The Situation of the Fourth Red Army || July 1929 to April 1930 || 1930  (I) The Course of the Red Army’s Operations  1. Entering Western Fujian from Central Fujian via Shanghang and Yongding.
On June 19, 1929, Longyan was captured for the third time, and after seizing Chen Guoju’s base, there were no significant enemies remaining in the surrounding western regions.
It was decided that the First Column would advance from Fangshi, Hexi, Zhengjialang, Qifeng, and Anxi, moving straight northward along the eastern bank of the Min River until reaching Huilong and Guanying.
Meanwhile, the Second, Third, and Fourth Columns operated separately throughout the western area, while the Command Headquarters led its direct subordinate units to Xinquan first.
The Front Committee dispatched five members (including Mao Zedong) to Yiyang to assist the Western Fujian Provincial Committee in convening the First Congress of Western Fujian, with the overarching goal of establishing a Red Base Area in Western Fujian.
By mid-July 1929, tensions were high across three provinces as troops were being mobilized.
Lu Xinfei still firmly controlled Zhangzhou, while Zhang Zhen had moved from Nanjing to Hexi, and Chen Weiyuan’s brigade, along with De’s guest troops, were concentrated in Dafu, Songkou, and Licheng counties.
Although Li Wenhui’s brigade in Tingzhou remained stationary, reinforcements from Jin Han’s unit were expected to arrive from Ruijin, making the situation increasingly tense.
By July, reports indicated that two additional regiments had been added to Zhangzhou, and Li Wenhui had advanced into Hetian.
Furthermore, news emerged that Zhang Zhen’s forces had entered Zhongshan, intensifying the pressure even further.
Some advocated concentrating forces to fight in Western Fujian, while others urged an offensive outward.
Ultimately, the Front Committee concluded that limited options existed within Western Fujian itself.
The Situation of the Fourth Red Army, page 99  100  It was decided to launch an offensive.
Consequently, the Second and Third Columns, together with the Command Headquarters and the Front Committee, rushed overnight to Longyan and Zisha to assemble.
The Second Column, which had previously advanced from Liancheng toward Huilong, found itself unable to cross the river and thus joined forces with the Fourth Column in Yanxi to plan a coordinated breakout.
Separately, the First Column, blocked from crossing the river and unable to reach the eastern bank, became confused regarding the direction set by the Western Fujian Provincial Committee.
Eventually, the Fourth Column resolved to divide its forces between Yongding and Longyan, actively organizing the masses to resist the enemy encirclement.
The First Column entered the vast border region between Longyan, Shanghang, and Yongding, dividing its entire force into three detachments, mobilizing the populace, establishing Soviet governments, and implementing land redistribution, thereby successfully rousing widespread popular support.
However, Chen Weiyuan soon arrived with three regiments, occupying Yongding and engaging in constant skirmishes.
Due to his strong position and lack of popular backing, even a single company could effectively confront one of his regiments.
He remained in Yongding for over a month, during which time his three regiments failed to penetrate the mountainous terrain, suffering heavy casualties.
The Fourth Column developed its operations from the northern part of Shanghang to Xinquan (in southern Liancheng) and Lengfang (in southern Shaxian). Its strength consistently came from Shaxian and Liancheng.
Zhang Yuan and Lian Qian’s brigades only reached Longyan after approximately one month of continuous movement from central Fujian.
Meanwhile, the Second and Third Columns gathered in Zisha before departing overnight for Ningyang, subsequently advancing through Liping and Shaoting toward the fertile fields of Datan and the direction of Dehua.
During this period, many soldiers fell ill, communication links were lost, artillery could not be moved, and rifles were too damaged to be carried properly, necessitating makeshift wooden frames for transportation.
As a result, we suffered the loss of over 300 personnel and more than 100 firearms, ultimately retreating to Pingtian to regroup and prepare for another assault against Zhang Zhen’s forces.
We attacked Yongfu that night, only to encounter Zhang Zhen’s Yanghe Brigade withdrawing from Longyan, forcing us to withdraw once again.
This campaign ultimately ended in failure.  2. Meeting at Shanghang.
On September 21, 1929, just prior to the joint conference, the Second and Third Columns, along with local supporters, met with a portion of the First Column at Xinjiu alone.
