() According to reports, the remnants of Sun Lianzhong’s forces had already withdrawn from Dongshao toward Yihuang on the 23rd, while Zhu Shaoliang’s three divisions had also fled via Guangchang to Nanfeng.

(ii) The Front Army decided to take the shortcut and occupy Nanfeng ahead of the enemy; if the enemy (Mao, Xu, and Hu) still remained to our right rear, we would intercept them immediately.

(iii) The Third Corps, as the Left Column, was to set out from its present position tomorrow (the 25th), traveling over a three-and-a-half-day march via Wucun, Qiaocun, and Sankeng to advance toward Nanfeng and seize the city when the opportunity arose. Upon reaching Nanfeng, it was to hold positions near Shishan Street in readiness for further orders, and one division was to be detached as an advance guard, making the three-day march ahead of schedule to arrive by November 17 near Nanfeng, attack the city, and capture it if possible, thereby covering the advance of our main force.

(iv) The First Corps, as the Right Column, was to move out at four o’clock tomorrow morning in the order of the Combined Direct Command of the 3rd and 4th Armies followed by the 12th Army, from their current location (Matian, South Regiment_ Upper). They were to proceed over a three-and-a-half-day march via Luokou, Fang, Kuzhu, Ganzhu, Fenglin, and Modaotu toward Nanfeng. Upon reaching the vicinity of Nanfeng City, they were to establish camp in the Yaogang area and stand by for further instructions. The Third Army was likewise to dispatch one division as an advance guard, completing the three-day march by November 17 to arrive near Nanfeng and cover the advance of our main force.

(v) The 35th Army was to reach Dongshao by November 16 and stand by; all units’ heavy baggage was to be placed under its protection. By November 18, all units were to assemble in Dongshao and await orders there.

(vi) The Camp School and the Red Guard Regiment (lacking the Fourth Company) were to return to the direct command of the Military Commission and move westward across the river.

(vii) Each column was to establish contact with one another upon reaching its bivouac site. The advance guards were to pay particular attention to reconnaissance of enemy positions and report back to headquarters without delay (a daily itinerary would be issued separately).

(viii) The General Headquarters would accompany the Right Column, following behind the Fourth Army and leading the 12th Army. (End) It should be noted that all advance guards must reach Nanfeng before the enemy, seize the city, establish defensive positions, maintain mutual communication, and await the arrival of the main force. They must not relinquish the city. The commander and political commissar of whichever advance guard unit arrived first in Nanfeng would assume overall command. Should the three bandits—Mao, Xu, and Hu—have already occupied the city, the advance guard was still to cooperate in launching an attack. The Front Army was to commence its march from near the South Regiment, with the itinerary as follows: Five days for the regimental units; five days plus seven days for the AB Army’s advance guard. The division advancing from the east would move from OU to Qiaocun, then along the Jingq Creek through Xishan to occupy Nanfeng. The main force would arrive at Wum Village Street. A1 Regiment, lacking a division, would advance from Wu0 Village via Si, transporting personnel first, then the 151st Division, which would travel from Matian through Sanluo to Baizhou, passing through Kuzhu and heading toward IJ Fenglin and Ganzhu Luo Fang to occupy Nanfeng. The M army, lacking a division, completed its brain work starting from Yunyuan Ma: attached to Tianjin, proceeding via Luop to Zhuyou^, then six sources of bitterness from Wukuzhu to Ganzhu, nearby via ^ down to Er Yang0 to Yaowuhu. Attached to the Fourth Army, Yan moved from Fang Nantuan–five via Oluow P to Ganyou Zhuyou Yanfang–seven via Okuzhu–to the same place. The General Headquarters Direct Command entered Bu Yanfang, proceeded via Nalaotuan Luoyi, then attached to Luo Jin Fang Bai–five stones0 to Feng“Yaowu, crossing the lake^, then Dao Si Dutu Oxiaoyang to Nantuan Di Shi Luoyi mouth up to Xiaoyan Lake Fang Wangyi to Fenglin Wu Yi. All units were to exercise caution: unless absolutely necessary, they must not alter their plans at will. If, despite best efforts, a unit could not reach its designated destination, it was to promptly report to headquarters and notify friendly forces.

Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, Political Commissar Mao Zedong. Document No. 356 from Party History Materials (III) – Li Bashi Qi. Seven. “Order to Seize Nanfeng Ahead of the Enemy’s Retreat,” exhibited at the Ningdu Revolutionary Memorial Hall.