To all Political Commissars and Directors of Political Departments of the Red Army, and to local governments at all levels:  I. The Central Significance of Securing Victory in the First Campaign Lies in Reversing the Balance of Forces Between Ourselves and the Enemy Since the temporary cessation of the warlord conflicts and the enemy’s subsequent offensive against the revolution, our position has generally been defensive, while theirs has remained offensive. Although the Longgang Campaign yielded a major victory, it failed to alter this fundamental balance. Consequently, reversing the offensive–defensive dynamic between us and the enemy has become the central task of the current campaign. To achieve this reversal, we must deliver a crushing blow to the enemy’s initial assault force and secure a triumph even greater than that at Longgang. Only by doing so can we drive the enemy into rout, compel them to fall back upon the central cities, and thereby transform their offensive posture into a defensive one. It is only when the enemy is forced to withdraw to these urban centers that we can thoroughly resolve the issue of consolidating the Soviet areas. Moreover, once they have retreated there, we shall be able to advance the extensive expansion of our existing Soviet territories; and it is only after the enemy has been routed, the Soviet regions genuinely consolidated and significantly enlarged, that we may proceed to further expand and refine the Red Army. Only with the Soviet areas firmly consolidated and broadly developed, and with the Red Army correspondingly strengthened and streamlined, can we exert a profound influence on the national political situation—both by hastening the eruption of internecine struggles for leadership within the ruling classes, thereby further weakening their respective factions and intensifying anarchic conditions among them, thus exploiting the favorable objective circumstances of the revolutionary movement, and by kindling a high tide of struggle among workers, peasants, soldiers, and the poor in the reactionary zones, deepening the substance of that struggle, broadening its scope, extending the boundaries of the existing Red Areas and Red Armies, and creating new ones, so as to propel the revolution forward across the entire country. Should we fail to secure a more decisive victory in this campaign, we shall be unable to reverse the offensive–defensive equilibrium, which would run counter to the tasks set forth above. Therefore, we must strive with all our might to win the First Campaign with a resounding success. Whoever fails to make every effort toward this end is guilty of betraying the revolution.

II. The Current Enemy–Ourselves Situation and the Conditions for Our Victory in the Second Campaign Following the Longgang–Dongshao Campaign, the political landscape remains marked by an escalating crisis within the reactionary camp. Recent developments—the resolution of the Shanxi reorganization issue; Zhang Xueliang’s efforts to co-opt remnants of the old warlord cliques and the convening of a financial conference embracing seven northern provinces; Chiang Kai-shek’s intensive attempts to court Huang Shaohong in order to settle the Guangdong–Guangxi dispute, together with his speeches rallying officers and cadres and his dispatch of emissaries to cultivate ties with minor warlords; and the unresolved clashes among the smaller warlords in Sichuan, Yunnan, and other provinces—all serve as clear indications that a showdown between Chiang and Zhang is inevitable. On the other hand, Chiang’s first offensive against the Soviet areas and the Red Army has met with failure nationwide. While the First Army has enjoyed unbroken success along the Eyu-Wan border, most recently capturing Huangmei and other strongholds, Chiang was compelled to commit seven divisions to the effort yet could not prevail. Similarly, He Long’s First Corps continues to operate effectively in western Hunan and eastern Hubei, despite Chiang’s earlier deployment of four divisions against it. Likewise, the Tenth Army in northeast Jiangxi and the Sixteenth Army along the Hunan–Hubei frontier remain active; the Sixteenth once annihilated an entire regiment of the enemy in Tongcheng County, seizing over a thousand