The Question of the Rich Peasants
—Resolution of the Joint Meeting Between the Preparatory Committee of the Fourth Red Army and the Special Committee for Western Fujian—
(November 1, 1930)

(1) What Are Rich Peasants? There are three types of rich peasants: The first type is the semi‑feudal rich peasant—those who cultivate their own land while also leasing out surplus plots. The second type is the capitalist-rich peasant—those who do not lease out their land, some even renting land from others and employing laborers to work it. The third type is the early-stage rich peasant—those who neither lease out their land nor employ hired labor, relying solely on their own labor to till the soil; yet they possess ample land and labor resources, producing enough surplus grain each year to sell or lend. All three types of rich peasants exploit the poor and impoverished masses in two common ways: First, through usurious lending—charging exorbitant interest on money, grain, pigs, cattle, and oil—and through the commercial sale of grain. Second, each type of rich peasant employs a unique form of exploitation: semi‑feudal rich peasants extract rent from the land, while capitalist-rich peasants exploit wage labor. Moreover, many rich peasants also engage in commerce—running small shops or trading in agricultural products—using commercial capital to further exploit the poor and impoverished masses.
(2) The Counter‑Revolutionary Nature of Rich Peasants Rich peasants constitute the rural bourgeoisie, but the exploitation practiced by Chinese rich peasants often carries a distinctly semi‑feudal and brutal character. Whether in terms of land rent, usurious loans, wage labor, or commercial capital, the exploitation carried out by rich peasants is often more ruthless than that of landlords. Consequently, the interests of this class are fundamentally at odds with those of poor peasants and tenant farmers. In the early stages of the revolution, although rich peasants may have had a need to oppose the warlord regime’s oppressive taxes and levies, their fundamental interests—namely, land and capital—dictate that as long as the revolution originates from the ranks of poor peasants and tenant farmers, they will inevitably side with the landlords against the poor and tenant farmers. At the height of the revolutionary tide, rich peasants might generously burn their land deeds, distribute land to the peasants, tie red ribbons around their necks to proclaim themselves comrades, or even infiltrate the Communist Party in an opportunistic bid to avert the crisis facing rural capitalism—a crisis that threatens to derail the path toward capitalist development (from the current stage of protecting private property to the future of capitalist growth). This is one of the most serious issues in rural struggles, demanding the full attention of all comrades. As rural struggles deepen—when poor peasants and tenant farmers have established firm leadership, when the political status of rich peasants has been overthrown, when their land, forests, draft animals, and debts have been confiscated—their response is invariably to spread rumors, sow confusion, and engage in passive resistance. When the revolution shifts from a state of peril to defeat, rich peasants become increasingly wavering, then compromise, and ultimately betray the cause entirely, joining the anti‑revolutionary front and launching attacks against poor peasants and tenant farmers.
(3) Debates Over Early‑Stage Rich Peasants In the past, various factions—especially in the Dongjiang region—only recognized two types of rich peasants: the semi‑feudal and the capitalist. They refused to classify early‑stage rich peasants as “rich peasants,” instead labeling them “middle peasants.” Some even opposed confiscating their surplus land or abolishing their debts—forgetting that these early‑stage rich peasants were, in fact, an exploitative class. Although they did not collect rents or exploit wage labor, they engaged in usurious lending and sold surplus grain at inflated prices during times of scarcity. These two forms of exploitation were no different from those practiced by semi‑feudal and capitalist-rich peasants. Relying on these two forms of exploitation, early‑stage rich peasants gradually accumulated capital and eventually joined the ranks of both capitalist and semi‑feudal rich peasants. Poor peasants and tenant farmers must not only confiscate the land and abolish the debts of semi‑feudal and capitalist-rich peasants—but also confiscate the land and abolish the debts of early‑stage rich peasants. Wherever the struggle deepened, poor peasants and tenant farmers followed this course. Yet within the Communist Party, this issue remained a matter of ongoing debate. The joint meeting’s view on this question was clear: we must adopt the same resolute stance toward confiscating the land of other types of rich peasants and abolishing their debts. Why should we pursue such a policy? Because only by confiscating their land can we effectively counter the cruel exploitation of surplus grain sold at inflated prices during times of scarcity; only by abolishing their debts can we address the harsh exploitation inherent in usurious lending. Both of these forms of exploitation are deeply rooted in semi‑feudal relations—and only by thoroughly eliminating them can peasants be fully liberated from semi‑feudal bondage. Simply abolishing the exploitation of landlords and the third category of rich peasants is not enough.
