On Mobilization for War and Work in the Rear
Directive No. 14 of the Central Executive Committee
(July 7, 1932)
Just now, the civil war is proceeding on an even wider scale. Besides commanding and organizing the Guomindang warlords to mobilize more than eighty divisions in conducting a huge "Encirclement and Suppression" against soviet areas
and the Red Army in seven or eight provinces throughout the country, the imperialists are preparing at any time a direct and open attack on the Chinese
soviets and the Red Army. The Japanese imperialists have used military force to
occupy the Three Northeastern Provinces and to attack Shanghai. This already
constitutes a most concrete manifestation of partitioning China by force and
intervening directly in the Chinese revolution. With the unanimous agreement
and sponsorship of the various imperialist robbers, a "truce agreement" was
signed at the so-called Shanghai Peace Conference with the aim of jointly carving up Shanghai and China more quickly and completely, so that they can concentrate all their energy on dealing with the Chinese revolution and the Soviet
Union. In the face of this agreement, the Guomindang warlord government further exposed its role in selling out China and serving as scavengers for the
imperialists. Thus, on the one hand, it signed the agreement to sell out Shanghai
and China. On the other hand, via the Shanghai-Ningbo Railway, it transferred
the soldiers of the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army, who had been
bravely fighting the Japanese, to Fujian and Wuhan to attack the soviet areas that
had freed themselves from the chains of imperialism, and to attack the armed
force which is truly opposing the imperialists, the Workers' and Peasants' Red
Army. The Central Soviet Government long ago declared a national revolutionary war against Japan. It has encouraged and led the workers, peasants, and poor
toiling masses of the whole country and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
on the front of the anti-imperialist struggle. It has repudiated all the agreements
and secret treaties by which the Guomindang counterrevolutionaries have sold
out China to the imperialists. It has developed the anti-Japanese people's armed
forces on a large scale and is actively preparing to fight the imperialists directly
to strive for China's independence, liberation, and unification.
At present, the Central Soviet Government is leading the broad masses in the

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 4, pp. 57-67.

soviet areas and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the whole country to
launch an all-out offensive, to respond to the new attacks from the imperialists
and the Guomindang with a revolutionary offensive, to rout and annihilate the
attacking forces of the Guomindang, to destroy the Guomindang's rule, and to
strive for the initial victory of the revolution in Jiangxi and neighboring provinces. This will deal a direct blow to the imperialists and create favorable conditions for the victory of the national revolutionary war. The continuous victories
in the two soviet areas, Hubei-Henan-Anhui and West Hunan-Hubei, have already created an even more favorable situation for threatening and encircling
Wuhan. The return of the Red Army of the Central Soviet Area from Zhangzhou,
its movement toward the west, the aggressive action by the Tenth and Sixteenth
armies of the Red Army, and the victory by the Third Army Group west of the
[Gan] River, have all facilitated the destruction of the enemy in Guangdong and
Jiangxi. The task of seizing key cities along the reaches of the Gan River and
seeking victory first in Jiangxi looms before us with greater urgency. The decisive battle along the reaches of the Gan River has already begun in the past few
days. War mobilization for the entire soviet area and work in the rear have thus
become more important and urgent than at any time in the past. The expansion
and deepening of mobilization for war and the consolidation and strengthening
of the work in the rear are of decisive significance for the victory of the revolutionary war at the front. Therefore, the Central Government hereby issues this
special order to direct the soviet governments at all levels and all armed organizations of workers and peasants immediately to execute the following tasks, so
that every worker and peasant under the Soviet Government not only understands the significance of this war for his own future, but also displays, throughout the entire process of class war, concrete actions of his own to ensure the
beginning and continuation of the victory of the revolutionary war. Only thus
can the previously existing phenomena of "fighting at the front having nothing to
do with the rear" (qianxian dazhang, houfang wuguan) and of muddling along
and the pursuit of temporary tranquility be changed.
1. In order that the Red Army may get sufficient replenishment of its military
manpower as the war develops, and that these recruits may be transported to the
front in a continuous and organized manner, the Central Government deems it
necessary during the current period of voluntary service to establish immediately
Red Army reinforcement regiments. Specific methods for establishing Red Army
reinforcement regiments are hereby stipulated as follows:
a. Within the existing soviet areas, each xian or several xian are to organize a Red Army reinforcement regiment. All soldiers from among the workers and peasants who are added to the main forces of the Red Army must go
through concentrated training in such reinforcement regiments so that they
may be sent to the front in a body. Only those recruited at the front or in
newly liberated areas, and new soldiers added to independent divisions and
regiments, may dispense with training in reinforcement regiments.

