Three Letters to the Red Eleventh Army June 18, 1931 To Comrade Li as intermediary for the Border Region Work Committee; to Comrade Zhenlin as intermediary for the Eleventh Army’s Military Commission: The recent division of operational areas among the various armies has been inappropriate. Qingliu and Liancheng should be assigned to the Eleventh Army as its primary initial zone of operations. The Eleventh Army’s central task is not fundraising but rather establishing a firm foothold in Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting counties. The Twelfth Army will operate in these three counties, the Thirty-Fifth Army in Ruijin County, and the Third Army in Yudu and Huichang Counties, all within a two-month timeframe (July and August) to complete land distribution, set up local armed forces, provisional local governments, and temporary party organizations. Truly resolving these four issues—linking Yudu, Ruijin, Shicheng, Ninghua, Huichang, and Changting into a unified whole—is our paramount objective. It will be no easy feat for the Eleventh Army to accomplish this in just two months. Following a previous campaign, over a period of four months, the Eleventh Army managed to establish itself in Shicheng County and in half of Ninghua and Nanping Counties. At present, Ninghua and Nanping remain semi-controlled zones, while Shicheng is fully under our control. Given such past results, attempting to cover three counties within a single month is bound to fail. Therefore, we must extend the time allotted for this work. If we were to expand operations to include Qingliu and Liancheng as well, placing the Eleventh Army’s main force—the Thirty-Fourth Division—in those two counties, the entire effort would again prove fruitless. Accordingly, the Kangdu Resolution should be revised: the Thirty-Fourth Division must be swiftly redeployed to take full responsibility for Ninghua County; the Thirty-Fifth Division should assume command over Shicheng County; and the Thirty-Sixth Division should oversee Changting County. Meanwhile, the army’s direct-affiliated units should be positioned between these three counties. I urge that this reorganization be implemented without delay. From a strategic perspective, the previously proposed plan to send the Third Corps to Yihuang and Chongren, and the Fourth Army to Xunwu and Anyuan, would not only objectively aid Chiang Kai-shek in his campaign against Guangdong and Guangxi—a goal he has long sought—but also risk provoking an immediate countermove from the two provinces. By concentrating their attention on us, we would effectively block their ability to oppose Chiang, thereby facilitating a compromise between him and the Guangdong leadership. Such a course of action would be highly unwise. Advancing northward beyond Nanfeng is neither feasible at present nor advisable strategically, as it would either fail to secure a stable government base or pose an excessive threat to the Yangtze River region. With the west, south, and north all ruled out, only the eastern area remains suitable—an area characterized by relatively sparse enemy presence. Firstly, the Jiangshan mountain range provides a natural barrier, offering no direct riverine routes that could easily connect Guangdong and Guangxi, making it the most appropriate choice. Secondly, the terrain there consists of isolated, rugged landscapes conducive to guerrilla warfare, where external pressures are minimal. Thirdly, if conditions permit, funds can be raised locally to sustain operations. Fourthly, the local populace is supportive and capable of providing recruits to expand the Red Army. Given these favorable conditions, we ought to formulate a long-term plan for operations in this region. The Third Corps should designate Jianning, Tai’ning, and Jiaole as its operational zones, using Shunchang, Shaowu, and Guangze as fundraising areas to achieve self-sufficiency. The Fifth Army will focus on Ruijin County for both operations and fundraising. The Third Army will operate in Yudu and Huichang, likewise aiming for financial independence. The Eastern Jiangxi Independent Division will continue to prioritize Guangchang as its main operational area, serving as a link between Jianning and Shicheng. In essence, “operational zones” refer to regions where land is redistributed and political structures are established, whereas “fundraising zones” involve targeting local landlords, conducting propaganda, but without engaging in land redistribution or institutional building. The initial operational period is tentatively set at one month, with the possibility of extending it to three months. Should enemy forces approach, we will concentrate our efforts and engage them in nearby locations; otherwise, we will persist in our current activities. The Eleventh Army’s work in Ninghua, Changting, and Shicheng requires a decisive shift away from the recent setbacks experienced in Jianning and Shicheng (where the Shicheng guerrilla unit, composed largely of