Currently, a nationwide war is unfolding on an even larger scale.
In addition to directing and organizing the Nationalist warlords and deploying over eighty divisions in a massive “encirclement and suppression” campaign against Soviet areas and the Red Army across seven or eight provinces, the imperialist powers are constantly preparing for a direct, open assault on the Chinese Soviet Republic and its armed forces.
Japan’s military occupation of Northeast China and its attack on Shanghai represent the most concrete manifestation yet of imperialist partitioning of China and direct interference in the Chinese revolution.
Under unanimous agreement and support from all imperialist aggressors, they have concluded the so-called “ceasefire agreement” at the Shanghai Conference, with the aim of swiftly and efficiently dividing Shanghai and, ultimately, all of China, so as to concentrate their full strength against the Chinese revolution and against the Soviet Union.
Faced with this agreement, the Nationalist warlord government has further exposed its role as a lackey of imperialism, willingly serving as a road-clearer for foreign interests.
While signing treaties that betray Shanghai and surrender China to foreign powers, it has simultaneously transferred soldiers from the valiant 19th Route Army and the Fifth Army along the Shanghai–Nanjing Railway to Fujian and Wuhan, where they are now being used to attack Soviet areas that have already broken free from imperialist shackles, as well as the genuine anti-imperialist armed force—the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army.
The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has long since declared a national revolutionary war against Japan, encouraging and leading the working masses and the Red Army across the country to stand united on the front lines of the anti-imperialist struggle.
It has repudiated all agreements and secret pacts by which the counterrevolutionary Nationalist regime has betrayed China to imperialism, while vigorously developing popular armed forces dedicated to resisting Japanese aggression and actively preparing for direct combat with the imperialists, in order to secure China’s independence, liberation, and unification.
At present, the Central Government is leading the broad masses in the Soviet areas and the entire Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in launching a full-scale offensive.
Through revolutionary offensive operations, it seeks to repel the latest imperialist and Nationalist onslaught, crush and annihilate the enemy’s attacking forces, overthrow the Nationalist regime, and achieve an initial revolutionary victory in Jiangxi and its neighboring regions.
By delivering a decisive blow to imperialism in this way, it aims to create the conditions necessary for ultimate victory in the national revolutionary war.
Recent, continuous victories in the Eyuwan and Xiang-E-Xi Soviet areas have already placed Wuhan under threat and encirclement, creating an even more favorable situation.
The Central Soviet Area’s Red Army has turned back from Zhangzhou and advanced westward; the vigorous actions of the Tenth and Sixteenth Armies, together with the Third Corps’ successes on the west bank of the Gan River, have made the task of defeating the Guangdong–Jiangxi White Forces and seizing the major urban centers in the Gan River basin—thus realizing the goal of an initial victory in Jiangxi—increasingly urgent.
A decisive battle in the Gan River basin has already begun in recent days.
Consequently, wartime mobilization throughout the Soviet areas and rear-area logistical support have become more critical and pressing than ever before.
The breadth and depth of the mobilization, coupled with robust and efficient rear-area work, are of decisive importance to securing victory in the revolutionary war on the front lines.
Therefore, the Central Government hereby issues special orders to all levels of Soviet governments and every workers’ and peasants’ armed organization, instructing them to promptly carry out the following tasks: Each member of the working class and peasantry under the Soviet system must not only understand, from a class-based political perspective, the significance of this war for their own future prospects, but also demonstrate concrete action throughout the course of the class war to ensure the success and continuation of the revolutionary struggle.
Only in this way can we overcome the previous attitude of “the home front has nothing to do with the fighting at the front,” characterized by complacency and a desire merely to get by.

1. To ensure that the Red Army receives adequate replenishment of troops during the ongoing campaign and can continue to be systematically dispatched to the front lines, the Central Government deems it necessary, in this period of voluntary military service, to immediately establish Red Army Replenishment Regiments.
The specific procedures for establishing these regiments are hereby prescribed as follows:  ① Within each existing Soviet area, one Replenishment Regiment shall be established for each county or group of counties.
All worker-peasant fighters who are to be incorporated into the main Red Army units must first undergo centralized training in these regiments, after which they will be organized and sent to the front.
Only those who are newly recruited directly to independent divisions or regiments, or who are assigned to newly developed front-line areas, need not pass through the Replenishment Regiment.  ② Each regiment may form up to five companies per month, but must maintain at least one company.
If a regiment fails to expand the Red Army by at least two companies each month, it shall jointly establish a Replenishment Regiment with a neighboring county.
