To the Soviet governments of Jiangxi, Fujian, Min-Gan, and Yue-Gan provinces, as well as to the Ruijin County Soviet and all levels of Soviet authorities:

Since the issuance of the Public Construction Bonds, considerable progress has been made in a short period. In localities where mobilization efforts were effectively organized, broad sections of the population enthusiastically supported the bond drive; for example, the Yunji District in Ruijin, and the Caixi and Hongfang Districts in Fujian, serve as exemplary cases. However, in many other areas, serious instances of compulsory quota imposition have occurred. The People’s Commissariat of Economic Affairs has already issued Instruction No. 16, together with a public notice and a propaganda outline, emphasizing that thoroughgoing mobilization is the key to successful bond sales and sternly condemning commandist practices in the bond-selling campaign.  In a directive letter to Soviet bond committees at all levels, the Central People’s Commissariat of Finance has extended the deadline for fully redeeming the bonds to November. The sales targets are to be determined according to local conditions, precisely in order to prevent coercive apportionment and allow sufficient time for comprehensive mobilization to encourage voluntary purchases. Following the issuance of these directives, there has indeed been a shift in sales methods across various regions. Nevertheless, this change remains inadequate. In numerous localities, forced quotas continue to be imposed. Particularly egregious is the case of Luofang District in Yudu County, where one middle peasant and the district Soviet chairman took their own lives in protest against the arbitrary bond levies. Similarly, in Xiaoxi District of Yue-Gan Province, over four hundred people fled the area, reportedly in connection with the same coercive measures. Such disgraceful incidents, which should never occur, have nonetheless taken place under the leadership of the Yudu County Soviet. Upon receiving this report, the central authorities immediately dispatched investigators to look into the matter and will impose severe disciplinary action on the Yudu County Soviet.

Upon receipt of this letter, all provincial Soviets are instructed to promptly direct their respective county Soviets to review the mobilization methods employed in each district and township for the bond drive. The Yudu incident must be used as a cautionary tale to warn all Soviet functionaries, and an intensive self-criticism campaign should be launched without delay, focusing squarely on eradicating all forms of commandism from every sphere of work—whether it pertains to Red Army recruitment, land survey campaigns, electoral processes, bond sales, or cooperative development. Commandist errors in Yudu have manifested themselves across all fronts, but they have been most blatant in the bond-selling effort. The lessons of Luofang and Xiaoxi should serve as a stark warning to all levels of the Soviet apparatus.

To ensure the successful sale of the bonds, both timing and target quantities must be carefully considered. Many local competition agreements set the deadline for completing sales by mid-October, which is far too hasty. In accordance with the September 15 instruction from the People’s Commissariat of Finance, appropriate extensions should be granted: for areas with late harvests or delayed bond distribution, the final deadline may be pushed back to mid-November. This will provide ample time for sustained and vigorous mobilization. However, it is absolutely unacceptable to follow the example of Huichang County, where the bonds were simply left unattended while the deadline was prolonged, leading to laxity and ultimately resorting to coercive apportionment in November—an approach that will not be tolerated.

As for the sales targets, they must be based entirely on local conditions and the level of mass enthusiasm. Some areas may need to increase their quotas, while others should reduce them; rigid, mechanically imposed figures are out of the question. County and district Soviets must adjust bond allocations on a case-by-case basis, according to the specific circumstances of each county and each district, so as to align with local realities. It is impermissible to distribute the bonds en masse and then consider the task completed, thereby forcing lower-level officials down the path of coercive quota-setting. This bureaucratic practice must be corrected forthwith.

Chairman of the Central Government Mao Zedong Vice Chairmen Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao September 1, 1933 Renyin Year, 100th Day of the Yellow Emperor’s Era, 13th Year of the Republic, 3rd Month, 27th Day Correcting Commandist Practices in Bond Sales Three Forces