Proposal to Convene a Plenary Session of the Central Bureau at the Front
to Discuss Operational Issues[1]

(September 25, 1932)

Central Bureau:

Telegram received.

(1) If a battle can be sought immediately now, it would indeed provide direct assistance to Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Hunan-Hubei-West, and open up the situation for northward development. We have considered this repeatedly. However, under the current enemy situation and the existing strength of the Front Army, there is no certainty in attacking cities and striking reinforcement troops. If, out of eagerness for battle, we act rashly, the result will instead waste time without success, squander troop strength in vain, and by seeking speed cause delay, thereby creating an even more unfavorable situation.

(2) If we attack Le’an, past experience shows it cannot be taken quickly or easily, which will inevitably draw strong reinforcements from the west, leading to pincer attacks from within and without, and we will fall into an unfavorable position. A feint attack on Nancheng from Lichuan is separated by a large river; the feint will have no effect, and we will be unable to strike the reinforcement troops. At present, there is only one opportunity: Yihuang is garrisoned solely by Sun Lianzhong’s[1] unit, and there are reports that the Fifth Division is moving to Guixi. If true, this could tie down enemy forces on both the eastern and western fronts. A forceful attack on Yihuang to annihilate Sun Lianzhong’s unit would be the first step of the plan, but we must wait for confirmation of the enemy situation before we can move. This would prolong the period of waiting for an opportunity within the Soviet area; if unconfirmed, time will inevitably be wasted in vain.

(3) We believe that to break through the current difficult situation, it is especially necessary to recognize that the enemy is arranging an even larger-scale offensive against the Central Area[2], and that brutal warfare will soon arrive. We must not lose the opportunity to adopt the policy of turning the northern region red, closing in on Yihuang, Le’an, and Nancheng, altering the enemy situation, and striving for conditions favorable to a decisive battle in order to annihilate the enemy. As for specific arrangements, we further advocate that in the first phase, we turn red the area west of Nancheng and south of Yihuang and Le’an, make preparations for warfare, and at any time strike at enemy advances from the east and west, or at raiding forces from Yihuang, Le’an, and Nancheng. Only in this way can we victoriously coordinate with the offensives of the Red Army nationwide. This is naturally an active offensive.

(4) If the Central Bureau agrees to this arrangement, please reply by telegram immediately so that we can set out tomorrow morning. If it is deemed necessary for us to wait for an opportunity to attack Yihuang, then we can only wait here without moving, because advancing close to Yihuang without being able to fight would be an even greater mistake.

(5) Regardless of which action the Central Bureau agrees to, we propose immediately convening a plenary session of the Central Bureau at the front, with all members present. This can not only resolve the current operational issues but also discuss accepting the Central Committee’s directives, the general operational policy and development direction of the Red Army, local mass mobilization and work in White areas, and especially the concrete implementation of expanding the Red Army and the Soviet areas and striving for the central cities, etc. The date of the 30th would be best for the meeting, allowing three days to reach Xiaotang north of Ningdu.

(6) What is your decision? Awaiting reply by telegram.

Zhou, Mao, Zhu, Wang
The 25th

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[1] This was a telegram sent by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the General Political Department of the First Front Army of the Red Army, to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of the Communist Party of China.

[2] Refers to the telegram of September 25, 1932, from the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of the Communist Party of China to Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang. The telegram stated: "Amid the active operations and arduous fighting of the Red Army in all Soviet areas nationwide at present, we do not agree with your dispersing of forces to first turn Nanfeng and Le’an red and close in on several cities in order to alter the enemy situation and seek favorable mass conditions to annihilate the enemy forces, and to explain this as the concrete arrangement and spirit of an active offensive strategy. In practice, this will delay the operational time by more than one month. It will not correspond to or coordinate with the active and arduous operations in Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Hunan-Hubei-West, and, more directly, the Sixteenth Army and Eighth Army west of the river. Moreover, it will give the enemy time to make arrangements. Dispersal also carries the risk of being attacked by the enemy, which is disadvantageous to us and could develop into a serious mistake." The telegram also stated: We believe the main force of the Red Army should actively strike out at the enemy, first attacking the Ninetieth Division at Le’an and seeking to annihilate this enemy. If this is not easily achieved, then draw out the enemy at Nanfeng and annihilate them.

[1] Sun Lianzhong, then serving as Commander of the Ninth Route Command of the Kuomintang Army’s General Headquarters for "Bandit Suppression" in the Jiangxi-Guangdong-Fujian Border Region.

[2] Central Area, referring to the Central Soviet Area.