firearms. Although Longyan in western Fujian has fallen, the Red Army has since advanced again toward Tingzhou, scoring further victories. Meanwhile, the Seventh Army of Guangxi gallops through the tri-border region of Guangxi, Hunan, and Hubei, having recently reached Shangyou and Chongyi, and stands poised to link up with our forces in the near future. As for my First Front Army, its resounding victory in the First Campaign has reverberated throughout the nation, striking a severe blow to the morale of the reactionaries and electrifying workers and peasants everywhere. According to recent reports from Shanghai, the city’s workers rose up in enthusiastic celebration of this triumph. Turning to the Jiangxi Soviet areas, apart from a few towns temporarily occupied by the enemy and pockets of local populations that have wavered under pressure, certain regions continue to experience growth, particularly in Guangchang, Shicheng, Ningdu, and the surrounding seven fortresses, as well as in Yongfeng, Le’an, and Nanfeng, where we have won over several hundred thousand additional supporters to join the struggle under the red banner. Meanwhile, Ninggang, Gan County, and Ji’an persist in tireless, unrelenting combat against the enemy. Thus, these developments simultaneously attest to the irreconcilable contradictions among the warlords and to the indomitable strength of the revolutionary forces. Under such circumstances, Chiang’s resolve to suppress the revolutionary movement in the southern provinces—and especially his determination to crush my First Front Army in a single stroke—can only grow more resolute. Although Chiang has augmented his forces in Jiangxi by adding the units of Wang Jinyu and Sun Lianzhong to the existing corps of Gong, Luo, Jiang, Cai, Mao, Xu, and Hu, thereby increasing their overall numbers, the logistical demands of maintaining rear-area communications require substantial troop commitments. With the arrival of the Red Army’s Seventh Division in Jiangxi, additional troops must be diverted to confront it, meaning that the effective strength at our disposal will likely not exceed nine divisions—roughly equivalent to what we faced previously. Coupled with the disastrous defeat at Zhangtan, morale among the enemy ranks has never been lower, rendering any further advance into the Soviet zones increasingly fraught with difficulty. Despite these inherent weaknesses on the enemy side, we possess a crucial advantage: our troops are united in spirit and eager to fight. First, following the Longgang Campaign, our army has reinforced its capabilities—through increased munitions, enhanced political education, and intensified military training. Third, we have expanded the local militia, arming the masses and centralizing command over these auxiliary forces. Fourth, the Futian Incident has been resolved, winning back those who had been misled. Fifth, we have secured control over the notoriously reactionary Three Counties and Seven Fortresses, thereby broadening the mass movement in Ningdu, Shicheng, Guangchang, Nanfeng, and Yongfeng, disarming remnants of the landlord class, and securing our rear areas. Sixth, the arrival of the Red Army’s Seventh Division in Jiangxi has inspired the populace and provided vital support for the forthcoming campaign. For these reasons, victory in the First Campaign is within our grasp—provided we all resolve to pursue it with unwavering determination.

III. The Imminence of the Second Campaign and Our Preparations At present, the enemy has begun to shift its forces: an additional regiment has been deployed to Nanfeng; Wang Jinyu has established a supervisory office in Nanchang, with elements of his corps reported advancing toward Nancheng; Hao Mengling’s unit has arrived in Jishui, while Ji’an itself is experiencing a surge in troop reinforcements accompanied by vigorous conscription efforts. The outbreak of the Second Campaign draws ever nearer. Intensifying all preparations for this engagement is an indispensable condition for securing victory. Beyond the military training directives already issued by the General Staff, the Headquarters hereby issues specific instructions regarding political preparations, divided into two components: for the Red Army and for local authorities.