The number of Replenishment Regiments to be established in each military region, as well as the monthly expansion target for each regiment, shall be determined by the respective regional military commands based on the total quotas allocated to their regions by the Central Revolutionary Military Committee.
For other Soviet areas, these matters shall be decided by the relevant subcommittees of the Military Committee.
Each Replenishment Regiment must dispatch trained new recruits to the front once a month or every half month, while continuing to train newly enlisted worker-peasant volunteers.  ③ The immediate commander of each Replenishment Regiment is the local county Soviet and its military department; however, the regiment may also coordinate closely with higher-level military authorities (such as regional or subregional military headquarters, garrison commands, or the Military Committee’s rear-area offices). These higher authorities are obligated to provide assistance and guidance to the Replenishment Regiments.  ④ Cadres for the Replenishment Regiments shall be supplied by the Red Army schools, the field schools attached to various armies, and the regional military commands.
All personnel previously assigned to hostels for newly recruited Red Army soldiers must fully participate in the work of the Replenishment Regiments, and such hostels shall be abolished.
Political commissars and political cadres shall be provided by the local Soviet governments.  ⑤ The firearms and ammunition required for training within the local area shall be procured separately by the Military Committee’s rear-area logistics base and the local governments, with allocation managed by the respective regional military commands.
These weapons and munitions need not be taken along when the trained soldiers are sent to the front, allowing for continued training of new recruits.  ⑥ Clothing supplies for the Replenishment Regiments in Jiangxi shall be urgently manufactured by the Military Committee’s rear-area logistics base and distributed by the regional military commands according to schedules set for each county.
In Fujian, Xiang-Guangdong-Jiangxi, Xiang-E-Guangdong-Jiangxi, Northeast Jiangxi, and Xiang-E-Western Jiangxi, the respective regional military commands shall assume responsibility.
For the Eyuwan region, the matter will be handled by the relevant subcommittee of the Military Committee.
As for food and miscellaneous expenses, these shall be borne by the individual county Soviets.
The budget for the Central Soviet Area will be determined by the regional military commands and must be approved by the Central Government.
Other Soviet areas will have their budgets decided and approved by the relevant subcommittees and regional military commands.  ⑦ Training sessions are generally scheduled to last half a month.
The content of the training shall be formulated and promulgated by the respective subcommittees of the Military Committee and the regional military commands.  ⑧ All Red Army Replenishment Regiments across the country must establish extremely close ties with the local Committees Supporting the Red Army and seek their assistance to ensure coordinated action.  ⑨ All Replenishment Regiments must be established no later than July.

2. At a time when the revolutionary armed forces require rapid development and guerrilla movements are flourishing on a broad scale, the main source of reinforcements for the Red Army should not rely solely on Replenishment Regiments and frontline recruitment.
Instead, efforts must be made to continuously integrate and reorganize independent divisions, independent regiments, guerrilla units, and other armed formations into the main Red Army.
The Central Revolutionary Military Committee, the various subcommittees of the Military Committee, and the regional military commands are required to include in their plans for expanding the Red Army specific targets and timelines for transforming certain independent divisions and regiments into regular Red Army units, as well as for establishing new independent divisions and regiments.

3. To enable every citizen with voting rights in each Soviet area to exercise their right to arm themselves, consolidate and develop the power of the Soviets, and fulfill their duty to join the Red Army and fight on the front lines, all Soviet areas should immediately and universally establish urban and rural Red Guard units.
The principles governing the establishment of Red Guard units are hereby reiterated as follows:  ① Citizens of Soviet areas who are eligible to vote and fall between the ages of eighteen and forty are obligated to join the Red Guard.
However, local Soviet governments should not automatically conscript all men and women over eighteen into the Red Guard; rather, they should conduct extensive publicity campaigns to encourage voluntary enlistment.
This remains the primary principle guiding the current formation of Red Guard units.  ② In general, Red Guard units should not be separated from production.
In rural areas, men and women workers aged eighteen and above should be encouraged to join voluntarily.
In cities, the workforce should serve as the core, with broader participation from impoverished urban residents.
In large cities, separate workers’ Red Guard units may be established.
Worker-peasant individuals over forty who wish to join the Red Guard may be assigned to reserve units to perform rear-area and guard duties.  ③ Red Guard units operate under the direct command of the district military departments, with the township serving as the basic organizational unit.
In addition to establishing Red Guard units in each township, district military departments may also form model battalions at the district level, ranging from three to four companies in larger districts to one or two companies in smaller ones.
These model units and youth pioneer detachments should be able to concentrate relatively superior weaponry within their respective areas.  ④ Youth pioneers aged eighteen to thirteen who have already received military training and served in military capacities need not simultaneously join the Red Guard.