b. Every month each reinforcement regiment may form five companies at
most, with a minimum of two companies. In areas where the reinforcement
regiment is unable to add two companies to the Red Army, a reinforcement
regiment should be formed jointly with neighboring xian. In the Central
Soviet Area, the command headquarters of each military district may determine, according to the monthly quota given to it by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, how many reinforcement regiments to form in
each military district and how many companies per month each reinforcement regiment should contribute to the Red Army. The Military Commission
separately makes such determinations for other soviet areas. Each reinforcement regiment must deliver trained fresh soldiers to the front once every
month or every two weeks; it must also continue to train soldiers newly
recruited from among the workers and peasants.
c. The immediate commander of the Red Army reinforcement regiment is
the local xian soviet and its military department. But the reinforcement regiment must set up connections with the supreme military agency in its local
area (such as the command post of the military district, the command post of
the branch military district, the headquarters of the garrison, and the rear
administrative office of the Military Commission); such military organs must
also provide assistance and guidance to the reinforcement regiment.
d. As for the cadres of the reinforcement regiment, the Red Army Military
Academy and the schools attached to each army and to the command posts of
individual military districts should find a way to provide them. The personnel
assigned by each army to different areas to work on receiving new Red Army
soldiers should all participate in the work of the reinforcement regiments.
The former reception stations should all be abolished without exception.
Local soviet governments are responsible for providing political commissars
and political officers.
e. The rifles and ammunition needed by the reinforcement regiments for
training in a given area will be separately obtained through the military
depots of the rear administrative office of the Military Commission and local
governments. They will be distributed according to plans set by the command
post of each military district. When soldiers who have already undergone
such training are sent to the front, these rifles and ammunition should not be
taken with them, so that they may be used for training new soldiers.
f. As for the supply of uniforms for the reinforcement regiments, in
Jiangxi the Central Government orders the rear administrative office of the
Military Commission and the military depots to provide them; then the
command post of the military districts will allocate to each xian its needs
according to a fixed time schedule. In Fujian, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-
Jiangxi, Northeast Jiangxi, and West Hunan-Hubei, such uniforms will be
provided by the command post of the respective military district. In Hunan-
Henan-Anhui, the branch of the Military Commission is to find its own

supplies of uniforms. As for the cost of food and incidental expenses, it will
be met entirely by the soviet government of each xian. Budgets in the Central
Soviet Area will be determined by the command post of each military district
and approved by the Central Government. In other soviet areas, they will be
established and approved by each branch of the Military Commission and the
command posts of military districts.
g. The duration of training is set, as a general rule, at two weeks. The
content of the training is to be fixed and announced by each branch of the
Military Commission and the command post of each military district.
h. Red Army reinforcement regiments in each locality must develop extremely close ties with local Red Army Support Committees and seek their
assistance in order to coordinate their action.
i. The reinforcement regiments in all areas must, in general, be formed
within seven months.
2. At present, when the revolutionary armed forces must be developed very
rapidly and when the guerrilla movement is everywhere in the process of unfolding on a broad and active basis, the source of reinforcements for the main forces
of the Red Army should not be limited exclusively to the reinforcement regiments and to expansion right at the front. The greatest possible efforts should
also be made to cause the independent divisions, independent regiments, guerrilla units, and other armed organizations to concentrate and regroup into the
main forces of the Red Army. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission,
the various branches of the Military Commission of each army, and the command post of each military district must, in their plans for expanding the Red
Army, specify their plans and schedules for expanding independent divisions
into armies or regrouping certain independent divisions or regiments into the
main forces of the Red Army. They should also decide on the establishment of
new independent divisions and regiments.
3. To enable all citizens in the soviet areas with voting rights to exercise their
rights to arm themselves to strengthen and develop the soviets, and to fulfill their
duties of serving in the Red Army and fighting at the front, each soviet area
should immediately and extensively develop and organize urban and rural Red
Guard armies. The Central Government hereby issues the following regulations
on the principles of organizing Red Guard armies:
a. Propaganda should be made to the effect that all citizens in soviet areas
who have voting rights and who are between the ages of eighteen and forty
have a duty to serve in the Red Guard armies. Local soviet governments
should not, however, organize every toiling man and woman over the age of

