(August 12, 1931)

Our tactics in dealing with the enemy's third offensive are as follows:
We will firmly carry out [the approach of] avoiding the strong and attacking
the weak, attacking the enemy's rear so that the main forces of the enemy
become useless and do not have enough supplies, thereby exhausting the enemy
and weakening his entire army. Then we will take advantage of his fatigue and
launch a sudden attack. In this way our victory in the third campaign is assured.
Beginning on August 4, our armies first divided and then gathered together
their forces and proceeded to the enemy's rear. On August 6 and 7 we wiped out
the enemy divisions of Shangguan Yunxiang' and Hao Mengling in the area of
Liantang, Chenggang, and Liangcun. The main forces of the Red Army have
already been safely concentrated in the vicinity of Junbu and are continuing to
carry out our overall strategy.
During this process, in order to facilitate the carrying out of our tactics, we
ordered the Thirty-fifth Army and the Thirty-fifth Division to make every effort
to pin down the enemy by guerrilla actions, in cooperation with the armed forces
of the various localities. They led the divisions of Jiang Dingwen and Zhao
Guantao to the east bank of the Gan River-Daliao and Liangkou. They led the
divisions of Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying to Wan'an. The three divisions of
Cai Tingkai, Shen Guanghan,² and Han Deqin are stranded between Chongxian
and Donggu, could not participate in the campaign because of the lack of food
supplies, and even sent a force of one division to harvest the rice of the masses in
the Chongxian area. In sum, the main forces of the enemy came a long way for
the attack, their troops have been walking for two months and several thousand
li, and thus far they have not encountered the main forces of the Red Army. On
the other hand, their units in the rear are constantly exposed to sudden attacks by our

forces whose job is to pin down the enemy. Above all, the wavering of the White
army soldiers has become more apparent since the beginning of the Third Campaign. Marching in the hot summer, more than half of the soldiers have fallen ill.
They have come to feel that it is very difficult for the White army soldiers to
fight in the Red region, and the officers as well as the soldiers are all disheartened. From today's perspective, we feel that the first step in carrying out our
plan was completely successful.
Beginning on August 9, however, the enemy became aware of our intentions.
Only then did they learn that the main forces of the Red Army had already
moved from the west to east, and that those left behind to the northwest of
Xing[guo] City were not such a big force as they had originally thought. Therefore, the first of the plans the enemy used against us had failed. Starting from the
9th, the enemy will change to another plan. The main content of this plan is to
reassemble troops to attack the main forces of the Red Army.
Until yesterday (August 11th), the positions of the enemy forces were as follows:

Fourteenth Division: Chen Cheng; Futian
Eleventh Division: Luo Zhuoying; in motion, position unclear
Sixty-first Division: Shen Guanghan; Gaoling
Eighth Division: Mao Bingwen; unclear
Twenty-seventh Division: Sun Lianzhong; unclear
Sixtieth Division: Cai Tingkai; Liangcun
Ninth Division: Jiang Dingwen; Xingguo
Sixth Division: Zhao Guantao; between Xingguo and Gaoxing
Forty-fifth Division:³ Wei Lihuang; Ningdu
Fifth Division: Zhou Hunyuan; Longgang
Twenty-eighth Division: Gong Bingfan; Taihe
Seventy-eighth Division: Lu Xiaochen; Ji'an
Fifty-third Division: Li Baoping; Ji'an
Twenty-fourth Division: Xu Kexiang; Guangchang
Forty-third Division: Guo Huazong; Futian

Looking at the situation from the enemy's perspective, the enemy will aim at
Junfu—the location of the Red Army—and turn around and continue to drive
toward the east.
Chen Cheng's division will be ordered back to Wan'an for concentration—it
will attack the rear of the Red Army from Baisha.
Jiang Dingwen's division will be ordered back to Xingguo, via Liangcun and
Juncun, to concentrate its forces [and move to] Gulonggang, Caijiang, and
Nankeng.

