Report on the Present Military Operations'
(September 23, 1932)

To the Central Bureau and for transmittal to the Central Committee:
1. The enemy's situation at present: after the Eighteenth Army disposed of
Zhang Ying's Fifty-ninth Division,² the Eleventh Division returned to Ji'an. The
Fourteenth Division is in Jishui and Xin'gan, the Forty-third Division is in
Yongfeng, and the Ninety-fifth Division³ is in Le'an. In Yihuang there are the
Twenty-fifth Division and one brigade of the Fifth Division.⁴ In Fuzhou there are
the remnants of Sun Lianzhong's forces and another brigade of the Fifth Divi-sion. In Nanfeng and Nancheng there are still the three divisions under Mao, Xu,
and Li;⁵ one brigade is in Lita and Xinfeng. It is not clear where the Fifty-second
Division is stationed; probably it is in the vicinity of Ji'an, Jishui, and Anfu. In
the area above Taihe on the Gan River is the Guangdong Army. Zhou Zhiqun's
forces are still scattered in Jianning, Taining, Shaowu, and Guangze in northern

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 290-92, where it has been
reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
Fujian. Generally speaking, they are moving forward very slowly, but the enemy
forces in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian are advancing relatively fast.
2. The best operation that the Red Army can undertake at present is to launch
an attack on the enemy immediately, unfolding toward northern Fujian, develop
the situation, promote morale, and provide direct assistance to the Hubei-Henan-
Anhui and the West Hunan-Hubei [soviet areas). In launching an attack we must,
however, be assured of victory and of being able to wipe out a portion of the
enemy forces, in order to smash the enemy one by one. These are the only
correct tactics. Otherwise, if we are impatient in seeking battle and meet with
reverses, this will lead to even more serious mistakes.
3. At present, because the enemy is firmly defending his urban strongholds in
the White region, there are still broad areas in the vicinity of the cities along the
line Jishui-Yongfeng-Le'an-Yihuang-Nancheng-Nanfeng-Lichuan that have not
yet been made Red. In addition, because of the difficult conditions created by
our past mistakes in strategy, our forces which will take the cities and strike at
the enemy's reinforcements must constantly be alert to the possibility that the
enemy may launch a concerted attack by converging columns. Moreover, many
Red Army men have left their units because of illness, and there is no time to fill
up the ranks by recruiting. It is also not easy to attack and destroy the three
relatively strong enemy divisions that are operating close to each other. Therefore, if we attack the two cities of Le'an and Yihuang once again, within two or
three days the enemy in the east, west, and north can concentrate at least five
divisions of troops to reinforce his concerted attack. At the same time, Wu Qiwei
and Zhou Hunyuan can certainly not be defeated as easily as Gao Shuxun.⁷ If we
attack Litayu, since the enemy is relatively weak, he will withdraw his forces to
Nanfeng City, where the fortifications are very strong and he can hold them
while waiting for larger reinforcements. When that time comes, the reinforcements will be too numerous, and we will be unable to attack the enemy from any
direction. If we attack Yongfeng City, we will be moving even closer to large
numbers of the enemy's reinforcements.
4. Consequently, we believe that under the current unfavorable situation for
an immediate battle, the general orientation for our operations at present should
be to take Nanfeng, turn the area on both sides of the Nanfeng River Red,
particularly the part from Nanfeng to Le'an, promote changes in the enemy's
situation, and prepare to attack and destroy the current main enemy forces in the
course of mobile warfare. The concrete deployment should consist in placing a
large force of troops in the area from the west of Nanfeng to the vicinity of Le'an
and placing one unit of troops southeast of Nanfeng to work for the expansion of
the Soviet Area. After this work has been going on for a time, small forces
should constantly be sent to Nanfeng to carry out guerrilla attacks, to provoke

the enemy to send troops to reinforce Nanfeng so we can prepare to attack the
reinforcements. At the same time, we should seize an opportunity to link up with
the soviet area in northern Fujian. Though this deployment is not aimed at an
immediate attack on the enemy, these are still active and offensive tactics, for
turning this area Red and closing in on these cities will surely change the
enemy's situation. It will also provide the Red Army with favorable mass conditions for wiping out the enemy and taking key cities.
5. During this operation we must assume that there will be a change in the
enemy's situation. When the time is favorable for us to attack, we must naturally
concentrate our forces flexibly for the battle. At the same time, in the course of
our work, we should never show the slightest negligence regarding the enemy's
offensive deployment and [the need for us to mount] surprise attacks by small
units at appropriate times.
6. We have decided to set out the day after tomorrow. If the Central Bureau
has any new opinions, we hope you will inform us immediately by telegram.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

--- Notes

1. This and subsequent documents dated September 26-30 present the views of Mao
and his "frontline" associates (Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang) on the strategic
and tactical military issues involved in efforts to counteract the buildup of Nationalist
troops preparatory to launching the Fourth Encirclement Campaign. As noted in the Intro-duction, disagreements over these issues between frontline and rear echelon Central Bu-
reau members provided the immediate rationale for convening the Central Bureau plenary
session that became known as the Ningdu Conference. We have been unable to locate full
texts of any of the rear echelon Central Bureau members' responses to the documents
translated herein, though portions of these responses are quoted in Mao Zedong nianpu and
other sources.

2. In September 1932, because the Fifty-ninth Division of the Eighteenth Army had
suffered heavy casualties in the "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign against the
Communists, its commander, Zhang Ying, was relieved of his post and what remained of
his division was reorganized into three regiments, which were incorporated into other
units.

3. A note to the Chinese text indicates that the "Ninety-third Division" should probably read "Ninetieth Division." The Fourteenth Division was commanded by Huo Kuizhang
and the Forty-third Division by Liu Shaoxian.

4. The Fifth Division was commanded by Zhou Hunyuan; the Twenty-fifth Division
has not been located in existing orders of battle.

5. Mao Bingwen, Xu Kexiang, and Li Yunjic, commanding the Eighth, Twenty-fourth,
and Twenty-third divisions, respectively.

6. The New Fourth Brigade.


7. Referring to commanders of the Nationalist army's Ninetieth, Fifth, and Twenty-seventh divisions, respectively.