Proposal as to How the Fourth Front Army'
Can Smash the Fourth "Encirclement
and Suppression"
(September 1932)
To the Central Bureau, for urgent forwarding to the Hubei-Henan-Anhui SubBureau:
We have taken cognizance of your telegram.
I. This time the enemy has concentrated his forces and launched a concerted
attack on our Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area by converging columns, and the
entire situation is quite different from that of last year. 2 Nevertheless, the strategy and tactics very much resemble those in last year's three "Encirclement and
Suppression" [campaigns] against the Central Soviet Area, when all the participating divisions advanced methodically together, and the enemy also benefited
from the tactics of resolutely defending strong points, moving steadily, and striking sure blows.
2. Consequently, we suggest that at present, the Fourth Front Army should
adopt appropriate tactics for luring the enemy deep into places where we have a
foundation in mass work and where the topography will favor us and conceal the
target of our main forces. It should carry out rigorously the tactic of having the
masses strengthen the walls and clear the fields [iianbi qingye],3 and make widespread use of our guerrilla detachments for actions such as harassing the enemy
from all directions, checking the enemy, carrying out surprise attacks, and cutting the enemy's communication lines. In this way we can wear out and disperse
the enemy's strength; it is not advantageous to hold a certain strong point obstinately, for this will facilitate the enemy's concerted attacks by converging col-
();~
text is Mao Zedong jun.shl wenji, Vol. I, pp. 286--87, where it is
reproduced from a printed document. The date is given as the middle ten days or Scptemberi932.
umns. Thus, in the course of mobile warfare, we should single out the enemy's
weak units and, after striking a fierce blow at a small part of the enemy's forces
and wiping it out, immediately move in another direction. By means of speed,
daring, secrecy, and mobility, defeat the enemy one by one, in order to shatter
completely the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression."
3. On the basis of the current situation and the strength and flexibility of the
Fourth Front Army, you can make use of the strategic and tactical experience of
these three campaigns.4
4. The two victories of the Sixteenth Red Army at Tongshan and Xianning,s
and the beginnings of a victory by the First Front Army this time in its movement northward, are all operations to cooperate with and assist the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area. Under the advantageous condition of striking the enemy at
one point, the West Hunan-Hubei Soviet Area should send one division to operate to the west of the Beijing-Hankou railway line.
Members of the Central Bureau
at the front
Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

--- Notes

I. The Fourth Front Army was the main Red Army force operating in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area. It should not be confused with the Fourth Army, which operated
in the Central Base Area.

2. This campaign began in August 1932, as one of several launched by Nationalist
forces to eradicate smaller communist base areas preparatory to launching another fullscale assault on the Central Soviet Area.

3. On the use of this term, see above, the relevant note to the text of July 4, 1931.


4. I.e., the encirclement campaigns against the Central Soviet Area.
S. The reference is to operations in southeastern Hubei by a Red Army force operating
in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet Area. The Sixteenth Army had been established in
August 1930.