(4) The Power of the Masses of Poor Peasants Is Sufficient to Overcome Rich Peasants Only when the Party Formulates a Strategy Against Rich Peasants Can We Mobilize the Masses of Poor Peasants to Thoroughly Complete the Tasks of the Democratic Revolution and Advance Toward the Stage of Social Revolution. In the Yangtze and Pearl River valleys, poor peasants and tenant farmers generally account for more than 70 percent of the population, while middle peasants make up about 20 percent, and rich peasants less than 10 percent. In rural struggles, the main force driving the movement is the broad mass of poor peasants and tenant farmers—and middle peasants can form alliances with them. Rich peasants, by contrast, are a small, highly isolated group. Although rich peasants are inherently counter‑revolutionary, claims that in certain southern provinces, rich peasants—or even self‑cultivating farmers—make up the majority, or a substantial proportion of the population (such as “Jiangxi is predominantly self‑cultivating farmers,” “Meixian and Dapu have many self‑cultivating farmers, so a land revolution cannot be implemented there,” “In Changting and Jianning, Fujian, rich peasants account for 40 percent” and similar assertions) clearly exaggerate the power of the rich peasant class. Such arguments suggest that in the first stage, we should only oppose landlords—and that it is not yet time to oppose rich peasants. Not only is this objectively wrong, completely inconsistent with social realities; some of these arguments are, in fact, subjective attempts to establish rich peasant leadership within the Party and among the masses, blurring class consciousness within both the Party and the masses, and even downplaying or canceling the Party’s task of opposing rich peasants—a counter‑revolutionary plot. The right‑leaning, opportunist position that exaggerates the power of the rich peasant class and argues that we should make concessions to rich peasants when attacking landlords is extremely dangerous. Likewise, simply viewing rich peasants as “a small, highly isolated group” inevitably leads to downplaying or even canceling the Party’s task of opposing rich peasants—and that, too, is equally dangerous. The opportunist opposition led by Chen Duxiu claimed that China’s countryside had already become capitalist, that feudal exploitation was nothing more than a lingering remnant. Their conclusion was, of course, to abandon the democratic revolution and end the struggle against landlords. But if we fail to examine exploitation from the perspective of its essence—and instead focus only on the methods of exploitation—we are bound to conclude that “rich peasants are not the primary enemy; landlords are the primary enemy.” If we fail to recognize that the nature of the struggle against rich peasants is the same as the struggle against landlords—to oppose the cruel, semi‑feudal exploitation—then our conclusions will inevitably lead to downplaying or even canceling the crucial task of fighting against rich peasants. Without fulfilling this task, we cannot mobilize the broad masses of poor peasants to thoroughly complete the democratic revolution and advance toward the stage of social revolution. On the contrary, only by recognizing that the struggle against rich peasants is, like the struggle against landlords, a fight against cruel, semi‑feudal exploitation can we resolutely establish the Party’s strategy against rich peasants, mobilize the broad masses of poor peasants, thoroughly complete the democratic revolution, advance toward the stage of social revolution, and completely overturn the theoretical foundations laid by Chen Duxiu—preventing him from continuing to wield influence over the “rich peasants” and spout nonsense about them.
