Recently, inspections of the implementation of emergency mobilization orders across various regions have revealed highly unsatisfactory results. In addition to the letters of reprimand issued by the Labor and War Committee to local authorities, the People’s Committee has further emphasized that the primary cause of this situation lies in fundamental political misperceptions: (1) Generally, there is a failure to recognize the gravity of the enemy’s large-scale offensive, reflecting the most backward and complacent mindset among the masses, who assume that the enemy has not yet arrived and thus continue their routine activities. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to carry out urgent tasks. (2) In border areas, exposure to enemy incursions has led to panic and disarray. This stems from a lack of understanding of the current favorable conditions for the revolution, a dearth of revolutionary confidence, and a pervasive sense of defeatism, all of which obstruct the execution of mobilization efforts. (3) There is also a mistaken understanding of the offensive strategy, with some viewing it as solely the responsibility of the Red Army, while they themselves merely await the Red Army’s success. Particularly in border regions, this attitude of dependence on the Red Army, coupled with a refusal to actively launch counterattacks against the enemy, reflects a fatalistic waiting stance. Such a mindset prevents the vigorous pursuit of an offensive strategy on all fronts and inevitably leads to the abandonment of all emergency mobilization work.

The People’s Committee calls upon governments at all levels and local military leadership organs to wage a resolute and uncompromising struggle against these political errors, opposing both the neglect of the enemy’s large-scale offensive—especially the backward mentality of complacency that assumes the enemy is still far off—and the panic-stricken, passive, and conservative attitudes toward the enemy’s advance. These are the most pernicious obstacles to the successful implementation of emergency mobilization aimed at crushing the enemy’s major offensive. The People’s Committee sternly urges governments at all levels and local military leadership organs to deeply appreciate the enemy’s ongoing efforts to construct extensive road networks, establish supply depots and transportation systems, organize and expand landlord militias, and cultivate anti-Communist organizations and volunteer militia units around the Soviet areas, while simultaneously amassing vast war funds and deploying massive troop concentrations. Notably, the intensified attacks on the northeastern Jiangxi, Xiang-E-Gan, and Xiang-Gan Soviet regions demonstrate the enemy’s increasingly meticulous preparations for a full-scale assault on the Central Soviet Area and a protracted struggle. It is imperative to recognize that defeating this major enemy offensive will be a long, arduous, and brutal class struggle—a pivotal juncture in the proletarian revolution. We must devote every ounce of our strength to securing victory in this war. At the same time, it should be noted that although the enemy’s armed forces have been significantly reinforced with direct imperialist support, its political position and internal cohesion have been greatly weakened compared to the previous three encirclement campaigns. Dissatisfaction and wavering are rife within the enemy troops arrayed against the Soviet areas. Meanwhile, the nationwide revolutionary upsurge, together with the expansion and strengthening of the Soviet Red Army, present favorable conditions for us. By mobilizing all available resources and making the necessary sacrifices, we can achieve complete victory in this war and secure the first triumph in Jiangxi.

During the inspection of mobilization work, another serious problem was identified: instead of politically mobilizing and organizationally engaging the masses, certain cadres have resorted to coercive, top-down methods that completely alienate them from the people. This practice is closely linked to the aforementioned political errors: First, because of the failure to grasp the seriousness of the enemy’s offensive, there is no corresponding recognition of the importance of mobilizing the broad working-class and peasant masses. Consequently, no effort is made to base mobilization work on mass participation or to conduct comprehensive political agitation. Second, leading organs at all levels often adopt a bureaucratic approach, simply issuing orders, resolutions, and plans without providing specific guidance or oversight regarding implementation details or effective methods for engaging the masses; in some cases, they even resort to mere commands or threats of punishment, thereby exacerbating the widespread phenomenon of coercive, authoritarian directives imposed on the grassroots level. Third, a lax and disorganized working style prevails: instead of utilizing mass assemblies, representative conferences, and various mass organizations to mobilize and strengthen popular support, reliance on coercion and command becomes inevitable. Fourth, the bureaucratic modus operandi inherently discourages diligent mass mobilization; convenience often takes precedence over genuine engagement, leading to the substitution of forceful compulsion and arbitrary orders for meaningful participation. These tendencies are particularly pronounced in emergency mobilization efforts. Most strikingly, in implementing the central government’s emergency mobilization order, no mass assemblies, representative meetings, Red Guard rallies, Young Pioneer gatherings, or meetings of other mass organizations were convened to provide detailed briefings and explanations or to conduct thorough political propaganda. As a result, the majority of the population remains unaware of the true nature and scale of the enemy’s offensive, rendering all mobilization efforts ineffective and preventing them from being carried out on the basis of genuine popular initiative. For example, efforts to expand the Red Army have fallen short of their targets, failing to inspire young men and women from worker and peasant backgrounds to enthusiastically and voluntarily join the Red Guard or the Young Pioneers; instead, punitive measures have been employed to compel participation. Similarly, in the collection of land taxes and the issuance of public bonds, adequate political education was lacking beforehand to ensure that each worker and peasant understood the rationale behind paying land tax and purchasing government bonds. When the actual collection and issuance took place, no appropriate meetings were convened, nor were urban and rural representatives utilized to encourage voluntary compliance and increased subscription. Rather than offering clear explanations in response to public queries, coercive tactics reminiscent of those used against rich peasants and capitalists were applied to ordinary workers and peasants, resulting in severe alienation from the masses. This not only complicates the collection of land taxes and the sale of bonds but also undermines all other mobilization initiatives—an extremely grave issue.

