Comrades! For two full days, you have been discussing the report I delivered on behalf of the Central Executive Committee and the People’s Committee to this Congress. Yesterday’s sectional meetings and today’s plenary session—over these two days—you have offered numerous opinions, drawing out lessons from every aspect of our work. In summary, it can be said that there has been unanimous recognition of my report. Regarding the current situation, the tasks arising from it, the implementation of Soviet policies over the past two years in all their various dimensions, as well as the weaknesses still present in our work, your discussions yesterday and today generally endorsed my presentation. The remarks made were, for the most part, entirely correct; this is the first point that should be emphasized.

However, during these two days of deliberation—particularly in yesterday’s sectional meetings—certain comrades voiced views that contained inaccuracies, and I too must bring them to light in my concluding remarks. The principal issue here concerns the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. On this matter, the majority of comrades agreed with what I stated in my report: we have achieved the initial victory over the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, yet the final decisive battle against it remains gravely before us. The call to mobilize the broad masses, unite all forces, and secure victory in this final showdown constitutes our most urgent task at present. Therefore, some comrades argued during the discussion that “the Fifth Encirclement Campaign has already been completely crushed.” Such a view is clearly incorrect. Others maintained that “we are merely preparing to crush the Fifth Encirclement Campaign,” which is equally erroneous. The former overestimates our achievements, lightly dismissing the serious responsibility of finally defeating the encirclement, while in reality Chiang Kai-shek is concentrating all his strength for a final major offensive against us. Hence, this assessment is not only inaccurate but also highly dangerous. The latter fails to recognize that, over the past several months, the Red Army has inflicted substantial blows upon the enemy through arduous warfare, securing an initial victory. This initial success, combined with the great triumph achieved in smashing the Fourth Encirclement Campaign, now forms a solid foundation for our ultimate annihilation of the Fifth. Underestimating one’s own accomplishments is equally perilous.

One comrade expressed the view that the People’s Revolutionary Government of Fujian possessed a certain degree of revolutionary character and was not wholly counterrevolutionary. This too is incorrect. As I pointed out in my report, the emergence of the People’s Revolutionary Government represents merely a new deceptive ploy by a section of the reactionary ruling class, attempting to save itself from impending doom. They regard the Soviets as their sworn enemies, yet find the Nationalist Party label too discredited. Thus, they concoct the sham of a “People’s Revolutionary Government,” appealing to a “third way” in order to deceive the masses—a scheme devoid of any genuine revolutionary significance, as current events have amply demonstrated. Another comrade, speaking in a sectional meeting, made further inappropriate statements, claiming that the Soviets had failed to expand the Red Army. Needless to say, such remarks were profoundly confused. Yet another asserted that all personnel in Fujian were opportunists. Again, this requires no further explanation; everyone knows it to be false. While we acknowledge that opportunist elements do exist among certain Soviet functionaries and must be resolutely combated, to generalize in this manner amounts to slander against the entire Soviet system.

Concerning marital matters, I noted in my report that when either spouse firmly requests divorce, the Soviet government ought to grant it. It should be pointed out, however, that special provisions apply to the families of Red Army soldiers. To strengthen the combat resolve of Red Army fighters, the central government has stipulated that a wife seeking divorce must obtain her husband’s consent; only if she has received no word from him for two years may she file for divorce independently. With regard to the marriage age, many comrades have advocated lowering the threshold. In my view, this proposal is ill-advised. For the interests of both the race and the class, the marriageable age should not fall below twenty-one for men and eighteen for women. Early marriage carries grave risks.

Comrades! Please bear with me just a moment! (The hall erupts in laughter.) Formerly, under landlord-bourgeois rule, poor workers and peasants often remained unmarried until their forties or fifties. Why, then, can we not wait even a year or two today? (Loud laughter again.)

The above constitutes the first part of my conclusion, but the main portion follows. There is one particularly important question that, in your discussions, you have not sufficiently emphasized: the connection between revolutionary war and the daily lives of the masses. This issue was neither highlighted in yesterday’s nor today’s deliberations, and I feel it necessary to raise it clearly here. The central task of the Soviets is to mobilize the broad populace to participate in the revolutionary war—to defeat imperialism through revolutionary struggle—and thereby advance the nation’s development. To reduce this fundamental mission to mere formalities, to blur its boundaries, would be tantamount to undermining the very essence of our revolution. If we fail to grasp this crucial task clearly—if we cannot see how genuinely advancing the revolution serves the vital interests of the masses, their everyday livelihood—we shall inevitably neglect those interests. We must never rely solely on grand slogans. Only by truly engaging the masses can we hope to wage effective warfare. For without their active participation, all our efforts will remain futile. The goal of winning battles and achieving victory lies in safeguarding the interests of the broad masses: leading the workers’ economic struggles to curb capitalist exploitation, guiding the peasants in their land campaigns, distributing land to improve their labor conditions and increase agricultural production, establishing cooperative enterprises, developing foreign trade, addressing issues of clothing, food, housing, fuel, oil, salt, and public health—all these are matters directly affecting the people’s daily lives. Unless we attend to them diligently, we shall never succeed.

