Political Commissars and Directors of Political Departments at All Levels of the Red Army, and Local Governments at All Levels:

(1) The central significance of striving for victory in the second campaign lies in transforming the situation between the enemy and ourselves.

Ever since the warlord wars temporarily subsided and the enemy launched an offensive against the revolution, the enemy has been on the offensive while we, broadly speaking, have remained on the defensive. Although the battle at Longgang achieved a significant victory, it has still not been sufficient to alter this offensive-defensive dynamic. Therefore, transforming this offensive-defensive situation between the enemy and ourselves has become the central task of the second campaign. To transform the offensive-defensive situation, we must deliver a severe blow to the enemy attacking for the second time and achieve a victory even greater than that of the Longgang battle. Only by doing so can we force the enemy into a rout, compel them to retreat to and defend the central cities, and turn their situation into a defensive one. Only by forcing the enemy to retreat to the central cities can we thoroughly resolve the problem of consolidating the Soviet areas. Only by forcing the enemy to retreat to the central cities can we further expand the existing Soviet areas significantly. Only when the enemy has been routed and the Soviet areas have achieved genuine consolidation, and especially when they have undergone substantial expansion, can the Red Army be further enlarged and refined. Only under the conditions of solid consolidation and significant expansion of the Soviet areas, and further enlargement and refinement of the Red Army, can we exert a major influence on the national political situation. On one hand, this will hasten the rapid outbreak of conflicts among the ruling class factions vying for leadership, further weakening their respective forces, intensifying the state of anarchy among them, and creating favorable objective conditions for the revolution. On the other hand, it will boost the morale of workers, peasants, soldiers, and the poor in the areas under reactionary rule, deepen the quality of their struggles, expand the scope of their struggles, enlarge the existing red areas and Red Army, create new red areas and Red Army units, and promote the broader expansion of the revolution nationwide. From this, we will strive for the first victory in one or several provinces, leading ultimately to nationwide victory. If we fail to secure an even greater victory in this campaign, we will be unable to transform the offensive-defensive situation between the enemy and ourselves, which would contravene our abovementioned tasks. Therefore, we must exert every effort to achieve a great victory in the second campaign. Anyone who does not strive for this victory is a criminal against the revolution.

(2) The current situation between the enemy and ourselves, and the conditions for our victory in the second campaign.

The political situation following the battles at Longgang and Dongshao: On the side of the reactionary rule, the crisis of warlord warfare continues to escalate day by day. For instance, the recent resolution of the Shanxi troop reorganization issue, Zhang Xueliang’s efforts to win over the former troops of certain commanders, the convening of the fiscal conference for the seven northern provinces, Chiang Kai-shek’s strenuous attempts to win over Huang Shaoxiong to resolve the Guangdong-Guangxi issue, his convocation of officers’ meetings to unify his cadres, his dispatch of personnel to various provinces to woo minor warlords, and the unresolved conflicts among minor warlords in provinces such as Sichuan and Yunnan—all are evidence that a clash between Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang is inevitable. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek’s first offensive against the Soviet areas and the Red Army failed nationwide. The First Army Group has met with nothing but success along the borders of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui, recently capturing places such as Huangmei; despite Chiang Kai-shek dispatching seven divisions to attack it, nothing could be done. The Fourth Army Corps, led by He Long and others, remains active along the western Hubei and Hunan border; Chiang Kai-shek also sent four divisions against it but was equally powerless. The Tenth Army in northeastern Jiangxi and the Eighteenth Army along the Hunan-Hubei border are highly active, with the Sixteenth Army once wiping out an entire regiment of the enemy and seizing a thousand rifles in Tongcheng. Although Longyan in western Fujian was lost, the Red Army there is now advancing toward Tingzhou and has won battles. The Seventh Army of Guangxi moves swiftly across the juncture of Guangxi, Hunan, and Guangdong, recently reaching Shangyou and Chongyi, and will soon join forces with us. As for the great victory of our First Front Army in the first campaign, it has had an even greater impact nationwide, striking great fear into the reactionary classes and greatly inspiring workers and peasants across the country. According to recent reports from contacts in Shanghai, workers there have risen up to enthusiastically celebrate this victory. In the red areas of Jiangxi, except for some cities occupied by the enemy and a section of the population near those cities that turned against us, there has even been development in some places. Particularly in Guangchang, Shicheng, Ningdu, Sandu, Qibao, and even places like Yongfeng, Le’an, and Nanfeng, hundreds of thousands of new masses have been won over and are tirelessly and unceasingly fighting against the enemy. Thus, all of the above demonstrates, on one hand, the strategic shift in warlord conflicts, and on the other, the tenacity of the revolutionary forces. This has compelled Chiang Kai-shek to further intensify his efforts to suppress the revolutionary forces in the southern provinces, especially his attempt at a second offensive against the First Front Army.

Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in Jiangxi, in addition to the original units under Gong, Luo, Jiang, Cai, Mao, and Xu, have been reinforced by Wang Jinyu and Sun Lianzhong. Although the numbers have increased compared to before, a significant portion of the troops must be used to maintain rear communication lines; and with the Seventh Army of the Red Army coming to Jiangxi, more troops must be diverted to deal with it. As a result, the actual forces deployed will likely not exceed nine divisions, roughly similar to the previous campaign. Moreover, after the severe defeat of Zhang and Tan, their troops are bound to be even more demoralized than before, and advancing into the red areas will be more difficult than before. The enemy has long had numerous weaknesses. On our side, although numerically inferior to the enemy forces, we possess one prime advantage: our troops are united in spirit, with everyone itching for battle. Secondly, after the Longgang battle, our army has strengthened its capabilities (in terms of arms, ammunition, and political and military training). Thirdly, local armed forces have been augmented, the broad masses have been armed, and the command of local armed forces has been unified. Fourthly, the resolution of the Futian Incident has won back the masses who were deceived. Fifthly, we have won over the most reactionary areas of Sandu and Qibao, expanded the mass struggles in places like Ningdu, Shicheng, Guangchang, Nanfeng, and Yongfeng, eliminated some of the landlord armed forces, and consolidated the rear areas for the war. Sixthly, the arrival of the Seventh Army of the Red Army in Jiangxi has inspired the masses and provided assistance for the second campaign. Thus, victory in the second campaign is bound to be ours, as long as we are all determined and strive hard to achieve it.

(3) The imminent second campaign and our preparatory work.

The enemy has already begun to move: four additional regiments have been sent to Nanfeng; Wang Jinyu has arrived in Nanchang and established an office in charge; Wang’s forces are reported to be proceeding to Nancheng; Hao Mengling’s forces have arrived in Jishui; additional troops have reinforced Ji’an, and conscription is being vigorously pursued. The outbreak of the second campaign is drawing nearer day by day. Strengthening all preparatory work for the second campaign is an essential condition for securing victory. In addition to the directives already issued by the General Staff Department regarding military training, our headquarters hereby provides instructions, divided into Red Army and local aspects, concerning political preparatory work as follows:

First, preparatory work of the Red Army:

(1) Convene meetings of political work personnel on a corps basis. In addition to political commissars and personnel above the section chief level from the political department, propaganda team leaders and chairmen of soldiers’ committees should attend. The main content of the meeting is to report on the political situation, the significance of the second campaign, and the internal propaganda and agitation plan. After the report, thorough discussions must be held, with attention paid to correcting various incorrect views and to the practical methods for carrying out propaganda and agitation.

(2) Convene soldiers’ mass meetings on a division basis, primarily to report on the political situation and the significance of the second campaign, and to conduct a major agitation for achieving victory in the second campaign. Speakers should include divisional commanders and divisional political commissars; in addition, corps commanders, corps political commissars, and directors of corps political departments should attend separately.

(3) Guide the soldiers’ committees in convening soldiers’ meetings, mainly to raise various issues related to striving for victory in the second campaign for discussion, enabling the soldiers to further understand political issues and consciously undertake actual preparatory work.