Such coercive and authoritarian practices are not confined to emergency mobilization; they permeate virtually all aspects of Soviet administrative work, fostering the very工作作风 that they represent. This is largely attributable to the serious bureaucratic tendencies exhibited by many leading organs, which either mechanically forward superior directives without modification or simply file them away untouched, eschewing the convening of meetings to thoroughly discuss and tailor implementation strategies to local conditions and provide concrete guidance to lower-level cadres. Moreover, there is a systematic failure to evaluate outcomes; regardless of performance, the focus remains on mere formal compliance. The entire system of governance is thus built upon a foundation of simplistic commands, with routine procedures prevailing across all periods and all types of work. This constitutes pure bureaucracy. Bureaucracy entails detachment from the masses and the erosion of the vital link between the Soviet state and its people, posing a grave threat to the success and development of the Soviet regime. Routine obfuscation and coercive edicts are among its most egregious manifestations—practices that have no place whatsoever within the Soviet government. This bureaucratic malaise has infiltrated the Soviet apparatus primarily through three channels: (1) the influence of semi-feudal social structures and the bureaucratic legacy of the Nationalist Party in China; (2) the pervasive disorganization characteristic of the peasantry, which lacks the organizational discipline of the proletariat; and (3) a general absence of the spirit of arduous struggle, replaced by a preference for expedient shortcuts, allowing bureaucratic tendencies to take root and flourish within Soviet institutions.

The People’s Committee therefore calls upon all Soviet organs at every level, as well as the broad ranks of workers and peasants, to unite in a resolute campaign against bureaucracy, purging it from Soviet bodies, expelling irredeemable bureaucratic elements, consolidating the power of the worker-peasant Soviet state, and simultaneously forging a new administrative ethos. To achieve this, the following measures are essential: First, all work must be grounded in mass mobilization; any departure from this principle inevitably results in isolation from the people. Second, the implementation of laws and resolutions should rely less on commands and more on raising the class consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses to secure their active support. Third, mass mobilization must be underpinned by robust political propaganda and agitation. Fourth, the tools of mass mobilization include not only various Soviet organizations but also all forms of mass associations. Urban and rural representative assemblies and mass meetings serve as direct conduits for engaging the populace, while trade unions constitute the cornerstone of mass mobilization. Fifth, every decision must be practical and feasible, rejecting empty, vague resolutions and the sterile, perfunctory meetings that yield neither preparation nor tangible results. Sixth, when issuing directives, attention must be paid to methods of engaging the masses and to their expressed views, using these as a basis for formulating concrete implementation plans. Seventh, upon receipt of orders or resolutions from higher authorities, immediate meetings should be convened for thorough discussion and the formulation of specific, locally adapted implementation strategies. Eighth, during the course of implementation, one must constantly assess one’s own work: What has been accomplished? Where lie errors or shortcomings? Ninth, tasks should be appropriately divided according to their interrelationships; this applies not only to individual departments and comrades but also to the manner in which instructions are conveyed to subordinates, ensuring that assignments are tailored to local conditions. Tenth, guidance provided to lower-level cadres must be substantive, concrete, and replete with actionable recommendations. Eleventh, official documents should be issued sparingly; instead, regular field inspections and on-site guidance are preferred. Inspectors are not mere observers standing aloof to criticize; rather, they bear substantive responsibility for examining work processes and assisting lower-level cadres in overcoming difficulties. Twelfth, specialized task forces should be dispatched to provide direct assistance to lower-level units. The mission of these teams is to ensure that assigned tasks are successfully completed, not merely to offer empty criticism while remaining uninvolved. Their modus operandi involves concentrating resources to first resolve pressing issues in one area before moving on to the next, with each member assuming specific responsibilities and committing to fully executing the tasks within their designated scope. Thirteenth, meetings should not be held capriciously; they must be carefully prepared, produce concrete outcomes, and be genuinely substantive. Fourteenth, mass meetings require thorough preparation. Every political rally or agitation session must be tailored to the needs of the audience, directly addressing their interests and concerns, and delivered in clear, concise language imbued with persuasive power.  The Soviet administrative style is characterized by its mass orientation, practicality, organizational rigor, and strict discipline, embodying the indomitable spirit of arduous struggle. Any approach that estranges the administration from the people falls squarely within the realm of bureaucratic作风. The People’s Committee calls upon all Soviet organs at every level to mount an emergency mobilization drive to counteract erroneous perceptions and negligent attitudes toward the enemy’s impending offensive, purge bureaucracy from Soviet institutions, and lay the groundwork for a new administrative ethos. In doing so, they should swiftly fulfill all obligations set forth in the emergency mobilization order. All Soviet organs—from provincial to township level—have immediately convened meetings pursuant to this resolution, conducting self-critical reviews to expose shortcomings in their respective work, specifying concrete implementation measures, and reporting the outcomes to the central authorities.  Chairman Mao Zedong Vice Chairmen Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao November 19, 1931