**I. Environmental Analysis and Action Plan**

In the Ji'an, Jishui, and Yongfeng area, there are currently three brigades under Cheng Guangyao, Zhu Yaohua, and Deng Ying, along with the remnants of Tang Yunshan's forces. Although Chiang Kai-shek's faction cannot divert troops to Jiangxi due to operations against Yan Xishan, the presence of these three brigades and above temporarily prevents the Fourth Army from advancing northward.

Jin Handing's division is moving toward Fujian, aiming to coordinate with Liu Heding in a pincer attack on Lu Xingbang's forces to occupy Fuzhou. The relative emptiness of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian provides us with a good opportunity to win over the masses and establish links among the three provinces. In western Fujian, only Zhang Zhen's troops are present, and in the somewhat more distant future, we can capture Zhangzhou, giving the Red area direct access to the sea. Meanwhile, the war between Guangdong and Guangxi is intensifying. The garrison in Dongjiang consists of only about one brigade, and there is potential for expanding the Red area in the seven counties northwest of Dongjiang. Although Ganzhou has not yet been taken, the impact on the masses there has been considerable, and it has also had a significant effect nationwide. It is unlikely that new troops will be able to take over the defense of Ganzhou in the short term. Before new troops arrive in Ganzhou, the 70th Regiment of Jin's forces cannot leave Ganzhou.

Under the above circumstances, the Fourth Army of the Red Army should conduct guerrilla operations in separate routes over a three-month period. The guerrilla zones are: in southern Jiangxi, the counties of Ganxian, Yudu, Ruijin, Huichang, Nankang, Xinfeng, Anyuan, and Xunwu; in Dongjiang, the counties of Wuhua, Xingning, Fengshun, Meixian, Pingyuan, Jiaoling, and Dabu; in western Fujian, the counties of Shanghang, Wuping, Changting, Ninghua, and Liancheng. The guerrilla zone for the Second Column of the Sixth Army over the three months should be Wan'an, the eastern part of Ganxian, the northern part of Yudu, the eastern part of Xingguo, the southern part of Ningdu, and the counties of Guangchang and Shicheng. The guerrilla zone for the First Column of the Sixth Army is the counties of Ji'an, Anfu, Fenyi, Yichun, Xinyu, Xiajiang, Jishui, Yongfeng, Le'an, and Xingan. The Third Column of the Sixth Army is assigned to the western part of Taihe, Suichuan, and Wan'an counties. The 22nd Column of the Red Guards should coordinate its actions with the Second Column of the Sixth Army, taking responsibility for completing the Red area in all of Xingguo County, the northern part of Yudu, and all of Ningdu County. The Ningnan Guerrillas should take responsibility for completing the Red area in Guangchang, Nanfeng, and Yihuang. The Fifth Army of the Red Army should, in the first step, coordinate its actions with the Second and Third Columns of the Sixth Army to complete the work in the upper reaches of the Gan River (Taihe, Suichuan, Shangyou, Wan'an, and other counties). In the second step, it should return to the Fifth Army's base area along the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border, expanding the Red area in eastern Hunan, southern Hubei, and northern Jiangxi, and opening up the route between northern Jiangxi and western Jiangxi.

The significance of dividing the troops for guerrilla warfare is to better win over the masses, better distribute land and establish political power, and better expand the Red Army and local armed forces. Under the current circumstances, if we continue to adopt the strategy of concentrating large forces for action, it would clearly be a purely military line, violating the great task of winning over the masses and expanding the Soviet area. After a period of dividing the troops for guerrilla warfare, when circumstances require it—such as for capturing southern Fujian or developing eastern Jiangxi—we should then concentrate our forces for action. Therefore, we must oppose both absolute centralism and absolute divisionism.