(4) On a corps basis, convene oath-taking rallies after the main forces have assembled. Local masses should be encouraged to participate in addition to the troops. The main purpose is to encourage the rank and file, and to boost their courage for battle. The content and technique of the speeches at the rally should be concise and rousing; insert a few slogans during the speeches to stir the enthusiasm of the crowd. Additionally, there should be preparations to prompt the soldiers to raise certain combat-related issues, such as joint responsibility regulations, for reiteration and adoption at the rally.

(5) In mass meetings, soldiers’ meetings, and oath-taking rallies, address military issues (such as combat precautions, combat experience, and reports on the special strengths and weaknesses of each unit).

(6) Organize and encourage the masses in areas near the operations to carry out various tasks for participating in the war and encouraging the Red Army. For example, implement red security measures, dispatch delegations to comfort the Red Army, organize stretcher teams, send off the Red Army units going into battle, and provide tea, water, gruel, and meals.

(7) The political department should immediately undertake propaganda work targeting prisoners of war and prepare propaganda materials, ensuring that each prisoner receives a well-designed propaganda piece.

Second, preparatory work of local governments and worker and peasant masses:

(1) On a county basis, convene joint meetings of government chairmen at all levels, guerrilla leaders, and heads of mass organizations, to report on the political situation and the significance of the second campaign, and to plan for strengthening defenses and carrying out combat participation tasks before the enemy forces advance.

(2) Hold mass meetings on a district basis, primarily to mobilize the masses for enthusiastic participation in the war.

(3) Select comrades with speaking skills and relatively correct views to form local Red Army comfort delegations to visit and boost the morale of the Red Army troops in battle. When coming, it is best to have arrangements: red flags with slogans written in text to encourage the Red Army, addressed to a specific army unit or inscribed as a gift from the workers and peasants of such-and-such a locality or a certain organization; at the same time, bring leaflets addressing the Red Army soldiers, and it would be even better to bring some comfort gifts.

(4) Prepare propaganda work for places through which the enemy will pass. Every village and township should be filled with slogans directed at enemy soldiers, and disseminate many simple and clear leaflets (such as those combining a few slogans). But do not have too many different slogan themes; widely post the same few main slogans.

(5) In every township and village, organize soldiers’ movement committees to carry out work among the soldiers of the enemy forces.

(6) Mobilize the masses to prepare for work related to sending off enemy prisoners of war and treating them warmly. For instance, local governments in places where prisoners pass through should provide meals, slaughter pigs for them to eat, offer tea, water, gruel, and rice along the way, shout slogans warmly welcoming new comrades, and have the masses present food to the prisoners while simultaneously conducting propaganda and agitation among them.

(7) Local armed units should make preparations by referring to the political agitation work of the Red Army.

Roll-call slogans for the Red Army and local guerrilla units during the second campaign:

1. Charge Bravely!
2. Fight to the Death and Destroy the Enemy!
3. Support the Communist Party!
4. Support the Soviets!
5. Capture He Yingqin Alive!
6. Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek!
7. Long Live the Victory of the Second Campaign!
8. Long Live the Liberation of Workers and Peasants!

Propaganda and agitation slogans directed at the enemy forces:

1. Soldiers of the enemy forces, you come from worker and peasant backgrounds—do not use your guns against workers and peasants!
2. If soldiers of the enemy forces want their overdue pay settled, you must rise in revolt!
3. Soldiers of the enemy forces, kill your counter-revolutionary officers, elect your own officers, and form Red Army units!
4. Soldiers of the enemy forces, do not go to the front lines to fight; do not serve as cannon fodder for the warlords!
5. Soldiers of the enemy forces, do not massacre workers and peasants on behalf of the warlords!
6. Soldier brothers and junior officers of the enemy forces, you are welcome to fight the local tyrants and redistribute the land!
7. Prisoners of war from the enemy forces are to be treated well!
8. Sick and wounded soldiers of the enemy forces are to be given medical care!
9. Soldier brothers and junior officers of the enemy forces, you are welcome to come and join the Red Army!
10. The poor do not fight the poor.
11. Soldiers do not fight soldiers.
12. The enemy forces are the warlords’ army; the Red Army is the army of the workers and peasants!

Director: Mao Zedong

(Copied from the Museum of the Chinese Revolution)