The Significance of Dividing the Troops to Win
Over the Popular Masses, and Our Line
Front Committee Announcement No. 3
(Issued on March 18, 1930,
from Loutiling in the suburbs of Ganzhou City)¹

1. Analysis of the Circumstances and Plan of Action

In the area of Ji'an, Jishui, and Yongfeng, there are the three brigades of Cheng
Guangyao,² Zhu Yaohua,³ and Deng Ying, plus the remnants of Tang Yunshan's
troops. Because it is engaged in fighting Yan Xishan, the Chiang Kaishek faction
cannot spare troops to send to Jiangxi, but this troop strength of over three
brigades makes it impossible to advance to the north for the time being.

Jin Handing's troops have set out for Fujian, with the objective of mounting a
pincer attack with Liu Heding on Lu's forces⁴ and advancing to occupy Fuzhou.
The vacuum in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian gives us a good opportunity
to win over the popular masses and establish links between the three provinces.
Western Fujian has only the troops of Zhang Zhen, and in the slightly more
distant future we can take Zhangzhou, which would bring the Red territories all
the way to the seacoast. At the same time, the Guangdong-Guangxi war has
become more and more intense, and the troops stationed in the East River area
[of Guangdong] are only one brigade more or less, and there is a possibility of

Our source for this document is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 3, pp. 87-93, where it is
reproduced from three documentary collections published in China between 1979 and
1982.
expanding the Red territories to the seven xian of the northwestern East River
area. Although Ganzhou has not yet fallen, the effect on the popular masses of
Ganzhou has not been small, and this has also had a considerable influence on
the whole country. Any reinforcement of the defense of Ganzhou with new
troops is not possible within a short period of time. Before new troops arrive in
Ganzhou, there is no way that the Seventeenth Regiment of Jin's forces can
leave Ganzhou.
Given the circumstances outlined above, the actions of the Fourth Army for a
period of three months should be to split up in different areas for guerrilla
actions, the regions for guerrilla actions being: in southern Jiangxi, the xian of
Ganxian, Yudu, Ruijin, Huichang, Nankang, Xinfeng, Anyuan, and Xunwu; and
in the East River area, the xian of Wuhua, Xingning, Fengshun, Meixian,
Pingyuan, Jiaoling, and Dapu; in western Fujian, the xian of Shanghang, Wuping, Changting, Ninghua, and Liancheng. The region of guerrilla actions for the
Second Column of the Sixth Army, for three months, should be Wan'an,
Dongxiang in Ganxian, Beixiang in Yudu, Dongxiang in Xingguo, Nanxiang in
Ningdu, and the xian of Guangchang and Shicheng. The region of guerrilla
actions for the First Column of the Sixth Army is the xian of Ji'an, Anfu, Fenyi,
Yichun, Xinyu, Xiajiang, Jishui, Yongfeng, Le'an, and Xin'gan. The region of
guerrilla action for the Third Column of the Sixth Army is Xixiang in Taihe and
the xian of Suichuan and Wan'an. The Twenty-second Column of the Red
Guards should coordinate its actions with those of the Second Column of the
Sixth Army and be responsible for completing the Red districts in the whole xian
of Xingguo, Beixiang in Yudu, and the whole xian of Ningdu. The Ningnan
guerrilla unit is then responsible for completing the Red districts of Guangchang,
Nanfeng, and Yihuang. For the Fifth Army of the Red Army, the first step should
be to coordinate actions with the Second and Third Columns of the Sixth Army
to complete the work upstream along the Gan River (in the xian of Taihe,
Suichuan, Shangyou, and Wan'an), and the second step should be to return to the
base territory of the Fifth Army in the border region of Hunan, Hubei, and
Jiangxi, to widen the Red territories in eastern Hunan and southern Hubei, and
northern Jiangxi, and also to open the roads between northern Jiangxi and western Jiangxi.
The significance of splitting up the troops for guerrilla action is to be better
able to win over the popular masses, better able to redistribute the land and
establish political power, and better able to enlarge the Red Army and the local
armed forces. Under current circumstances, if we were to adopt the tactic of
concentrated action with large forces, it would obviously be a line of purely
military action, which would go against the great task of winning over the
popular masses and expanding the soviet territories. After a period of dividing