(5) The Failure of the Hailufeng Struggle Was Due to Adventurism and Localism, Not to Opposition to Rich Peasants The comrades in Hailufeng, drawing lessons from the past failure in Hailufeng—where rich peasants (whom they referred to as “middle peasants”) turned against the revolution—urged localities not to attack early‑stage rich peasants. Similar arguments were heard elsewhere, not unlike the tendency during the Great Revolution when comrades in the Two Lakes region blindly followed Tang Shengzhi and Xu Kexiang, loudly claiming that the peasant movement had gone too far. Today, we all understand that the Great Revolution failed not because of “going too far,” but because of “not going far enough” (opportunism). The failures in Hailufeng and elsewhere were due to adventurism, narrow-minded localism, and the fact that the national revolutionary situation was at a low ebb—not because of opposition to rich peasants. Under the leadership of adventurism and localism, failure is inevitable—no matter when it occurs. Failing to oppose rich peasants does not prevent failure, and treating the struggle against rich peasants as equivalent to reckless burning, killing, and looting is itself a form of adventurism that should serve as a cautionary tale for the future. On the contrary, resolutely struggling against rich peasants and establishing the absolute leadership of poor peasants and tenant farmers in the countryside is a vital condition for ensuring the victory of the revolution.
(6) Preserving Rich Peasants’ Debts in Order to Facilitate Financial Circulation Is the Most Foolish Approach To “facilitate financial circulation”—that is, to allow rich peasants to lend money to poor peasants again—while simultaneously obstructing the poor masses’ struggle to completely abolish rich peasants’ debts is utterly misguided. It is hardly surprising that rich peasants would use such slogans in a deceptive manner; however, to advocate for this approach from the perspective of poor peasants is sheer folly. Once rural order is disrupted, all lending and credit transactions immediately come to a halt—so how could there be any reason to talk about “financial circulation” when the time comes to confiscate land? The experiences of every red zone have taught us that the only way to facilitate financial circulation is for poor peasants themselves to organize credit cooperatives and for Soviet institutions to forcefully borrow from rich peasants at low interest rates—perhaps offering rich peasants a bit of compassion and relief when poor peasants are unable to repay their debts. But to rely on such idealistic notions is pure fantasy.
(7) Confiscate All Land, Abolish All Debts “Confiscate all land” and “abolish all debts” are two central slogans that cannot be altered in the land struggles across the southern provinces. The masses everywhere are universally implementing these two slogans—but the Party, instead of leading the masses, merely follows along after they have already begun to act, only “ratifying” their efforts afterward. Some even persistently “deny” these slogans—thus becoming not only followers of the masses, but adversaries of the very people they claim to represent. If this serious trend is not corrected, the Party will never be able to lead the land struggles in the southern provinces. There is no doubt that the slogans “confiscate landlord class land” and “abolish usury” are inappropriate; in many places, rich peasants and opportunistic Communists have exploited these slogans as tools to hinder the struggles of poor peasants. There is no doubt that “confiscate all land” and “abolish all debts” must be openly and positively raised at all times and in all places across the southern provinces. While “denying” these slogans is utterly wrong, “ratifying” them is also a form of tail‑end thinking. We must mobilize the masses using these two slogans—and not wait until the masses have already begun their struggles before the Party steps in to provide leadership. The strategy of “waiting until the masses rise up before leading them” still fails to deeply understand the land conditions in the southern provinces, resulting in opportunistic, vacillating strategies. Such vacillating strategies are ill‑suited to leading the great struggles of tens of millions of poor farmers that are just around the corner.
(8) Regardless of the Time, Always Raise the Two Slogans Some argue that the Party’s strategy toward rich peasants should differ between white areas and red areas: in red areas, we can strike against rich peasants and implement the slogans of confiscating all land and abolishing all debts; in white areas, we should continue to focus on confiscating landlord land and abolishing landlord debts—this is done in order to keep rich peasants temporarily neutral and ensure that the struggle of poor peasants against landlords achieves initial victory. This view is mistaken. We must recognize that rich peasants—though including those who are actually rich peasants but are commonly regarded as “middle peasants”—are a minority within the overall peasant population (yet they constitute the majority compared to landlords). And these few rich peasants exploit poor peasants and tenant farmers with the most brutal semi‑feudal methods—they are bound to become counter‑revolutionary. We must never blur the class distinctions between rich peasants and other peasants, allowing rich peasants to seize opportunities for opportunistic maneuvering. Instead, we should let them reveal their true nature from the very beginning, enabling the masses to recognize their counter‑revolutionary tendencies. Furthermore, rich peasants will never remain “neutral”; as soon as they see poor peasants and tenant farmers uniting, they will immediately join the landlord camp—what neutrality could there possibly be? The illusion of keeping rich peasants neutral will inevitably hinder the task of mobilizing poor peasants and tenant farmers into fierce struggles against rich peasants, and of winning over middle peasants to form alliances with them. For if we do not raise the slogan against rich peasants from the outset, poor peasants will feel disappointed—as has already been proven in the struggles of Minxi and other regions. After all, the enemies of poor peasants and tenant farmers are not limited to landlords alone; rich peasants are another adversary. While landlord exploitation is indeed severe, rich peasant exploitation is even more brutal.
