January 5, 1930
[This was a letter written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in criticism of certain
pessimistic views then existing in the Party.]


Some comrades in our Party still do not know how to appraise the current
situation correctly and how to settle the attendant question of what action
to take. Though they believe that a revolutionary high tide is inevitable,
they do not believe it to be imminent. Therefore, they disapprove of the
plan to take Kiangsi and only approve of roving guerrilla actions in the
three areas on the borders of Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; at the same
time, as they do not have a deep understanding of what it means to establish
Red political power in the guerrilla areas, they do not have a deep understanding
of the idea of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary high tide through
the consolidation and expansion of Red political power. They seem to think
that, since the revolutionary high tide is still remote, it will be labour
lost to attempt to establish political power by hard work. Instead, they
want to extend our political influence through the easier method of roving
guerrilla actions, and, once the masses throughout the country have been
won over, or more or less won over, they want to launch a nation-wide armed
insurrection which, with the participation of the Red Army, would become
a great nationwide revolution. Their theory that we must first win over the
masses on a country-wide scale and in all regions and then establish political
power does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution. This
theory derives mainly from the failure to understand clearly that China is
a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending.
If one clearly understands this, one will understand first why the unusual
phenomenon of prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes is
only to be found in China, why this warfare is steadily growing fiercer and
spreading, and why there has never been a unified regime. Secondly, one will
understand the gravity of the peasant problem and hence why rural uprisings
have developed on the present country-wide scale. Thirdly, one will understand
the correctness of the slogan of workers' and peasants' democratic political
power. Fourthly, one will understand another unusual phenomenon, which is
also absent outside China, and which follows from the first (that in China
alone there is prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes),
namely, the existence and development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces,
and together with them, the existence and development of small Red areas
encircled by the White regime. Fifthly, one will understand that in semi-colonial
China the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forces
and the Red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership
of the proletariat, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the semi-colonial
peasant struggle, and undoubtedly the most important factor in accelerating
the revolutionary high tide throughout the country. And sixthly, one will
also understand that the policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions
cannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionary
high tide, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and
also by Fang Chih-min [1] is undoubtedly correct--that
is, the policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up political
power; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armed
forces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards,
then the district Red Guards, then the county Red Guards, then the local
Red Army troops, all the way up to the regular Red Army troops; of spreading
political power by advancing in a series of waves; etc., etc. Only thus is
it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout
the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Only
thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary
ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration.
Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the
chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus
is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.

Comrades who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity overestimate the subjective
forces of the revolution [2] and underestimate the forces
of the counter-revolution. Such an appraisal stems mainly from subjectivism.
In the end, it undoubtedly leads to putschism. On the other hand, underestimating
the subjective forces of the revolution and overestimating the forces of
the counter-revolution would also constitute an improper appraisal and be
certain to produce bad results of another kind. Therefore, in judging the
political situation in China it is necessary to understand the following:

1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are now weak,
so also are all organizations (organs of political power, armed forces, political
parties, etc.) of the reactionary ruling classes, resting as they do on the
backward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This helps to
explain why revolution cannot break out at once in the countries of Western
Europe where, although the subjective forces of revolution are now perhaps
somewhat stronger than in China, the forces of the reactionary ruling classes
are many times stronger. In China the revolution will undoubtedly move towards
a high tide more rapidly, for although the subjective forces of the revolution
at present are weak, the forces of the counter-revolution are relatively
weak too.

2. The subjective forces of the revolution have indeed been greatly weakened
since the defeat of the revolution in 1927. The remaining forces are very
small and those comrades who judge by appearances alone naturally feel
pessimistic. But if we judge by essentials, it is quite another story. Here
we can apply the old Chinese saying, "A single spark can start a prairie
fire." In other words, our forces, although small at present, will grow very
rapidly. In the conditions prevailing in China, their growth is not only
possible but indeed inevitable, as the May 30th Movement and the Great Revolution
which followed have fully proved. When we look at a thing, we must examine
its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold,
and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing;
this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.