However, the youth pioneer organizations should regularly channel their most active members into the Red Guard and, when engaged in both front-line and rear-area activities, submit to the command of the Red Army and the Red Guard.  4. To support the main Red Army in combat, local armed forces in each county should launch a full-frontal offensive, actively penetrating white-ruled territories and enemy rear areas to develop guerrilla movements and establish new Soviet areas.
Beyond expanding and founding new independent units, maximum effort should be devoted to developing and organizing guerrilla forces.
The primary mission of guerrilla units is to engage in vigorous activity deep within white-controlled zones and enemy rear areas, eroding and undermining the enemy’s foundations and military strength; inciting and organizing peasant uprisings; instigating mutinies among enemy troops; widely proliferating guerrilla organizations; developing new Soviet areas; disrupting enemy communications; seizing enemy supplies; and attacking enemy positions—all of which serve to consolidate and expand Soviet territory and constitute essential conditions for a successful full-frontal offensive alongside the main Red Army.
Regarding the organization of guerrilla units, the following points should be noted:  ① Each county should determine the number of guerrilla units to be established based on its local struggle environment.
In counties located at the heart of red strongholds, at least four or five guerrilla units must be formed to operate in bordering white-ruled areas.  ② The size of each guerrilla unit need not be rigidly fixed; it should be determined according to the objective conditions of the area in which it intends to operate and the resources available to the unit itself.
Sometimes the unit may comprise as many as two companies, while at other times it may consist of only a dozen or so individuals.  ③ The composition of guerrilla units must include the bravest and most active worker-peasant fighters, particularly the leaders, who should be vanguard figures firmly committed to the struggle, in order to provide effective protection for the guerrilla movement as it ventures into white-controlled territories and undertakes independent operations.  ④ Guerrilla units must suspend production when operating in white-controlled areas; upon returning to Soviet territory for reorganization and training, they should preferably resume production.
When they venture out again on guerrilla missions, a portion of the original members should be rotated or supplemented with new recruits, so that the entire working-class and peasant population across the Soviet area can practice guerrilla tactics.  ⑤ Local security companies, model Red Guard battalions, and model youth pioneer detachments should all adopt guerrilla-style operations, organizing detachments that temporarily leave production to engage in vigorous activities in white-controlled areas and enemy rear areas.  ⑥ With regard to guerrilla plans and operational guidelines, the respective regional military commands, especially the local Soviet military departments, should issue specific instructions tailored to the actual conditions prevailing in their jurisdictions when dispatching guerrilla units.  5. Local Soviet governments and all local armed organizations should extensively mobilize the masses to join various supporting units such as stretcher teams, supply convoys, guides, scouts, sabotage teams, laundry crews, comfort groups, and medical aid teams.
These organizations must receive the necessary material assistance, and their members should be led to the front lines to participate in practical work.
District and township military departments should plan the number and size of such units for each district or township, while regional and subregional military commands should specify the quantities needed for deployment to the front lines and various combat sectors, assigning responsibility to local governments for ensuring their timely delivery to the front.
C.1. In order to swiftly transport food and all military supplies from the rear to the front and to facilitate the Red Army’s marches without obstruction from roads or rivers, all levels of Soviet governments must systematically lead the masses in promptly repairing bridges and roads along major transportation arteries and assisting the logistics bases in carrying out all related tasks.
Particularly in riverine and border regions, there should be a planned collection of watercraft prepared at all times to support military transportation.
Postal services along military transportation routes should routinely prepare for changes in those routes, strengthening post offices along the way by increasing staffing and adjusting mail-delivery schedules, so that military correspondence can be delivered quickly and without loss.
At the same time, all levels of government should provide maximum support to postal workers by increasing their numbers.  7. In order to fully finance the war effort and enable the Red Army to devote its full strength to the decisive battle, the Central Government has decided, on the one hand, to raise progressive tax rates on business income, to revise land taxes, and to impose taxes on urban rents, while also requiring local Soviet governments to raise funds through the development of new Soviet areas, thereby placing the burden of taxation squarely on the wealthiest classes.
On the other hand, it will issue sixty million yuan worth of short-term “Revolutionary War” bonds across all Soviet areas, mobilizing the broad working-class and peasant masses economically to assist the Red Army and ensure that the war effort faces no difficulties or obstacles.
Simultaneously, in order to promote financial circulation within the Soviet areas and to facilitate commercial exchange and national taxation, the Central Government will begin issuing a substantial quantity of state paper currency backed by sufficient reserves starting this month.
