may permit but the present environment does not, is pure fantasy. The current work consists of those tasks urgently demanded by the war. Each of these tasks is for the sake of the war, not a peaceful undertaking detached from it. If any comrades harbor the idea of carrying out economic development in isolation from the war, they should correct it immediately.

Without correct methods of leadership and work, it is impossible to rapidly launch campaigns on the economic front. This is also an important question, and it must be resolved at this conference. For upon returning, comrades must not only personally and immediately begin many tasks, but also guide many other workers in doing the same. This is especially true for comrades at the township and city levels, as well as those working in cooperatives, grain bureaus, trade bureaus, and procurement offices—they are the practical workers who personally mobilize the masses to organize cooperatives, adjust and transport grain, and manage import-export trade. If their methods of leadership are wrong, if they fail to adopt a variety of correct and effective work methods, the results will immediately be affected: our various efforts will fail to gain the support of the broad masses, and we shall be unable to fulfill, this autumn and winter and next spring and summer, the overall plan of the Central Government for economic development.

Therefore, I wish to point out the following to you comrades: First, mobilize the masses organizationally. In the first place, comrades on the executive committees, in the national economy departments, and in the finance departments of governments at all levels must regularly place work such as the issuance of bonds, the development of cooperatives, grain adjustment, production development, and trade expansion on their agendas for discussion, supervision, and inspection. Secondly, we must activate mass organizations, primarily the trade unions and the poor peasant leagues. The trade unions must mobilize their members to join the economic front. Poor peasant leagues are a powerful base for mobilizing the masses to develop cooperatives and purchase bonds, and district and township governments must vigorously provide leadership to them. Next, we must conduct propaganda on economic development through mass meetings organized by village or by household units. In this propaganda, the relationship between the revolutionary war and economic development must be explained with great clarity, and the improvement of the masses’ livelihood and the strengthening of their fighting capacity must be explained in highly practical terms. We must call upon the masses to purchase bonds, develop cooperatives, adjust grain supplies, consolidate the finances, and expand trade, urge them to struggle for these slogans, and raise their enthusiasm. If we fail to mobilize and propagandize among the masses organizationally in this way—that is to say, if the executive committees, national economy departments, and finance departments of governments at all levels do not focus their efforts on discussing and inspecting economic development work, do not pay attention to activating mass organizations, and do not hold mass meetings for propaganda—then achieving the objective will be impossible.

Second, the methods of mobilizing the masses must not be bureaucratic. Bureaucratic methods of leadership are impermissible in any revolutionary work, and economic development work likewise tolerates no bureaucratism.

Cast that abominable bureaucratic approach into the cesspool, for no comrade likes it. What every comrade should embrace is a mass-oriented approach, one that every worker and peasant is willing to accept. One manifestation of bureaucratism is the slacking off that comes from ignoring people or brushing them aside with perfunctory responses. We must wage a stern struggle against this phenomenon. Another is commandism. On the surface, commandists are not slackers—they seem to be working diligently. In reality, developing cooperatives in a commandist way cannot succeed; even if some formal progress is made temporarily, it cannot be consolidated. The result is a loss of credibility, which hinders the development of cooperatives. In pushing public bonds commandistically—disregarding whether the masses understand them or can afford so many, just arbitrarily imposing quotas according to one’s own figures—the masses end up unhappy, and the bonds cannot be properly sold. We must absolutely reject commandism. What we need is to work hard at propaganda, to persuade the masses, and, in light of the specific conditions and the specific sentiments the masses show, to develop cooperatives, to promote public bonds, and to carry out all economic mobilization work.

Third, developing the economic construction campaign requires a large number of working cadres. This is not a matter of a few dozen or a few hundred people, but of thousands and tens of thousands. We need to organize them, train them, and send them to the front of economic construction. They are the commanders on the economic front, while the broad masses are the combatants. People often sigh that there are no cadres. Comrades, are there really no cadres? From the masses forged in the land struggle, the economic struggle, and the revolutionary war, countless cadres have surged forth—how can anyone say there are no cadres? Discard the wrong viewpoint, and cadres will stand right before you.

Fourth, economic construction today cannot be separated not only from the overall task of war but also from other tasks.^3 Only by deepening the land investigation movement can we thoroughly eliminate feudal and semi-feudal land ownership, stimulate the peasants’ productive enthusiasm, and swiftly bring the broad masses of peasants onto the front of economic construction. Only by resolutely implementing the labor law can we improve the lives of the working masses, make them actively and rapidly join in economic construction, and strengthen their leadership role over the peasants. Only by correctly guiding the election campaigns and the inspection campaigns^4 that unfold alongside the land investigation movement can we make our government organs sounder and enable our government to lead the revolutionary war, all aspects of work, and economic work with greater strength. Using cultural and educational work to raise the political and cultural level of the masses is also of tremendous importance for developing the national economy. As for never overlooking the work of expanding the Red Army, that goes without saying. Everyone understands that without the Red Army’s victories, the economic blockade would become even more severe. On the other hand, developing the national economy and improving the lives of the masses will undoubtedly greatly assist the work of expanding the Red Army, enabling the broad masses to surge eagerly toward the front lines. To sum up, if we secure all the conditions mentioned above, including economic construction as an extremely important new condition, and make all these conditions serve the revolutionary war, then the victory of the revolutionary war will undoubtedly belong to us.

Notes
[1] From 1930 to 1934, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces launched five large-scale military offensives against the Red Zone centered on Ruijin, Jiangxi, known as the five “encirclement and suppression” campaigns. The fifth officially began in October 1933, but from the summer of 1933 Chiang had been actively preparing for this offensive.
[2] Muchang, periodically held trading markets in rural Jiangxi.
[3] The land investigation movement was a campaign to check land distribution after it had been carried out in the Red Zones at the time, aimed at examining whether the distribution was entirely correct and proper.
[4] The inspection campaign was a democratic movement in which the broad masses, from the bottom up, exposed certain undesirable behaviors of personnel in the democratic government.