2. Expand and Be Thorough at the Same Time

To try to expand without trying to be thorough is a line of serious opportunism.
In the past, in such places as southwestern Jiangxi and the East River area, it was
a grave mistake to wait a very long time before redistributing the land and
establishing soviets and to overlook the organization of Red Guard units. When
engaged in guerrilla actions, it is also easy for the Red Army to make this
mistake of trying to expand and not trying to be thorough. In less than three to
five days after reaching any location, it was on the move again, having put out a
bit of propaganda and organized a few very tiny peasant-worker associations and
a few immature budding armed groups. But as soon as the Red Army moved off,
they immediately crumbled. This kind of organization cannot count as organization. There have indeed been places like this, in which some propaganda was
carried out, but no organizational work was done, as in the xian of Nankang,
Dayu, Huichang, Ruijin, and Shicheng. In some there originally was no organizing at all, and in some there was originally a little organizing, but only very little.
In such places it would be a waste of effort to attempt to do thorough organizational work. In such places we naturally can only do some propaganda work and
distribute the grain supplies of the big gentry, to make something of an impression on the popular masses, and then take off. But in other places, such as the
xian of Ningdu, Yudu, Anyuan, Xunwu, Changting, and Wuping, the situation is
entirely different. Not only do they already have Party and mass organizations,
there are small areas and even large areas that are openly Red territory, that have
a long experience of armed struggle. When the Red Army reaches these xian, it
should give well-planned assistance to the Party and to the popular masses of the
already existing Red territories to organize political power, to set up armed
forces, to redistribute the land, to strengthen the organizational and fighting
ability of the Party and other groups, to expand the original territory throughout
the entire xian, and to push into neighboring xian. For example, in southern
Jiangxi, we should expand in the four xian of Ningdu, Yudu, Anyuan, and
Xunwu and make them completely Red, and in western Fujian, the xian of
Wuping and Changting should be made entirely Red. In this way, embracing
Ruijin, Huichang, and Shicheng as the center, our plans to go on and tie Fujian
and Jiangxi together will be successful. The Red territory at Xunwu and the East
River Red territory are already connected, so in this way these three provinces
will be successfully joined. If we do not do our work thoroughly in these five or
six xian, but merely mount a single guerrilla attack in the style of viewing the

