Recently, reports from various regions indicate that grain transportation has been prohibited in many counties within the Soviet areas. Boundaries have been drawn between County A and County B, leading to widespread food shortages and soaring rice prices—money cannot buy food. This is a very serious situation. Within the Soviet zones, the availability of grain varies: some areas have surpluses while others face scarcity. In border regions, enemy raids have exacerbated rice shortages. Areas where Red Army units are stationed and near hospitals experience even greater food shortages. The mutual redistribution of grain among different districts and counties is not only crucial for ensuring the daily sustenance of the general populace; it is also vital for supplying the Red Army and rear-area hospitals. It is an indispensable condition for defeating the enemy’s fourth encirclement campaign, making it particularly important.

The reasons hindering grain circulation can be summarized as follows: (1) Residents in grain-short areas fear that if too much grain leaves their locality, they will have to purchase expensive rice during May and June. (2) Those with surplus grain wish to hold onto it for later, hoping to fetch higher prices. (3) Wealthy farmers and unscrupulous merchants manipulate the market for profit, sometimes deliberately causing disruption and undermining the revolutionary war effort. Local governments, without proper investigation, simply impose bans. However, those who worry about facing high rice prices locally in May and June should know that other regions have already been consuming increasingly expensive rice for some time. In Yongding, one yuan buys just three and a half liters; in Shanghang, four liters; in Tingzhou, seven liters; and in Ruijin, even eight liters. In all other areas suffering from rice shortages, prices continue to rise daily. Urban workers, having no land to cultivate and earning a living through wage labor, must feed their families—with elderly and children alike—on meager wages while purchasing exorbitantly priced rice. Meanwhile, the entire Red Army is fighting desperately on the front lines, relying on supplies delivered from the rear. Local governments must explain these facts to the people, emphasizing that it is imperative to ensure everyone across the Soviet zone has enough to eat, especially the Red Army. Only by uniting and working together to defeat the enemy can we find a way out. They should also urge households with surplus grain not to hoard it in pursuit of higher prices, as others are starving and the front lines lack military rations. We must recognize that if the overall situation remains poor and the Red Army fails to prevail, our own interests will never be secured. As for wealthy farmers and unscrupulous traders who resent the government’s procurement of military rations and the cooperative distribution of food, whether they deliberately stockpile goods or secretly manipulate the market, even spreading false rumors to incite the masses, such actions constitute counter-revolutionary behavior. Local governments should lead the revolutionary masses in imposing strict sanctions against them. After all, the interests of the whole and the interests of the war take precedence over all other considerations, a principle that both local governments and the people need to deeply understand.

The Central Government has already formulated a plan for grain redistribution and established a Grain Redistribution Bureau. Local governments should lead the people in swiftly organizing grain cooperatives and, with guidance and support from the Grain Redistribution Bureau, vigorously implement this initiative. In addition to rice, salt should also be distributed to counter the hoarding and manipulation tactics of wealthy farmers and unscrupulous merchants, prepare for the Nationalist Party’s severe blockade, regulate food supplies across regions, and provide adequate provisions for the front lines. Local governments should be aware that last year’s harvest in the Central Soviet Zone was poor, and this year’s spring famine is bound to be severe. Leading the people to resolve this grave issue is a major task for the Soviet government. From provincial Soviets down to urban and rural representative assemblies, thorough discussions, precise planning, extensive publicity, and resolute action are required to accomplish this mission. This is a matter of direct concern to the masses and a key factor in breaking the enemy’s fourth encirclement campaign. To transform the Soviet government into one that truly represents the interests of the people and effectively leads the war effort, we must pay the utmost attention to this problem.

In addition to the notice issued by the Central People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, this order is hereby transmitted to all levels of local governments for strict compliance.

Issued by: Chairman Mao Zedong, Vice Chairmen Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao. Gregorian calendar, March 4, 1933. Red People’s China, Issue 58, March 6, 1933.  To regulate food supplies and ensure military provisions.