1. The term "army" (jun) here and throughout the following paragraphs dealing with
Red Guard organizations is used in a loose sense, roughly synonymous with "unit." Red
Guard "armies" were often very small forces of a few dozen or so people, and are not to
be confused with the much larger regular military units also referred to as "armies."

eighteen into a Red Guard army. Rather, they should, through extensive
propaganda, cause them to join voluntarily. This is the main principle for
establishing Red Guard armies at this time.
b. The general principle of the Red Guard armies is that their members
are not divorced from productive activity. In the countryside, all toiling men
and women over the age of eighteen can join voluntarily. In the cities, workers should constitute the backbone and [the Red Guards] should include the
broad masses of the poor. In large cities, workers' Red Guard armies should
be formed separately. Toiling men and women over the age of forty, if they
voluntarily join a Red Guard army, may be grouped into reserve detachments
of the Red Guard armies to serve on guard duty in the rear.
c. Red Guard armies are part of the system directly under the military
district. Their basic organizational unit is the township; they are subordinated
to the military affairs department of the district, and the xian military affairs
department exercises unified command over them. Apart from establishing
Red Guard armies generally in all the townships, the military department of
each district should also form a model Red Guard battalion for each district.
Three or four companies may be organized in large districts, and one or two
companies in small districts. Model battalions and model Young Pioneer
units can gather together a considerable number of the better weapons in their
districts.
d. All toiling young men and women between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-three who have already joined the Young Pioneers do not need to join
the Red Guards at the same time, as they are already receiving military
training and performing military duties. But the Young Pioneers should regularly send batches of their most active members to the Red Guards. More-over, when they participate in military missions at the front and in the rear,
the Young Pioneers must be placed under the command of the Red Army and
the Red Guards.
4. In order to provide coordination with the main forces of the Red Army in
combat, the local armed forces of each xian should carry out attacks along the
entire front. They should actively develop the guerrilla movement and new soviet areas in the areas under White rule and in the enemy's rear. This requires,
aside from expanding and establishing new independent regiments, the expansion and formation to the greatest possible extent of guerrilla organizations. The
principal task of guerrilla detachments should be to act energetically in White
areas and the rear of the enemy forces. To erode and sabotage the enemy's
foundation and military force, to organize peasant uprisings, to call for and
organize mutinies of White Army soldiers, to generate new guerrilla detachments everywhere, to develop new soviet areas, to sabotage the enemy's communications, to seize the enemy's impedimenta, to launch surprise attacks on
enemy forces, to collect supplies for the Red Army all these are necessary
conditions for strengthening and expanding the soviet areas, carrying out an

offensive on the entire front, and contributing to the victory of the main forces of
the Red Army. As regards the organization of guerrilla detachments, attention
should be paid to the following points:
a. Each xian should, in accordance with the circumstances of the struggle
in the locality in question, determine the number of guerrilla detachments it
should establish. Even xian in the heart of the Red Area must each establish
at least four or five guerrilla detachments to operate on the borders of xian
located on the periphery of the Red Area.
b. The number of people in each guerrilla detachment should not be set
mechanically; it should be determined according to the objective environment of the areas in which the units are to operate and according to the
strength they themselves are capable of mobilizing. Sometimes the number
may be as large as that of one to two companies; sometimes, it may be as
small as a dozen or so.
c. As regards class composition, a guerrilla detachment must comprise the
most courageous and active worker and peasant elements. The leaders especially must be vanguard elements who struggle resolutely among the masses,
for only thus can the guerrilla detachment be consolidated politically so as to
provide a powerful guarantee when it goes to operate independently in an
area under White rule.
d. When guerrilla detachments operate in the White areas, they must be
separated from the production process; when they return to the soviet areas
for regrouping and training, it is best that they return to production. When the
detachments go on another mission to other places, a portion of their members should be changed and some new members added, so that the workers
and peasants of the entire soviet area may all be trained in the operations of
the guerrilla detachments.
e. Local garrison companies, model battalions of the Red Guards, and
model Young Pioneers should all adopt the operational tactics of the guerrilla
detachments and organize guerrilla detachments that are divorced from the
productive process to operate actively in White areas and the rear of the
enemy in turns.
f. The command post of each military district and especially the military
affairs departments of local soviets should formulate concrete plans and
guidelines for the guerrilla teams being sent out, in accordance with the
actual conditions in the localities in question at the time in question.
5. Local soviet governments and all local armed organizations should mobilize the masses in a big way to join all kinds of organizations that participate in
the war, such as stretcher-bearers' teams, transportation teams, guide teams,
scout teams, sabotage teams, laundry teams, relief teams, rescue teams, and so
on. They must provide the necessary material assistance to these organizations.
They should lead these organizations to the front to participate in practical work.
The military department of every xian and every district should plan the number