All levels of Soviet governments should extensively mobilize the masses to make them aware that the working-class and peasant populations throughout the Soviet areas bear not only political but also economic responsibility for ensuring ample provisions and funding for the Red Army, so that the continuation of the war’s success can quickly lead to the capture of major urban centers and the achievement of an initial victory in Jiangxi.
Accordingly, all working-class and peasant people across the Soviet areas should, on the one hand, strictly supervise merchants, capitalists, and rich peasants, leaving them no room for evasion of national taxes.
They must prevent such elements from engaging in opportunistic practices, concealing capital, underreporting profits, spreading rumors, sabotaging production, plotting against the Soviet financial system, or attempting to manipulate and control the situation.
Upon discovery of any such misconduct, the Soviet government must take resolute measures to impose severe penalties.
With respect to all merchant organizations still operating within the Soviet areas, such as “ya hang” and other remnants of old guilds, all levels of Soviet governments must enforce strict prohibitions.
Only the Soviet government has the authority to convene merchants and present them with laws, orders, and decisions.
On the other hand, the vast majority of working-class and peasant people, who pay only minimal land taxes (with tenant farmers and unemployed workers exempted, and poor farmers receiving exemptions or reductions), should, especially when it comes to purchasing bonds and using paper currency, demonstrate great enthusiasm and initiative by paying taxes first, buying bonds first, and using paper currency first, employing a method of revolutionary competition to encourage one another.
In mobilizing the masses for these purposes, all levels of Soviet governments must rely on the assistance of trade unions, tenant farmers’ unions, poor farmers’ associations, mutual aid societies, and other revolutionary mass organizations, striving to sell more than the prescribed quota of sixty million bond tickets within the designated timeframe.
The issuance of paper currency proceeds smoothly thanks to the immense trust the people place in it.
Likewise, all taxes can be paid without hesitation under the supervision, urging, and encouragement of the masses.
When raising funds for the development of new Soviet areas, all levels of Soviet governments and regional military commands must follow a class-based approach, carefully planning and assigning dedicated personnel to oversee the process.  8. In order to ensure sufficient food supplies for the masses and the Red Army, to promote rural economic development, increase government revenue, and bolster the war effort, as well as to enhance the income generated from Red Army-owned farmland and family plots, all levels of Soviet governments must undertake a comprehensive campaign to protect the autumn harvest and promote intercropping.
The specific tasks involved in this campaign are as follows:  ① All levels of Soviet governments, particularly township and district Soviets, should lead the masses in devising various measures to safeguard the autumn harvest.
First and foremost, strict red alert restrictions must be enforced, with widespread establishment of Red Guard units tasked with maintaining security, so that bandit gangs cannot invade villages to steal crops either just before maturity or after the harvest.
Special vigilance is required along the borders of the Soviet areas to prevent Nationalist White Army forces from entering and ravaging grain fields, thereby destroying the autumn harvest.
The success of these protective efforts depends on the concerted mobilization of the entire community.
On the one hand, the most effective strategy is to organize robust guerrilla units to operate in white-controlled areas and enemy rear areas, conducting raids on bandit hideouts and demonstrating the Red Army’s proactive outward expansion to defeat hostile forces, win over bandit sympathizers and foot soldiers, and ultimately eliminate bandit gangs—a fundamental approach to protecting the Soviet autumn harvest.
On the other hand, Red Guard units and youth pioneer detachments at all district and township levels must operate under the unified command of the county Soviet military departments, maintaining close coordination with one another.
Whenever bandits or White Army forces intrude, the entire district or township Red Guard, and even the county’s powerful model battalions, must be able to act in concert to launch comprehensive counterattacks aimed at defending the harvest.  ② To ensure that farmers can reap the benefits of a timely harvest when their crops are ripe, local Soviet governments should encourage and mobilize the masses to form harvesting teams and cutting parties, assisting households with fewer laborers to complete their own harvests or adopting mutual aid methods to accomplish the task collectively.
For families of Red Army soldiers, especially those with Red Army-owned farmland, it is particularly important to organize “assault teams” and “charge teams” to carry out the harvest on their behalf through a spirit of revolutionary competition.
Such mobilization should rely heavily on the enthusiasm of farmers themselves, with tenant farmers’ unions and poor farmers’ associations serving as key driving forces.  ③ When guerrilla units venture into white-controlled areas, they should also mobilize the local population to participate in the autumn harvest.
The most practical approach is to identify wealthy landowners’ grain fields in advance when the crops are maturing, then deploy guerrilla units together with local residents to harvest those fields, thereby empowering the local working class to wage its own class struggle.
