Letter to the Southwest Jiangxi Special
Committee, for Transmission to the
Central Committee, on the General Situation
with Regard to All New Military Operations of
Our Army in Western Jiangxi
(August 19, 1930, at Huangmao)
To the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee, for transmission to the West Fujian Special Committee and the Central Committee:

At the beginning of this month from Fengxin, I sent a brief letter to the
Special Committee, reporting our past operational experiences and future operational plans, and I wonder whether or not it has been received. The First Army
Group set out from Xingguo, and by way of Jishui (because of the difficulty in
crossing the river, which delayed us, we were unable to carry out our plan of
attacking in the dark, and in the end did not take the town of Jishui), Yongfeng,
and Xin'gan (we did not engage in any fighting at all on the way, the bandit-suppression troops¹ in Xin'gan and Yongfeng simply fired a few shots and fled),
attacked Zhangshu at daybreak on July 24. Two battalions of the enemy's Hundred and eighth Regiment were routed, nearly two hundred rifles were captured,
and more than a hundred enemy soldiers were taken prisoner. At this time there
were two enemy regiments in Fuzhou, and it appeared as though the forces at
Daiyue would cross the river at Xin'gan and move to Zhangshu. If we went to
attack Fuzhou, the enemy in Fuzhou would surely flee without our being able to
inflict damage on them. If the enemy continued to advance, we did not know either
when we would be able to finish them off. If we marched directly to Nanchang, then
the enemy's main forces would not have been wiped out, but would actually have
been behind our army. In addition, Nanchang is surrounded by water on all four
sides, and this would have put us in an unfavorable situation. Therefore, we took
the opportunity to cross the river, marched in the direction opposite to Nanchang,

We have translated this letter from Jiangxi dangshi ziliao, Vol. 6, pp. 80-82. No earlier
source appears to be available.
in the border region of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, our army decided to march to
Liuyang to attack the enemy, and go directly to take Changsha. On our way back
we would take the Zhu[zhou]-Ping[xiang] railway² to attack the enemy in
Jiangxi (at that time we predicted that the enemy had already concentrated
enough forces and was about to attack us), take Ji'an, and then come back along
the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad and attack Wuhan. When we arrived at Wanzai
we learned that the Third Army Group had taken Changsha. When leaving
Fengxin, we received the July 30 and August 1 telegrams from Shanghai and
learned that our troops had taken Changsha (but we did not know how it had
been taken). This seizure was achieved not by a sudden attack. Instead, it was
done by defeating the enemy first and then taking the city while He Jian was
hesitating greatly. (The campaign started on the 23rd and did not stop until our
troops moved into Changsha on the 27th, during which time we defeated six
regiments of enemy troops, took two thousand to three thousand captives, and
captured more than four thousand rifles and countless bullets, as well as many
cannons and machine guns. Until August 5, because of our inaccurate estimation
of the enemy, we underestimated the enemy and thought he did not have enough
strength for a counterattack, so we did not make preparations. In addition, we did
not adequately guard against the hidden counterrevolutionaries in Changsha, so
that we were attacked by the enemy the enemy surrounded us on all four sides
but we were unaware of this until the enemy had already entered the streets of
Changsha. As a result, the Third Army Group suffered great casualties and losses
during this battle.) It is our estimation that the present situation represents a
turning point. After suffering a huge defeat imposed by our Third Army Group,
He Jian will certainly waver even more. It is imperative that our First Army
Group (which is now operating in the Tonggu area, where we have already sent

people to get in touch with it) wipe out the enemies one by one, take Changsha
and Yuezhou, attack Wuhan and Jiujiang, open up bigger prospects in the three
provinces, and promote a nationwide general uprising. With Jiujiang under attack, the enemy forces on the southern bank of the Yangzi River will have to
move to the lower reaches and advance toward Jiujiang, so that Ji'an will be
taken without a fight.

2. At present He Jian has a force of more than ten regiments that are concentrated in Liuyang and are marching toward our Third Army Group. The right
route forces, about ten regiments, are scattered in the two points of Wenjiashi
and Sunjiaduan. The left route is situated in the Hudongmenshi area. Yesterday
we arrived herein Huangmao (100 li from Wanzai, 30 li from Wenjiashi) and
decided to finish off the enemy in Wenjiashi and Sunjiaduan tomorrow, and then
to attack the enemy's left route. We require that the Third Army Group attack
from Pingjiang, so as to wipe out the enemy's main force, and go directly to
Changsha. This time the enemy has penetrated deeply into the Red area, and they
still do not know that we are in front of them. In addition, the enemy has suffered
repeated defeats, and we are confident that this enemy can be eliminated.

3. Given this increasingly intense revolutionary situation, the expansion of
the Red Army is an extremely urgent matter, and we hope that the Special
Committee will have Comrade Wu Zhonghao³ bring the thirty thousand reinforcements for the First Army Group as originally decided upon, or that at the
very least, ten thousand will arrive at Pingjiang and Liuyang by the middle of
September. Because of the needs of the Red Army, Comrade Bao Ping, who
remained behind in Donggu to provide medical treatment for Comrade Wu
Zhonghao, must come together with Comrade Wu Zhonghao. To meet the needs
of developing the three provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, Comrade Deng
Zihui should immediately lead the Red Army School northward, and Comrade
Liu Shiqi should also be prepared to go north.

Secretary of the Front Committee Mao Zedong

--- Notes

1. The term jingfei here refers to the White forces engaged in suppressing the Communist "bandits."
and took as our objective an attack on the Niuhang Railway Station in order to
hold an August 1 demonstration. By way of Gaoan, we arrived on July 30 in the
area of Wanshougong, Shiziling, and Shengmijie, about 30 li from Nanchang.
On August 1, two columns were sent across the river from Nanchang to attack
the Niuhang Railway Station. The enemy forces in Nanchang did not fire a
single shot or send out a single soldier, and at this time we were unable to find
any enemy to fight. Since we could not attack Nanchang, and we had fulfilled
our task of holding an August 1 demonstration, we scattered in the area around
Fengxin and Anyi to conduct our work, mobilize the masses, raise funds, make
propaganda, and so on. We were afraid that if we waited too long for the enemy
but they did not come, once the enemy did assemble enough troops and begin to
attack us we would be put in a difficult situation. Moreover, at the time it was
reported in the newspapers that He Jian was marching toward the Fifth Army. In
order to wipe out the enemy, aid the Fifth Army, and open up broader prospects

2. The railway from Zhuzhou, southeast of Changsha in Hunan, to Pingxiang, just
across the border in Jiangxi.


3. Wu Zhonghao (1905-1930), a native of Hunan, had joined the Chinese Communist
Party in 1924. In 1927, he had participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and had
followed Mao up the Jinggangshan. In 1930 he was commander of the Twenty-first
Western Fujian Red Army.