To: Zhou Yili, Tan Zhenlin, and Others[1]

(June 28, 1931)

Comrade Yili, please forward this to the Border Area Work Committee.
Comrade Zhenlin, please forward this to the Military Committee of the Twelfth Army:

The division of work areas for the Twelfth Army this time is inappropriate. Qingliu and Liancheng should be designated as secondary work areas for the Twelfth Army. The central task of the Twelfth Army should not be fundraising but rather the establishment and deepening of work in the three counties of Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting. The Twelfth Army shall take charge of these three counties, the Thirty-Fifth Army shall be responsible for Ruijin County alone, and the Third Army shall handle the two counties of Yudu and Huichang. All are to complete their tasks within a two-month period (July and August), including the thorough resolution of four issues: completing land distribution, establishing local armed forces, setting up temporary local governments, and forming temporary local Party branches. This will connect the six counties of Yudu, Ruijin, Shicheng, Ninghua, Huichang, and Changting into a contiguous area. This is our central task. It will not be easy for the Twelfth Army to accomplish the work in three counties within two months. After the First Campaign,[2] over four months, the Twelfth Army managed to complete work in Shicheng County and half of Ningnan[3] County. Currently, Ningnan remains a semi-red area, while Shicheng is

[1] This letter was written by Mao Zedong after the conclusion of the Second Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, addressing Zhou Yili, Director of the Political Department of the First Front Army of the Red Army and Secretary of the Fujian-Jiangxi Border Area Work Committee, and Tan Zhenlin, Political Commissar of the Twelfth Army of the Red Army, regarding the issue of dispersing Red Army units to work areas. On June 30, Mao Zedong sent another letter to the Military Committee of the Twelfth Army, forwarding it to Zhou Yili, the Fujian-Jiangxi Border Area Work Committee, and the Military Committee of the Thirty-Fifth Army, stating: "Judging from all available information, there is no doubt that the enemy will launch an attack on us very swiftly. Under such circumstances, we absolutely cannot afford to spend this period on preparatory work; we will likely have to prepare for combat within the next month." The letter also noted that under the current situation, the Twelfth Army could only plan for one month of work in Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting, with fundraising and mass work both serving as primary tasks.

[2] The First Campaign refers to the First Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign conducted by the First Front Army of the Red Army.

[3] Ningnan refers to the southern part of Ningdu County, Jiangxi.

a fully red area. Given these past results, it is bound to be difficult to complete the work in three counties within two months now, and the work period will certainly need to be extended. If we expand to include the two counties of Qingliu and Liancheng and deploy the main force of the Twelfth Army, the Thirty-Fourth Division, to those two counties, then the work of the Twelfth Army will once again yield no results. Therefore, the Kangdu Resolution[1] must be revised. The Thirty-Fourth Division should be swiftly redeployed to take charge of the entirety of Ninghua County, the Thirty-Fifth Division to handle all of Shicheng County, and the Thirty-Sixth Division to manage all of Changting County, with the army's directly affiliated units positioned among the three counties. I urge that this arrangement be resolutely implemented.

From the broader perspective, the previously proposed plan of sending the Third Army Group to Erchong[2] and the Fourth Army to Ning'an[3] would not only objectively assist Chiang Kai-shek in striking at Guangdong and Guangxi[4]—something Chiang would greatly welcome—but would also quickly provoke joint action against the Communists by Guangdong and Guangxi. This would result in us single-handedly diverting the anti-Chiang attention of Guangdong and Guangxi, focusing it entirely on ourselves, inevitably accelerating the process of Chiang and the Guangdong warlords compromising to oppose the Communists. We should not be so foolish. Advancing north of Nanfeng is currently neither practically permissible nor strategically advisable. First, there is no possibility of consolidating political power there; second, it would excessively threaten the Yangtze River region. With the southwest, north, and south all being unfeasible, the east remains the only favorable area. First, it is within Chiang Kai-shek's territory, avoiding the drawback of directly threatening Guangdong and Guangxi. Second, its remote terrain poses less of a threat compared to our advancing toward Nanfeng or Yihuang. Third, it features extensive mountainous terrain without river barriers, making it most suitable for creating new battlefields. Fourth, funds can be raised there, ensuring no worries about supplies for the army. Fifth, there is a large population, allowing for recruitment to expand the Red Army. Given these conditions,

[1] From June 21 to 22, 1931, the Provisional General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army held its ninth meeting at Kangdu Market in Nanfeng County, Jiangxi, to discuss the current situation, the operational policy for the Third Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, and battlefield arrangements. The meeting decided that the Third Army Group would advance toward Jiangle and occupy Jiangle and Shunchang counties, raising 600,000 yuan; the Twelfth Army would disperse its forces to work in Ninghua, Qingliu, and Tingzhou, raising 150,000 yuan; the Fourth Army (minus one division) would press toward Shaxian, Guihua, and Yong'an, raising 400,000 yuan; and two divisions of the Third Army would advance into Nanfeng, limited to reaching Lita Market. If the enemy did not retreat, only one division would remain on the border of Xingguo and Yudu.

[2] Erchong, as written in the original document, is suspected to refer to Shangyou and Chongyi in Jiangxi.

[3] Ning'an, as written in the original document, is suspected to refer to Dingnan and Anyuan in Jiangxi.

[4] In May 1931, Li Zongren of Guangxi and Chen Jitang of Guangdong, in alliance with Tang Shaoyi, Wang Jingwei, Sun Ke, and others, established a National Government in Guangzhou, standing in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing Government.

we should make long-term work plans in this area. The Third Army Group should take Jianning, Taining, and Jiangle as its work areas, with Shunchang, Shaowu, and Guangze as fundraising areas. The Fourth Army should take Guihua,[1] Qingliu, and Liancheng as its work areas, with Shaxian, Yong'an, and Youxi as fundraising areas, raising funds in these three counties for self-sufficiency. The Thirty-Fifth Army should take Ruijin as its work area and raise funds for self-sufficiency. The Third Army should take Yudu and Huichang as its work areas and raise funds for self-sufficiency. The central work area for the Independent Division of Eastern Jiangxi should be Guangchang, linking Jianning and Shicheng. All so-called work areas must involve land distribution and the establishment of political power. Fundraising areas, on the other hand, are only for targeting local tyrants and conducting propaganda, without distributing land or establishing political power. The work period is tentatively set at two months, which may be extended to up to six months. When the enemy comes, we will concentrate forces and fight nearby; when the enemy does not come, we will continue working in this area. In its work in Ninghua, Changting, and Shicheng, the Twelfth Army must strictly guard against the failures experienced during the second phase in Shicheng and more recently in Jianning (where the Shicheng guerrilla forces were entirely composed of riffraff and rich peasants, all of whom defected). A thorough transformation is required, and opportunism in mass work must be resolutely opposed. If the work in these three counties turns out to be like the past efforts in Jianning and Shicheng, then the Military Committee and the three divisional committees will bear serious responsibility.

Mao Zedong
General Front Committee
10:00 p.m., June 28, Jianning

The three-month work period mentioned in the Shicheng letter must be shortened by one month due to the imminent enemy offensive.

[1] Guihua, a former county name, now corresponds to Mingxi County, Fujian.