of teams and number of people of these organizations to be formed by every
district or township. The command post of each military district and branch
district should set the number needed by the front and other battle fronts and
require that each local government be responsible for dispatching such organizations to the front.
6. In order that food and all military supplies be speedily transported to the
front, and in order that the Red Army may move around conveniently without
being hampered by roads and rivers, soviet governments at all levels should lead
the masses in a planned way to repair bridges and roads on key transportation
routes speedily, and assist military depots in carrying out all their work. In
particular, in soviet areas and border regions near rivers, it is even more important to have a plan to collect boats to be used for military transportation at any
moment. The post offices along military transportation routes should be constantly prepared, in accordance with changes in the military transportation
routes, to strengthen the postal service along such routes, in such ways as increasing the number of letter carriers and delivery frequency, so that the military
mail may be delivered most rapidly and without loss. At the same time, governments at all levels should provide maximum help in increasing the number of
postal workers, and in transferring them.
7. In order to raise sufficient funds for the war and enable the Red Army to
devote all of its energies to decisive battles, the Central Government has especially decided, on the one hand, to raise the rates of the progressive tax on
business income, to set new rates for the land tax, to collect rents in cities and
towns, and to instruct local soviet governments to raise money in the process of
developing new soviet areas, so that the heaviest burden of all taxes may be
placed on the class with the most property. On the other hand, the Central
Government has decided to raise money through selling 600,000 yuan in short-term "revolutionary war" bonds in the whole of the Soviet Area, so that the
broad masses of the workers and peasants may be mobilized economically to
help the Red Army and to guarantee funds for the revolutionary war, so that no
difficulties and obstacles are encountered. At the same time, in order to facilitate
financial liquidity within the borders of the Soviet Area, for the convenience of
payment for commercial transactions and collection of state taxes, the Central
Government has especially decided to issue a considerable amount of state paper
currency backed by sufficient funds beginning this month. Soviet governments at
all levels should extensively mobilize the masses and make them understand that
the workers, peasants, and impoverished masses of the entire Soviet Area must
ensure, not only politically but economically, that there are sufficient supplies
and war funds for the Red Army, so that the war may proceed victoriously, and
we may take the key cities rapidly and achieve initial victory in Jiangxi. Therefore,
the workers, peasants, and impoverished masses of the entire Soviet Area should,
on the one hand, strictly supervise the merchant bosses and rich peasants; not
relax even slightly their government tax burdens; and guard against their machi-

nations and all their plots, resistance, and manipulations to hide capital, report
smaller sums on larger incomes, manufacture rumors, create trouble, sabotage
production, and sabotage the finances of the Soviet. When such facts are uncovered, soviet governments should take firm measures to mete out severe punishment. Soviet governments at all levels must strictly ban business organizations
such as "brokerage houses" and remnants of other old-style guilds that still
survive within the soviet areas. Only soviet governments can call gatherings of
businessmen to announce the government's laws, regulations, orders, and decisions applicable to them. On the other hand, the broad masses of impoverished
workers and peasants should manifest a great deal of enthusiasm and activism in
paying their very small amounts of land taxes (farm laborers and unemployed
workers are exempt from taxes; poor peasants whose lives are difficult are exempt from taxes or pay a reduced tax), and especially in purchasing government
bonds and using paper currency. They should hasten to do so as quickly as
possible. Moreover, they should use the method of revolutionary competition to
carry this out and to encourage one another. As regards all such efforts at mass
mobilization, soviet governments at every level must rely on help from labor
unions, unions of farm laborers, poor peasant leagues, mutual assistance associations, and all the revolutionary mass organizations. They must ensure that the
sale of 600,000 yuan in government bonds exceeds the preset amount within a
fixed period. The circulation of paper currency can be smoothly carried out amid
a very high level of confidence on the part of the masses. All taxes can also be
paid on time under the supervision, guidance, and encouragement of the masses.
As regards raising money through developing new soviet areas, soviet governments at all levels and command posts of military districts should rely even more
on the class line, devise careful plans, and appoint special personnel to take
charge of this.
8. In order to replenish adequately the food supplies of the masses in the
soviet areas and of the Red Army, assure the economic development of the
countryside, increase the government's tax revenues, raise sufficient funds for
war, and increase the income from the public land owned by the Red Army and
the land of families of Red Army soldiers, soviet governments at all levels must
carry out an extensive campaign to assure the autumn harvest and plant additional miscellaneous grains.² The following points should be noted regarding the
concrete work of this campaign:
a. Soviet governments at all levels, especially district and township soviets, should lead the masses to plan various methods to protect the autumn
harvest. First, they must strictly enforce Red martial law and form Red Guard
armies everywhere to perform security duties, so that bandits and the landlord
militia [mintuan] can be prevented from invading the townships to loot the
rice harvest when the autumn rice crops are about to ripen or after they are

