1933. A() A Great Victory  Under the call of the Party and the Central Government, the land survey and redistribution campaign has been widely launched. If previously it was still in its initial stages, then the work accomplished during July following the August Land Survey Conference involving eight counties far surpassed all previous achievements over the preceding six months. Generally speaking, in these eight counties where the conference was held, the campaign entered a new phase, becoming a broad mass movement. The greatest successes were recorded in Ruijin and Bosheng, which together identified over one thousand landlords and rich peasants. Yudu, Huichang, Tingdong, Changting, Shicheng, and Ninghua also achieved preliminary results.  In every district and township where progress was made, vigorous mass struggles erupted. Many previously stagnant aspects of Soviet and Party work have now been revitalized. Numerous undesirable elements within the Soviets have been purged, while counterrevolutionaries concealed in the countryside have faced severe repression. In short, feudal remnants suffered a crushing defeat before the masses. Building on this momentum, various tasks have been further advanced. In areas where the land survey yielded tangible results, efforts to expand the Red Army and local armed forces, to promote economic construction bonds and develop cooperatives, to carry out autumn harvests and plowing, to establish labor mutual aid societies, as well as cultural initiatives such as club literacy classes and evening schools, have all gained significant traction, proceeding more smoothly than ever before.  With the active participation of the masses, large numbers of enthusiastic activists have emerged as cadres for diverse undertakings. Many worker-peasant activists have joined the Party and become involved in Soviet work. The best example is Ren Tian District in Ruijin. With assistance from a central government working group, the land survey campaign there mobilized the entire district’s population within fifty-five days, thoroughly eliminating feudal vestiges. Over three hundred landlord and rich peasant households were identified; eleven counterrevolutionaries—referred to by the masses as “big tigers”—were executed, and counterrevolutionary activities were suppressed. Several Soviet officials who had committed serious errors were publicly exposed and removed, and class enemies who had infiltrated the Soviets were likewise expelled.  Across the district, a total of seventeen thousand dan of land were surveyed. Each of the more than ten thousand working people received approximately one dan and one dou of land, and countless assets belonging to gentry and landlords were distributed to the populace. Thanks to an unprecedented surge in popular enthusiasm, over seven hundred men enlisted in the Ruijin Model Division within fifty-five days, with not a single desertion. Grain savings sold to the Red Army reached over nineteen hundred dan, a figure unmatched by any other district in the county. At the request of the townships, the district undertook to underwrite forty thousand yuan worth of economic construction bonds, having already collected seven thousand five hundred yuan through fines imposed on landlords and donations from rich peasants, with plans to raise an additional ten thousand yuan. Cooperatives expanded rapidly, and cultural and educational programs such as literacy clubs and evening schools proliferated. Party membership grew, leadership was strengthened, and trade union work improved. Ren Tian District underwent a dramatic transformation, rising from a backward area of Ruijin to an equal-level district alongside Wuyang District in just fifty-five days.  We may ask: Why did Ren Tian District achieve such remarkable success? The answer lies in their keen understanding of the importance of the land survey mission, coupled with their resolute implementation of the Central Bureau and Central Government’s correct directives regarding mobilization methods, class line, and mass work—conducting truly Bolshevik-style operations. Recognizing the close link between the land survey campaign and the revolutionary war, they approached the task with utmost seriousness, firmly assuming leadership and meticulously planning local activities. In terms of mobilization, they focused particularly on the seven most backward and moderately backward townships among the district’s eleven, deploying Party members, Youth League members, township Soviets, trade unions, poor peasants’ associations, and other mass organizations to engage the broader populace. On the class line, they steadfastly adhered to the strategy of relying on hired laborers and poor peasants while uniting the middle peasants, significantly expanding the ranks of the poor peasants’ association. They emphasized that the land survey was not about land distribution but rather about class differentiation, clarifying that the focus was on identifying landlords, rich peasants, and hired laborers, ensuring thorough “class analysis.” When landlords and rich peasants in Gefeng Township intimidated middle peasants, causing widespread panic, our comrades engaged several middle peasants in individual talks, who then conveyed the message to their peers. As a result, Gefeng’s middle peasants quickly stabilized, actively supporting the Soviet’s land survey policy and shifting from being misled by landlords and rich peasants to joining forces with poor peasants and workers to collectively oppose them. Although Ren Tian District’s cadres occasionally made mistakes in handling certain cases, they promptly corrected them.  