(9) Regardless of the Location, Always Raise the Two Slogans Another opinion holds that in certain areas, we should make concessions to rich peasants—for example, in some counties within a province, or in certain townships within a county—wherever “rich peasants are in the majority,” we can deviate from the standard practice in areas where poor peasants are more numerous, adopting alternative approaches decided by the local Soviet, such as allocating land based on labor capacity or refraining from abolishing small‑asset debts. Higher‑level Soviets should criticize such practices. However, this approach carries two major dangers: First, in those so‑called “special areas,” in order to win the favor of rich peasants, we may completely sacrifice the interests of poor peasants and tenant farmers. These individuals fail to recognize that where rich peasants are numerous, poor peasants and tenant farmers are necessarily more numerous as well. By catering to the interests of rich peasants at the expense of poor peasants and tenant farmers, we are essentially adopting the Nationalist Party’s strategy—and the Communist Party must not follow such a path. First, we should not grant special Soviet bodies the right to protect the interests of rich peasants (such as by failing to divide land equally or by refusing to abolish small‑asset debts)—even in areas where rich peasants are not particularly numerous, or where self‑cultivating farmers are rare. As long as the local Soviet is dominated by rich peasants, they can easily conceal their true intentions and present such demands to the masses. Thus, the danger of this approach lies not only in perpetuating the exploitation and oppression of poor peasants and tenant farmers by rich peasants; in the southern provinces, we should raise the slogans of “confiscate all land, abolish all debts” without regard to regional differences—only then can we avoid this danger.
(10) Allocating Land Based on Labor Capacity Rather Than Population Is Advantageous for Rich Peasants Allocating land based on labor capacity—giving more to those with greater labor potential and less to those with lesser labor potential—is beneficial for rich peasants. In China, most rich peasants are either semi‑feudal or early‑stage; purely capitalist farms or agricultural corporations are exceedingly rare—almost nonexistent in the southern provinces. Since the vast majority of China’s rich peasants rely primarily on their own labor, allocating land based on labor capacity is highly advantageous for them. Not only do they possess abundant labor, but they also have ample oxen, farming tools, and capital—far more than poor peasants, who may have labor but lack sufficient oxen, tools, or capital, or even none at all. Therefore, allocating land based on labor capacity benefits rich peasants. Even among poor peasants, households with greater labor capacity—such as a family of eight where four members are capable of working—are better positioned to develop into rich peasants than families with fewer laborers—such as a family of eight where only two members are able to work—because they have the opportunity to quickly accumulate the resources needed to become wealthy.
(11) Mobilizing the Masses Is the Primary Strategic Priority; Developing Production Is Not the Primary Strategic Priority At a time when the balance between red and white forces remains uncertain—indeed, especially now—our sole priority is how to mobilize the broad masses to overcome old obstacles and achieve new victories. At this moment, the decisive criterion for all strategic decisions is mobilizing the masses, not developing production. After all, the means of production—land and other resources—are still in the hands of the enemy, or even if they fall into the hands of the masses, they remain vulnerable to being seized back by the enemy. Thus, discussing production development at this stage is entirely premature. Those who raise questions about production development at this time—questions that are clearly untimely—are, in fact, representing the right‑leaning, opportunistic line of the rich peasants. Objectively speaking, these proposals do not promote production development; rather, they impede the progress of the struggle, prolong the life of landlords, and ultimately lead the revolution toward defeat.