2. Za liang, i.e, cereals other than the main crops of rice and wheat.


harvested. In particular, along the borders of the soviet areas, rigorous measures must be taken to guard against the Guomindang White army's destroying the rice paddies of the soviet areas and sabotaging the autumn harvest.
The success of such defensive efforts must rely on the mobilization of the
masses of entire townships and districts. On one hand, the most effective
guerrilla units should be organized to operate in White areas and in the
enemy's rear, and to conduct guerrilla actions in areas where bandits and
landlord militia are stationed. It must be recognized that the basic method for
protecting the autumn harvest in the soviet areas consists in the active outward expansion of the Red Army, in smashing the enemy's attacks, in winning over the masses of the bandits and members of the militia, and in
annihilating the bandits and the landlord militia. On the other hand, the Red
Guard armies and Young Pioneers of each district and township must, under
the unified military command of the xian and district soviets, establish close
contact with one another. When they suffer invasions by bandits, enemy
police, or the White army, the Red Guard armies of an entire district and
township, even the most effective model battalions of an entire xian, should
be able to coordinate their actions and launch raids in all directions, so that they
may provide a joint defense to fulfill the task of protecting the autumn harvest.
b. In order that peasants may reap the benefit of a timely harvest when the
autumn crops are ripe, local soviet governments should mobilize and encourage the majority of the masses to form harvest teams and grain-cutting teams,
so that when they have finished their harvest, they may go to help those
peasant households with less manpower or adopt the method of mutual assistance to do so. As regards the families of Red Army soldiers and especially
the public land owned by the Red Army, they should mobilize the masses
even more to form "shock brigades" and "assault teams" and, using the
method of revolutionary competition, go first to help these people bring in
the harvest or to do it for them. The government should depend on the
activism of the majority of peasants to carry out this mobilization. Moreover,
they should use the farm laborers' unions and poor peasant leagues as the
backbone of this mobilization.
c. When guerrilla units go to the White areas to carry out operations, they
should also mobilize the masses in the White areas to launch an autumn
harvest campaign. The most practical method is to identify clearly in advance
the rice paddies of the despotic gentry in the White areas when the autumn
crops are ripe, and then use the guerrilla detachments to support the masses in
harvesting these rice paddies. Most of the harvested rice is to be given to the
local masses in order to promote their class struggle. This not only protects
the autumn harvest in the soviet areas, but also effaces the boundary marking
the opposition between Red and White, expanding the influence and the
territory of the soviets.
d. In the course of the autumn harvest, local soviet governments should

make even more efforts to increase the growth of miscellaneous cereals, to
provide sufficient food supplies for the soviet areas. They should investigate
and prepare the miscellaneous cereals suitable for cultivation in the land of
each township and district, and then encourage and provide incentives for
peasants to grow them. After the autumn harvest this year, it must be strictly
prohibited to grow opium again anywhere throughout the entire Soviet Area.
This requires, first of all, an extensive effort of propaganda and explanation
directed at the masses.3
e. In the course of the autumn harvest, local soviet governments should
pay attention to pooling together the government's rice harvest and run public
granaries. They should conduct a campaign among the masses for saving grain
and preparing to sell newly harvested rice at low prices to the Red Army. They
should also promote a reduction in the production of rice wines and rice flours
and an increase in the reserves of dried rice to prepare for next year.
9. Soviet governments at all levels should lead mass organizations to launch
a movement of economizing on all expenditures in order to generate enough
funds for war expenses. All those government expenditures that can be saved,
such as meals for guests, office expenses, the cost of kerosene, and other incidental expenses must be reduced as much as possible; in particular, more paper
and envelopes can be saved. Although all these saved items are small in themselves, they comprise a considerable sum when added together. Moreover, it is
possible in this way to cultivate a soviet workstyle of greater industriousness and
thrift in the soviet areas and this is absolutely necessary. Those in the soviets
who are engaged in embezzlement and corruption must be subjected to severe
disciplinary punishment once they are discovered, in governments at any level.
Whoever tries to cover up, protect, or slacken the investigation and exposure of
such elements will be similarly denounced by the revolution. At the same time,
one must be aware that economizing on expenditures does not mean, in any
sense, a reduction in workload. On the contrary, the efficiency of our work
should be further increased in the spirit of hard work.
10. In order to develop the economy of the soviet areas, soviet governments
at all levels should pay attention to promoting, restoring, and aiding productive
enterprises. At present, local governments should plan to bring recovery to many
old productive enterprises in the soviet areas, such as the paper and lumber

