In September 1930, the First Front Army of the Red Army returned to Jiangxi after attempting to capture Changsha. In early October, it captured Ji’an and advanced into the Yuan River basin. Xingguo sent many peasants to join the Red Army, and I took this opportunity to conduct an investigation of the Tenth District of Xingguo, namely the Yongfeng District.


I convened a meeting with eight individuals—Fu Jiting, Li Changying, Wen Fengzhang, Chen Zhenshan, Zhong Dewu, Huang Dachun, Chen Beiping, and Lei Hanxiang—to carry out the inquiry.


The investigation was conducted in late October 1930 at Luofang in Xinyu County, and the meeting lasted for one week.


The Yongfeng District is situated at the junction of Xingguo, Ganxian, and Wan’an counties. It is divided into four townships: the former Lingyuan Township constitutes the First Township, the Dongjiang Township the Second, the Sankeng Township the Third, and the Jiangtuan Township the Fourth. Yongfeng Market Town in the Second Township serves as the district’s political and economic center.


Population distribution: The First Township has 3,000 inhabitants; the Second, 800; the Third, 3,000; and the Fourth, 2,000, for a total of 8,800.


Located at the tripoint of Xingguo, Ganxian, and Wan’an, a thorough understanding of this district would also provide insight into the other two counties, and by extension, into the broader land struggle throughout southern Jiangxi.


The formulation of concrete policies must be based on specific local conditions. What one imagines while sitting indoors, or what is crudely set forth in superficial written reports, bears no resemblance to the actual situation on the ground.


To base policy decisions on mere assumptions or on unrealistic reports is fraught with danger. In the past, numerous errors occurred in the revolutionary base areas precisely because Party guidance failed to accord with the realities on the ground.


Therefore, detailed, scientific, and fact-based investigations are absolutely essential.


Although this particular survey was still not very in-depth overall, it represented a greater degree of thoroughness than my previous inquiries. First, we conducted household-level surveys of eight families—an approach I had never employed before. In truth, without such household studies, it is impossible to form a solid conceptual foundation regarding the rural context. Second, we examined how different social classes had participated in the land struggle, an aspect I had begun to explore during my Xunwu investigation but had not fully completed.


The shortcomings of this study include the omission of inquiries into the conditions of children and women, the state of trade and price comparisons, post-land-distribution agricultural production, and cultural conditions. These matters were indeed intended for examination; however, when enemy forces launched an attack on Luofang and the Red Army decided to adopt a strategy of luring the enemy deeper into our territory, our investigative meeting was forced to conclude.


The materials presented here were gathered as follows: I outlined the agenda for the inquiry, posed questions one by one, and engaged in discussion. All conclusions were formulated by me with the agreement of my eight comrades, after which they were recorded. In some instances, no definitive conclusions were reached; instead, only their responses were transcribed.


Our investigative meetings were lively and engaging, often held twice or even three times daily, sometimes continuing far into the night, yet none of the participants appeared fatigued. We owe them profound gratitude. Several among them were Communist Party members, but the majority were not.


January 26, 1931, at Xiaobu Market Town, Ningdu. Postscript compiled upon completion of the compilation.
Printed according to the edition published by the People’s Publishing House in 1982, entitled Collected Works on Mao Zedong’s Rural Investigations.