Reasons for the Failure to Take Changsha[1]

(September 17, 1930)

The failure to take Changsha this time is attributable to three reasons: (1) We failed to destroy the enemy’s main force before attacking his fortifications. The enemy had a total of thirty-one regiments. Although we wiped out more than five enemy regiments in the two engagements at Wenjiashi and Houzishi,[2] the bulk of his forces had not yet been destroyed when they withdrew into the city’s trenches, so the enemy still had enough strength to defend the city. (2) The mass conditions were not ripe. There were no worker uprisings or soldier mutinies inside the city to echo our attack, and the masses along the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway, the Zhuzhou-Pingxiang Railway,[3] and on the opposite bank of the river did not rise up, so we could not cut off the enemy’s water and land communications or blockade his economic and military transport. (3) The technical conditions were not adequate. The enemy’s fortifications were of a European-style multi-layered configuration, with eight or nine rows of barbed wire, trenches, and so forth. We had only hand-to-hand combat capability and no heavy artillery to destroy the enemy’s fortifications, nor did we have communications equipment such as radio sets, so liaison between the two army corps was poor, and we missed opportunities. The above three points are the reasons why we failed to fight our way into Changsha, the first point being the main reason. However, in the Wenjiashi engagement we wiped out three enemy regiments, and in the Houzishi engagement we wiped out more than two enemy regiments, capturing over two thousand rifles and twenty-five machine guns, killing the enemy brigade commander Dai Douyuan, wounding the enemy brigade commander Chen Wo, capturing two enemy regimental commanders, wounding two enemy regimental commanders, and killing, wounding, or capturing

[1] This is part of a report written by Mao Zedong in Liling, Hunan Province, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the name of the secretary of the Front Committee of the First Army Corps of the Red Army.

[2] This refers to the battles of Wenjiashi and Houzishi. The battle of Houzishi was fought on September 3, during the second attack on Changsha, when the First Front Army of the Red Army used the tactic of luring the enemy out and destroying him, wiping out more than two enemy regiments near Houzishi on the outskirts of Changsha.

[3] The Guangzhou-Hankou Railway refers to the railway from Guangzhou to Wuhan, a section of the present Beijing-Guangzhou line. The Zhuzhou-Pingxiang Railway refers to the railway from Zhuzhou to Pingxiang, a section of the present Zhejiang-Jiangxi line.

a great many enemy middle- and lower-ranking officers, the number of which we have not been able to count, capturing over two thousand enemy soldiers, and killing or wounding over four thousand enemy soldiers. We besieged Changsha for sixteen days, fought fiercely for several days and nights, and extended the battle line for over thirty li. On September 3, we completely routed the enemy’s sallying force, after which he shrank back into his trenches and dared not venture a single step out. On September 10, our army launched a second general offensive but failed to achieve its objective, and on September 12 we decided to withdraw to Pingxiang and Liling.[1] The victory of this campaign lies in having completely deflated the arrogance of over thirty enemy regiments, so that they no longer dare to look our Red Army squarely in the eye, and in having exerted a considerable influence throughout the country.

This campaign was the first major battle since the Red Army came into being, and consequently our army’s casualties were not light. In the First Army Corps alone, the higher-ranking cadres Ke Wudong and Liu Zuoshu[2] died in battle, scores of middle-ranking cadres and over a hundred lower-ranking cadres were killed or wounded, and about sixteen hundred soldiers were killed or wounded. The Third Army Corps also suffered considerable losses. Despite these losses, the morale of our army is still generally very high, and there is no problem in continuing to Jiangxi to fight.

[1] Pingxiang and Liling refer to Pingxiang in Jiangxi Province and Liling in Hunan Province.

[2] Ke Wudong, formerly commander of the First Column of the Third Army of the First Army Corps of the Red Army, died in action in August 1930 in the battle of Wenjiashi. Liu Zuoshu, formerly political commissar of the Third Column of the Third Army of the First Army Corps of the First Front Army of the Red Army, died in action in September 1930 in the battle of Houzishi.