Summary
(June 22, 1931)
2:00 P.M. on the 22nd
The number of those present is the same as before.¹
Chairman Wang Jiaxiang
He declares the resumption of the meeting.
1. The problem of predicting the location of the third phase of the war.²
Mao: Last time, we talked about the fact that the third phase of war might
start with an attack on us from Nanfeng. If that is the case, we shall be in a
favorable situation and can lure the enemy deep into Ningdu, Huangpi, Xiaobu,
and even Shicheng and then attack them. The situation would be unfavorable for
us if the enemy came from four places—Xingguo, Baisha, Shuinan, and
Nanfeng—perhaps even with the addition of a column from Le’an and another
column from Futian and Donggu. It would be unusual for the enemy to concentrate on only one route by the time they get to Donggu and Longgang. If our
prediction is that the enemy will come by two routes, we should endeavor to
work hard to penetrate more deeply [into the masses] in the areas of southern
Jiangxi. If Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] also come to fight us, we should
attack them before they finish building fortifications. This time, we are able to
attack them. Then we should deploy our forces on the Yudu battlefield and be
sure to break through to Qifang. The entire Third Army should be employed to

rout Jiang and Cai, thus creating a balance of power between the Nanjing government and the Guangdong government. Consequently, the actions of Jiang and
Cai have a direct bearing on our choice of an area to do battle, and we must
discuss this.3
Peng: The White armies have thoroughly learned, in the course of two defeats, that they are not capable of carrying out an encirclement, so this time they
will certainly concentrate their forces more to carry out a pincer attack. It is not
to our advantage if the enemies strengthen and further combine their forces. We
should abandon Donggu and Longgang, and if Jiang and Cai advance from the
direction of Xingguo and take Xingguo and Ningdu as their targets, we should
arrange to have the battlefield at Yudu. Chiang Kaishek, acting in accordance
with his scheme for establishing his prestige, must pursue the goal of beating us,
but he no longer dreams of "exterminating" the Red Army. Therefore, when the
enemy concentrates and advances by one route, let them penetrate deeply. When
several columns are seeking to encircle us, we should attack before they get too
close.
Mao: If the enemy advances from Nanfeng, they will have boats for transportation only north of Guangchang. Therefore, the enemy can enter Guangchang
only before August 15 and can move further only after the new grain has been
harvested.4 Before July, we should try hard to raise funds, and we may ignore
them in August. The main point is to arrange for consolidated soviet areas in
Yu[du], Rui[jin], Shi[cheng], and [Chang]ting xian to serve as battlegrounds.
Lin: I agree with most of what has been said. The enemy may advance along
three routes next time, but they will nevertheless be the same old routes. Their
force on the central route will be strengthened. It is to the enemy's advantage to
fight a speedy war, and we should prolong it. Jiang and Cai, because they aim to
deal with Chiang Kaishek and keep their present position garrisoned, will not
find it advantageous to leave Ganzhou and come via Ji'an. We should now

intensify our efforts to deploy forces in this area. Naturally, in the future fighting,
we may attack whenever conditions are favorable to us.
Ouyang: Jiang and Cai moved very slowly in the second phase of the fighting, and the newspapers in Ganzhou were full of anti-Chiang [Kaishek] sentiments (before the 29th). Jiang and Cai seem to have a slight tendency not to
follow the orders of Chiang Kaishek.
Zhu: In the future, it will still be better to fight Zhu Shaoliang, and the
battlefield should have Longgang as the central point of concentration. The
broad masses are close to us and they? cannot come very fast.
Cai: On the whole, I agree with you. Moreover, the enemy will certainly put
his main force on the route from Nanfeng to Guangchang. The elements in
Jiang's and Cai's forces opposed to Chiang Kaishek may be somewhat more
numerous. No matter where the battle zones are, it is necessary to try to seize
Yubei, for the purpose of consolidating the Red areas and establishing liaison
with Xing[guo], Yu[du], and Ning[du]. In the past, a lot of troops were used to
attack Chengjiang and Laicun, but were still unable to take them. Now with
only two divisions of the Third Army sent to launch a surprise attack, it will be
difficult to make arrangements.
Zhou: The enemy's third attack will certainly be launched from at least three
directions, and arrangements should be made for the battlefield to be located in
the area of Xing[guo], Yu[du], Ning[du], and Rui[jin].
Ouyang: In the third offensive, Chiang will certainly not launch an attack
from all sides, and at most will have one or two routes, one from Nanfeng and
another from Ji['an] or Yong[feng]. There are many anti-Chiang elements in the
forces of Jiang and Cai, and so they will not easily come along. If they do not
oppose Chiang, there will be a rear area. If they do not oppose Chiang this time,
they will not retreat to Ganzhou. They have only two divisions that they dare
move toward Guangdong, and they will certainly not attack Guangdong. The
battlefield must be between Ningdu and Ruijin.
Chairman: We can only make a decision in broad outline, so as to prepare for
the task. Now the work in Yongfeng must be consolidated at once. All fortified
villages (tuwei) in the area of Yubei in southern Jiangxi should be destroyed and

