(March 17, 1931)
Having achieved great victories in the battles in Longgang and Dongshao during
the first period, we have already beaten back the White armies that came to
attack the revolutionary forces. Now the enemy seeks to launch even more cruel
attacks on the revolution, in an effort to seize the leadership of the counterrevolution, to put up a last-ditch struggle before the collapse of the ruling class, and
to maintain his life which is about to expire. Two more of Wang Jinyu's divisions have recently been deployed (one division has arrived near Ji'an and Jishui,
and Guo Huazong's division is still in Gaoan) to join the five divisions of Hao
Mengling (now moving towards Jishui), Hu Zuyu (in Yihuang), Han Deqin (in
Xin'gan), Liu Heding (in Jianning), Luo Zhuoying² (in Pingxiang), and the two
divisions of Gong [Bingfan] and Luo [Lin] originally in Ji'an. They all appear to
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 206-11, where it is
reproduced from a volume entitled Junshi wenxian (Military Documents) published in
1942. This version is basically the same as that which appears in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,
Vol. 3, pp. 217-23, but is slightly more complete and accurate.
be actively preparing for an offensive against us, so the second stage of the war
is about to begin.
This time, however, we are in a much better position than we were last
time to win victory in the military operations. The conflict between Chiang
and Zhang³ is intensifying, and economic panic throughout the country can
hardly go on for long without leading to an inevitable eruption of renewed
fighting among the warlords, all of which is very unfavorable to them. For
our part, we have already achieved a nationwide victory as a response to the
counterrevolutionaries' attack on us. In the battle at Longgang especially, not
only did the enemy forces lose two divisions, but the morale of their troops
was further shaken and their soldiers began to lean toward the revolution. Not
only have we been replenished with many guns and much ammunition, but
our local armed forces have obtained four thousand more rifles. Among the
100,000 or so people we have recently won over in Guangchang, Ningdu,
Yongfeng, Le'an, Nanfeng, and Sandu-Qibao, there is a considerable
amount of armed organization, and already five routes of Red Guard armies
have been organized, ten guerrilla areas have been designated, and concrete
methods have been decided upon for the local armed forces to cooperate with
the Red Army in fighting (discussed at the Red Area military affairs conference). The complete settlement of the Futian Incident makes for the renewed
concentration of revolutionary forces in Hexi. Moreover, we have added a
vital new force the Seventh Army (it has been reported that this army has
arrived at Lingxian and Suichuan), much to the enemy's surprise. Their
arrival is bound to hamper the enemy's plans to attack us. All of these conditions
guarantee us an even greater victory this time.
To make sure that we achieve this even greater victory, we should review the
characteristics of our fighting in the past, and make even better preparations for
the battle this time. In addition to the comprehensive directives on political

propaganda and agitation work already given by the General Political Depart-ment, we hereby list the military preparatory work as follows:
I. General Shortcomings of the Previous Combat

A. Before the Combat
1. There was no advance planning in the areas in which fighting was anticipated, so that the sketch map used for the attack on Longgang was based on a
survey of nothing but the closest vicinity, the routes were chosen at the last
minute, and the local people were mobilized at the last minute as well.
2. Many departments and units (staff officer departments, aides-de-camp
units, and the office of the military area command) failed to convene special
meetings to discuss preparatory work for the battle, so that when the fighting
started they were completely disorganized, or in too much of a rush, or unable to
figure out what to do. In some cases all personnel had been sent out and no one
was left to be sent out later, or work had begun but the equipment had been left
behind (for example, staff officers forgetting to bring carbon paper and pencils,
and medical officers forgetting to bring the necessary medicines).
3. Because of inadequate preparation for the laying in of provisions, some
troops had nothing to eat for two days during the battle.

B. During the Combat
1. Modifications of the battle plan made by higher authorities were conveyed
in a vague manner, making it impossible to grasp the intention when battle
commands were received from higher authorities.
2. In terms of giving direction, there was some inability to command the
troops, some lack of flexibility, and some failure to pay attention to the overall
situation on the battlefield.
3. Liaison between higher and lower levels of authority and between neighboring troops was very poor (very few reports and circulars).
4. In most cases during battle provisions for the troops were poorly managed.
5. Because deployment of personnel in the various military units was unplanned and unscientific, both on the battlefield and in the rear, people were
running around in all directions, unable to accomplish their tasks.

C. After the Combat
1. Our pursuing troops were disorganized. Troops pursuing the enemy had
not been given the task by higher command officers, and in some cases pursuing
troops retreated to camp on their own initiative, without receiving orders from
the supreme command (for instance, during the battle at Dongshao).

2. There was no planned assignment of special personnel to different military
units to take charge of battlefield cleanup.
3. None of the military units sent people out to collect classified papers and
confidential documents, telegram cipher codes, special equipment, and technical
personnel.
4. At the conclusion of the battle, the direction, route, and condition of
enemy retreat were reported either very late or not at all; reports on statistics of
what was captured and of casualties, and on the replenishment and consolidation
of the troops were extremely slow in coming.
5. After the battle, the booty, the captives, and the wounded were handled too
slowly, and this greatly hampered the pursuit. At the same time, not much
attention was paid to taking care of the wounded, and they went without anything to eat for quite a long time.
6. Unable to get a full meal immediately, to restore the soldiers' morale, or
even to feed the horses and clean the guns.... 10
7. No special personnel were assigned to take charge of managing captives,
so that the captives had nothing to eat all day. At the battle in Longgang, they
were resentful toward us.

II. Preparatory Work to Be Done Now
A. Agitation!!

1. In addition to carrying out political agitation work according to the directives of the General Political Department, each section should hold separate
pledge-taking rallies as well.
2. Before departure for battle, troops should be assembled and given agitation
speeches.

