Directive of the Central Executive
Committee Concerning the Problem of
Expanding the Red Army
(No. 15, September 20, 1932)'
1. The current development of the revolutionary war--at a time when the
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army continues to win great victories throughout the country, and when in addition there is a high tide of workers' strikes
all over the country and a great unfolding of the anti-imperialist movement
and the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the Northeast-has entered a stage of life-and-death struggle against the counterrevolutionaries,
bringing straight to the fore the historical phase of vast armed clashes between the Chinese masses of workers and peasants on one hand and imperialism on the other.
The imperialist Guomindang's huge new Fourth "Encirclement Attackl
against the soviet areas throughout the country and the Workers' and
Peasants' Red Army has been continuously routed or destroyed by our heroic
Red Army on all fronts, and has met with continuous defeat. To salvage their
moribund rule, the Guomindang warlords on the one hand are gathering their
greatest military forces to make a last-ditch defense of key cities, and at the
same time are mobilizing large formations of several divisions or more to
fight to the death against the Red Army in an attempt to avoid being routed
and destroyed.
Given such a fierce, large-scale revolutionary war, in order to smash the
enemy's Fourth Encirclement Attack thoroughly, succeed in taking key cities
quickly, and accomplish the current fighting task of winning initial victory in

Jiangxi, it is necessary for us to destroy the enemy's large concentrations of
military power with the strongest armed force. To this end, not only must mil·
lions of worker and peasant masses be called to arms, but what is most important
is to strengthen the main armed force of the revolutionary war--the Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army. At the time of the civil war in the Soviet Union, Lenin
once said during a certain campaign: "Estimating the enemy's military power, to
accomplish the work we have taken on, by next spring we should have a million
Red Army soldiers, and later there should be three million." On the basis of our
estimate of the present development of the revolutionary war, we must not only
be able to destroy the enemy's large formations of military forces rapidly and
efficiently; we must also be prepared at all times to engage directly in widespread armed combat with imperialism. For this reason, both objectively and
subjectively, in order to accomplish the task at hand it is necessary for our
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to rapidly become strong, going along according to the development and demands of the revolutionary war. Vigorously
expanding the Red Army is at present a most fundamental condition for our
thoroughly smashing the enemy's armed forces, accomplishing all tasks, and
striving for soviet victory throughout China.
2. Recent investigation of results in expanding the Red Army in various
locations has been truly disappointing and shows the local soviet governments'
lack of enthusiasm for expanding the Red Army. Jiangxi was able to reach only
half of its originally planned goal, and Fujian fell much further short. This proves
that governments at all levels failed to recognize: the current situation of the
revolutionary war and their own central tasks. This accounts for the passivity
toward the work of expanding the Red Army and the failure to make expanding
the Red Army one of their primary working tasks.
It must first be pointed out that soviet governments at all levels shifted the
work of expanding the Red Army onto committees to support the Red Army,
while they themselves took a position of bearing no responsibility at all for it. At
the same time they did not use political mobilization to encourage the broad
masses of workers and peasants to join the Red Army enthusiastically. They
failed to lead the masses of workers and peasants and to carry out effectively the
regulations on preferential treatment for Red Army [families] so as to encourage
the masses of workers and peasants to join the Red Army eagerly. In actuality,
coercion and giving orders have taken the place of propaganda and agitation
work, forms of covert seduction (such as giving gifts as enticement) have even
taken the place of political mobilization, and the quality of people is not taken
into consideration. As a result the small, the weak, the old, and even class-alien
elements have been sent into the Red Army to fill the ranks. The work of
expanding the Red Army is not steady, but rather an on-again off-again phenomenon. This is an extreme case of performing one's duties in a perfunctory manner. Not only is it impossible to expand the Red Army this way, but this
obstructs the expansion of the Red Army and saps the strength of the Red Army.

