Comrade Yuan Guoping:  I. Your first letter from Jiangkou has been received here. As your letter indicates, conditions in Gulonggang and other localities are likely even more favorable than in Sandu. We must redouble our efforts to win over the masses; under no circumstances should we allow their growing consciousness to lead us to slacken our work or relax our discipline.

II. In conducting this campaign, we must constantly keep in mind all strategies and methods of work, ensuring that they remain aligned with the overarching task of “winning over the masses and establishing a Soviet region.” We must not lower our political slogans to accommodate the backwardness of the masses. While it may sometimes be necessary to proceed step by step when dealing with less conscious sections of the population, such an approach must never divert us from our fundamental objective—namely, the comprehensive goal of “winning over the masses and establishing a Soviet region.” The strategies and methods outlined in the third issue of the General Communications Bulletin are broadly correct, but you must apply them with great flexibility and avoid slavish adherence to the text. Our previous assessment of the masses in Sandu Qibao differs somewhat from what you describe in your current letter; consequently, the application of our working strategies and methods cannot be carried out mechanically. For example, the so‑called “first strike against big landlords, then against small landlords” is by no means a strategic line. Given the present situation in Sandu, rigidly following this approach would inevitably lead us down the path of opportunism. Similarly, the transition from the Peasants’ Association to the establishment of Soviets and Poor Peasants’ Leagues should not be protracted. Instead, we must vigorously mobilize poor peasants, hired laborers, and middle peasants to rise up and engage in struggle without delay. Through this struggle, we should swiftly shift our focus from confronting big landlords to targeting small landlords and rich peasants, implementing measures such as land redistribution and debt cancellation. Once a substantial majority of the impoverished masses have joined the movement, we must immediately expel from the Peasants’ Association any remaining small landlords and rich peasants who are opportunistically exploiting the situation, and promptly set up mass political organs—the Soviets—and class-based mass organizations—the Poor Peasants’ Leagues.

In short, our strategies and methods of work must be determined by the concrete local conditions. You should make a realistic assessment of the local situation, of the sentiments and demands of the masses, and based on this, adopt more practical strategies and methods, so as to achieve greater tangible results. When Red forces first enter White areas, acts of reprisal and spontaneous, uncoordinated action are bound to occur. You should also be vigilant about similar incidents arising elsewhere. Disciplinary standards within the troops must be maintained without the slightest relaxation. The masses should organize small guerrilla detachments to distribute the property of local tyrants and gentry among themselves; to form initial mass organizations—the Peasants’ Associations; even to establish temporary political organs—the Revolutionary Committees—in order to organize these guerrilla units; and to mount attacks against fortified strongholds that the masses fear. Why is this so? Because in environments like Sandu Qibao (and in still worse conditions, such as those currently prevailing in Yongfeng under the Third Army, near Nanfeng under the Fifth Army, in Anyuan under the Fourth Army, or along the Shicheng–Ninghua border under the Eleventh Army), the very existence of mass organizations and political organs, as well as the benefits of land distribution and debt cancellation, remains highly precarious. Once the Red Army withdraws and the landlords’ armed bands return, all such organizations will collapse, and all gains will be lost. Only organized guerrilla units—trained by us, having already engaged in struggles against local tyrants and shared in the spoils, and standing in irreconcilable opposition to the gentry and landlords—can fall back with the Red Army to the Red Zone, biding their time for a decisive offensive. Such forces alone can serve as a reliable foundation; they are the only means of preventing this entire undertaking from being rendered futile.

Leaving aside earlier campaigns, consider the operations in Pingxiang, Liling, and You County after the Changsha Campaign, as well as the initiatives in the Yuan River basin and the Wujiang River basin. Did these not teach us that the key to success lies precisely in organizing guerrilla units independent of production? All the painstaking efforts expended by our comrades to distribute land, cancel debts, establish Soviets, and organize Red Guards (which did not operate independently of agricultural production)—were they not ultimately wasted? Since none of your four previous letters mentioned the formation of guerrilla units, I have taken the liberty of elaborating on this point at length in the present missive. This does not imply, however, that you should lack a plan for consolidating political power in Sandu Qibao. Although the local conditions there differ significantly from those in Yongfeng, Nanfeng, Anyuan, and other regions, there can be no doubt that you ought to formulate such a plan. It should envisage a thorough mobilization of all the masses, the complete destruction of the landlords’ armed forces, the organization of class-based mass organizations and political organs, and the implementation of land redistribution. If you were to calculate the circumstances prevailing at that juncture, you would recognize that the establishment of locally recruited, non‑production‑dependent guerrilla units to combat local tyrants constitutes the very core of your entire campaign. To treat the formation of guerrilla units as merely one component of our work, rather than its central focus, would be counterproductive and could easily lead to laxity in carrying out our other tasks.

In the past, the political departments of various armies, as well as the vast majority of cadres engaged in political work, failed to grasp the central importance of organizing guerrilla units in specific local contexts. Instead, they often pursued activities ill‑suited to the actual conditions, resulting in much wasted effort and meager substantive achievements. Accordingly, the instructions contained in this letter are not only addressed to your unit operating in Sandu Qibao; they apply equally to the entire army, to each independent division, and to all local guerrilla units, which are all expected to follow them scrupulously.

Mao Zedong, Director of the General Political Department