This not only protects the Soviet autumn harvest but also blurs the boundaries between red and white, expanding the influence and reach of the Soviet system.  ④ During the autumn harvest, local Soviet governments should also prioritize promoting intercropping to ensure sufficient food supplies for the entire Soviet area.
They should survey and prepare suitable land in each township and district for growing diverse crops, encouraging and rewarding farmers for planting.
Following this year’s autumn harvest, the cultivation of opium poppies will be strictly prohibited throughout the Soviet areas, necessitating extensive public awareness campaigns to explain this policy.  ⑤ While managing the autumn harvest, local Soviet governments must also focus on establishing central granaries to store surplus grain and launch campaigns among the populace to conserve food and prepare for lower prices on new grain intended for the Red Army.
Furthermore, they should advocate reducing the production of rice wine and rice flour, instead storing more dry grain in preparation for next year’s harvest.  9. All levels of Soviet governments should lead mass organizations in implementing austerity measures to conserve resources and bolster the war effort.
Any expenditures within the government that can be reduced—such as banquets, office expenses, and lighting costs—should be minimized as much as possible, particularly paper and envelope usage, which can be significantly economized.
Although the savings achieved in each individual category may be small, they accumulate over time and can foster a more frugal and disciplined administrative style within the Soviet system—an absolutely essential outcome.
Once any instances of corruption or embezzlement are discovered within the Soviet apparatus, the relevant authorities must impose severe disciplinary sanctions.
Those who conceal, shield, or fail to rigorously investigate and expose such misconduct shall likewise face stern condemnation.
It is important to note, however, that resource conservation does not equate to reduced workload; on the contrary, under a rigorous and disciplined ethos, work efficiency can actually be further enhanced.  10.
To promote economic development within the Soviet areas, all levels of Soviet governments should prioritize the restoration and support of traditional industries.
Many long-standing enterprises currently exist in various parts of the Soviet areas, including papermaking and timber processing in Minxi, tea oil production in Jiangxi, summer cloth weaving in Ningdu, camphor extraction in Ruijin, and coal mining in Huichang and Anyuan, among others.
These industries should be planned for revival by local governments and, after review and approval by the central authorities, either leased to private investors for operation, entrusted to worker cooperatives, loaned to individual farmers for management, or retained under direct Soviet administration.
The promotion and planning of such industries should be regarded by all levels of Soviet governments as one of the central tasks for consolidating and developing the Soviet areas, bearing a crucial relationship and playing an important role in mobilizing economic resources for the war effort.
To prevent and resist speculative and monopolistic practices by merchants, particularly in response to the enemy’s economic blockade and internal counterrevolutionary sabotage within the Soviet areas, all levels of Soviet governments should provide special assistance to worker cooperatives, especially consumer cooperatives, in terms of organization and development.
In several key centers across the various Soviet areas (such as Ruijin, Tingzhou, Baisha, Xingguo, Yunmenling, Ningdu, and Yudu in the Central Soviet Area), local governments should help worker collectives establish larger-scale consumer cooperatives and provide them with substantial financial support, enabling them to offer affordable goods amidst wartime conditions and thereby counteract merchant manipulation while meeting the needs of the population.  11.
Local Soviet governments and all local armed organizations must strictly enforce red alert restrictions and safeguard transportation networks.
They should closely monitor and inspect the activities of all class enemies and individuals exhibiting suspicious behavior within the Soviet areas, in order to prevent the resurgence of counterrevolutionary forces and to secure the rear of the war effort.
Any township or county that neglects to implement red alert measures or fails to effectively address the activities of merchants—that is, any locality that does not fully discharge its responsibilities in maintaining rear-area order—will inadvertently provide convenient opportunities for counterrevolutionaries and reactionary elements to operate.
The Central Government sternly requires all levels of Soviet governments that exhibit such negligence or inaction to be subject to sanctions under Soviet law.
In order to ensure that all of the aforementioned mobilization and rear-area efforts proceed under more organized and centralized leadership, the Central Executive Committee has decided to establish a Labor and War Committee under the People’s Committee.
This committee will plan and manage all mobilization efforts related to the economy, the military, and labor, as well as exercise command authority over various government ministries, military regions, and local governments concerning matters of wartime mobilization.
All levels of Soviet governments and all armed organizations are required to regularly report their plans and progress regarding mobilization and rear-area work to the Labor and War Committee, so that it may conduct routine inspections and provide timely guidance.
At the same time, each government’s armed organizations must continue to report to their respective supervisory and commanding authorities in order to preserve their original administrative and command structures.
Chairman Mao Zedong Vice Chairmen Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao July 7, 1931