1. Preparations within the Red Army: Convene political work conferences at the regimental level, inviting not only political commissars and heads of political department sections at or above the regimental level, but also propaganda chiefs and soldier committee chairmen. The primary agenda items shall include briefings on the current political situation, the significance of the upcoming campaign, and guidelines for political agitation and mobilization within the ranks. Following the formal report, participants are to engage in in-depth discussions aimed at correcting erroneous perceptions and refining practical methods of agitation and mobilization. At the divisional level, hold soldier assemblies primarily to inform troops about the political climate and the importance of the coming battle, offering robust encouragement to strive for victory. In addition to the divisional commander and political commissar, the corps commander, corps political commissar, and director of the corps political department should each address the assembly. Guide the soldiers in conducting their own meetings, focusing on raising and debating various issues related to achieving victory. This will deepen their understanding of political matters and foster a sense of personal responsibility for carrying out preparatory tasks. Upon assembling the main force, convene a swearing-in rally open to local civilians, with the principal purpose of inspiring both soldiers and the general population and bolstering their fighting spirit. Speeches delivered at such gatherings should be concise yet stirring, punctuated by a few rallying slogans to ignite enthusiasm and prepared to prompt soldiers to raise questions concerning operational details for resolution during the meeting. Discussions at these rallies—whether among prisoners, soldiers, or the broader public—must invariably touch upon military matters (such as tactical considerations, accounts of combat experience, and an assessment of each unit’s unique strengths and weaknesses). Organize and energize the civilian population in the vicinity of the combat zone to participate in various forms of support and agitation for the Red Army, including the imposition of red martial law, the dispatch of delegations to comfort and encourage the troops, the formation of stretcher-bearer teams, farewell ceremonies for departing units, and the provision of tea, porridge, and meals. The Political Department should immediately initiate propaganda work targeting enemy prisoners and prepare appropriate informational materials, ensuring that each captive receives suitable literature.

2. Preparations by Local Governments and the Masses: At the county level, convene joint meetings of government heads, guerrilla unit leaders, and representatives of mass organizations to brief them on the political situation and the significance of the impending campaign, as well as to plan for scorched-earth tactics in anticipation of White Army advances. At the district level, hold mass rallies primarily to galvanize popular participation in the struggle. Select comrades endowed with strong communication skills and sound ideological perspectives to form delegations that will visit Red Army units to offer moral support and encourage them in combat, bearing banners emblazoned with large, rousing slogans directed at specific units, local worker-peasant groups, or particular organizations, accompanied by leaflets informing the soldiers of the benefits of accepting such provisions. Prepare for the passage of enemy troops through local communities by erecting signs denouncing the enemy soldiers and distributing simple, straightforward leaflets containing a handful of key slogans, though care should be taken to avoid excessive repetition. Each village and township should establish a Soldiers’ Movement Committee to organize resistance against the White Army. Mobilize the populace to extend a warm welcome to returning White Army prisoners, with local governments providing banquets featuring pig slaughter and serving tea, porridge, and other refreshments along the route, while crowds chant slogans bidding farewell to their erstwhile “comrades.” At the same time, conduct targeted agitation to dissuade these individuals from rejoining the enemy ranks. Local armed forces should also join in the Red Army’s political agitation efforts. During combat operations, both the Red Army and local guerrilla units should regularly intone the following battle cries: 1. Charge bravely! 2. Fight to the death! 3. Uphold the Communist Party! 4. Support the Soviets! 5. Capture He Yingqin alive! 6. Down with Chiang Kai-shek! 7. Long live the victory in the Second Campaign! 8. Long live the liberation of workers and peasants!  Against the White Army, the following slogans should be employed: 1. Brothers in the White Army, you come from working-class and peasant backgrounds—do not take up arms to oppress your own people! 2. White Army soldiers, demand your overdue pay—if necessary, rise up in revolt! 3. Brothers in the White Army, if you kill a counterrevolutionary official, elect a new leader and establish a Red Army yourselves! 4. White Army soldiers, refuse to go to the front lines and serve as cannon fodder for the warlords! 5. White Army soldiers, you are workers and peasants—do not allow the warlords to massacre your fellow countrymen! 6. Welcome, junior officers of the White Army—come join us to carry out land reform and distribute land to the peasants! 7. Show special consideration to White Army prisoners! 8. Provide medical treatment to wounded White Army soldiers! 9. Welcome, brothers in the White Army—junior officers included—to join the Red Army! The White Army is the army of the warlords; the Red Army is the army of the workers and peasants! Director Mao Zedong March 11, 1931 (Gregorian calendar)