The key to success, therefore, does not reside in abstract theoretical debates or in endlessly repeating catchphrases. Rather, it lies in concrete action: in deeply understanding the real needs of the masses, in formulating practical policies that genuinely benefit them, and in implementing those policies with unwavering determination. Only by placing the welfare of the people above all else can we effectively lead their struggles and achieve meaningful results.

Take, for example, the question of expanding the Red Army. Many of you have likely seen the two model county brochures we distributed. Consider the contrasting cases of Changgang County in Jiangxi and Caixi County in Fujian. Both achieved remarkable success in recruiting young men into the Red Army: in Changgang, eighty out of every hundred adult males joined; in Caixi, eighty-eight out of every hundred did so. Public debt was also vigorously promoted—in Changgang, with a population of 1,500, bonds totaling 4,500 yuan were sold. In all other aspects of war mobilization, these counties likewise attained outstanding results. Why was this possible? Let me offer a few examples. In Changgang, a poor peasant burned down a dilapidated hut; the commune immediately dispatched relief supplies to aid him. In Caixi, the commune provided financial assistance to impoverished households, allocating funds to help repair homes and purchase essential goods. These initiatives were warmly welcomed by the people, who actively contributed to communal projects. For instance, villagers voluntarily donated money and labor to build bridges and roads, demonstrating their enthusiasm for improving local infrastructure.

Crucially, the leadership in these model counties exhibited none of the bureaucratic inertia and indifference prevalent elsewhere. By studying Changgang and Caixi, we can learn valuable lessons in combating bureaucracy. I hereby solemnly urge this Congress to pay close attention to the everyday lives of the people—from basic living conditions to access to food, fuel, and medical care. Women need to be taught how to use plows and harrows; where are the instructors to teach them? Children require schooling; are primary schools adequately established? The wooden bridge opposite is dangerously dilapidated—should it be repaired? Many people suffer from illness and disease—what measures can be taken to address these problems? All such issues concerning the people’s daily lives must be placed squarely on our agenda: discussed, resolved, implemented, and monitored. Our aim should be to ensure that the broad masses recognize the Soviets as champions of their interests, as voices with whom they share a common destiny. Only then can they wholeheartedly support the Soviets, appreciate the higher tasks they set forth, and enthusiastically engage in the revolutionary war—the very struggle that will ultimately liberate them from exploitation and oppression.

The leaders of Changgang and Caixi exemplified precisely this spirit. Their tireless dedication to serving the people earned them the respect and admiration of the entire community. Through their visionary leadership, they transformed their respective regions into shining beacons of revolutionary progress. Their success demonstrates that true power resides not in lofty rhetoric or empty promises, but in steadfast commitment to the welfare of the people.