Having captured Shanghang and completed operations in the Min River basin, the Soviet government had expanded to WuPing.
The Fourth Column was currently resting and replenishing its ranks.
Each column had been reorganized into three detachments, with roughly 800 to 900 members per column, bringing the total strength of the army to over 7,000.
At this point, it was clear that Chen Weiyuan intended to advance eastward; however, Liu and Ban’s two brigades had also arrived in Hedan, and Jin Han’s electrically powered troops were steadily increasing in number.
We therefore decided to establish positions in Pingtian to prepare for potential engagements.
Our strategy at the time was to strike westward against Jin Han, using the west as our rear base, while simultaneously advancing eastward towards Jiangdong.
The Central Committee had instructed us to move eastward.
The Second Column engaged in a fierce battle with two opposing political factions near the Guangdong border at Shibada; meanwhile, the First Column defeated an enemy faction in Songyuan, displaying remarkable momentum, and proceeded directly toward Hang County, traveling nonstop from Jiao’an that very day.
However, the following afternoon, Jiang Guangxi personally led three regiments in pursuit, forcing us to safely withdraw southward through Banshun, Matou, Suoxian, and Nanfang to rest.
This occurred on October 26, 1929.
We initially planned to disperse our columns across various locations in Jiangdong to mobilize the masses.
Many argued that dispersal would make it easier for the enemy to defeat us individually, but after deliberation, we ultimately decided to maintain a unified front.
At the same time, we learned that only Siyuan’s teaching regiment was stationed in Licheng, leading us to unanimously resolve to launch a counterattack against Meixian.
On October 31, we broke into the city at dawn, only to come under intense enemy fire, forcing us to withdraw by 4 p.m., resulting in the loss of approximately 200 personnel and dozens of weapons.
Around this time, we anticipated that Cai Tingcuo would return to Jiangdong, and that Zhang Guode would also advance from Huizhou to Xingning and Wanghua.
Consequently, we chose not to proceed through Xingning, instead opting to advance through Taiping, seeking guidance from Shi Zhengzhi, and later deciding to head to Anyuan to gather political intelligence and address economic issues.
This expedition out of Licheng resulted in significant losses among our elite units: the First Column was reduced to two detachments, the Second Column’s warehouses were looted during the march, leading to further reductions and consolidation into two detachments, while the Third Column was downsized to a single battalion.
Overall, we suffered the loss of over a thousand personnel.  4. Retreat from Anyuan back to Tingzhou.
In Anyuan, we determined that, given Jin Han’s tendency to shift forces westward, we should likewise pivot back westward.
As expected, Jin Han dispatched Wei Gang’s brigade, which had previously passed through Lang, directly to Ya Zipu, fifty kilometers from Anyuan.
Accordingly, we immediately departed for Gongping, spending three days at Maonian Dam before continuing to Pinyuan, where we rested briefly at a government compound.
We then resolved to attack Shaxian and capture Tingzhou in order to resolve pressing economic problems, deploying the First Column to Hetian and Shuishang, and the Second Column to Tingzhou, while the Third Column focused on Liancheng.
The Situation of the Fourth Red Army -0  -DO 2  5. Rest and recuperation in Xinquan and Gutian.
Although the objective circumstances in Tingzhou were not particularly difficult, Jin Han continued to reinforce his troops in an attempt to reclaim the region.
Given the need for comprehensive military, political, and Party organizational restructuring, we decided to retreat to Xinquan for a period of restorative work.
After ten days of recuperation in Xinquan, we proceeded to Gutian for intensive training, where the Party held nine consecutive congresses.  6. Advancing from Liancheng to Guangchang.
On January 5, 1930, our main force departed from Gutian for Liancheng, and on January 9th, we moved from Liancheng to Ninghua.
Our strategy involved advancing southwestward to expand the Red Base Area in that direction.
We hoped that Jin Han would follow our lead and withdraw from the western region, allowing the already established Red Base Area in the west to be further enlarged after his departure.
Thus, on January 16th, we successfully occupied Guangchang.
This operation brought significant development to both the western region and the southwestern front, greatly benefiting the Red Army, and was entirely justified.  7. Eastern Alliance.
While operating in Guangchang, the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Shishan was intensifying.