Regarding the leadership of the mass struggle, they first conducted extensive propaganda, eschewing large-scale district- or township-wide meetings in favor of village-household gatherings to reach a wider audience and deliver repeated appeals. This ensured that the entire population understood that participating in the land survey and class differentiation was both their responsibility and their own interest. Secondly, they investigated class composition, mobilized the majority to participate in the survey, and meticulously collected evidence for each case before presenting it to the masses, thereby avoiding discontent. Decisions concerning class identification were initially reviewed by the land survey committee, then submitted to the poor peasants’ association for discussion and approval, before being brought to a village assembly convened specifically for the expropriated household to explain the situation and seek unanimous consent prior to confiscation. In distributing property and land, staff maintained exemplary conduct, ensuring that all items were fully allocated to the rightful recipients, with larger shares going to villages that had cooperated more actively and smaller portions to others, thus securing complete satisfaction among the people. Land was also distributed swiftly, unlike in some areas where delays were common, enabling rapid mobilization of the masses. Their approach to engaging even the most backward large villages was equally effective. Rather than fearing these villages or resorting to brute force, they concentrated their efforts, intensified publicity, cultivated local activists, educated them, and leveraged their influence to mobilize the broader population. Though seemingly slow-paced, this patient and methodical work ultimately proved highly efficient: within fifty-five days, they successfully transformed all of Ren Tian District’s lagging large villages, eradicating their backwardness. In one village of Baikeng Township, however, two notorious “big tigers” continued to cause trouble. In response, they organized a traveling court to try these individuals locally, garnering overwhelming public support for their execution. The resulting fervor spread rapidly throughout the district, prompting villagers to demand action against other local evildoers as well. The land survey campaign in Ren Tian District truly serves as a model for the entire Soviet region.  Jiubao District in Ruijin also achieved significant results. They prioritized work in three townships, convening the land survey committee members from each township for a three-day training session at the district level to clarify mobilization methods, class lines, and strategies for engaging the masses. They devised an effective approach to confiscation and distribution: whenever a landlord’s property was to be seized, they would gather the residents of the relevant village and household to form a confiscation and distribution committee, conducting the process openly under public scrutiny. Confiscated items were piled up in a central location, and after obtaining the villagers’ consent, they were immediately distributed to those entitled to receive them. Foodstuffs were shared communally, with everyone partaking in a communal meal prepared by slaughtering a pig and cooking rice. This method proved highly successful in Jiubao District. Their confiscation and distribution committees were convened ad hoc rather than operating on a regular basis, maintaining closer ties with the masses (while routine land-related matters remained under the jurisdiction of the standing land committee). Instead of transporting confiscated goods to the township office and waiting until enough items accumulated before distribution—a process prone to delays and potential theft—their approach eliminated these issues altogether. Jiubao District’s overall strategies and methods were generally sound, enabling them to effectively mobilize the masses. Notably, no landlords or rich peasants protested their classification at the township level, a stark contrast to earlier experiences where many targeted individuals would arrive at the Soviet offices to argue vehemently against their designation, often accompanied by representatives from their respective poor peasants’ associations seeking intercession on their behalf. This time, however, the opposition simply lacked strength; none of their kin or allies offered support, leaving the landlords and rich peasants unable to mount any meaningful resistance. This outcome underscores the effectiveness of Jiubao District’s mass mobilization efforts—without such engagement, achieving this level of success would have been impossible.  