3. Similarly, in appraising the counter-revolutionary forces, we must never
look merely at their appearance, but should examine their essence. In the
initial period of our independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area,
some comrades genuinely believed the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan
Provincial Committee and regarded the class enemy as not worth a rap; the
two descriptive terms, "terribly shaky" and "extremely panicky", which are
standing jokes to this day, were used by the Hunan Provincial Committee at
the time (from May to June 1928) in appraising the Hunan ruler Lu Ti-ping.
[3] Such an appraisal necessarily led to putschism in
the political sphere. But during the four months from November of that year
to February 1929 (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi
warlords), [4] when the enemy's third "joint suppression
expedition" [5] was approaching the Chingkang Mountains,
some comrades asked the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?"
As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United States
and Japan had by then become quite open, and a state of tangled warfare between
Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi clique and Feng Yu-hsiang was taking shape;
hence it was actually the time when the counter-revolutionary tide had begun
to ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. Yet pessimistic ideas were
to be found not only in the Red Army and local Party organizations, even
the Central Committee was misled by appearances and adopted a pessimistic
tone. Its February letter is evidence of the pessimistic analysis made in
the Party at that time.

4. The objective situation today is still such that comrades who see only
the superficial appearance and not the essence of what is before them are
liable to be misled. In particular, when our comrades working in the Red
Army are defeated in battle or encircled or pursued by strong enemy forces,
they often unwittingly generalize and exaggerate their momentary, specific
and limited situation, as though the situation in China and the world as
a whole gave no cause for optimism and the prospects of victory for the
revolution were remote. The reason they seize on the appearance and brush
aside the essence in their observation of things is that they have not made
a scientific analysis of the essence of the overall situation. The question
whether there will soon be a revolutionary high tide in China can be decided
only by making a detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictions
leading to a revolutionary high tide are really developing. Since contradictions
are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between the
imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists and
the proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need for
the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialist
contention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction between
imperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the
imperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creating
the tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving
rise to the continuous development of the contradictions among the different
cliques of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictions
among the reactionary ruling cliques--the tangled warfare among the
warlords--comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the contradiction
between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers. In the
wake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industry
comes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to obtain concessions from
the imperialists, which sharpens the contradiction between the Chinese
bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class, with the Chinese capitalists trying
to find a way out by frantically exploiting the workers and with the workers
resisting. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinese
merchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, etc., comes
the deepening of the contradiction between the landlord class and the peasantry,
that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated and the hatred
of the peasants for the landlords grows. Because of the pressure of foreign
goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses,
and the increase in government taxation, more and more dealers in Chinese-made
goods and independent producers are being driven into bankruptcy. Because
the reactionary government, though short of provisions and funds, endlessly
expands its armies and thus constantly extends the warfare, the masses of
soldiers are in a constant state of privation. Because of the growth in
government taxation, the rise in rent and interest demanded by the landlords
and the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditry
everywhere and the peasant masses and the urban poor can hardly keep alive.
Because the schools have no money, many students fear that their education
may be interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have no
hope of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall
see in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds herself.
We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the imperialists,
the warlords and the landlords is inevitable, and will come very soon. All
China is littered with dry faggots which will soon be aflame. The saying,
"A single spark can start a prairie fire", is an apt description of how the
current situation will develop. We need only look at the strikes by the workers,
the uprisings by the peasants, the mutinies of soldiers and the strikes of
students which are developing in many places to see that it cannot be long
before a "spark" kindles "a prairie fire".