3. Several xian in the Central Soviet Area, including Xingguo, Ningdu, and Yudu, had
considerable areas of poppy cultivation in the 1910s and 1920s, and efforts to protect
these crops against incursions by army troops engaged in "opium poppy eradication
campaigns" (actually thinly disguised extortion and taxation programs) had on occasion
led to violent popular resistance. In Xingguo and perhaps elsewhere as well, local Party
leaders had used poppy-growers' resentment against this extortion as one of many peasant
grievances that they exploited in their first efforts to mobilize popular support. Part of the
"explanation" referred to here, therefore, probably involved telling growers why the Party
in turn was now prohibiting this lucrative cash crop.

industries in western Fujian, tea-oil in Jiangxi, grass cloth in Ningdu, camphor in
Ruijin, coal mines in Anyuan and Huichang, and coal deposits spread around in
many places. Moreover, after investigation and approval by the Central Government, these facilities may be either leased to businessmen for them to invest in
and manage or turned over to workers' cooperatives to run. The government may
also make loans to peasants for them to manage these facilities, or they can be
managed by the Soviet Government itself. Soviet governments at all levels
should treat the promotion and planning of these productive enterprises as one of
the central tasks in strengthening and developing the soviet areas. This is of
extremely great significance and plays a crucial role in economic mobilization
for war. In order to prevent and frustrate speculation and monopoly on the part of
businessmen, and especially to resist the enemy's economic embargo and the
counterrevolutionaries' troublemaking within the soviet areas, soviet governments at all levels should provide special assistance to the cooperatives formed
by the toiling masses, especially the organization and development of consumer
cooperatives. In several key localities in each soviet area (such as Ruijin,
Tingzhou, Baisha, Xingguo, Yunmenling, Ningdu, and Yudu), local governments should help the toiling masses to organize consumer cooperatives on a
relatively large scale and provide them considerable financial assistance, so that
in a war environment they will be able to counter businessmen's manipulation
with low-priced goods and meet the needs of the masses.

11. Local soviet governments and all local armed organizations must strictly
enforce Red martial law and protect transportation lines. They must closely
watch and check up on the activities of all the class-alien elements and suspicious persons in the soviet areas, in order to prevent the counterrevolutionaries
from raising their heads and to strengthen the rear in the war. If any township or
xian is negligent in enforcing Red martial law or adopts a negative attitude
toward work with businessmen, that township or xian thereby fails to fulfill its
responsibility for carrying out work in the rear. That township or xian offers
counterrevolutionary factions and counterrevolutionary elements a more favorable opportunity to operate there. The Central Government strictly demands that
the soviet governments at all levels punish, with the penalties prescribed by
soviet law, those who are passive or negligent regarding such work. In order that
all mobilization efforts and work in the rear described above be carried out under
conditions of better organization and more centralized leadership, the Central
Executive Committee hereby decides to form the Committee for Labor and War
under the Council of People's Commissars. The Committee for Labor and War
plans for and manages all economic, military, and labor mobilizations. It also has
the power to give directions to the various ministries and committees of the
government, military districts, and local governments on the issue of war mobilization. Soviet governments at all levels and all armed organizations should regularly report to the Committee for Labor and War their plans for mobilization and
work in the rear and the extent to which these plans have been put into effect, so

that the committee may conduct frequent investigations and provide timely guidance. At the same time, all armed organizations of these governments must still
report to their commanding organs to maintain the original administrative and
command systems.

Chairman
Vice-Chairmen
Mao Zedong
Xiang Ying
Zhang Guotao