(12) Dividing Land According to Population Does Not Reduce Production—On the Contrary, It Enhances Production As mentioned earlier, only by dividing land according to population can we mobilize the broad masses of poor peasants during intense struggles. Even in terms of production development, Minxi provides excellent evidence. In Minxi, land was allocated evenly according to population, and this year’s crops are exceptionally lush—estimates indicate a 20 percent increase in yield compared to last year, when land was not divided. The concerns once voiced by some comrades in Minxi—that “the plots are too small,” or that “those who previously did not farm will not know how to cultivate their fields and will let them lie fallow”—all posed risks of reduced production. Now, reality proves that these concerns were unfounded; in fact, the opposite is true—production has not only failed to decline, but has increased. Why is this the case? Because when poor peasants and unemployed masses receive land, they devote all their labor to the fields. The parasitic elements of rural society—landlords and vagrants—who previously did not contribute to production and relied on the land for sustenance now find themselves without food if they do not till the fields—and are thus compelled to start cultivating. The labor that once lay idle among poor peasants due to insufficient land is now put to use thanks to the newly acquired plots. As a result, production increases. Moreover, since China’s agricultural production still relies on manual cultivation, manual irrigation, and manual fertilization—using green manure, farmyard manure, and the like—during the era of landlord exploitation, poor peasants viewed the land as not truly their own and were reluctant to work hard. They showed little interest in “deep plowing and frequent hoeing,” and were equally disinclined to invest in irrigation systems or to apply generous amounts of fertilizer—often too lazy to even bother with fertilization. As a result, the fields grew increasingly barren, production plummeted, and a nationwide agricultural crisis ensued. Once the farmers of Minxi received their land—and were allocated plots evenly, with each person receiving a share—those days of labor neglect were completely eliminated. They became eager to plow deeply, dedicating large-scale manpower to repairing irrigation channels and ditches. Unlike the era of landlord and rich peasant exploitation, when irrigation channels were often left unattended and poorly maintained, proper allocation of land allows us to harness large-scale labor to restore and repair irrigation systems. Straw and crop residues were placed in pigsties and cowsheds to create farmyard manure; grass clippings were dug up and fermented into compost, mixed with human and animal waste—and with that, the problem of fertilizer was solved. All of these effects stem from the equal division of land and the mobilization of large-scale labor. With these results, production naturally increased. If some lacked oxen and found it difficult to cultivate their plots after land division, those who had previously rented oxen from rich peasants could simply take the initiative to reclaim their oxen—once the rich peasants’ oxen were confiscated, the problem was resolved. Those who had never even rented oxen could temporarily borrow oxen from relatives and friends or rent them from others. If farming tools were in short supply, they could borrow excess tools from rich peasants—after all, the rich peasants’ surplus land had been confiscated, leaving them with plenty of extra tools—and even confiscate the rich peasants’ surplus tools. As for the claim that overly small plots are detrimental to production, this phenomenon only arises in large-scale corporate agriculture—which is virtually nonexistent in China. The prevailing pattern is small‑scale farming: even when a large landowner possesses extensive tracts of land, he typically subleases the land to numerous farming households rather than leasing it all to a single household. There is no such thing as “too small a plot” that hinders production. Moreover, in the realm of agriculture, we should encourage poor peasants to move toward socialism through collective production—rather than encouraging rich peasants to pursue capitalist production. During revolutionary times, agricultural product prices tend to plummet, and the “scissors gap” between urban and rural incomes widens. Rich peasants, having cultivated their land without profit, lose interest in farming—and in doing so, they end up undermining production. Even if a household divides its land evenly between those who can work and those who cannot, production will not decrease. After all, the few members of the household who are able to work can often shoulder the responsibility of providing food for the entire family. And even those who are considered “unable to work” are not entirely without labor—they can still assist with certain tasks. As for large families where the number of those unable to work greatly exceeds the number of those who can (for example, nine people to one), such situations are rare. In these cases, the family can simply return the land to the Soviet and transfer it to another household for cultivation—without letting the land go to waste.