26B
Most serious is that many district and township governments do not actively urge
deserting soldiers to return to ranks or lead the masses to oppose desertion but
rather assign these people to local jobs. In various parts of Fujian letters have
even been written telling Red Army soldiers to return home. This actually
amounts to openly and directly sabotaging the Red Army. Some local governments are actually not as actively engaged in expanding the main force, or the
Red Army, as they are in expanding local armed forces. All of these are obstacles to the expansion of the Red Army. The fact that the provincial and xian
governments have not done their utmost or used the most concrete methods to
correct these mistakes made by the lower levels of government and offer guidance is a manifestation of passivity toward expanding the Red Army.
3. The development and demands of the revolution absolutely will not
allow these errors to continue developing. The Central Soviet demands that
governments at all levels rapidly rectify these serious errors with the most resolute determination, and strive and struggle to realize the current tasks of the
soviets. All work methods that obstruct the expansion of the Red Army are to be
fundamentally eliminated and abandoned. Wherever there is deliberate or unwitting sabotage of Red Army expansion and weakening of Red Army power, the
leaders of the government at that level should be punished according to revolutionary discipline.
4. Now is a period of revolutionary war, and all of our work should serve the
war effort, all forces should be pooled toward developing and strengthening the
revolutionary war, all sacrifices made to strive for revolutionary victory. Therefore, expanding the Red Army is a most fundamental task for the soviet government in actually leading and developing the revolutionary war and completing its
current task. This task should have first priority on the work schedule and become one of the regular tasks.
a. Expanding the Red Army is done primarily through political mobiliza..
tion. The broadest possible masses of workers and peasants should be stimulated through the unfolding and victory of the war and the unfolding and
deepening of all class struggles to develop enthusiasm for taking part in the
war and to join the Red Army voluntarily and eagerly.
b. The masses should be led effectively to carry out the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army, frequently visiting and taking care of Red
Army families. Being a Red Army soldier should become a matter of honor
among the masses in order to encourage the worker and peasant masses so that
they join the Red Army without any worries whatsoever about their families.
c. Propaganda and agitation are to be used to arouse the enthusiasm of the
worker and peasant masses and inspire the masses to join the Red Army.
Coercion and giving orders are absolutely to be abolished.
d. Meetings of all organizations (such as meetings of the electorate,
township deputy meetings, Red Guard armies, Young Pioneers, labor
unions, poor peasant leagues, etc.) are to be used to carry out the regular

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26!1
work of expanding the Red Army. In particular, political propaganda and
education should make the worker and peasant masses realize on a deeper
political level the great significance of joining the Red Army and expanding
the Red Army, thus firmly correcting the tendency to turn "expand the Red
Army" into a mere slogan for meetings.
c. People's class status and quality should be investigated in detail so that
class-alien elements, those who lack enthusiasm, and those in poor physical
health are not sent in to make up the numbers. Those who become Red Army
soldiers must be the healthiest and most enthusiastic elements among the
worker and peasant masses. Only in this way can the Red Army be qualitatively strengthened.
f. A movement against desertion should be launched among the masses so
that they feel that "to desert is to go slow in the revolution" and ”to desert is
to aid the enemy." The ire and scorn of the masses should be aroused toward
desertion, and it should even be punished by the masses (making deserters'
names public, for example, or forbidding them to participate in all groups and
organizations, etc.) so that deserters cannot "hang around in a carefree manner" at home without shame. The general practice of desertion must be eliminated through a movement against desertion.
5. All of these are simply the mistakes made in expanding the Red Army.
The more the revolutionary war develops victoriously in a forward direction,
however, the more our all-out armed battle to the death against the imperialist
Guomindang expands and intensifies. Moreover, to win victory for the soviets
throughout China in this decisive class battle and liberation for the Chinese
people and the worker and peasant masses, the entire worker and peasant masses
must be called upon and furnished with arms, and the greatest revolutionary
military force of the worker and peasant masses must be established. In particular, the main force in the revolutionary war must be strengthened as the war
develops. Only in this way may the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army meet the
needs of this revolutionary war and win total victory in the war.
6. In its Directive No. 14,3 the Central Soviet formally raised the point that by
widely establishing Red Guard armies and intensifying education and training in
bearing arms among the entire masses of workers and peasants. ”all can exercise
the right to arm themselves to strengthen and develop the soviets and to fulfill
their duties of serving in the Red Army and fighting at the front" (see Directive
No. 14). At the same time, "in order that the Red Army may get sufficient
replenishment of its military manpower as the war develops and that these recruits
may be transported to the front, it is necessary, during the current period of
voluntary service, to establish immediately Red Army reinforcement regiments."
"Each xian is to establish a Red Army reinforcement regiments (see Directive No.

