To the Left Route Military Commission of the Provincial Party Committee, the Western Jiangxi Military Commission, and the Eastern Hunan Special Committee:  Upon my arrival in Shuinan, I learned that preparations for resisting the enemy were already quite advanced.
Mass meetings had been held in every township, and a conference of active elements was convened across the entire district.
Measures for fortifying positions and clearing the countryside had been put in place, and particularly effective work had been done to propagate among the White Army soldiers.
The streets and buildings of Shuinan were covered with slogans, manifestos, and folk songs.
Moreover, a committee for mobilizing White Army troops had been established.
In this respect, Shuinan’s preparations far surpassed those of the Rufang District, where virtually nothing had been done: most of Ji’an’s rice oil remained unremoved, salt had not yet been fully evacuated, and propaganda efforts were weak.
Judging from the situations in the Rufang District and Ji’an, it seems likely that other areas—such as the Western District, Rulin District, Chunhua District, Taihe, Yongxin, Lianhua, Anfu, Yongfeng, Xingguo, and especially Yundu on the eastern front—are similarly ill-prepared.
Under these circumstances, the Provincial Party Committee should urgently issue renewed, stringent instructions to the Western Jiangxi, Eastern Jiangxi, and Eastern Hunan special committees.
When doing so, it must correct the widespread misconception that victory in Ji’an heralds lasting peace.
Concrete examples should be cited: the complete annihilation of the Fenyi County Party Committee and Government; the severe losses suffered by the Xinyu County Party Committee and Government; the disruption of the emergency meeting in Xiajiang by enemy forces; the fact that Ji’an is now without salt, while thousands of pounds of rice oil and salt have been handed over to the enemy—all of these serve as grave lessons.
Reports indicate that the Third Regiment of the Sixtieth Division has completed its deployment from southern Hubei, and that the Sixty-first Division is continuing to advance, striking into western Jiangxi from Suichuan and Lianhua.
The county Party committees and Soviet governments of Yongxin and Anfu must act with utmost urgency.
Once the enemy enters Yongxin, Anfu, Taihe, Ji’an, and other localities, the Western Jiangxi Military Commission must direct the masses throughout the region to launch all-out guerrilla operations aimed at harassing and delaying the enemy.
At the same time, every possible measure must be taken to pin down the forces already occupying Ji’an, ensuring that the four divisions under Chiang Kai-shek—those commanded by Chiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, Luo Lin, and Li Jue—remain unable to cross to the east bank of the river.
In carrying out this mission, the Red Army’s Third Corps bears a heavy responsibility.
All of these tasks require close guidance from both the Left Route Military Commission and the Left Route Command Headquarters.
Yet, up to now, neither body appears to have fulfilled its duties: no circular directives have been issued, nor have any reports been circulated detailing the enemy situation in various regions.
This constitutes a very serious shortcoming that must be rectified without delay.
As for the eastern sector, the Left Route Commission and its corresponding organs should exercise their leadership over the Eastern Hunan Military Commission.
Similarly, the Western Jiangxi Military Commission ought not, in this critical juncture, simply demarcate spheres of jurisdiction and refrain from providing direction to the Eastern Hunan, Eastern Jiangxi, and Southern Jiangxi military commissions.
For example, recent expanded meetings of the Western Jiangxi Military Commission, joint sessions of the county committees of that region, and conferences of tenant farmers’ representatives all excluded delegates from Lianhua, Pingxiang, Xingguo, Ningdu, and Yongfeng—at the very least, these colleagues should have been invited to attend as observers.
Such exclusion is wholly unacceptable.
In the Shuinan area, people are still unaware that only funds for firewood and vegetables are being distributed, with no oil, salt, or rice provided; elsewhere the situation remains the same.
Regarding the supply of oil, salt, and rice to the Red Army, until formal notice is received, I hereby instruct the Ministry of Finance to dispatch two officials immediately to Yongfeng and Ningdu, via Chunhua, Shuinan, Pitou, and Baisha, to resolve the issue of troop provisioning.
Although ministry personnel acknowledged the order, no concrete action has yet been taken.
By the time the Red Army reaches these localities, the problems of oil, salt, and rice will remain entirely unresolved.
Salt, in particular, must be allocated from the provincial government’s reserves and delivered directly to these areas, rather than requiring purchase with cash.
With regard to fundraising, only 130,000 yuan of the planned 1.1 million yuan has thus far been secured.
Regardless of who holds it, this sum cannot be disbursed without an order from the General Front Committee; therefore, every effort must be made to expedite withdrawals.
Once the Red Army enters the liberated zones, all supplies must be obtained from the provincial government; there is no alternative.
The Provincial Party Committee should therefore revise its plans accordingly and maintain strict oversight, leaving no room for complacency.
It would be advisable for the Provincial Party Committee to convene daily, bringing together relevant leaders to provide unified guidance on all matters.

4. We may reach Baisha today and Tengtian tomorrow.
I urge the Provincial Party Committee, the Left Route Commission, the Eastern Jiangxi Military Commission, and the Western Jiangxi Military Commission—indeed, all eleven army-level command bodies—to transmit intelligence reports to the General Front Committee on a daily basis, ensuring timely and accurate information flow.
The Eastern Hunan Military Commission’s most recent report, which mentioned the surrender of over five hundred weapons by an independent division, has already been received in An.
Mao Zedong