**II. Simultaneous Expansion and Deepening**

Seeking only expansion without deepening is a serious opportunist line. In the past, in southwestern Jiangxi, Dongjiang, and other places, it was a grave mistake to go for long periods without distributing land, without establishing Soviets, and neglecting the organization of Red Guards. When the Red Army conducts guerrilla operations, it is also prone to this error of seeking only expansion without deepening. In some places, after staying for no more than three to five days, they move on again. They do some propaganda work and organize a few small peasant unions or a few tender, budding Party branches, but as soon as the Red Army leaves, these organizations immediately collapse. Such organizations cannot be considered real organizations. There are places where only propaganda is done and no organizational work is carried out, such as in Nankang, Dayu, Huichang, Ruijin, Shicheng, and other counties. Some of these places originally had no organization at all, while others had only a very small amount. In such places, attempting to do deep organizational work would be a waste of effort. Naturally, in these places, we can only do propaganda work and distribute the grain and goods of the gentry, exerting a certain influence on the masses before moving on. However, in other places, such as Ningdu, Yudu, Anyuan, Xunwu, Changting, Wuping, and other counties, the situation is entirely different. These places not only have existing Party and mass organizations but also have small or even large openly established Red areas, with long experience in armed struggle. When the Red Army arrives in these counties, it should systematically help the Party and masses in the existing Red areas to organize political power, build armed forces, distribute land, and strengthen the organizational capacity and combat effectiveness of the Party and mass organizations, expanding the existing areas to cover entire counties and extending them to neighboring counties. For example, in southern Jiangxi, we should expand the complete Redification of Ningdu, Yudu, Anyuan, and Xunwu counties. In western Fujian, we should aim for the complete Redification of Wuping and Changting counties. In this way, Ruijin, Huichang, and Shicheng will be enveloped in the middle, and then we can plan to develop the connection between Fujian and Jiangxi, achieving success. The Red area in Xunwu is already connected with the Red area in Dongjiang, and in this way, the linkage of the three provinces will be accomplished. If we do not deepen the work in these five or six counties and merely conduct a superficial guerrilla tour—like the forty-five days of work in southern Jiangxi last year—then the task of connecting Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi will remain unfulfilled for an unknown period. Concentrating efforts within a specified time and designated area to expand that area while simultaneously deepening it is a highly effective method of work. When the various units of the Red Army are operating separately, they should designate specific times and assign them to specific areas. In areas where deep work is to be done, more time should be allocated; in areas where deep work is not to be done, less time should be allocated. Within a given area (such as the Third Column of the Fourth Army in Yudu), there must also be a plan for which parts require more time and which require less, in order to make the work more effective.

**III. Development in Tandem**

The work line of "development in tandem" has demonstrated its effectiveness through our experience. The concept of developing alongside existing small Red areas, establishing new small Red areas, and then promoting their further development must be deeply ingrained, as it has not been present before. Past experience shows that without this approach, work is wasted effort. The creation of the large Red area along the Hunan-Jiangxi border was possible because, during the Great Revolution, there were remnants of Party organizations from the mass struggles in Chaling, Lingxian, Lianhua, Yongxin, and Ninggang counties. It was by building on these existing foundations that development occurred. Suichuan originally had no foundation, and despite forced efforts, no significant situation could be created. During the Fourth Army's July guerrilla operations in western Fujian, the First Column's advance from Kanshi and Lanjiadu along the Ting River and then back to the border area between Shanghang and Yongding was all carried out in tandem with existing foundations, serving as work to "open up" and "connect." That is why the First Column's work during that period was particularly effective. The Third Column's work in the Longyan and Longmen area was carried out alongside areas of original struggle, helping the peasants in their work, and thus also achieved results. Unfortunately, the work period was short, and they hastily moved into central Fujian, so the effectiveness was far less than that of the First Column. The Second Column went to Yanshi and Gutian, where there was originally no foundation at all, so it was a completely wasted trip with virtually no effectiveness to speak of. During this recent visit of the Fourth Army to Jiangxi, when troops were divided among Ningdu, Le'an, Yongfeng, and Tengtian, only the route taken by the Fourth Column in Ningdu achieved significant results (in twenty days in Ningdu, the Fourth Column not only expanded the Red area but, more importantly, corrected the opportunism of the Ningdu Party and carried out the important tasks of distributing land, organizing Soviets, and building Red Guards). The other three routes did not achieve the effect of expanding the Red area, because none of those three places originally had organizations. Only the Third Column sent a small unit to Jishui, but unfortunately, the Party in the Third Column developed this area too late and was unable to send many personnel to carry out intensive work. Although we do not overlook it, these examples are sufficient for us to recognize that the slogan "development in tandem" is undoubtedly correct. Although we do not restrict the Red Army's feet and forbid it from stepping into purely White areas, and sometimes, for reasons of national significance or other unavoidable causes—such as "influencing the current situation, solving economic problems," or "retreating"—it is necessary to enter areas with no original foundation, this is not the principle of our work line. Our principle is undoubtedly "development in tandem," which is also what has always been referred to as "expanding forward in a wave-like manner."