flowers from horseback, as we did during the forty-five days of work in southern
Jiangxi last year, then who knows when the task of linking Fujian, Guangdong,
and Jiangxi together will ever be realized. To specify that within a fixed period
of time our best efforts will be concentrated in a territory, to enlarge this territory
and at the same time do a thorough job in this territory, is a very effective work
method. When the various units of the Red Army split up to work separately, a
fixed period of time should be allocated for a specific territory. For those territories in which the work should be thorough more work time should be allocated,
and for those territories in which the work is not to be thorough, less work time
should be allocated. Within a particular territory (such as the Third Column of
the Fourth Army in Yudu), which places are to be allocated more time and which
places are to be allocated less time, should also be planned, for only then will the
work be even more effective.
only enlarged the Red territory but made its principal contribution by rectifying
the opportunism of the Party in Ningdu, carrying out the important tasks of
redistributing the land, organizing a soviet, and establishing Red Guards). Apart
from this, the other three units did not achieve any results in expanding the Red
territories, because there were no existing organizations in those three places.
Although the Third Column sent a small detachment to Jishui, unfortunately the
Party of the Third Column had developed this region too late and was not yet
able to send out very many staff members to put a lot of effort into the work
there. Although we shall certainly not abandon our efforts, the above examples
are quite enough to show us that the slogan "development in partnership" is
undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, we will certainly not tie the feet of the Red
Army or prohibit it from taking a single step into territory that is entirely White.
There are times when the army has to enter territory where there is no existing
base, because of its significance for the whole country or for other unavoidable
reasons, such as "influencing the situation, and solving the economic problem,"
or "retreating," and so on. This does not, however, correspond to the principles
of our work policy. Our principle is undoubtedly "development in partnership,"
which is, as we have always said, "wavelike advance and expansion."
At this point something must also be said about how to deal with the problem
of local Party groups and the popular masses "requesting troops." Some comrades have not taken very seriously local Party or popular mass requests for Red
Army troops to fight local bullies or militia. They do not realize that when the
local popular masses ask for troops this is a good work opportunity. For when
the masses take charge, and all the arrangements and planning are done by the
masses themselves, if the Red Army avails itself of this opportunity to help them
out, the development of the struggle is exceptionally rapid. When we disregard
the requests of the masses and just arrange the work subjectively, excellent
opportunities to develop will be lost. This is an individualist way of working and
is also incorrect.
3. Development through Partnership
Our experience with the line of progress through partnership clearly
demonstrates that work done in this way is effective. The concept of working in
partnership with an existing small piece of Red territory to develop and establish
a new small piece of Red territory, and then further encouraging it to develop
must become fully established, for previously it did not exist. Past experience
that was not like this was a complete waste of effort. The creation of the large
piece of Red territory on the Hunan-Jiangxi border came about because, at the
time of the Great Revolution, the mass struggle in the xian of Chaling, Lingxian,
Lianhua, Yongxin, and Ninggang had a few remnants of Party organization. It
was only by working in partnership with these already existing bases that development was possible. In Suichuan there was never any foundation, and the result
of trying forcibly to fabricate one was that nothing came of it. In July, the Fourth
Army split up and detached its troops for guerrilla actions in western Fujian, and
the First Column from Kanshi and Lanjia crossed over and went up along the
Ting River, going back and forth repeatedly in the border area of Shanghang and
Yongding, always in working partnership to develop a few bases, working to
"open up contact" and "connect." As a result, the work of the First Column was
especially effective on that occasion. In the area of Longtan and Longmen, the
Third Column operated in partnership with a region that had already undergone
struggle, helping the peasants with their work, so it too achieved results. Unfortunately it had not been working very long when it abruptly went off to central
Fujian, and consequently it was far less effective than the First Column. The
Yanshi-Gutian area, to which the Second Column went, had no base at all, so it
was a totally wasted trip, with no results to speak of. This time, when the Fourth
Army came to Jiangxi and divided its troops among the four places of Ningdu,
Le'an, Yongfeng and Tengtian, it was only the Fourth Column in Ningdu that
was highly effective (during the twenty days in Ningdu, the Fourth Army not
4. Armed Peasants
A major condition for enlarging the Red districts is the armed forces of the
peasants. If peasant armed forces cannot be created, the so-called task of doing
thorough work is only an empty phrase. When a guerrilla unit reaches an area in
which there is hope for doing thorough work, for one thing the existing armed
peasant forces must not be taken over to enlarge the Red Army (only in the heart
of a Red territory when part of the land struggle has already been thorough and
there is less need for the use of armed forces may a portion of the local military
forces be brought together in a planned way and turned into Red Army units).
When conditions are such that the fighting strength of the Red Army is not large
and there is a sense of having suffered losses, we must definitely still take rifles
from the Red Army and use them to arm the popular masses. Not only must we

--- Notes

1. Three weeks earlier, on February 26, 1930, Li Lisan had issued Central Circular No.
70, which explicitly criticized the "hide-and-disperse views" of Zhu De and Mao Zedong,
and indicated that they should be preparing themselves to march toward China's major
centers, rather than developing guerrilla bases in rural areas. (For the text, see Central
Committee Documents (1930), pp. 25-34.) It is not clear whether this document had not yet
reached Mao, or whether he chose to ignore it. On the relation between Mao Zedong's strategic
concepts as a whole and those of Li Lisan at this time, see the Introduction to this volume.

2. Cheng Guangyao (1898-1950) was a native of Hunan, and a graduate of the Hunan
Military Academy. In May 1927, he had been appointed commander of the Fifth Division
of the Thirteenth Army of the National Revolutionary Army.

3. Zhu Yaohua (dates unknown) was a native of Changsha, who had risen through the
ranks of the army in Hunan. From 1924 to 1927 he was a brigade commander, but since
mid-1927 he had commanded a division. At this time, he was commander of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Twenty-second Army.

4. Lu is Lu Xingbang, mentioned above, in the letter of April 5, 1929.


5. The xian enumerated here, in the East River area of Guangdong, are located in the
northeastern corner of that province, not far from the boundary with Jiangxi.
the troops for guerrilla actions, we should then concentrate our actions, because
of the needs of a different kind of circumstances, and to seize southern Fujian
and develop such places as eastern Jiangxi. Thus, we should oppose the idea of
absolute concentration, while at the same time opposing also the idea of the
absolute division of the troops.