(March 19, 1930)1
This order is to be carried out. Be it known that there are only two ways to take a
city—the surprise raid and the attack in force. In its recent attack on the city of
Ganzhou, our army, having resolved to attack in force, employed the method of
the surprise raid. Because of the influence of the shortcomings described below,
it was impossible to attain the desired results, and this is truly a matter for regret.
Herewith are listed, in broad outline, for future reference, the shortcomings and
lessons to be learned from this battle.

1. Inaccurate Assessment of the Enemy Situation

Reports came in from various sources, some saying that there were no enemy
[forces] in the city except for a local Security Guard Regiment about a hundred
strong, and some saying that there was only one enemy battalion in the city. This
led the commander to the erroneous conclusion that the enemy forces consisted
of only one battalion, whereas in fact the enemy's entire Seventieth Regiment
was in the city (consisting of three battalions, with three infantry companies and
one machine-gun company in each battalion). Because of this, the allocation of
forces and the plans for attacking the city were full of underestimations and
inadequacies.

2. Failure to Reconnoiter the Terrain in Advance

The day before, when the First and Second Columns arrived in the vicinity of the
city gates, the enemy closed the gates to engage in stubborn resistance. At the
time, our side had not yet resolved to attack the city, so the senior commanders
did not lead the subordinate commanders to reconnoiter the terrain on the out-

We have translated this document from Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 138-40,
where the source is given as Junshi wenxian (Documents on Military Affairs), published in
1942 by the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party. This collection is not available to us.
3. Lack of Thorough Preparation in Advance

When our army reached the area around Maodian and Dongtian, instruments for
scaling the city walls (such as bamboo ladders, etc.) had not yet been prepared,
and this caused great haste when the moment arrived.

4. Absence of Unanimous Resolve at Higher and Lower Levels

During battle, when the officers and soldiers of the various units suddenly discovered that there was actually a whole regiment of enemy forces inside the city,
one unit wavered in its resolve to attack the city, and failed to carry out the order
to attack.

5. Inaccurate Battlefield Reporting

The battlefield report is actually the basis upon which senior commanders assess
the enemy situation and make decisions adapted to the circumstances, so it is
inappropriate to underestimate the enemy or overestimate oneself, and also to . . . 2
During this battle, at one time it was reported that another attack was about to be
launched, and then it was reported that the attack could not be made, thus
chopping and changing, without any accurate . . . 3 at all, making it difficult for
the commander to handle the situation.

6. Failure to Launch the General Assault on Time

According to the order to attack the city, the general assault on the city was
originally to be carried out at 3:30 A.M. on the 16th. By 4:30 A.M., however, the
Fourth Column had not arrived at the designated reserve position between the
southern and eastern gates, thereby missing the time for the general assault. By
the time firing began outside the south gate, dawn was already breaking, so that
the city walls could not be scaled successfully.

7. Inappropriate Command

The commander of one unit fell into recklessness in the pursuit of victory,
without giving sufficient consideration to the terrain and making a poor choice of
skirts of the city. As a result, when the Fourth Column arrived near the city's
southern gate the next day, it was unable at the time to occupy an advantageous
position, in preparation for later scaling the city walls. As for artillery and machine gun positions, the sector of fire was not selected in advance, nor were
shooting distance and other measurements taken.

2. Six or seven characters are missing here.

3. Four or five characters are missing here.

--- Notes

--- Notes

1. This is order No. 2 of the Fourth Red Army Headquarters, promulgated on the date
indicated.