wealthy peasants and local thugs, ultimately defected). A thorough transformation is imperative, firmly rejecting any opportunistic approaches to mass mobilization. Should the same mistakes made in Shicheng and Jianning recur in these three counties, both the Military Commission and the respective divisional committees will bear serious responsibility. Mao Zedong, General Front Committee Secretary, Jianning, 10:00 PM June 30, 1931 To the Eleventh Army’s Military Commission, with copies forwarded to Comrade Li and the Border Region Work Committee, as well as to the Thirty-Fifth Army’s Military Commission: On the 21st, a letter was dispatched from both Shicheng and Ruijin—has it been received? According to today’s radio report, He Yingqin has advanced from Nanchang to Fuzhou to personally oversee the battlefront. (The remainder of the message is omitted.) Furthermore, according to a dispatch from Hao Mengling’s radio station, our unit remains ordered to follow the Fourth Division (No. 28) northward from Yongfeng, advancing via Shaxi, and so forth. Based on the prevailing circumstances, enemy forces are rapidly closing in upon us. There can be no doubt that under these conditions, we cannot afford to spend time preparing for combat; preparations should instead be completed within the coming month. Orders have already been issued to the Fourth and Third Armies to move to Shunchang and Shaxian, where they are to immediately begin fundraising in Jiaole and Guizhong, with a ten-day window allocated for this purpose. Naturally, the actual duration will depend on the enemy situation: if no advance occurs, no concentration will take place. The designated concentration period is five days, with Ninghua and Shicheng serving as assembly points. As stated in my previous letter, fundraising is not the Eleventh Army’s primary mission; rather, the true priority lies in mass mobilization across Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting counties. However, upon further reflection, it has become clear that both fundraising and mass work are equally important tasks. Indeed, when mass mobilization is conducted effectively, it often facilitates fundraising without hindering it. By the time this letter reaches Ninghua, the Thirty-Fourth Division will likely already be engaged in fundraising in Qingliu, having departed from Ninghua. Their primary objective should be to make Ninghua the focal point of their operations, simultaneously advancing both fundraising efforts and mass mobilization to ensure equitable land distribution. One regiment of the Thirty-Fifth Army’s First Division ought to be stationed in Anyuan, while the other regiment and the division headquarters should be deployed to Shicheng. For now, non-essential tasks should be temporarily suspended, as Shicheng holds critical strategic importance. The army’s direct-affiliated units will remain within Ninghua County, while the Thirty-Sixth Division will operate in Changting (with particular emphasis on coordinating activities at the junctions of Shicheng, Ruijin, Changting, and Ninghua). By maintaining a balanced presence—one part focused on fundraising and the other on mass mobilization—in both Ninghua and Shicheng, we can achieve our objectives. To this end, the Thirty-Fourth Division must withdraw from Qingliu and Liancheng and return promptly to Ninghua, lest its ongoing activities impede progress there. Even if fundraising prospects in Qingliu appear promising, it would still be inadvisable to stay longer than one week to ten days, as sufficient resources can typically be secured within that timeframe. Under the current circumstances, operations in Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting can only realistically be planned for one month (with the potential for a brief extension thereafter). The key is to carry out substantial and effective work during July, with land distribution forming the core of our efforts. Due to the vast geographical expanse involved, specific responsibilities must be clearly delineated among the various units and subunits operating along different sections of the county boundaries. Each unit should concentrate on designated areas, ensuring comprehensive coverage across the entire county. For instance, the Ninghua County team should focus on An’yuan, Gucun, Niucheng, and Shasi, while the Shicheng team should address the border regions adjacent to Ruijin and Changting, paying close attention to key intersections. Every unit tasked with land distribution must consist of at least five members. Those responsible for guiding the process should possess a deep understanding of local conditions and strong leadership capabilities. Comrades like Zhenlin, Binghui, and Tan Zheng should not be assigned to oversee multiple areas concurrently; instead, each should be entrusted with leading a single sector while periodically visiting others as needed. The Military Commission should convene once every ten days, with Comrade Zhenlin undertaking