() During the Fourth Revolutionary War, on the northern front, Chiang Kai-shek’s White Army suffered several disastrous defeats.
After the Red Army had achieved major victories time and again, the Nationalist warlords once more began to regroup their remnants and prepare a new offensive.
At the same time, the Guangdong warlord Chen Jitang, the Fujian warlord Cai Tingkai, and the Hunan warlord He Jian all joined forces, mobilizing their troops to attack the Soviet areas.
The Red Army was locked in fierce, bloody combat with the enemy, determined to shatter the enemy’s encirclement.
Meanwhile, the Nationalists had colluded with Japanese imperialism, which had already occupied Beijing and Tianjin.
The Red Army thus found itself having to brace for direct warfare against imperialist forces and to overthrow both the imperialists and the Nationalist clique.
Yet at this very moment, the Red Army faced a severe food shortage: some units were reduced to eating thin rice porridge, and even the central government organs themselves were forced to subsist on half-portion rations of congee.
Rice was exorbitantly priced and virtually unavailable, turning what had begun as a logistical challenge into an acute crisis.
Moreover, a segment of the poorest masses—especially the families of Red Army soldiers—were left without sufficient food, creating an extremely grave situation.  (II) But did the Soviet areas truly lack grain?
Not so.
There was indeed ample grain within the Soviet regions.
Leaving aside counties like Gonglue and Wantai, where grain production was particularly abundant, even taking Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng, and Shicheng—the four counties in question—we can see that these areas consistently yielded surpluses year after year.
Although last year’s harvest was poor, there remained considerable stockpiles.
So why was it impossible for the Red Army to procure grain in these localities?
First, wealthy peasants and unscrupulous merchants were hoarding grain or artificially inflating prices, deliberately making things difficult for the Red Army.
Second, many households that possessed surplus grain failed to grasp the urgency of the Red Army’s plight; they hoped to sell their stocks at even higher prices later.
And then there were those whose grain reserves were neither plentiful nor meager—households of the “middle class”—who likewise did not fully appreciate the Red Army’s predicament and therefore refrained from setting aside any portion to supply the troops.
It was due to these two factors that grain had become scarce in the markets.
Comrades, your lack of understanding regarding the Red Army’s difficulties stems precisely from the fact that the local soviets have never adequately explained the situation to you.
Now, the Central Government intends to purchase fifty thousand dan of grain from Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng, and Shicheng to reinforce the front-line Red Army units.
This responsibility falls upon the county-, district-, and village-level soviets of these four counties, as well as upon their combined population of one million people.
The allocation among the counties is as follows: Ruijin will contribute sixteen thousand dan, Huichang fifteen thousand, Bosheng eleven thousand, and Shicheng ten thousand.
However, this is not a loan but a purchase.
Drawing on our past experience with grain loans, we know that the masses voluntarily lent substantial quantities of grain to the Red Army, and many even repaid their loan notes promptly.
This demonstrated the highest level of revolutionary enthusiasm among the people, reflecting their deep commitment to the Red Army as if it were their very lives.
Whenever word spread that the Red Army needed grain, everyone readily contributed.
Yet, comrades, the grain that was previously borrowed has now been consumed.
The Central Government must once again purchase another batch—this time totaling fifty thousand dan—at market prices.
The delivery period is limited to June, to be completed in installments.
The procedure requires households with surplus grain to make available whatever excess they have, while also setting aside a portion for the Red Army.
Even those who have no surplus are expected to contribute a share.
Only those who themselves are severely short of food and rely entirely on assistance from relatives and friends may be excused from participating.
Comrades, we all long for the Red Army’s victory.
How can we rest easy while our troops on the front lines are struggling with hunger?
If each of us eats a bit less of refined grains and substitutes more coarse cereals and vegetables, and if we collectively set aside a small amount of grain to sell to the Red Army, those individual contributions will soon add up.
I am confident that the one million people across these four counties can easily pool together forty to fifty thousand dan of grain.
Comrades, once the front-line Red Army is well-fed and achieves victory, it will be a source of honor and joy for us rear-area residents—even if it means we ourselves eat a little less!  (III) There is yet another aspect of the grain issue that demands our close attention: the plight of certain extremely impoverished groups who lack adequate food.
As the majority, we must absolutely prevent these individuals from going hungry, especially the families of Red Army soldiers.
Their hardships must be addressed.
The solution lies in mutual assistance among the people.
First, we should promote sales of grain at reduced prices; second, we might consider implementing a system of “borrowing in autumn and repaying in spring.”
In the interests of our class, we must not act solely in our own self-interest while ignoring others.
Townships with abundant grain supplies ought to assist those with shortages; villages rich in grain should support those with less.
Within each village, households that have surplus grain should extend aid to those in need.
Beyond fulfilling our obligation to sell fifty thousand dan of grain to the Red Army, we must also ensure that the most destitute receive adequate food.
Only in this way can we truly practice class solidarity and mutual aid—supplying the Red Army with porridge while preventing the poor from starving; using grain to help the Red Army break through the enemy’s fourth encirclement campaign—Ying Xiangzhang Guo Tao.