14). The implementation of all of this work has everywhere been extremely
formalistic and perfunctory. In Jiangxi attention has been paid only to the organization and training of the Red Guard armies' model battalion, and the work of
the Red Guard armies as a whole has been sorely neglected. In Fujian, practically nothing at all has been done to carry out the establishment and training of
the Red Guard armies. This is proof that the various military areas and governments at various levels have not understood the significance of arming the whole
of the masses of workers and peasants and the role of accumulating military
force to reinforce the front lines. Therefore, the general practice of using the Red
Guard armies purely as armed forces to consolidate the soviet areas and coordinate with the actions of the Red Army, failure to do actively the work of expanding the Red Army within the Red Guard armies, and separating the expansion of
the Red Army from the Red Guard armies instead of linking the two, are grave
mistakes. As for the work of the reinforcement units, many have not yet been set
up, and the ones that have been established cannot fulfill their role because they
have not achieved much in the way of expanding the Red Army. Sources for Red
Army soldiers should be: (I) the broad masses of toiling workers and peasants in
the soviet areas, and (2) the worker masses in the White areas, the large numbers
of peasants and disaster victims who suffer exploitation by the Guomindang
warlords and the landlords, soldiers in the anti-imperialist, anti-Guomindang
volunteer armies, and all the laboring masses, as well as revolutionary soldiers in
the White army. But because the soviets in various places have not actively
promoted the development of soviet areas or set up the work in the White areas,
the guerrilla forces have become troops to guard the soviet areas and do not
penetrate deeply into the White areas to develop guerrilla warfare, lead and
develop the workers' and peasants' struggles in the White areas, and create new
soviet areas. In actuality, many contrary actions have occurred that violate and
sabotage soviet discipline and credibility, obstruct the expansion of the soviet
areas and winning over the masses in the White areas, and create a severe
situation of opposition between Red and White. This means that it is impossible
to draw the worker and peasant masses in the White areas into the Red Army to
expand it. At the same time, with regard to the work of Red Army expansion
within the soviet areas, aside from passivity and mistakes in work on the part of
the soviets. there is also the fact that an organization responsible for expanding
the Red Army has not been clearly designated. The Red Army support commit4
tees are not in fact true mass organizations and organs of the movement to
support the Red Army and for expansion of the Red Army, but are simply run by
a few staff workers specially there to expand the Red Army, and because in the
work there are no fixed relationships and organizational foundations, this gives
rise to a sort of foundationless, floating situation. In this way, Red Army expansion relies solely upon a kind of extremely simple propaganda and agitation. This
kind of agitation work is not regular either and is heavily laced with a commandist style. This naturally causes a situation in which reinforcements from the rear

SEPTEMBER l!U2
are unable to keep up with the needs of the front. That Red Army expansion is
unable to keep up with objective developments is the largest loss in our revolutionary development.
Even though at present military service is still voluntary rather than compulsory, of course mobilizing the worker and peasant masses to join the Red Army
still relies upon our carrying out all sorts of political mobilization (compulsory
military service also requires some political mobilization, but it has a coercive
component to it). Given the present development and demands of the revolutionary war, however, past methods of expanding the Red Army are no longer
suitable to address the current needs. It must be understood in particular that the
front makes use of troops, and it would do great harm to ensuring complete
victory in the war if the rear could not amass a steady supply of troops to keep
sending to the front. Therefore, in addition to Directive No. 14, the Central
Government has established the following regulations:
1. Although at present military service is voluntary, propaganda about compulsory military service should begin immediately, to prepare for the future transition
and to make the broad masses of workers and peasants realize that to be a Red Army
soldier is not only an obligation but also a right enjoyed only by the worker and
peasant class, and that all exploiters have been stripped of such rights.
2. During the present period of revolutionary war,the Red Army is the field
army doing battle at the front, and the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers are
not only the armed forces of the broad masses but are also the garrison army and
supplementary force for consolidating the soviet areas and supplying reinforcements to the Red Army. This means that the Red Army actually makes use of
troops, and the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers are where the amassing of
troops takes place.
3. According to Directive No. 14, as for the Red Guard armies, all members
of the worker-peasant laboring masses (men and women) aged eighteen to forty
should join them (those who join the Young Pioneers need not join the Red
Guard armies). But at present propaganda methods are to be used so as to get
those with the right to vote to join voluntarily. It is desirable through this work,
however, to have all members of the worker-peasant masses between the ages of
eighteen and forty join up, thereby establishing a foundation for the eventual
institution of compulsory military service.
4. The Red Guard armies are to be set up as follows: one army per xian, one
division for every three districts, one regiment per district, one battalion per
township, between two and five companies in each battalion, three platoons in
each company, between three and five squads in each platoon, and from ten to
fifteen people in each squad. In the cities, a separate Workers' Red Guard Army
is to be established, with workers as the main force. There are some places at
present, however, where because the history of the struggle is relatively short
and Red Guard armies have not yet been established, this arrangement may be
brought into existence gradually, so as to guard strictly against unwillingness and simply using orders to coerce the masses.
5. The Red Guard armies fall under the jurisdiction of the various military
districts. The position of army commander is to be filled by the head of the
military department at the xian level and the position of political commissar is to
be filled by the Communist Party branch secretary at the xian level. The position
of division commander is to be filled by having the military department [of the
division] apply to the military district to appoint the head of the military department of a given district to serve concurrently. The position of political commissar is to be filled by having the Communist Party xian committee appoint a
district branch secretary to serve concurrently, with the military district's political department providing supplementary personnel. The head of the district military department serves concurrently as regimental commander, and the
Communist Party district branch secretary serves concurrently as the
[regiment's) political commissar. As for commanders of battalions, companies,
and platoons, the district military departments submit reports to the xian military
departments for them to make appointments. Company political instructors are
designated by the xian [Party] committees from among Communist Party members in the city and township branches.
6. Red Guard army model battalions are to be set up in every district, and one
model division is to be established in each xian, so as to have unified command,
which not only is for concentrating forces to coordinate actions with the Red
Army at any time and consolidating and developing the soviet areas, but also for
providing a place to train lower level Red Guard army cadres and preparing an
organization of activists who will join the reinforcement troops and go directly to
join the Red Army.
7. The Red Guard armies' weapons are mostly various types of old-style
weapons. A certain number of guns may be distributed as appropriate in the
model battalions.
8. Red Guard army training should involve a fixed regimen of military drills
and political education classes, which the military district is responsible for
supervising, and the military department of each xian plans and regulates. Especially with regard to political education, it is necessary to take strict measures to
correct the mistakes of the past in which only military exercises were undertaken
and there were no political education classes. In the curriculum, attention should
be paid to practical applications of military [concepts], and all formalistic tricks
should be scrapped. As for politics, the past tendency toward spouting empty,
vague, unrealistic nonsense should be corrected by being simple and straightforward and easy for the troops to understand. Attention should be paid in particular
to the key political questions of the day.
9. Each military district is responsible for operating a large political training
unit and training courses that will frequently train and foster middle-level cadres
in the Red Guard armies, the guerrilla forces, independent regiments, and so on.
Among the cadres in particular, large numbers of worker cadres must be drawn in so

