To the CPC Central Committee Military Commission from Tan ××:

   The current division of operational areas among the Twelfth Army is inappropriate. Qingliu and Liancheng should be assigned to the Second Army as its second-phase operating zone. The Twelfth Army’s primary mission should not be fundraising but rather establishing a base area spanning Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting counties. Specifically, the Twelfth Army would take charge of these three counties, the Thirty-Fifth Army would handle Ruijin County alone, and the Third Army would cover Yudu and Huichang Counties. All three units are to complete this task within two months—July and August—by fully distributing land, organizing local armed forces, setting up provisional local governments, and establishing temporary party organizations, thereby genuinely resolving these four key issues and linking the six counties of Yudu, Ruijin, Shicheng, Ninghua, Huichang, and Changting into a single contiguous base area. This constitutes our central objective.  It will be no easy feat for the Twelfth Army to accomplish work in three counties within just two months. Over the past four months following the Second Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the Twelfth Army managed only Shicheng County and part of Ningnan County; moreover, Ningnan is now a semi-controlled area while Shicheng remains fully under our control. Given such past results, attempting to assign the Twelfth Army the task of operating in three counties over the next two months is bound to fail unless the timeframe is substantially extended. If we further expand operations to include Qingliu and Liancheng, deploying the Twelfth Army’s main force—the Thirty-Fourth Division—to those two counties, the entire campaign will again come to naught. Therefore, it is imperative to revise the Kangdu Resolution: the Thirty-Fourth Division should be responsible for the entirety of Changting County, with the army’s direct-affiliate units positioned between the three counties. I earnestly request that this arrangement be implemented without hesitation.

   From a broader strategic perspective, the previously proposed plan to dispatch the Third Corps to Erchong and the Fourth Army to Ning’an would not only objectively aid Chiang Kai-shek in striking at Guangdong and Guangxi—a goal long desired by Chiang—but also risk precipitating an early joint action between the two provinces, which would inevitably draw their anti-Chiang focus squarely onto us, thereby accelerating the process of a Chiang-KMT compromise against the Communists. Such a course of action would be profoundly unwise. Advancing northward beyond Nanfeng is neither feasible in practice nor advisable strategically: first, there is no prospect of consolidating a stable regime there; second, it poses an excessive threat to the Yangtze River region. With the southwestern and northern fronts remaining largely unchanged, only the eastern sector offers a viable option. To begin with, advancing into this area does not directly threaten Guangdong and Guangxi. Furthermore, the terrain is relatively remote and thus less vulnerable to enemy pressure—indeed, it presents fewer risks than our previous thrusts toward Nanfeng and Yihuang. Additionally, the rugged mountainous landscape, devoid of major river barriers, provides an ideal environment for creating a new battlefield. There is also ample potential for fundraising; within a single corps, logistical supply would not be a concern. Finally, the local population is substantial, offering a rich pool of recruits to expand the Red Army.  In light of these favorable conditions, we should formulate a long-term operational plan for this region. The Third Corps should operate in Jianning, Taishou, and Jiaole, using Shunchang, Shaowu, and Xianzhe as fundraising zones. The Fourth Army should work in Guihua, Qingliu, and Liancheng, raising funds locally through Shaxian, Yong’an, and Mingxi. The Thirty-Fifth Army will concentrate on Ruijin County, achieving self-sufficiency in both personnel and supplies. Meanwhile, the Third Army will operate in Yudu and Huichang, likewise securing its own resources. As for the Eastern Jiangxi Independent Division, its primary mission is to connect Jianning with the Shicheng base area, establishing a fund-raising zone where land reform is carried out. However, if the campaign merely targets local tyrants for propaganda purposes without distributing land or instituting any form of local governance, the time limit should be set at two months, with the possibility of a brief extension to a maximum of four months. Should enemy forces appear, we will concentrate our forces nearby and engage them decisively; otherwise, we shall continue our work in this area.  The Twelfth Army must strive to execute its mission in Ninghua, Changting, and Shicheng with utmost diligence. Following the recent failure in Ninghua—where the Shicheng guerrilla unit degenerated into a band of thugs and collaborators—it is essential to undertake a thorough transformation and resolutely oppose opportunism in mass work. Should the operations in these three counties once again resemble the previous fiasco in Ninghua and Shicheng, then both the Military Commission and the commanders of the three divisions must bear full responsibility.

   The General Front Committee

   Mao Zedong

   10:00 PM, June 28th, at Jianning

   Regarding Shicheng’s report proposing to compress the operational period to three months and citing the imminent two-month offensive by the enemy, this document is forwarded to the Twelfth Army Command and Comrade Li, as well as to the Border Region Work Committee.