Cai Tingkai's division will be ordered back from the area of Donggu and
Chongxian to concentrate its forces in the vicinity of Chenggang, (and move to]
Liangcun and Yuexi.
During this period, in the actions of the main forces of the Red Army, we
should, without the slightest doubt, continue to apply our overall tactics, striving
to wipe out the weak units in the enemy's rear as well as the military depots in
his rear, so that the enemy will suffer great difficulties in supply. At present, the
line of communications between Chen Cheng's division and the rear must be via
Ji'an and Futian; the communication lines of the divisions of Jiang Dingwen and
Cai Tingkai must be via Ganzhou and Xingguo. Consequently, the overall operation of our Red Army should aim at the complete destruction of the enemy's old
base of operations and at preventing the establishment of a new base of operations. Only this will be a fatal blow to the enemy, and it is the major premise for
defeating the enemy.
The local forces left behind in Xing[guo], Yu[du], Gan[xian], Wan['an], and
Tai[he] should operate according to our overall tactics. Their tasks should be as
follows: strive to destroy the three water and land communication lines between
Ji'an and Futian, Ji'an and Ganzhou, and Ganzhou and Xingguo; use guerrilla
methods and resolute actions to destroy the enemy's new base of military operations, so that the enemy armies become extremely exhausted, extremely hungry,
extremely sick, and extremely enfeebled; then launch a relentless attack. Only
thus can we win complete victory in the third campaign.
On the basis of the above decisions, the operations and tasks of the forces in
Xing[guo], Yu[du], Gan[xian], Wan['an), and Tai[he] should be as follows:
1. The Fourth Independent Division should cooperate with the local armed
forces and the units under the provincial [committee), follow Cai Tingkai's
division closely, and actively launch continuous surprise attacks against the
enemy's rear. In general, its actions are:
a. Make surprise attacks on the enemy's supplies and gear in his rear and
the soldiers guarding them;
b. Launch night raids on the enemy's camps and disrupt them, so that the
enemy will not be able to have any rest day or night;
c. Destroy the enemy's communication lines in the rear—in particular,
find a way to destroy the enemy's radio;
d. Take over the weapons of the scattered enemy troops in the rear.
2. The Fifth Independent Division should cooperate with the local armed
forces in Chunhua and operate actively in the rear of Chen Cheng's division,
striving to pin down this enemy with guerrilla methods. In general, its actions
are:
a. Make surprise attacks on the enemy's garrison forces in the rear (it
should be under the command of the Thirty-fifth Division at times when
these two join forces);
b. Destroy the enemy's supply depots;

c. Destroy the enemy's telegraphic communications.
3. In cooperation with the local armed forces in Tiancun and Bailu, the
Thirty-fifth Army should operate actively in the area stretching from Longkou,
Liangkou, and Nantangxu to Dahujiang, striving to destroy the rear communications of Jiang Dingwen's and Cai Tingkai's divisions. In general, its actions are:
a. Cut communications on the Gan River along the area from Liangkou to
Dahujiang;
b. Cut communications by land along the area from Longkou and Daotan
to Nantang;
c. Actively launch surprise attacks on the enemy forces in the rear and
their supply depots;
d. Strive to strike a heavy blow against the landlord armed forces that are
taking advantage of this opportunity and annihilate them completely;
e. Strive to destroy the enemy's telegraph and telephone lines, as well as
the enemy's communication units.
4. The 101st Regiment should cooperate with the local armed forces in Gao-xing, Cayuangang, and Juncun and operate in the area to the west of Gaoxing. Its
tasks:
a. First of all, wipe out the militia bandits [tuanfei] in the Langchuan area
and get rid of the obstacles to communication with Taihe;
b. Wipe out the militia bandits in the Hengtang' and Wusu area, so that the
shores of the Gan River in the Gan[xian] and Wan['an] area will be entirely
sealed off by us.
The carrying out of the aforementioned tasks is one of the tasks of the Red
Army in the third campaign as a whole. The armed forces left behind in
Xing[guo], Yu[du], Gan[xian], Wan['an], and Tai[he] should strive to accomplish these tasks under the direct command of the Central Military Commission.
They must not, for the sake of their departmental demands, sabotage the overall
operational plan of the Red Army. This constitutes the guarantee that the Red
Army will triumph over the enemy.
During the critical period in the Third Campaign, the various local armed
forces should mobilize all their strength to take part in the campaign and actively
harass the enemy. They cannot simply post some sentries to protect their own
townships, and leave it at that. Obviously, the action of the local armed forces
should be under a unified organ of command. For this reason, we should have
the following rule: In every locality where there are Red Army forces, the commander of this Red Army unit will be concurrently the commander of the local
armed forces, and the local armed forces must accept his leadership. Only thus

will we be able to wipe out the enemy in a planned manner. If there are no Red
Army troops stationed in a locality, the local armed forces should unite with the
armed forces in the neighboring townships to elect a commander who will unify
the command and decide on the operation of the armed forces in these townships. We must be aware that only through unified command and cooperative
actions can victory be secured.
It is of particular importance that the Red Army and the local armed forces
should not only unite for the purpose of actively wiping out the enemy troops
and the armed forces of the landlords. At the same time, they must take their
stand in favor of the general task of setting up revolutionary bases and assist in
mass work in the locality, in order to consolidate the victory they have already
achieved. Therefore, the actions of the armed forces should be intimately linked
with the masses in the locality, and military operations that are isolated from the
masses are absolutely not allowed. We must not neglect this point in the slightest
degree, for only in this way will we be able to set up stable revolutionary bases.

Central Military Commission

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Jiangxi dangshi ziliao, Vol. 19, pp. 80-84.

1. Shangguan Yunxiang commanded the Nationalist army's Forty-seventh Division.

2. Shen Guanghan commanded the Nationalist army's Sixty-first Division, formerly
commanded by Dai Ji.


³ As pointed out in a note to the text as printed in Jiangxi dangshi ziliao, Wei's
command at this time was the Tenth Division.


4. According to a note to the Chinese text, "Daotan" is a typographical error for
"Chutan," a locality in Gan xian.

5. According to a note to the Chinese text, "Hengtang" is a typographical error for
"Huangtang," a place located between Xingguo and Wan'an xian.