Encirclement of and Attack on the
Soviet Area in Western Hubei
(September 1932)
To the Central Bureau, for urgent forwarding to the West Hunan-Hubei Sub-Bureau and to the Central Committee:
We think that since the enemy is using large numbers of troops to surround
tightly the soviet area in western Hubei, the Third Red Army should concentrate
all its forces, flexibly choose the enemy's weak point, attack this side of his
forces first and wipe it out, and use the local armed forces and the guerrilla
actions of the masses to immobilize the other fronts. Only in this way can the
enemy be defeated one by one. If, because you are worried that the enemy may
invade the soviet area, you divert part of your forces to guard against this, you
will not only fail in your resistance because the forces will be insufficient, but
you will also reduce the forces employed in the decisive battle, and the losses
will be even greater. It was disadvantageous last time to divide the Third Army
into two units during operations.! Especially under the present conditions of civil
war, it is even more disadvantageous for the Red Army to fight a prolonged
battle of several days against the enemy, but to fail to destroy him. At present,
the central area is only 40 or 50 li [across]. The Seventh Division and the Eighth
and Ninth divisions should find a way to take advantage of the dark of night and
small roads to avoid combat and steal out of the enemy's heavy encirclement
right away, then concentrate their forces, choose an appropriate spot, and be
prepared to hit the enemy when the opportunity offers. They can also develop
new soviet areas. On both the internal and external fronts of the soviet's core
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. I, pp. 284-85. where it is
reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. The date is given as the first ten days of
September 1932.
I. The Red Third Army in West Hunan-Hubei came into existence in March 1931,
when, as part of a larger reorganization of Red Army forces throughout the country, the
Central Committee ordered this redesignation for a force previously known as the Second
Army Group. In July 1932, Nationalist army forces began a major encirclement campaign
against the West Hunan-Hubei base area, and the Third Army divided its forces in an
unsuccessful attempt to resist the enemy attack. By October the entire base area had been
lost, though part of the Third Army escaped.

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER
area, guerrilla and mobile warfare should be expanded and developed to resist
and harass the enemy. The Eighth and Ninth divisions should not be called back,
as stipulated in the plan of the sub-bureau, nor should the Seventh Division be
sent to another xian.2 Dispersion, as well as prolonged and obstinate fighting,
provide the enemy with the best opportunities to smash us one by one and to
launch attacks on us by converging columns. Do you agree or not? Please reply
by a telegram.
Zhou Mao Zhu Wang
at the front

--- Notes

2. Reference here is to various component units of the Red Third Army.