All these exemplary cases—of which there are many more elsewhere—represent a Bolshevik response to the call of the Party and Central Government, demonstrating the absolute correctness of the Central Bureau and Central Government’s directives. Wherever these instructions were rigorously followed, great victories ensued. Conversely, failure to adhere to or outright disregard of these guidelines led to flawed implementation, yielding either meager results or none at all. Let us illustrate this point with specific examples.  (1) Some areas abandoned leadership of the land survey campaign. Despite the issuance of resolutions by the Central Bureau and directives by the Central Government, as well as the convening of the eight-county land survey conference, the campaign’s reach remained uneven across regions. For instance, Fujian Province’s overall performance was comparable only to that of Bosheng County, while the achievements of Yudu, Huichang, Shicheng, and Ninghua were equivalent to those of merely one or two of Ruijin’s best districts. In numerous counties, land survey committees had never convened, and even in some instances, county-level committees had yet to take charge of the campaign statewide (Huichang, Yudu, Shicheng, Ninghua). Moreover, in many districts and townships, chairpersons neglected their duties as committee heads, citing other pressing commitments and abandoning oversight of the land survey entirely. While in areas where the campaign progressed successfully, the Party’s strong leadership was clearly evident, with the majority of Party members and cadres actively participating in courageous and decisive actions under the guidance of branch and district committees, in places where the campaign stalled or yielded minimal results, the Party’s neglect of this critical task became apparent. For example, the Huichang County Committee failed to discuss the land survey issue for nearly two months following the Central Bureau’s resolution, only holding its first meeting on the matter at the end of July. Similarly, a section of the Ruijin City Committee completely disengaged from the campaign. Although the city committee did convene once to address the issue, it failed to urge the suburban branches to prioritize it, resulting in no corresponding meetings being held at the grassroots level. Other counties such as Yudu, Huichang, Shicheng, and Ninghua likewise showed insufficient attention to the campaign. The Party and Central Government have consistently emphasized that “the land survey campaign is a powerful means of igniting class struggle among rural masses, fundamentally resolving the land question, and eradicating feudal and semi-feudal remnants” (Central Bureau resolution), “a task of paramount importance requiring immediate action in all Soviet areas” (Central Government directive), and “the most crucial component of current work” (summary of the eight-county conference). Yet many comrades continue to claim, “We are too busy to attend to the land survey campaign.” The Party’s resolutions explicitly state, “Any perfunctory or bureaucratic approach to the land survey campaign is highly detrimental.” Nevertheless, some cadres persist in adopting precisely such attitudes.  (3) Instances of capitulation to local elites persisted. Even in areas where the land survey campaign was underway, serious shortcomings remained. Specifically, certain Party and Soviet officials exhibited opportunistic vacillation in the face of this intense class struggle, primarily due to their entrenched clan and regional ties, which led them to shield local landlords and rich peasants of the same lineage and village. Alternatively, erroneous class assessments resulted in misidentifying landlords as rich peasants or rich peasants as middle peasants. In some cases, judicial personnel, through gross negligence, accepted false accusations fabricated by landlords and rich peasants posing as ordinary peasants to discredit land survey activists. On the other hand, certain security and judicial officers failed to keep pace with the escalating mass struggle, neglecting to vigorously suppress counterrevolutionary elements—even when the populace demanded the arrest and execution of landlords and rich peasants obstructing the survey. The Ruijin judicial authorities, for instance, exemplify numerous such failures.  (4) The tendency to infringe upon the interests of middle peasants constitutes the gravest danger. Opportunistic tendencies leaning toward the “left” manifested themselves in many areas during the July land survey. Of particular concern is the encroachment upon middle peasants’ rights. Although the Central Bureau’s resolution explicitly stipulates, “Special attention must be paid to forging alliances with middle peasants, who constitute the largest and most fundamental stratum in post-revolutionary rural society. All our policies and strategies must secure their support and endorsement. Every decision made by the poor peasants’ association and the Soviet authorities should be endorsed by middle peasants in village- or household-level assemblies, and their voices must be heeded. Any attempt to undermine their interests must be sternly punished.” Furthermore, the conclusion of the eight-county conference reiterated, “The purpose of the land survey is to differentiate classes, not to redistribute land,” “Alliances with middle peasants should never compromise their interests,” and “At the outset of the survey, the Soviet policy of non-interference in middle peasants’ affairs should be widely publicized. During the survey itself, caution must be exercised when dealing with suspected cases situated between middle and rich peasants to avoid misclassification.” However, these directives were frequently ignored by local cadres. In Ruijin City, for example, the land survey proceeded on a household-by-household and acre-by-acre basis, leading some middle peasants to panic and petition the Soviet authorities to revise their class status, requesting reclassification as poor peasants. They argued, “Middle peasantry is perilous—step up a notch and you’re a rich peasant. If I’m reclassified as a poor peasant, I’ll be safely distanced from the rich.” Shouldn’t we heed such heartfelt pleas? In Yanggu Township of Huangbai District, officials informed the masses, “Class differentiation applies only to rich peasants, landlords, and middle peasants.” Meanwhile, in Daojing District, signs were erected mandating class surveys, triggering panic among some middle peasants who fled to the mountains. Similar incidents occurred in certain townships of Bosheng County, where the erection of such signs sparked widespread fear. The eight-county conference had already declared, “The notion that erecting signs is essential to the land survey is incorrect,” yet this practice persisted in multiple locations—an extremely serious problem. By conflating the land survey with land redistribution, they distorted the true objectives of the struggle. As previously pointed out, “The land survey and land redistribution must be strictly distinguished. This distinction not only safeguards farmers’ land ownership rights, preventing unnecessary anxieties about land allocation, but also ensures victory in the class struggle. It is imperative to concentrate our efforts, especially on uniting middle peasants, to counter the resistance of landlords and rich peasants; under no circumstances should internal divisions arise among the peasantry” (conclusion of the eight-county conference). Such strategic clarity remains conspicuously absent in many areas. This oversight can no longer be tolerated. Those responsible for deliberately perpetuating these errors, particularly senior Soviet officials in the affected regions, must be severely disciplined. Ideological struggles should be waged within Party and Youth League circles to combat any member’s infringement upon middle peasants’ interests or violation of the alliance strategy with them. In cases where harm has already been done—for instance, if middle peasants’ land and property have been confiscated—Soviet personnel must publicly acknowledge their wrongdoing and restore the affected assets. Last year, Xingguo County compensated numerous middle peasants, earning their satisfaction—a valuable lesson.  (5) The isolationist tendencies of the poor peasants’ association and the neglect of hired laborers’ leadership role are deeply misguided. “Poor peasants are the backbone of the Party and the proletariat in the countryside, staunch supporters of a thoroughgoing land revolution,” and “Relying on poor peasants” is one of the key strategies underlying the land survey campaign and all land-related struggles. The eight-county congress of the poor peasants’ association had already condemned the association’s isolationist tendencies, urging the abolition of the referral system and opening its doors to all poor and hired laborers, regardless of age or gender. Yet many local chapters continued to operate under the old regime, refusing admission without a formal introduction. Even in Daojing District of Ruijin, when unaffiliated poor peasants attempted to attend a poor peasants’ association meeting, the leaders outright dismissed them. In Zhuzi Township of Bosheng, the poor peasants’ association saw no growth whatsoever during July. In districts and townships where the land survey yielded positive results, the poor peasants’ association flourished; conversely, in areas lacking success or experiencing only marginal gains, its stagnation served as a clear indicator of the organization’s isolationist stance. The vital leadership role of hired laborers in the land survey campaign likewise remains unrecognized by many. The Party’s resolutions affirm, “Hired laborers are the rural counterparts of urban proletarians and pioneers of the land revolution. Therefore, Soviet officials and trade unionists must collaborate closely to cultivate and organize the enthusiasm of the working masses, making them the vanguard of the land survey campaign.” However, the majority of our comrades have yet to act accordingly. The primary approach