The gist of the above was already contained in the letter from the Front
Committee to the Central Committee on April 5, 1929, which reads in part:

The Central Committee's letter [dated February 9, 1929] makes too pessimistic
an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. The
Kuomintang's three "suppression" campaigns against the Chingkang Mountains
was the high water mark reached by the counter-revolutionary tide. But there
it stopped, and since then the counter-revolutionary tide has gradually receded
while the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fighting
capacity and organizational strength have been weakened to the extent described
by the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivity
among comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the counter-revolutionary
tide gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly come over to us. The Kuomintang's
policy of massacre only serves to "drive the fish into deep waters",
[6] as the saying goes, and reformism no longer has any
mass appeal. It is certain that the masses will soon shed their illusions
about the Kuomintang. In the emerging situation, no other party will be able
to compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political
line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth National
Congress [7] are correct, i.e., the revolution at the
present stage is democratic and not socialist, and the present task of the
Party [here the words "in the big cities" should have been added]
[8] is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate
insurrections. Nevertheless the revolution will develop swiftly, and we should
take a positive attitude in our propaganda and preparations for armed
insurrections. In the present chaotic situation we can lead the masses only
by positive slogans and a positive attitude. Only by taking such an attitude
can the Party recover its fighting capacity.... Proletarian leadership is
the sole key to victory in the revolution. Building a proletarian foundation
for the Party and setting up Party branches in industrial enterprises in
key districts are important organizational tasks for the Party at present;
but at the same time the major prerequisites for helping the struggle in
the cities and hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are specifically
the development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment of
Red political power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the
Red Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities,
but in our opinion it would also be wrong for any of our Party members to
fear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers'
strength and harm the revolution. For in the revolution in semi-colonial
China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership
of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle
outstrips the forces of the workers.

The letter also contained the following reply on the question of the Red
Army's operational tactics:

To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee asks
us to divide our forces into very small units and disperse them over the
countryside and to withdraw Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung from the army, so concealing
the major targets. This is an unrealistic view. In the winter of 1927-28,
we did plan to disperse our forces over the countryside, with each company
or battalion operating on its own and adopting guerrilla tactics in order
to arouse the masses while trying not to present a target for the enemy;
we have tried this out many times, but have failed every time. The reasons
are: (1) most of the soldiers in the main force of the Red Army come from
other areas and have a background different from that of the local Red Guards;
(2) division into small units results in weak leadership and inability to
cope with adverse circumstances, which easily leads to defeat; (3) the units
are liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one; (4) the more adverse the
circumstances, the greater the need for concentrating our forces and for
the leaders to be resolute in struggle, because only thus can we have internal
unity against the enemy. Only in favourable circumstances is it advisable
to divide our forces for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the
leaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must in adverse
circumstances.

The weakness of this passage is that the reasons adduced against the division
of forces were of a negative character, which was far from adequate. The
positive reason for concentrating our forces is that only concentration will
enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy towns. Only
after we have wiped out comparatively large enemy units and occupied towns
can we arouse the masses on a broad scale and set up political power extending
over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we make a widespread impact
(what we call "extending our political influence"), and contribute effectively
to speeding the day of the revolutionary high tide. For instance, both the
regime we set up in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area the year before last and
the one we set up in western Fukien last year [9] were
the product of this policy of concentrating our troops. This is a general
principle. But are there not times when our forces should be divided up?
Yes, there are. The letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee
says of guerrilla tactics for the Red Army, including the division of forces
within a short radius:

The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are
indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign.
With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle on an ever-broadening
scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are guerrilla
tactics. They consist mainly of the following points:

"Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with
the enemy."

"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires,
we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

"To extend stable base areas, [10] employ the policy
of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy
of circling around."

"Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and
by the best possible methods."

These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able
to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw
it in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used for the past
three years.

Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide our forces within a short radius.
For example, when we first captured the county town of Yunghsin in the
Hunan-Kiangsi border area, we divided the forces of the 29th and 31st Regiments
within the boundaries of Yunghsin County. Again, when we captured Yunghsin
for the third time, we once more divided our forces by dispatching the 28th
Regiment to the border of Anfu County, the 29th to Lienhua, and the 31st
to the border of Kian County. And, again, we divided our forces in the counties
of southern Kiangsi last April and May, and in the counties of western Fukien
last July. As to dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible only
on the two conditions that circumstances are comparatively favourable and
the leading bodies fairly strong. For the purpose of dividing up our forces
is to put us in a better position for winning over the masses, for deepening
the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and for expanding
the Red Army and the local armed units. It is better not to divide our forces
when this purpose cannot be attained or the division of our forces would
lead to defeat and to the weakening of the Red Army, as happened in August
two years ago when our forces were divided on the Hunan-Kiangsi border for
an attack on Chenchou. But there is no doubt that, given the two above-mentioned
conditions, we should divide our forces, because division is then more
advantageous than concentration. The Central Committee's February letter
was not in the right spirit and had a bad effect on a number of Party comrades
in the Fourth Army. At that time the Central Committee also issued a circular
stating that war would not necessarily break out between Chiang Kai-shek
and the Kwangsi warlords. Since then, however, the appraisals and directives
of the Central Committee have in the main been correct. It has already issued
another circular correcting the one containing the wrong appraisal. Although
it has not made any correction of the letter to the Red Army, its subsequent
directives have not been couched in the same pessimistic tone and its views
on the Red Army's operations now coincide with ours. Yet the bad effect which
this letter had on some comrades persists. Therefore, I feel that it is still
necessary to give some explanation.

The plan to take Kiangsi Province within a year was also proposed last April
by the Front Committee to the Central Committee, and a decision to that effect
was later made at Yutu. The following reasons were given in the letter to
the Central Committee:

The armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords are
approaching each other in the vicinity of Kiukiang, and a big battle
is imminent. The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the spread of
contradictions among the ruling reactionaries, makes it probable that there
will soon be a high tide of revolution. As for how our work should be arranged
under these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provinces
are concerned, the armed forces of the compradors and landlords in Kwangtung
and Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that in Hunan, moreover, we have
lost almost all our mass following, inside as well as outside the Party,
because of the Party's putschist mistakes. In the three provinces of Fukien,
Kiangsi and Chekiang, however, the situation is different. First, militarily
the enemy is weakest there. In Chekiang, there is only a small provincial
force under Chiang Po-cheng. [11] In Fukien, although
there are five groups of enemy troops totalling fourteen regiments in all,
Kuo Fengming's troops have already been smashed; the troops under Chen Kuo-hui
and Lu Hsing-pang [12] are bandits of small fighting
capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never
seen action and their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not high; Chang Chen
[13] alone can put up some sort of a fight, but, according
to an analysis made by the Fukien Provincial Committee, even he has only
two relatively strong regiments. In addition, Fukien is now in a state of
complete chaos, confusion and disunity. In Kiangsi, there are sixteen regiments
under the two commands of Chu Pei-teh [14] and Hsiung
Shih-hui; [15] they are stronger than the armed forces
of either Fukien or Chekiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan. Secondly,
fewer putschist mistakes have been made in these three provinces. We are
not clear about the situation in Chekiang, but the Party's organizational
and mass base is somewhat better in Kiangsi and Fukien than in Hunan. Take
Kiangsi for example. In northern Kiangsi we still have some basis in Tehan,
Hsiushui and Tungku; in western Kiangsi the Party and the Red Guards still
have some strength in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Suichuan; in southern
Kiangsi the prospects are still brighter, as the 2nd and 4th Regiments of
the Red Army are steadily growing in strength in the counties of Kian, Yungfeng
and Hsingkuo; and what is more, the Red Army under Fang Chih-min has by no
means been wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nanchang.
We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that during the period of prolonged
warfare among the Kuomintang warlords, we should contend with Chiang Kai-shek
and the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi Province and also for western Fukien and
western Chekiang. In these three provinces we should enlarge the Red Army
and create an independent regime of the masses, with a time limit of one
year for accomplishing this plan.

