To the Left Route Military Commission from the Provincial Committee: To the Western Jiangxi Military Commission and the Eastern Hunan Special Committee:

1. Upon my arrival in Shuinan, I learned that preparations for resisting the enemy were already quite advanced. Mass meetings had been held in every township, and a conference of active elements was convened across the entire district. Measures for fortifying positions and clearing the countryside had also been taken; most notably, propaganda work among the White Army soldiers was particularly effective. The streets and buildings of Shuinan were covered with slogans, manifestos, and folk songs, and a committee for mobilizing White Army troops had been established. In this respect, Shuinan’s preparations far surpassed those of the Rufang area, where virtually nothing had been done: the bulk of Jianshan’s kerosene remained unremoved, salt had not yet been fully evacuated, and propaganda efforts were weak. Judging by the situations in Rufang and Jianshan, it seems likely that similar shortcomings exist throughout the Western District, Rulin District, Chunhua District, Taihe, Yongxin, Lianhua, Anfu, Yongfeng, Xingguo, and especially Yundu in the eastern sector. Under these circumstances, the Provincial Committee should urgently issue renewed, stringent instructions to the Western Jiangxi, Eastern Jiangxi, and Eastern Hunan special military commissions. When doing so, it must emphasize the erroneous notion that victory in Jianshan would bring about peace throughout the land. Examples such as the complete annihilation of the Fenyi County Party Committee and Government, the severe losses suffered by the Xinyu County Party Committee and Government, the dispersal of the Xiajiang Emergency Meeting by enemy forces, and the fact that Jianshan was left without salt while tens of thousands of jin of salt were instead supplied to the enemy, serve as grave warnings.

2. Reports indicate that the 3rd Regiment of the 60th Division completed its march from southern Hubei five days ago, and the 61st Division is now continuing its advance, aiming to strike Western Jiangxi via Lianhua and other routes. The county Party committees and Soviet governments of Yongxin and Anfu must swiftly prepare for an imminent enemy offensive. Meanwhile, the masses of Eastern Hunan and the Independent Division bear a heavy responsibility: once the enemy enters Yongxin, Anfu, Taihe, Jianshan, and other areas, the Western Jiangxi Military Commission should direct local populations to engage in delaying and deceptive operations to mislead the enemy. At the same time, all possible means must be employed to pin down the enemy already in Jianshan, ensuring that the four divisions under Chiang, Cai, Luo, and Li are prevented from crossing to the east bank of the river. In carrying out this mission, the Red Third Army bears significant responsibility. All of these tasks require guidance from both the Left Route Military Commission and the Left Route Command Headquarters. However, up to now, these bodies have seemingly failed to discharge their duties: no circulars or directives have been issued, nor have they transmitted reports on the enemy situation from various locales. This constitutes a very serious shortcoming that must be rectified without delay. As for the Left Route Commission and Command in the Eastern Hunan region, they ought to exercise leadership over the Eastern Hunan Military Commission, which in turn should provide direction to the Western Jiangxi Military Commission regarding matters within its jurisdiction. Yet even in this critical juncture, neither body has clearly demarcated areas of responsibility nor offered substantive guidance. Moreover, recent expanded plenary sessions of the Fourth Jiangxi Military Commission, joint meetings of the Western Jiangxi county committees, and the Peasant Congress all excluded representatives from Lianhua, Pingxiang, Xingguo, Ningdu, and Yongfeng—though at least they should have been invited to attend as observers. Such omissions are highly inappropriate.

3. In the Shuinan area, word has yet to reach the people that only funds for firewood and vegetables are being distributed, with no provision for oil, salt, or rice. The same holds true elsewhere. Regarding the supply of oil, salt, and rice to the Red Army, until official notification is received, I propose dispatching two personnel from the Finance Department—one to Yongfeng and Niudu, and another through Chunhua, Shuinan, Botou, and Baisha—to resolve the issue of Red Army provisioning. However, the designated Finance Department officials have thus far failed to take action. By the time the Red Army arrives in these localities, the problems of oil, salt, and rice will remain entirely unresolved. In particular, a portion of the provincial government’s salt reserves must be allocated to these areas to supply the army free of charge. With regard to fundraising, only 130,000 yuan has been collected out of the targeted 1.2 million (and even this sum cannot be disbursed without a directive from the General Front Committee). It is imperative to intensify efforts to secure additional funds. Once the Red Army enters the revolutionary base areas, all supplies must be obtained from the provincial government; there is no alternative. The Provincial Committee should therefore re-examine its plans in this regard and ensure strict, unwavering oversight. A daily meeting attended by relevant leaders to centrally coordinate all aspects of this work would be highly desirable.

4. We may reach Baisha today and Xingtian tomorrow. I urge the Provincial Committee, the Eastern Jiangxi Military Commission, the Western Jiangxi Military Commission, and the Twenty-Second Army Military Committee to submit intelligence reports to the General Front Committee on a daily basis, so as to maintain constant situational awareness. The Eastern Hunan Military Commission recently reported that the Independent Division had seized over five hundred firearms, among other matters; this report has now been received in An.

Mao Zedong
November 24, 1930