involves encouraging rural workers to join the poor peasants’ association and forming dedicated worker subgroups within it. Through these groups, active poor peasants can rally others and advance the association’s mission. The experience of Shanhe Township in Huangbai District offers valuable insight: when two attempts to convene a poor peasants’ association meeting failed, they instead organized a gathering of members from agricultural and craft trade unions, mobilizing dozens of workers, each of whom brought along a poor peasant to join the association. On the third attempt, the meeting finally succeeded, marking the beginning of Shanhe Township’s land survey campaign. This approach should be replicated nationwide. Trade union bodies at higher levels ought to provide proactive guidance to their subordinate unions, designating the land survey as one of their core tasks.  (6) Misconceptions regarding rich peasants pervade rural struggles. Our overarching strategy hinges on rallying poor peasants, forging firm alliances with middle peasants, and leveraging the pioneering role of hired laborers to unite all revolutionary forces against the landlord class and counter the influence of rich peasants. On the subject of rich peasants, the Party has unequivocally stated, “Landlords and rich peasants must be clearly distinguished. In our relentless campaign to eradicate feudal remnants, any attempt to eliminate rich peasants is unacceptable.” During the July land survey, although no explicit theories advocating the annihilation of rich peasants were encountered, numerous instances were observed where individuals treated all rich peasants as mere landlords, confiscating their entire estates. The root cause of this error lies in a flawed understanding of the concept of “labor.” When we define landlords as those who derive income solely from rent or other exploitative practices without contributing any labor, some mistakenly classify individuals who engage in substantial manual labor as “auxiliary laborers,” thereby misidentifying them as landlords. Others view rich peasants engaged in usurious lending as mere moneylenders, applying measures intended to combat usury directly to them. Still others retroactively attribute wealthy status to individuals based on long-standing relationships with employers—for instance, considering someone a rich peasant if they had employed day laborers five or even ten years ago—or even elevating those who had only briefly hired help to the rank of rich peasants. Even more egregious was a practice observed in a certain locality of Xingguo: classifying individuals as landlords or rich peasants based solely on the number of exploitative activities they engaged in—three or more designated as landlords, two or fewer as rich peasants. Thus, whether one hires laborers, collects rent, or extends loans, they are deemed a landlord regardless of how much actual labor they contribute. Furthermore, the category of “reactionary rich peasants” has caused considerable confusion in many areas. In Wuyang District, for example, a wealthy merchant and businessman hosted a dinner attended by seventeen individuals; two years earlier, one of his relatives had been executed for involvement in the AB Group. Consequently, the local authorities resolved to confiscate the entire family’s property. Similar situations have arisen elsewhere, where rich peasants, despite having participated in relatively minor counterrevolutionary activities prior to the uprising—such as collecting thirty percent of the harvest—as demonstrated in Ruijin, subsequently refrained from engaging in further subversive acts. Despite this, the majority of the populace does not advocate for their punishment, whereas certain comrades insist on confiscating their assets. A more nuanced approach is warranted: in consolidated regions, stricter measures should be implemented to suppress counterrevolutionary elements, including rich peasants, while in border areas, decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis. Those who engaged in serious counterrevolutionary activities before the uprising or continued to do so afterward naturally warrant confiscation, whereas others may be spared. In the latter scenario, only the individual concerned and those directly complicit in their actions should be targeted, leaving the remaining family members untouched. This represents a more appropriate course of action.  (7) The Worker-Peasant Inspection Departments failed to fulfill their responsibilities, committing numerous errors in the process. Many comrades within these departments fail to recognize that the unfolding land survey campaign presents an ideal opportunity to wage ideological struggles against bureaucracy, corruption, inaction, and class enemies, expelling them from the Soviets. Regrettably, their efforts in this regard have been woefully inadequate. Faced with this intense class struggle, numerous members of the Worker-Peasant Inspection Departments succumbed to passivity, exhibiting bureaucratic and formalistic tendencies. For instance, the head of the Worker-Peasant Inspection Section in Ruijin City covered up the massive embezzlement committed by the head of the city’s Judicial Section (misappropriating over a thousand yuan of public funds). Similarly, the head of the Worker-Peasant Inspection Section in Dutou District turned a blind eye to the township chairman’s dereliction of duty in overseeing the land survey campaign, neither criticizing nor reporting him. Moreover, the inspection departments sometimes pursued misguided avenues, treating romantic entanglements as corruption and the acquisition of landlord-owned items as embezzlement, subjecting those involved to public shaming or even trials. In some cases, even minor infractions resulted in dismissal. Rather than systematically encouraging self-criticism and fostering ideological debate, they opted for simplistic punitive measures, foregoing the arduous task of cultivating self-awareness and ideological vigilance. Needless to say, those Soviet officials guilty of prolonged and serious misconduct undoubtedly deserve expulsion. However, meting out similar penalties for less severe offenses constitutes an overreach. Regarding class enemies, the prevailing practice of judging individuals solely on their background—regardless of their longstanding commitment to the Party and Soviet principles—has led to the blanket designation of “class enemy” and subsequent expulsion. While this approach may suffice in certain instances, we must resolutely purge those whose class origins are tainted and who have further compounded their transgressions through inaction, corruption, and other malfeasance (including landlords, rich peasants, and other recalcitrant elements). Failure to do so would indeed be excessive.  (8) A lack of Bolshevik artistry in leading the land survey campaign persists. Despite a clear understanding of the mission and guiding principles, the absence of skillful leadership in mobilizing the masses continues to hinder the campaign’s progress. As noted earlier, Ren Tian District and other locales offer exemplary models of effective leadership, whereas many other areas remain fraught with errors. Some localities remain unaware of the need to employ diverse tactics when confronting large, landlord-dominated villages—for instance, recognizing that genuine mobilization can only be achieved by first apprehending prominent figures known colloquially as “big tigers.” Likewise, numerous districts overlook the optimal strategy of utilizing confiscated assets to galvanize mass participation. In Wazi Township of Daojing District, for example, confiscated items were distributed exclusively to land survey cadres and members of the poor peasants’ association, with others receiving nothing on the grounds that they had not actively contributed. In some areas, the distribution of confiscated goods proceeds at a glacial pace, with items languishing for over a month before reaching the intended recipients. Land confisicated from landlords is distributed even more slowly. Many local cadres fail to mobilize the various departments of the Soviet apparatus and different mass organizations, neglecting to engage all Party members and youth league members across all villages and households to assume pivotal leadership roles. When work stalls, they often claim that no viable solution exists. In other cases, once the mass struggle has been ignited—when numerous individuals report landlords and rich peasants, urging investigation and confiscation—our cadres lack the ability to seize the moment and channel this momentum into sustained action, extending their efforts to every village. Furthermore, even after initial progress, when the fervor of the mass struggle begins to wane, our comrades are unable to employ various techniques to reignite it and drive the campaign forward until all feudal remnants are eradicated. In still other instances, when the land survey campaign has successfully unleashed the passion of the masses, local leaders fail to harness this energy to pursue complementary objectives—for example, encouraging participants to enlist in the Red Army, purchase economic construction bonds, join cooperatives, intensify autumn harvests and plowing, or establish literacy clubs and evening schools. Instead, they allow this golden opportunity to slip away, only resuming propaganda and agitation once prompted by higher authorities. This tail-end approach to leadership, lagging behind the surging tide of mass struggle, proves profoundly detrimental to the revolutionary cause. Conversely, a small minority of cadres have resorted to reckless, heavy-handed tactics in various locales. We have repeatedly emphasized that combating the neglect of mass mobilization and rejecting commandist methods requires patient, painstaking efforts to engage and win over the people—a process that ultimately secures their support and achieves the goal of eradicating feudal remnants. Such mass work stands as the sole guarantee of implementing the correct class line. The commencement of the land survey campaign necessitates extensive propaganda in every household, elucidating its necessity and distinguishing