This proposal to contend for Kiangsi erred only in setting a time limit of
one year. It was based not only on conditions within the province itself,
but also on the prospect that a nation-wide high tide of revolution would
soon arise. For unless we had been convinced that there would soon be a high
tide of revolution, we could not possibly have concluded that we could take
Kiangsi in a year. The only weakness in the proposal was that it set a time
limit of one year, which it should not have done, and so gave a flavour of
impetuosity to the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high
tide of revolution". As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi,
they well deserve our attention. Besides the subjective conditions described
in the letter to the Central Committee, three objective conditions can now
be clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Kiangsi is mainly feudal, the
merchant-capitalist class is relatively weak, and the armed forces of the
landlords are weaker than in any other southern province. Secondly, Kiangsi
has no provincial troops of its own and has always been garrisoned by troops
from other provinces. Sent there for the "suppression of Communists" or
"suppression of bandits", these troops are unfamiliar with local conditions,
their interests are much less directly involved than if they were local troops,
and they usually lack enthusiasm. And thirdly, unlike Kwangtung which is
close to Hongkong and under British control in almost every respect, Kiangsi
is comparatively remote from imperialist influence. Once we have grasped
these three points, we can understand why rural uprisings are more widespread
and the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in any
other province.

How then should we interpret the word "soon" in the statement, "there will
soon be a high tide of revolution"? This is a common question among comrades.
Marxists are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicate
the general direction of future developments and changes; they should not
and cannot fix the day and the hour in a mechanistic way. But when I say
that there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am emphatically
not speaking of something which in the words of some people "is possibly
coming", something illusory, unattainable and devoid of significance for
action. It is like a ship far out at sea whose mast-head can already be seen
from the shore; it is like the morning sun in the east whose shimmering rays
are visible from a high mountain top; it is like a child about to be born
moving restlessly in its mother's womb.
## Notes

[1] Comrade Fang Chih-min, a native of Yiyang, Kiangsi Province,
and a member of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,
was the founder of the Red area in northeastern Kiangsi and of the Tenth
Red Army. In 1934 he led the vanguard detachment of the Red Army in marching
north to resist the Japanese invaders. In January 1935 he was captured in
battle against the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang troops and in July he
died a martyr's death in Nanchang, Kiangsi.

[2] The subjective forces of the revolution mean the organized
forces of the revolution.

[3] Lu Ti-ping, a Kuomintang warlord, was the Kuomintang
governor of Hunan Province in 1928.

[4] The war of March-April 1929 between Chiang Kai-shek,
the Kuomintang warlord in Nanking, and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, the
Kuomintang warlords in Kwangsi Province.

[5] The third invasion of the Red Army's base area on the
Chingkang Mountains by the Kuomintang warlords in Hunan and Kiangsi lasting
from the end of 1928 to the beginning of 1929.

[6] The quotation is from Mencius, who compared a tyrant
who drove his people into seeking a benevolent ruler to the otter which "drives
the fish into deep waters".

[7] The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of
China was held in July 1928. It pointed out that after the defeat in 1927,
China's revolution remained bourgeois-democratic in nature, i.e.,
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, and that since the inevitable new high
tide in the revolution was not yet imminent, the general line for the revolution
should be to win over the masses. The Sixth Congress liquidated the 1927
Right capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu and also repudiated the "Left" putschism
which occurred in the Party at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928.

[8] The statement in brackets has been added by the author.

[9] The regime set up in western Fukien came into being in 1929, when the Red
Army in the Chingkang Mountains sallied eastward to build a new revolutionary
base area and established the people's revolutionary political power in the
counties of Lungyen, Yungting and Shanghang in the western part of that province.

[10] Stable base areas were the relatively stable revolutionary
base areas established by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

[11] Chiang Po-cheng was then the commander of the Kuomintang
peace preservation corps in Chekiang Province.

[12] Chen Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang were two notorious
Fukien bandits whose forces had been incorporated into the Kuomintang army.

[13] Chang Chen was a divisional commander of the Kuomintang
army.

[14] Chu Pei-teh, a Kuomintang warlord, was then the Kuomintang
governor of Kiangsi Province.

[15] Hsiung Shih-hui was then a divisional commander of
the Kuomintang army in Kiangsi Province.


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.