Shi Yousan had seized Bengbu, and the ongoing military conflict between Chiang and Tang was becoming increasingly apparent.
At that time, we sought to restore connections among the three provinces and strengthen ties with the Western Fujian Provincial Committee, as well as with the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army.
We decided not to advance toward Nanfeng or Nancheng, but rather to establish a Red Base Area in the eastern region, planning to rest for two days in Le’an and Yongzhan before proceeding to Jishui and Ji’an.
The Front Committee dispatched the Second Column to track our progress from Liancheng, Qingliu, and Ninghua toward Guangchang, recognizing the importance of maintaining unity among the eastern forces and anticipating that they would converge with the main force at Lokou.
Currently, the military landscape is characterized by chaotic warfare, yet revolutionary forces are gaining momentum.
We resolved to formulate a plan to seize control of the entire province of Jiangxi.  8. Occupation of Ningdu, Yongfeng, and Le’an.
With our forces divided into four columns, the Fourth Column collaborated with the Ningdu Red Guards, while the Fifth Column worked alongside local authorities in Ningdu to implement southern policies, helping to resolve land-related issues.
To counter Jin Han’s influence, I personally led the First Column directly to Le’an, while the Third Column occupied Yongfeng.
The Second Column advanced along the way, attacking local landlords and expanding our influence up to the farmland.
At this juncture, the Front Committee believed that both domestic and international circumstances were ripe for a revolutionary upsurge, with a real possibility of conquering the entire province of Jiangxi.
Therefore, they decided to establish a joint Front Committee comprising the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies to guide these three armies, as well as the Southwest, West, and East Jiangdong revolutionary movements.
The plan was to concentrate the forces of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies and seize provincial power in Jiangxi.
At that time, military figures such as Tang Yunshan, Jin Hanzi, and Zhu Juhua were actively directing their forces toward us, prompting us to adopt a more aggressive stance.
Consequently, the entire army refrained from advancing toward Jishui and instead retreated to Futi for recuperation.
During this period, the morale of both officers and soldiers soared, driven by a fervent desire to establish a Soviet regime and redistribute land.
However, Tang Yunshan managed to advance independently, approaching Futi from forty kilometers away in Shuinan and launching a three-pronged attack against us.
We first repelled his two battalions in Shuinan, and the next day destroyed two-thirds of his remaining forces, completely routing him.
Following our victory over Tang Yunshan, we decided that the Fourth and Sixth Armies’ Second Columns would jointly advance northward, heading straight for Jishui’s southern bank.
We convened an expanded meeting to assess whether a northern advance would be politically advantageous.
However, Zhu Juhua, the Ying Two Brigade, and Tang Yunshan’s remnants in Jishui obstructed our path across the river, while Guangqian’s forces were entrenched in Ji’an, and Dai Yue’s brigade was positioned in Yongfeng and Le’an.
Unable to proceed either westward or northward, we ultimately opted to retreat to Shuinan for a meeting, where the decision was made to follow the earlier suggestion of entering Ningning from Guangchang.
On March 10, 1930, our main force arrived in Dongjiao.
Siege of Cancer Province.
Our main force advanced toward Xingguo, and on March 16th, we launched a brief assault on the city’s eastern, southern, and western fronts, but none of these attacks succeeded in breaching the defenses.
The siege continued for several days without any breakthrough.  = Division of Forces.
Occupying the southern counties and ultimately joining forces with Ading in Nanxiong.
As the siege of Cancer Province remained inconclusive, we collectively agreed that, given Jin Han’s current preoccupation with internal affairs, it would be more beneficial to focus on strengthening the Red connection among the three provinces.
Accordingly, we resolved to mobilize the masses over a three-month period, with each county—Cancer, Zhuan, Anyuan, and Xun—working toward a common goal of converging on Longyan in the west.
Therefore, the Third Column fully escorted the victorious troops from Cancer back to Zhuan, coordinating with the Second and Fifth Columns of the Sixth Army.
The Second Column of the Sixth Army advanced along Xingguo toward Ningdu and Ruijin, while the Fifth Column headed toward Wan’an to join forces with the Third Column of the Fourth Army on the western bank of the Ji River.
The Third Column of the Fourth Army worked in Zhuan for a month, establishing a local regime and linking it to Anyuan.