it from land redistribution. It is crucial to clearly explain to the populace what constitutes a landlord, rich peasant, or middle peasant. Household assemblies should not be held merely once; particularly in backward villages, they must be convened more frequently, ensuring that no revolutionary-minded individual is left unaware of our message. To accomplish this, we must first educate all active elements—through township Soviets, trade unions, poor peasants’ associations, women’s farmer associations, and other mass organizations—so that they, in turn, can disseminate information to the broader populace. Class differentiation should not be undertaken by a select few; rather, it must engage the majority. Beyond review by the poor peasants’ association, township Soviets, and district Soviets, a public assembly should be convened in the home of the targeted household, obtaining the consent of the residents before proceeding with confiscation. Property should be distributed directly to the villagers and household members, securing their satisfaction. All these measures are aimed at securing the support of the masses. The Party and Soviet officials must always keep the broad masses in mind, regardless of the specific task at hand. We must orient ourselves toward the people—and, more importantly, toward the vast majority of them. Our work demands deep immersion in every large and small village, as well as in all towns and cities. We must resolutely oppose the isolationist, commandist, and erroneous approaches adopted by a small minority. Unfortunately, many of our comrades have yet to adopt such an approach. In Ruijin, numerous districts and townships have never addressed the issue of class differentiation with the populace (never explaining the distinctions between landlords, rich peasants, and middle peasants). In Ruijin and several other counties, instances have been observed where cadres initiate the survey without prior propaganda, leading landlords and rich peasants to spread rumors claiming an abundance of their kind in the area or asserting that hundreds of households are slated for investigation (as reported in Ruijin). Meanwhile, our comrades remain oblivious to the need for transparent “class analysis” to dispel such misinformation. A landlord in Guangchang remarked, “The land survey campaign is merely the Central Government compelling debtors to repay their debts.” Our comrades, however, have yet to refute this fallacy. In several townships of Daojing District, aside from neglecting propaganda, class differentiation is carried out solely by a handful of members of the land survey committee, bypassing both public assemblies and the poor peasants’ association. They contend, “The masses cannot be relied upon; they lack the capacity to analyze class composition. Any attempt to bring the matter before a public assembly will inevitably lead to disputes, whereas the committee’s determination alone holds sway.” This peculiar rationale from Daojing District truly qualifies as a global oddity! In several locations, landlords are confiscated exclusively at night, ostensibly to prevent their escape. In one instance, a “district-wide” assembly was convened, yet attendance barely exceeded two hundred people. Three speakers took turns delivering addresses from morning until afternoon, denying attendees rest or refreshments, under the pretext of forestalling a mass exodus. Such crude tactics also rank among the most bizarre.  (9) Engaging on Two Fronts to Overcome Errors and Achieve Complete Victory in the Land Survey Campaign  Undoubtedly, the land survey campaign has gained momentum across vast territories. However, as we advance and accurately assess our achievements while laying the groundwork for further development, we must remain vigilant against obstacles that may impede our progress. Only by unleashing the combined firepower of a dual-front struggle—combating underestimation of the campaign’s significance, resisting compromises with landlords and rich peasants, and rejecting tail-end leadership tactics—can we propel the land survey campaign forward with greater speed. It is every Communist Party member’s duty to wage ideological battles against right-leaning tendencies, to challenge complacency regarding the profound implications of the land survey campaign, and to uphold the principle of uncompromising confrontation with feudal remnants. Simultaneously, we must draw the attention of all Party members to the grave danger posed by infringements upon the rights of middle peasants, reaffirming our resolve to “severely punish any attempt to undermine their interests,” as this peril has already become acutely apparent in ongoing land survey operations. Flawed perceptions of rich peasants likewise risk adversely affecting middle peasants. Moreover, all forms of commandism pose the greatest threat to the unity of middle peasants. By marshaling the full force of a two-front struggle to eliminate every obstacle in our path, we can ensure that the land survey campaign marches steadily toward complete victory, with all necessary safeguards firmly in place.