Here, we must also address the issue of responding to requests for troops from local Party branches and the masses. Some comrades casually dismiss the matter when local Party branches and the masses request the Red Army to send troops to attack local tyrants and militia. They fail to realize that such requests from the local masses are excellent work opportunities. Because the masses take the lead, and all arrangements and plans are their own, the Red Army can seize this opportunity to lend a hand, and the struggle will develop with exceptional speed. Ignoring the requests of the masses and subjectively arranging work only results in losing an excellent opportunity for development. This is an individualistic work line and is also erroneous.

**IV. Arming the Peasants**

The primary condition for expanding the Red area is the arming of the peasants. If we cannot create peasant armed forces, then so-called deep work is merely empty talk. Wherever the guerrilla forces go, in areas where there is hope of doing deep work, not only must we refrain from confiscating the arms of the existing mass armed forces to expand the Red Army (only in the interior parts of extensive Red areas, where the land struggle has already deepened and the role of armed forces has diminished, can we systematically concentrate a portion of local armed forces to be incorporated into the Red Army). Under conditions where the Red Army's combat strength is not great and losses are felt, it is even necessary for the Red Army to allocate firearms to arm the masses. Not only must we provide guns, but sometimes also bullets; not only bullets, but sometimes also military personnel. When the Red Army's strength is weak and it is practically impossible to allocate guns, ammunition, and personnel, we must strive as much as possible to seize the arms of the gentry and small enemy units to arm the peasants. In short, the guerrilla forces' commitment to local armed forces is as enduring as their work itself. Anyone who does not regard arming the localities as an extremely urgent task, who does not value local armed forces as much as they value their own units, is an opportunist who abandons the masses.

**V. Training Local Cadres**

The Party in the Red Army has richer and more advanced experience in struggle compared to many local Party branches in agricultural areas. At the same time, as local struggles develop, the lack of working personnel and incorrect work lines become increasingly evident. Therefore, the commanding organs of the Red Army Party must undoubtedly shoulder the responsibility of training local cadres and personnel in newly developing areas. The proposal for short-term internal Party training classes and training classes for mass leaders should still be carried out based on previous experience.

**VI. The Actions of Local Party Branches Must Be in Step with the Actions of the Red Army**

Last year, when the Fourth Army was conducting guerrilla operations in the Donghe area of southern Jiangxi, the South Jiangxi Special Committee instead focused its attention on the day-to-day struggles in Xihe. It completely failed to direct the masses in the Donghe area, who had been stirred up by the Red Army into a fervent state, allowing them to cool down. It mechanically carried out the slogan of making the Jiangxi-Guangdong thoroughfare the central area, neglecting the political role of the Red Army in the Donghe area and ignoring the great significance of linking the three regions of southern Jiangxi, Dongjiang, and western Fujian. This demonstrated full-blown opportunism. In southern Jiangxi and other places, there have been many, many timid cadres who, even long after the Red Army arrived, did not come forward to make contact. When asked to initiate armed struggle, they were scared out of their wits. Some who were a bit more active still could not take advantage of the Red Army's guerrilla operations to intensify the work of developing the struggle. This phenomenon of local Party actions being out of step with the Red Army's movements is the greatest reason for the loss of work effectiveness. This phenomenon is most severe in southern Jiangxi, and the Southwestern Jiangxi Special Committee must strive to correct it.

**VII. The Relationship Between Red Army Party Branches and Local Party Branches**

The military committee of the Red Army and the local special committee hold joint meetings to resolve issues; for matters below the county committee level, the military committee can directly guide the work. The column committee of the Red Army and the county committee hold joint meetings to resolve issues; for matters below the district committee level, they can guide the work. The detachment committee of the Red Army and the local district committee hold joint meetings to resolve issues; for local party branches, they can guide the work. The brigade committee of the Red Army and the local party branch hold joint meetings to resolve issues. The special committee can guide the work of the column committee, but for the various columns of the Red Army that operate beyond local boundaries, it cannot completely restrict their actions. The front committee, taking the column as a unit, dispatches inspection teams to hold joint meetings with the special committee to resolve issues, exercising guiding authority over matters below the county committee level.