The Fourth and First Columns of the Fourth Red Army each had accompanying units; the Second Column was based in Nankang.
However, at this time, all sixty-eight or sixty-nine enemy battalions had converged upon us.
We, including the First, Second, and Fourth Columns, assembled in Nanan to form the Western Jiangjiang Revolutionary Committee, simultaneously organizing twenty-six sub-units to establish a small Soviet government.
On April 1, 1933, we finally secured permission to defeat Wu’s two battalions, capturing hundreds of prisoners and advancing to Nanxiong.
Subsequently, Jin Han’s forces mutinied, withdrawing back to Xinfeng in preparation for rejoining the Third Column.
Simultaneously, the Second Column of the Sixth Army continued to coordinate with the others to advance toward Jiangdong; if the convergence with the Third Column proved impossible, we would proceed according to the original plan.
Regarding Anyuan, we undertook a mission to expand the Red Base Area to include Anyuan, connecting it to Zhuan, and dispatching troops to join the Jiangdong Red Army as a unified force.
Thereafter, we would integrate the Western Jiangjiang Revolutionary Committee into a single entity, either by merging it with the Chaoshan group advancing eastward or by incorporating it into the Southern Swamp faction awaiting central instructions.
This constituted our plan for Nanxiong.  (II) Current Organizational Structure: The Fourth Army is organized into First, Second, Third, and Fourth Columns, with the First, Second, and Fourth Columns each consisting of two detachments, while the Third Column comprises three.
Each of these columns numbers approximately 1,300 to 1,400 members.  (III) Party Organizational Status  1. Guiding Principles of the Fourth Army Party Before and After the Ninth Congress:  Prior to the Ninth Congress, all matters were subject to collective discussion.
At that time, the Front Committee had effectively relinquished its centralized leadership role over the entire army, resulting in an extremely democratic style of governance.
Meetings were held without prior preparation, and no session could commence unless every column was fully represented.
Sometimes, deliberations would drag on for days without resolution.
This mirrored the so-called “debate over top-down paternalism versus bottom-up democracy” that had arisen during the Seventh Congress between Zhu and Mao.
Only after the Ninth Congress did we clearly recognize the necessity of heeding central directives and correcting the excessively democratic leadership tendencies, adopting a collective decision-making approach for all issues.
Consequently, all proposals presented at the Ninth Congress were first convened by the Front Committee among secretaries of detachment-level units and above, drafted by the Propaganda Organization, reviewed by the Front Committee, and then submitted to the plenary session.
Similarly, electoral nominations were also prepared in advance, stipulating that candidates must meet three criteria: “politically sound views, active participation in revolutionary struggles, and a history of resistance.”
This replaced the previous practice of selecting individuals based solely on their hierarchical rank within the organization and submitting a list of names to the congress.
Thanks to this new approach, the Ninth Congress proceeded smoothly over just two days, laying out numerous policy directions, unlike the Eighth Congress, which had devolved into three days of unproductive chaos.
Following the Ninth Congress, the guiding principles for all levels of command—from the Front Committee down to the grassroots branches—were fundamentally transformed.
Various Incorrect Tendencies and Current Practices Within the Fourth Army Party: During the Ninth Congress, eight specific incorrect tendencies related to class consciousness were explicitly identified: OO Purely militaristic viewpoints; extreme democratization; absolute egalitarianism; @ seventy percent thinking; lack of organizational awareness; individualism; O complete ideological emptiness; and reactive activism.
After the Ninth Congress, considerable progress was made in rectifying these tendencies, most notably overcoming the purely militaristic mindset and excessive democratization, while other issues were gradually being addressed as well.
The Question of Expanding the Red Army: At that time, our overarching strategy revolved around transforming local armed forces into the Red Army as the primary means of expansion.
Total Party Membership: The Fourth Army had a total of 160,000 party members, accounting for approximately one-quarter of the army’s overall membership of over 600,000.
Officials numbered over 400.

The Situation of the Fourth Red Army, page 1005  Sixty thousand soldiers—over one hundred thousand in total; Composition: Over three hundred workers, over two hundred intellectuals, over two hundred small merchants and others, and over nine hundred farmers.
o Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Area (Part III), Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, May 1982