(13) Rich Peasants’ Demand to Reserve Public Land and Utilize Collective Production The model farms and cooperative-style collective production advocated by the Soviets are excellent ways to move agriculture toward socialization. However, during the current phase of struggle, the Soviets’ primary task is to direct the struggle—not to develop production—so operating model farms is currently not feasible. Some, driven by financial needs or the prospect of having a son next year, argue that land should not be fully allocated, but that public land should be reserved, while forests and surplus housing should remain undivided. Others, ostensibly on the left, advocate for so‑called “socialist collective production” (where all land is managed by the Soviets, farmers work under the Soviets’ direction, produce is distributed by the Soviets according to population needs, and any surplus belongs to the Soviets)—figures like Yuan Wencai in Jiangxi and Fu Bocui in Fujian—all espouse policies aligned with the rich peasant line. This is a clever deception employed by shrewd rich peasants to delay land distribution to poor peasants during the height of the revolutionary tide. After all, what matters to poor peasants is not whether they will have a son next year—but whether they will have food to eat tomorrow. Thus, poor peasants demand that all land be allocated as quickly as possible. Reserving public land for the birth of a son next year is entirely unnecessary in the eyes of poor peasants. Socialist production, on the other hand, should only begin after land has been fully allocated and feudal relations have been thoroughly eradicated—when poor peasants organize cooperatives to cultivate collectively. After the nationwide victory of the revolution, the Soviets can select suitable sites to operate farms, thereby moving toward socialism. If we bypass the process of land allocation and the cooperative process, and instead implement a policy of Soviet management, this is nothing more than a petty-bourgeois fantasy—objectively, it hinders the land struggle, leading the land revolution toward defeat and fundamentally negating the prospect of socialism.
(14) When to Divide Land, When to Harvest Grain The traditional method involved allocating land after sowing, with the harvest from that year going to the original cultivators. This policy satisfied only the rich peasants, while poor peasants were deeply dissatisfied. Under this policy, in areas where crops are harvested once a year, poor peasants and unemployed masses might not see their first grain harvest until the following autumn—and even in areas where crops are harvested twice a year, the first harvest would not occur until the next season. Naturally, poor peasants and unemployed masses were unhappy with this arrangement. Though the rich peasants were dissatisfied, they nonetheless gained the support of poor peasants and unemployed masses. Paying the rich peasants for their land before harvesting was also a policy that favored their interests. From the perspective of poor peasants, there was no need to pay them—even though poor peasants had no money to make such payments.
(15) Grain can also be used to escalate rural struggles into violent uprisings. In the struggle against local gentry and the burning of land deeds, poor peasants, tenant farmers, and unemployed masses inevitably engage in grain‑related struggles—followed by land‑related struggles. To carry out a thorough grain‑related struggle, we must not only confiscate the grain held by landlords, but also confiscate the grain held by rich peasants. By dividing the total grain stock of a township by the total population of that township, we can redistribute all surplus grain from every household at no cost. If, in this struggle, we adopt the slogan “Oppose Absolute Equality” from the perspective of the rich peasants, we are sure to lose the support of poor peasants—clearly, this is not the right approach. We must, without a doubt, launch grain‑related struggles from the perspective of poor peasants, tenant farmers, and their impoverished masses. In guerrilla warfare, where even short-term stability of government authority may be elusive, we should resort to “grain raids.” Although we may raid landlords’ grain, when the masses seek to raid the grain of rich peasants, we must fully support their actions.
(16) Collecting Funds from Rich Peasants Is Not Adventurism It is appropriate for Red Army guerrillas and Soviets to levy contributions from rich peasants. In the past, preventing the masses from collecting funds from rich peasants and labeling such actions as adventurism was a misguided approach—rooted in the desire to court the rich peasants, which was fundamentally incorrect.