B. Meetings
Using various types of meetings to do preparatory work for battle and to discuss
points for attention during battle and cleanup work after battle is the best way to
accomplish the task. Therefore, all military units should immediately convene
the following types of meetings:
1. Meetings to be convened at the army or divisional level:
a. Convening staff officers' meetings to discuss points for attention for the
troops during battle, staff work, methods of liaison with various units,
logistical service in the rear, as well as ways to gather classified papers
and documents after battle, and also current training principles in the
various military units.

b. Convening meetings of aides-de-camp to discuss the division of labor
among personnel who do odd jobs, ways to handle large baggage, provision of material assistance, temporary issues at the front, including the
treatment and repatriation of captives, as well as ways of handling booty,
the recruitment of stretcher-bearers, and the problem of provision and
delivery of drinking water.
c. Convening meetings of medical officers to discuss the matters of rescuing
and transferring wounded soldiers, establishing bandage units, and ways to
obtain drugs, Western medicine, nurses, and so on, after battle....
d. Convening meetings of officers above the level of deputy regiment commander and regiment commander to review past shortcomings in training
and wartime command, and to discuss the necessary preparations and
points for attention for the present battle, as well as current training.
2. Meetings to be convened at the regimental level:
a. Convening one meeting, with the whole regiment as a unit, to be attended
by officers above the level of platoon leader and deputy platoon leader, to
review past shortcomings in fighting and discuss necessary preparations
and points for attention for the current battle.
b. Convening one meeting, with the whole regiment as a unit, to be attended
by aides-de-camp, special task leaders, and those in charge of provisions,
such as staff sergeants for military supply and others, to discuss wartime
supplies and provision of material assistance and the supply of provisions
for the wounded and captives after battle.
3. Meetings to be convened at the company level:
a. Convening one company affairs meeting, with the whole company as a
unit, to be attended by officers above the level of deputy squad leader, to
review past shortcomings in fighting and discuss the necessary preparations and points for attention for the present battle.
b. Convening a soldiers' meeting of the entire company to report on the
political task and its significance in the current battle, and to discuss the
necessary efforts to be made.
C. Training
1. Step up training according to the new drilling methods and conduct separate shooting exercises (army and division commanders must all attend the
drill).
2. Carry out and evaluate field combat exercises, and conduct mock military
maneuvers once between regiments and once between divisions.
3. Morning exercises every day must include the activities of racing to the
top of the hill, pursuit, target practice, and quick assembly. Recreation periods

must be devoted entirely to bayonet practice, surveying, games, the long jump,
and so on. During evening roll call, military evaluations must be made.
4. Soldiers performing miscellaneous duties (especially porters) must be assigned someone to teach them how to do such things as form ranks, march, take
breaks, and make stops (close to the side of the road), so as not to impede the
army's forward march, and add to the fighting ranks.
5. Stretcher-bearers and military nurses must conduct joint exercises in rescue and transfer operations.
6. All military personnel must know how to take cover against air raids while
on the march, in bivouac, or in battle, so that they can quickly hide themselves
when encountering enemy airplanes (for details see Order No. 1 issued by the
Front Army in Changsha).
7. As much as possible, cooks should avoid fatigue, and they should be
trained to improve their cooking skills.
8. Methods of cleaning and protecting weapons should be explained, and
soldiers must be urged to utilize them.

D. Provisions
All military units must prepare a supply of rice for ten days and money for
one month.
Upon receipt of this order, all military units must immediately hold meetings
and make detailed plans for their subordinate units to carry out each measure. It
is also necessary that all progress be reported to this headquarters for review.
It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

March 17, 1931, according to the Western calendar

Suppression, Vol. 1.

--- Notes

1. Communist documents written during this period use a variety of terms to refer to
the successive anti-Communist military operations that the Nationalists labelled the "encirclement and suppression" [weijiao] campaigns. Although documents written in the later
stages of the Jiangxi Soviet period (especially in 1933-1934) quite often use the Nationalist term "encirclement and suppression" enclosed in quotation marks, earlier documents
such as this one more commonly use terms such as "phase," "battle," or "war" to refer to
the campaigns. Thus, the term "Second Phase of Operations" in this title refers to the
Second Encirclement Campaign.

2. Luo Zhuoying (1896-1961), a native of Guangdong, was at this time the commander of the Guomindang Eleventh Division. His forces are not listed in Communist-compiled Nationalist orders of battle for the Second Encirclement Campaign, but did
participate in the Third Encirclement Campaign later in 1931. This is confirmed in Bandit


3. I.e., between Chiang Kaishek and Zhang Xueliang.

4. Sandu and Qibao were communities in an area of eastern Xingguo xian which had
until recently been a center of anti-Communist resistance.

5. The term "route" (lu) here is used not in the sense of "road," but as a term of
geographical jurisdiction, as in the East, West, South, North, and Central route action
committees organized by the Party in central Jiangxi in 1929-1930.

6. The reference is to an ad hoc conference called jointly by the First Front Army and
the local armed forces in the Central Soviet Area to discuss the situation following victory
against the First Encirclement Campaign.

7. "Hexi" refers to the area west of the Gan River. For discussion of the Futian
Incident, see the Introduction.

8. The Red Seventh Army had left its place of origin in Guangxi and had arrived in the
area west of the Gan River in early 1931. During the first half of the year it operated in
this region in conjunction with local Red Army forces from the area around the
Jinggangshan base area, and with the Red Twentieth Army, which had fled to this region
following its involvement in the Futian Incident in December 1930.


9. Another reference to the First Encirclement and Suppression Campaign.

10. This ellipsis, and that at the end of paragraph IIB1c below, appear in the available
Chinese text.

11. Regarding the difference between propaganda and agitation see above, the note to
the text of March 12-14, 1931.