APPEAL TO THE MASSES OF JUI-CHIN, HUI-CH'ANG, PO-SHENG, AND SHIH-CH'ENG COUNTIES FOR 50,000 TAN OF GRAIN TO SELL TO THE RED ARMY

June 1933

[Text] (1) During the fourth revolutionary war, after Chiang Kai-shek's White army in the North suffered several tragic defeats and the Red Army won several great victories, the Kuomintang warlords are mustering their remnant troops and preparing a new attack. Meanwhile, Kwangtung's warlord Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Fuchien's warlord Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, and Hunan's warlord Ho Chien are starting out together and moving their troops against the soviet areas. The Red Army is fighting bloody battles against the enemies and aiming at smashing the enemy encirclement campaign. In another aspect, the Kuomintang conspired with Japanese imperialism to occupy Peiping and Tientsin, and the Red Army is preparing to confront imperialism directly and knock down the imperialist Kuomintang at the same time. However, in the Red Army at this time, a serious grain problem has arisen. Some of the Red Army troops live on rice congee, and some of the Central Government organs must also live half of their meals in congee. The price of rice is high, and it cannot be bought. It is truly a difficult problem. In addition, a part of the extremely impoverished masses, especially the families of Red Army soldiers, have nothing to eat. The situation is very serious.

(2) Is there no grain in the soviet areas? No, the soviet areas have considerable amounts of grain. Leaving aside K'ung-lueh and Wan-t'ai, where grain is abundant, and taking, for instance, the counties of Jui-chin, Hui-ch'ang, Po-sheng, and Shih-ch'eng, we find that there is a surplus every year. Though the harvest last year was inferior, there was still a large surplus. Why is it that the Red Army cannot buy grain in these areas? Primarily, it is due to the manipulation of the rich peasants and unscrupulous merchants. They hide the grain, or raise the price much above the market and deliberately make it difficult for the Red Army. Next, the people with more grain still fail to understand the difficulties of the Red Army and want to wait for higher prices in the future. Even those who have an average amount of grain do not understand the difficulties of the Red Army; therefore, they have not saved a part of their grain to sell to the Red Army. With these two reasons, grain has become unavailable on

the market. Comrades, you do not understand the difficulties of the Red Army because the soviets of the various areas have never explained them to you. Now the Central Government wishes to purchase 50,000 tan of grain from the counties of Jui-chin, Hui-ch'ang, Po-sheng, and Shih-ch'eng to supply the Red Army at the front. It wishes to place the responsibility on the county, district and township soviets and the 1 million people of the four counties. The distribution is 16,000 tan from Jui-chin, 12,000 tan from Hui-ch'ang, 12,000 tan from Po-sheng, and 10,000 tan from Shih-ch'eng. However, this time it is not borrowing, but purchasing. According to our grain borrowing experiences of the past, the masses voluntarily loaned much grain to the Red Army, and many of them even returned to us the grain borrowing notes. It indicated the tremendous revolutionary fervor of the masses. It indicated that the masses regarded the life of the Red Army as their own and the moment they heard of the need, they lent their grain. But, comrades, the Red Army has exhausted the grain borrowed in the past and the Central Government now wishes to buy grain. The amount is 50,000 tan, at market price. It is to be delivered in batches during the month of June. In regard to the method, those with surplus grain will surrender the surplus and an additional amount save by them. Those without surplus will save some grain and surrender it. Only those who do not have enough to eat and must depend on their relatives and friends for help do not have to sell to the government. Comrades, we all hope that the Red Army will win. Now that the Red Army fighting on the front does not have enough to eat, can we set our mind at ease? We must all eat more sundry grains and vegetables and save a part of the grain to sell to the Red Army. As many driblets become a river, we believe that it should not be hard for the million population of the four counties to save 40,000 or 50,000 tan of grain. Comrades, as long as the Red Army on the front has enough to eat and wins battles, even if our masses in the rear eat a little less, it will be glorious and joyful!

(3) Another aspect of the grain problem also requires the attention of our broad masses. It is the problem of the grain shortage of the extremely impoverished masses. The majority of us must not allow them, especially the families of the Red Army soldiers, to go hungry. Their difficulty must be solved by us all. The method of solution is mutual help among the masses, first by selling grain at reduced prices, and next by borrowing in summer and repaying in the fall. For the interest of the class, we must not consider ourselves only and ignore the others. Those townships with more grain must help those with less grain. Those villages with more grain must help those with less grain. In a village, those households with more grain must help those with less grain. Besides selling 50,000 tan of grain to the Red Army, we must help the extremely impoverished masses. Only thus are true class friendship and true class mutual help!

Arise, all 1 million of the masses of the four counties!

Sell 50,000 tan of grain to the Red Army!

Help the impoverished masses by "price reduction" and "grain loans!"

Do not let the Red Army live on congee!

Do not let the impoverished masses go hungry!

Help the Red Army break down the fourth enemy encirclement campaign with grain!

Long live the victory of the Red Army!

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Government
Hsieh Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-tao, Vice Chairman

"RED CHINA," No 83, 4 June 1933