(17) Distribute Land Equitably: Beyond “Take More, Give Less” If we simply implement “take more, give less,” as experience in Minxi showed last year—and as the documents explicitly state, “Do Not Dream of Equal Distribution”—then rich peasants will obtain protective talismans, leaving the lean lands to others while holding onto the fertile fields, leaving poor peasants deeply dissatisfied. This phenomenon occurred not only in Minxi but in many other regions as well. This is a practical and important aspect of land struggles that we must not overlook. In addition to “take more, give less,” we should also add “take fertile, give lean”—and amend the document’s statement “Do Not Dream of Equal Distribution” to read “Do Not Hold Onto Fertile Fields.”
(18) Oppose Rich Peasants Through Investigation and Research The slogan “Investigate thoroughly, research carefully” is often used by many rich peasant Communists to obstruct land struggles and delay land allocation. Their slogan is that investigations are incomplete and research is not yet thorough—resulting in situations where, even after three years of investigation and research following a riot, land has still not been allocated; or where, after a year of investigation and research, land has still not been allocated. We must fundamentally oppose this kind of armchair theorizing and endless deliberation. When it comes to the actual allocation of land, we should not rely on higher‑level authorities for investigation and research—simply conducting surveys through township governments allows us to allocate land swiftly. To rapidly mobilize the masses and quickly spread the influence of the revolution, we must allocate land quickly.
(19) Land Tax Should Be Based on the Principle of Protecting Poor Peasants, Linking Middle Peasants, and Striking at Rich Peasants The goal of progressive land and agricultural taxes is to meet the financial needs of the struggle—and under this goal, we must adhere to the principle of protecting poor peasants, linking middle peasants, and striking at rich peasants. To meet the financial needs of the struggle, poor peasants cannot avoid paying a reasonable land tax—but the tax must be kept very light; the extremely poor—those who cannot afford to eat adequately each year—should be exempt from taxation. Middle peasants may pay a slightly higher tax than poor peasants, but they must not violate the principle of linking middle peasants—meaning that the tax paid by middle peasants should not be excessively heavy. For rich peasants, we may levy a land tax as high as 15 percent—because of the urgent needs of the struggle, we can even requisition surplus grain from rich peasants at no cost.
(20) After Equal Division, There Are Still Rich Peasants Today The primary purpose of fighting against rich peasants is not to eliminate them, but to win over the masses of poor peasants, expand the struggle, and secure the victory of the revolution. In fact, even after the struggle against rich peasants, rich peasants will not be wiped out—because rich peasants possess a variety of superior socio‑economic conditions. Even after their land is divided, they still hold advantages over poor peasants; the development of rich peasants is bound to outpace that of poor peasants. Poor peasants and tenant farmers will continue to be exploited by rich peasants (through commercial practices of hoarding and reselling, as well as through the operation of small shops). To truly eliminate rich peasants—and to ensure that poor peasants and tenant farmers are no longer exploited by rich peasants—we must wait until the nationwide victory of the democratic revolution is achieved, then transition to the nationwide victory of the social revolution, and after the socialization of agriculture. Only with the help and guidance of urban workers, combined with the diligent efforts of poor peasants and tenant farmers, can we socialize agriculture—and only then will the capitalist production of rich peasants be replaced by socially organized production. When that day comes, all farmers will become proletarianized, and exploitation in the countryside will truly come to an end. This is the goal that the industrial proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party, must lead farmers toward together.
