On Redistributing the People's Food Supply to
Help Provide for the Military
Order No. 39 of the Council of Peoples Commissars
of the Provisional Central Government
(March 4, 1933)
According to recent reports from various localities, in many places in various
xian within the soviet areas it has been forbidden to transport rice. Boundaries
have been drawn between xian A and xian B, famine has occurred in many
places, and the price of rice has soared, to the point that even those with money
cannot buy it. This is an extremely serious phenomenon. It appears that within
the soviet areas the grain situation varies; there is a surplus in some places and a
shortage in other places. Places in the border areas have been looted by the
enemy, leading to rice shortages. Where the Red Army is stationed and near
hospitals the shortage of rice is even more severe. Mutual redistribution and
adjustment among the various districts and xian does not affect merely the daily
provisions for the popular masses in general; it is a matter of great importance.
The fact that it affects the provisions for the Red Army and the hospitals in the
rear, and is therefore a condition that cannot be missing even for a day in order to
withstand the enemy's Fourth Attack, is of particularly great moment.
There are only three causes that impede the flow of food supplies: (I) The
popular masses whose grain supply is insufficient are afraid that if they let too
much out from their own locality, they will have to pay higher prices for rice in
May and June. (2) The popular masses who have a surplus of grain want to save
it for later so that they may get a high price for it. (3) The rich peasants and
unscrupulous merchants manipulate the market to seek profits, and even deliberately cause trouble and sabotage the revolutionary war. Without investigating,
the various local governments began to carry out the ban [on transporting grain].
They could not know that as for the fear of eating expensive rice in their own
area in May and June, in other places the eating of expensive rice had begun long
before. In Yongding, 1 yuan buys 3 sheng; in Shanghang, 1 yuan buys 4 sheng;
Ibis docwnent was tint published in Hongse Zhongh1«1, no. 58, March 6, 1933. We have
banslated it from Mao Zedotrgji, Vol. 3, pp. 19s-97, which reproduces that version.
"'

MARCH l933
36S
in Dingzhou, 7 sheng; in Ruijin, it has even reached 8 sheng. In other places
with rice shortages, it is more expensive from one day to the next. The workers
of the city, having no land to till, have to work as laborers. They have to buy
expensive rice with the small wages they earn to feed the young and old in their
families. The entire Red Army is fighting with all its might against the enemies
at the front, relying on rice supplied from the rear. All local governments should
give these explanations to the masses in their localities. It is essential that the
whole Soviet Area have food to eat, especially that the Red Army have food to
eat. The only way out is to join hearts and energies together to smash the enemy.
Those who have a surplus of grain should be told not to think only of high prices.
Other places are suffering from hunger, and provisions for the troops are lacking
at the front, so people cannot sit back and remain indifferent. [They] need to
know that if the whole [of the Soviet Area] is not in good shape, and the Red
Army is not victorious, your own interests cannot be served either. As for rich
peasants, and unscrupulous merchants, they hate it when the government purchases rice for the army and they hate it when the cooperatives redistribute food
for the popular masses., so they either stock up intentionally, or manipulate
behind the scenes, or even create rumors in a big way to stir up the masses.
These are all counterrevolutionary acts and the local governments should lead
the revolutionary masses in punishing them severely. It must be made known
that the interests of the whole and the interests of the war are the most important
interests of all. The governments and popular masses everywhere should be
profoundly aware of this.
The Central Government has decided on a plan to redistribute food and has
established a Grain Redistribution Bureau. All local governments should lead the
masses in quickly organizing grain cooperatives and diligently carry out [the
work], under the leadership and with the assistance of the Grain Redistribution
Bureau. In addition to rice, salt also needs to be dealt with, to counteract hoarding and manipulation by the rich peasants and unscrupulous merchants, to guard
against the severe blockade by the Guomindang, to redistribute the people's
provisions in all locations, and to supply military provisions at the front. Local
governments in all localities must know that last year the harvest in the Central
Soviet Area was not abundant, so this year the problem of famine in the spring
will inevitably be severe, and that leading the masses to solve this serious problem is a momentous task of the Soviet Government. From the provincial soviets
down to the township and village representative committees, there must be detailed discussions, comprehensive plans, widespread propaganda, and diligent
actions. Only thus can this task be accomplished. This is an issue of immediate
concern to the masses and a key to smashing the enemy's Fourth Encirclement
Attack. If the Soviet Government is to become a government that truly represents
the interests of the masses, and if the Soviet Government is to become a government that is capable of leading the war, then this problem may not be neglected
in the slightest.

Note
Aside from being announced by the Central People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, this order is being sent to all localities and all levels of government
to be carried out accordingly. It is so ordered.
Chairman
Vice-Chairmen
Mao Zedong
XiangYing
Zhang Guotao