taken over by us. 10 In the Red areas, we must guard against infiltration by the
AB Corps and enemy spies. In principle, hospitals should be moved, but they
should stay where they are for the time being.
Mao: The enemy in Nanfeng now appears to be retreating. If the enemy
withdraws from Nanfeng, one division of the Third Army should advance to
work in the area of Lita, north of Nanfeng. The Twelfth Division should be
moved to work in Xinfeng City. The Third Army should not increase the number
of troops working in southern Jiangxi and indeed should decrease them, because
the duration of the fighting will certainly be rather long.
2. The issue of the Red Army School. (Omitted)
3. The lessons of the second phase of the war. 11
To be discussed at the Tingzhou Conference.

--- Notes

Our source for this document is Jiangxi dangshi ziliao, no. 19, pp. 36-38. This version
is preferable to that in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 3, pp. 283-85, which has a number of
missing characters.

1. This meeting was held in Kangduxu. According to a note by the editors of Jiangxi
dangshi ziliao, Vol. 19, p. 36, the participants in the meeting were Mao Zedong, Wang
Jiaxiang, Zhou Yili, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Xie Weijun, Tan Zhenlin, Cai
Huiwen, Guo Huaruo, and Ouyang Jian. It is also stated that the meeting began on June
20, with the “first three days” devoted to discussion of the Second “Encirclement and
Suppression.”

2. I.e., during the Third Encirclement Campaign, which would begin a few days after
this meeting, catching the Red Army leaders off guard.


3. The divisions of Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai were major units of the Nine-teenth Route Army, then stationed in the area around Ji'an on the eastern edge of the
soviet areas. From this location astride the Gan River, these divisions could easily move
either east toward the Communist base around Donggu, or south along the river and then
hook to the east toward Xingguo and Ningdu in the heart of the soviet areas. As
discussion in this meeting indicates, Party leaders were anxious to determine which
route the units would take. In addition, though part of the anti-Communist forces, Nine-teenth Route Army officers were not particularly loyal to Chiang Kaishek; in 1933, they
abortively attempted to establish an independent régime in Fujian (see the Introduction).
Comments by Mao and others reflect their recognition of the ambiguous loyalties of the
army commanders.

4. There was a large waterborne traffic in grain from the upper reaches of this river
system down toward markets in the city of Fuzhou (Linchuan). Perhaps Mao is suggesting
that with the harvest in full swing, all available boats would be tied up transporting grain.
Alternatively, porters to aid in land movement further south might have been unavailable
because of the need for harvest workers.


5. Ouyang Jian (1902-1932), a native of Huarong in Hunan, joined the Communist
Party during the Northern Expedition; by 1930 he was a political commissar in the
Thirty-fifth Division.

6. Commander of the Nationalist Sixth Route Army.

7. I.e., the enemy forces, hampered in their advance by the refusal of the population to
provide information.

8. Yubei is a contraction for "northern Yudu," commonly used in Communist Party
documents during this period. Some lineages and militias in the area strongly assisted the
Red Army.

9. Chengjiang (also readable as Dengjiang) is a small town in eastern Xingguo xian;
Laicun is a larger town in southwestern Ningdu xian.


10. The reference is to the fortified strongholds often constructed by lineages and
communities in southeastern China, and frequently used as bases during this period by
local elite militias and other anti-Communist local forces.

11. I.e., of the Second Encirclement Campaign.