(21) Criticism Should Encourage Poor Peasants to Move Forward, Not Discourage Them When the masses enthusiastically rise up to carry out land‑division struggles, critical remarks such as “Dreaming of Equal Distribution” or “Petty‑Bourgeois Fantasies” are often exploited by rich peasants—and even by Communists who originally came from rich peasant backgrounds—to distort the meaning and resist the land‑division struggles of poor peasants. Such examples are found everywhere; in the midst of fervent struggles, these criticisms are like pouring cold water over the flames, inevitably leading to disappointment among poor peasants. In fact, the criticism we should offer is not that land division is bad—but that after land division, the system of private property has not been abolished, the communist system has not been realized, and the exploitation of poor peasants by rich peasants will still continue. Therefore, the ultimate victory for poor peasants lies not in the act of land division itself, but in what comes after. On a national scale, even after land division, workers have not yet united with the strength of farmers to overthrow the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Capitalism continues to exploit farmers—and in some ways, it exploits them even more severely than before—creating a cruel “scissors gap” in rural areas. Farmers may have enough to eat, but they lack clothing and goods; all agricultural products are priced ridiculously low, while fabrics and manufactured goods are priced outrageously high. The lives of farmers remain bitterly difficult. To resolve this “scissors gap” of suffering, our comrades should, in every red rural area, use every opportunity and every possible method to inform farmers about the political and economic situation in both the countryside and across the nation—as mentioned above—encouraging them to take one step forward, rather than pulling them back by adopting the perspective of rich peasants. If we raise such criticisms while the land‑division struggle is raging and fiercely underway, not only are we likely to be misinterpreted and exploited by rich peasants, but we also risk presenting two goals to the masses—democracy and socialism—leading to confusion in their minds. After all, while the masses have not yet realized the current goal, they only understand the goal before them and do not yet grasp the goals beyond. If we fail to encourage the masses to vigorously pursue the current goal before it is realized, but instead relax our focus on the current goal to encourage goals further down the road, the masses may begin to wonder, “If you say this is good, and that is good—then which one is truly best?” If we begin to criticize after the masses have successfully completed their land‑division struggles—after just two weeks, the land‑division struggle can be finished—such problems will no longer arise.
(22) Purge Rich Peasants Organizationally (1) To Ensure the Victory of the Land Revolution, We Must First Purge the Party of Rich Peasant Elements To resolutely attack rich peasants and establish the leadership of poor peasants and tenant farmers in the countryside—and to safeguard the victory of the land revolution in rural areas—we must first purge the Party of its rich peasant elements, especially within the Party’s rural organizations. This work is of paramount importance. Throughout history—from the past until today—local Party organizations, particularly the guiding bodies, have been rife with rich peasant elements, regardless of location. This is because, before rural struggles had fully taken root, the people sent by higher‑level authorities to work in the countryside were often intellectuals who came from rich peasant or small‑landowner backgrounds. Naturally, these intellectuals tended to recruit only those who shared their own ideological inclinations. As rural struggles developed, many of these rich peasant and small‑landowner Party members rose to become cadres at the branch level and above—acting as the guiding figures in local Party organizations. The slow pace and lack of depth in rural struggles across various regions were largely attributable to these individuals. Their directives were blocked by the higher‑level guiding bodies, preventing them from reaching the masses—and it was only when the masses’ struggles broke through their opportunistic leadership that the higher‑level guiding bodies finally adopted anti‑rich peasant strategies, aligning their policies with the struggles of the masses. The process of purging the rich peasant line from Party guiding bodies at all levels has been experienced in almost every locality. Clearly, if we fail to cleanse the Party of rich peasants—especially within the guiding bodies—how can we ever truly purge rich peasants? By observing those who display the rich peasant line throughout various struggles, we can promptly remove them from the Party. (2) Rich Peasants Should Not Participate in the Soviets To establish the leadership of poor peasants and tenant farmers in the countryside and prevent rich peasants from exerting leadership, in addition to purging rich peasants organizationally, there is another fundamental measure: deprive rich peasants of their electoral rights. All former and current rich peasants should be barred from participating in Soviet elections—and certainly should not be elected as Soviet representatives or hold any other positions in government organs. This is a crucial juncture in ensuring that the revolution progresses from democracy toward socialism; neglecting this important juncture is bound to lead to grave errors.
(23) Develop the Theoretical Struggle Against Rich Peasants Beyond Organizational Exclusion of Rich Peasants, it is equally important to develop the theoretical struggle against rich peasants. Whether within the Party or among the masses, this theoretical struggle against rich peasants must be greatly intensified. Only in this way can we fundamentally overcome the rich peasant line—not only overturning the current leadership of rich peasants in practice, but also ensuring that it never rises again at any time.