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27J
as to strengthen the leadership of the working class in the Red Guard armies.
10. Soviet governments at all levels should strengthen their leadership of the
military departments. District and township soviets should, in turn, help Red
Guard Army political committees at their respective levels carry out political
education, frequently reporting all orders and resolutions of the soviet governments and all political issues (materials are various government documents,
Hongse zhonghua, and so on). The Red Guard armies should function as schools
for the education of the masses.
11. As for the Red Guard Army organization in newly developed soviet
areas, it may proceed and be expanded according to the degree of consolidation
of the given area.
12. The work of expanding the Red Army should be carried out by mobilizing the masses in various mass groupings, such as voters' meetings, unions, poor
peasant leagues, associations against imperialism, associations for mutual assistance, associations to support the soviets, and so on, to join the Red Army. The
Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers in particular are the primary grounds
from which to mobilize and recruit. Therefore, when frequently training the Red
Guard armies, attention should be paid to inspiring the masses from a political
standpoint to join the Red Army and encouraging the most active members to
join the Red Army (women, however, cannot officially join the Red Army [as
soldiers], but may shoulder such tasks as nursing and caretaking and so on).
13. In the past it had been stipulated that reinforcement units were to serve as
holding and transfer organs for new soldiers going into the Red Army, and new
troops from the rear had to undergo short-term training in a reinforcement unit
before joining the Red Army. The organization as stipulated made it so that two
xian were combined in setting up reinforcement units, so that in management
and training this was a rather inconvenient arrangement. Therefore it is now
being changed to one reinforcement unit in each xian, and the unit can be as
small as a company or as large as a regiment. Reinforcement teams are standing
organizations, prepared to meet the needs of the front at any time.
14. All border area governments and guerrilla forces should resolutely engage in work that involves the masses of the White areas, to instigate mass
struggles and expand the soviet areas. As for engaging in work among White
army soldiers, at present White army troops are becoming every day more revolutionized. Especially because the surroundings are being influenced by the soviets and the Red Army, it is becoming easier to work within the White army to
undermine the enemy's military forces and win over revolutionary soldiers
within the White army. The guerrilla forces in particular should penetrate into
the White areas, develop the war, and win over the masses in the White areas. In
this way, large numbers of worker and peasant masses are drawn from the White
areas into the Red Army.
15. The worker-peasant inspection department is charged with investigating
Within a short period of time the implementation of the regulations on preferen- tial treatment for the Red Army and organizing large numbers of shock forces to
launch an assault movement on those who refuse to carry out preferential treatment for the Red Army [soldiers and their families].
All the above items must be strictly observed and carried out by all levels of
government and all armies, and at the same time, more concrete plans for implementation should be resolved according to the above stipulations. In particular, within the shortest possible time the military district is to convene meetings
of the heads of each xian military department to discuss implementation of plans
and regular training work. It is so ordered.

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Notes

We have translated this text from ZhongytJng genjudl shiliao, Vol. 2, pp. 636-43.
1. Our Chinese sources provide no explanation of why there should be two directives of the Central Executive Committee on entirely different subjects. both dated
September 20 and both bearing the same number. Only the present document, on
expanding the Red Army, is mentioned in the Nianpu, Vol. I, p. 385, but we have no
reason to doubt the authenticity of the preceding text.
2. This text uses the term weigong (encircle and attack) instead of weijiao (encircle
and suppress) for the Guomindang's anti-Communist campaigns, but the meaning is
obviously the same.
3. For this directive, see above, ”On Mobilization for W• and Work in the Rear," July
7.1932.