regular field inspections, potentially residing permanently in a particular location. It is crucial to recognize that few regimental-level commanders or political commissars possess the independent judgment required to lead mass mobilization campaigns without error. Even senior officers such as divisional commanders and their political commissars rarely exhibit a clear class consciousness coupled with robust leadership skills. The failures observed in previous operations across various divisions serve as stark evidence of this reality. Upon receipt of this letter, you are hereby instructed to reassess your current arrangements in light of these principles. The Thirty-Fifth Army’s operations in Ruijin should prioritize the nine fortresses, the embankment areas, Wuyangwei, and Xigang, ensuring genuine land redistribution within a single month and refraining from encroaching into Huichang County. Although Xigang falls administratively within Huichang, it occupies a pivotal position at the juncture of Ruijin and Yudu, significantly influencing the broader dynamics of the surrounding tri-county region. Consequently, the Thirty-Fifth Army should prioritize Xigang as part of its own operational scope and strive to achieve rapid results there. Officers such as Jingquan and Zhaoliang should personally conduct field inspections, as lower-ranking cadres lack the requisite experience and competence to effectively manage mass mobilization initiatives. Appendix 1 to the Red Army Communications serves as instructional material for soldiers’ political education classes. Mao Zedong, General Front Committee Secretary, Jianning July 1, 1931 To Comrade Zhenlin and the Eleventh Army’s Military Commission: Your letter dated the 29th from Ninghua was received today (the 1st). However, it makes no mention of the Thirty-Sixth Division or Comrade Li—have they already proceeded to Changting? Judging from your current deployment, which centers on fundraising, no personnel have been dispatched to Shicheng at all. This arrangement renders your efforts ineffective. You might manage to maintain a presence in Shaxian for a month or so, briefly extending your reach to Changting, but such sporadic activity will hardly suffice. In contrast, the Forty-Third Division has concentrated its forces in Qingliu and Liancheng, deploying rear echelon units to support operations in those areas. Over the next hundred days, they will gradually relocate to Ninghua, passing through An’yuan and Shaxian en route. Nevertheless, their ultimate objective remains to advance toward the Jiangxi border, thereby connecting with the Jiangxi Red Base and linking up with the Thirty-Fifth Division’s headquarters. Within ten days, you should redeploy to Shicheng and establish a solid presence in three critical locations. Non-essential tasks, such as water-related duties, may be temporarily suspended, resuming only after initial priorities have been addressed. Please note that the operational demarcation now confines you exclusively to Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting counties. Achieving meaningful results in these three counties will require sustained, concerted effort over an extended period. Ruijin, meanwhile, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Thirty-Fifth Army; Guangchang remains under the purview of the Eastern Jiangxi Independent Division (directly guided by the Eastern Jiangxi Special Committee) and is therefore not your responsibility. Jianning, having already begun to show signs of progress, will continue to be overseen by you. This expanded Red Army contingent also falls under your supervision. However, any areas where tangible progress has yet to be made should be transferred to the Third Corps, as Jianning will eventually revert to their control in the larger strategic picture. Three Letters to the Red Eleventh Army June 18, 1931 To Comrade Zhenlin and the Eleventh Army’s Military Commission; to Comrade Li as intermediary for the Border Region Work Committee; to the Thirty-Fifth Army’s Military Commission: The Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign of the Central Red Army: Selected Documents Compiled by the Editorial Board of Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), Published December 1979, Regarding Order No. 299 Issued During the Third Counter-Encirclement Campaign, July 1931: The enemy has launched a large-scale offensive against our core Soviet base area. Regardless of the challenges ahead, we must prevail over this adversary. We shall confront them with unwavering resolve, indomitable spirit, and enduring perseverance. Through such steadfastness, we will undoubtedly secure final victory. Long live the heroic Red Army! Mao Zedong Central Red Army: Five Counter-Encirclement Campaigns—Selected Documents Edited by the Editorial Board of Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), Published December 1979, Regarding Order No. 299 Issued During the Third Counter-Encirclement Campaign