So, how can we secure the unwavering support of the masses? How can we inspire them to devote their utmost energy to the revolutionary cause? It requires bringing people together, awakening their initiative, showing genuine concern for their hardships, and sincerely working to advance their interests—addressing issues of salt, food, housing, healthcare, and even childbirth. We must tackle all these challenges comprehensively. Only in this way will the broad masses come to embrace the Soviets as their lifeline, as the banner of their highest aspirations. When the Nationalists launch an attack, the people will defend the Soviets with their very lives. There is no doubt about it. Is the Fifth Encirclement Campaign truly shattered? Not in the slightest! Consider the ancient fortresses and palaces built by feudal emperors over millennia—are they not considered impregnable? Yet, when the masses united, they were swiftly overthrown. The Russian tsar, once regarded as one of the most tyrannical rulers in history, faced insurrection after insurrection from the proletariat and peasantry. Ultimately, his seemingly impenetrable defenses crumbled. Comrades, the true essence of Soviet power lies in the millions of people who wholeheartedly support the Soviets. This is the genuine revolutionary force we seek to unleash. Without resolute leadership capable of breaking through the enemy’s encirclement and rallying hundreds of thousands of troops, no amount of empty sloganeering will suffice.  Some comrades have suggested that we simply repeat the slogan “Expand the Red Army!” a thousand times—night after night, day after day, like monks chanting the name of Amitabha Buddha. But such rote repetition achieves nothing; the Red Army remains untouched. (Laughter) Do we not encounter similar situations in our own work? Indeed, quite frequently! Take the cases of Ruijin and Fujian. Ruijin’s recent intensive campaign to expand the Red Army deserves high praise. Guided directly by the Central Bureau and the Central Military Revolutionary Committee, and conducted over a period of one and a half months starting November 1st, the campaign succeeded in recruiting nearly four thousand new recruits. This was accomplished through sound methods—by promoting anti-imperialist education and intensifying class struggle among the masses—which yielded such impressive results, making Ruijin the clear winner of this island-wide expansion drive.  Now consider Fujian: across more than ten counties, the overall results amounted to little more than what Ruijin alone achieved. Even Ruijin’s success depended heavily on a shift in leadership style during the final two weeks of the campaign. Had the same bureaucratic approach prevailed throughout, Ruijin itself would scarcely have managed to recruit thirty additional soldiers. In fact, Ruijin expanded its ranks by four thousand within forty-five days, whereas in August of last year it had added only thirty recruits over an entire month. The stark contrast between ineffective, bureaucratic leadership and decisive, pragmatic guidance underscores the profound lesson we must draw from this experience. Furthermore, examining Ruijin’s November campaign reveals that certain districts—such as Xiaoxiao and Huangbai—achieved virtually no results during the first half of the period due to incompetent management. Once the leadership was changed and proper methods were adopted, the second half not only met but exceeded the monthly quota by over one hundred percent. The same principle applies to the promotion of government bonds. While Ruijin successfully sold and collected bonds totaling 140,000 yuan, our Yudu County, under the sway of opportunism and bureaucracy, managed to raise only 19,000 yuan. To this day, the remaining 120,000-plus yuan in bond certificates likely remain locked away in the offices of those very officials responsible for their failure. In contrast, Changgang County sold bonds totaling 4,500 yuan, with each resident purchasing an average of 3.8 yuan worth. If every county were to emulate Changgang’s approach, the central region alone could issue bonds worth 1.1 million yuan. Yet, following Yudu’s example, even one million yuan would prove insufficient. Does this not underscore the critical importance of leadership and methodology? The same holds true for land surveys, economic construction, cultural education, border area work, and all other Soviet endeavors. If we merely set ambitious goals without exercising effective leadership during implementation, without adopting sound working methods, without actively combating opportunism and bureaucracy, and without replacing empty rhetoric with concrete, practical action—or coercive orders with patient persuasion—then no task, however noble, can ever be truly accomplished.  Comrades, let us take inspiration from the model counties of Xingguo and Changgang, which have successfully integrated the daily lives of the people with the revolutionary war, simultaneously resolving pressing social issues while advancing the revolutionary cause. These exemplary cadres approached their work with earnestness and meticulousness, tackling problems head-on and achieving tangible results. In the face of revolution, they demonstrated unwavering resolve, taking firm responsibility for guiding their communities toward a brighter future. Among them were outstanding individuals—skilled organizers and dedicated leaders—who played pivotal roles in uniting the people and steering them toward victory. Their achievements serve as a powerful reminder of the potential inherent in every Soviet cadre.  In provinces such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Hunan—as well as in numerous counties across Jiangxi—Soviet work still harbors significant weaknesses. Fujian and Guangdong, in particular, remain far from fulfilling their full potential, burdened by lingering opportunistic and bureaucratic influences. Moreover, the relationships between these provinces and the central authorities remain strained, with some local leaders failing to grasp the broader strategic objectives of the revolution. Consequently, they continue to operate in isolation, oblivious to the imperative of strengthening ties with the central leadership and aligning their efforts with the national revolutionary movement.  The work being carried out in these regions urgently requires a thorough transformation following the First All-Soviet Congress. Especially those cadres steeped in opportunism and bureaucracy—those who remain detached from the realities on the ground, indifferent to the sentiments of the masses, and prone to empty rhetoric or coercive directives—must be unequivocally condemned by this Congress. Their views and methods are fundamentally flawed, obstructing the advancement of the Soviet cause and undermining the revolutionary war effort. They should be promptly reformed. At the same time, we must recognize and nurture the many dedicated, conscientious cadres who have emerged from among the masses. These comrades bear a special responsibility: to confront opportunists and bureaucrats with rigorous self-criticism, guiding them toward swift correction and ultimately purging recalcitrant elements from the ranks of the Soviet movement.  We stand at the threshold of a great revolutionary war, poised to break through the enemy’s massive encirclement and extend the revolution nationwide. (1) All Soviet personnel share an immense collective responsibility. Following this Congress, we must adopt concrete measures to improve our work: advanced areas should forge ahead, while lagging regions must catch up. We should strive to create thousands of Changgang-like communes and dozens of Xingguo-style counties—communities that embody the principles of revolutionary mobilization and mass participation.  In conclusion, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign looms large before us, demanding decisive action to shatter the imperialist powers and secure victory for the revolution. With this, my remarks come to an end. Other points I raised in my original report will not be repeated here. My conclusion is now complete. (Thunderous applause)