--- Notes

To the Fujian Provincial Committee, forwarded to the Central Committee: ① We (the Fourth Red Army) captured Tingzhou City on March 14.
Guo Fengming (Commander of the Second Brigade of Fujian) was killed, and his body was publicly displayed in the streets of Tingzhou for three days.
Approximately five hundred rifles were captured (single-shot and nine-shot rifles, which the Soviet Red Army cannot use), along with seven or eight carbines, three mortars, and over one hundred artillery shells.
The remnants of Guo’s brigade retreated in disarray toward Shanghang. ② The masses in Tingzhou are very good: After we distributed grain and property belonging to local tyrants and reactionaries and extensively carried out propaganda, workers and peasants near the city rose up in large numbers.
In recent days, we have been conducting the basic organization of peasant associations and trade unions (in both secret and open forms), and within a few days, a provisional organ of political power—the Revolutionary Committee—will be established.
Until then, the Political Department is temporarily acting as the organ of political power. ③ As the situation develops (we have seen the Shanghai newspaper of March 3, the newspapers of March 13, as well as newspapers from Zhangzhou and Chaozhou), we look to the Central Committee to provide us with instructions on the general plan for western Fujian and southern Jiangxi.
We urgently need swift instructions on how the Red Army should act, in order to vigorously win over the masses.
At this moment, no faction’s attempts to deceive the masses can match the facts we Communists present. ④ In addition to workers and peasants, winning over soldiers among the masses is also an extremely important task.
Regarding the general focus of work, in our opinion, it is advisable to concentrate efforts in Jiangsu and Zhili.
The number of small Red Army-led Soviet areas should be increased, not only in regions such as Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian, but also in areas like northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, northern Hubei, southern Henan, and Zhili, where Red Army forces and small Soviet areas should be established. ⑤ The Front Committee has decided on the actions of the Fourth Army, the Fifth Army, and the First and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army.
During the initial period of the Guomindang’s warfare, we shall operate within a scope encompassing over ten counties in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian.
Employing guerrilla tactics, we will go from mobilizing the masses to openly establishing Soviet political power and securing a base area, using this base area to link up with the base area along the Hunan-Jiangxi border. ⑥ The First Independent Regiment of the Jiangxi Red Army (under Li Wenlin) has about four hundred rifles and fairly good combat effectiveness; it is now at the junction of Xingguo, Taihe, and Ganzhou.
The Fourth Independent Regiment (under Duan Yuequan) has about three hundred rifles and relatively weak combat effectiveness; it is currently at the junction of Xingguo and Yudu.
Peng Dehuai’s Red Army unit has about three hundred rifles (consisting of those who escaped from Jinggangshan and the remnants left after desertions along the way) and is between Yudu and Xinfeng.
On March 7, Peng’s unit raided the remnants of Liu Shiyi’s forces, capturing over one hundred rifles, one heavy machine gun and one light machine gun, and seven loads of ammunition.
The Fourth Red Army will probably remain working along the Fujian border for about ten more days, after which it must proceed to the Ruijin and Ningdu areas on the Jiangxi border for guerrilla operations.
At that time, we must decide on our actions based on the changing situation in the Hunan-Jiangxi war zone, guided by what is most favorable for the development of the Red Army and the worker-peasant masses: either returning to the Fujian border, conducting prolonged guerrilla warfare in southern Jiangxi, or advancing toward Ji’an to approach the Guomindang’s war zone.
However, the plan—from mobilizing the masses to achieving open armed rule—within the region of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi must be firmly established and cannot, under any circumstances, be abandoned, for this is the foundation for our advance. ⑦ The Fujian Provincial Committee must immediately dispatch a Western Fujian Special Committee to Tingzhou to guide the work of the eight counties under Tingzhou’s jurisdiction.
The Party organization in the Tingzhou region is too weak and cannot shoulder the responsibility of building political power.
The main tasks at present are to expand Party and mass organizations, establish organs of political power, and build up the Western Fujian Red Army (currently, we have guns but no one to recruit). We hope the Provincial Committee will direct strong attention to this matter. ⑧ Throughout Fujian Province, Zhejiang Province, and the regions of eastern and southern Jiangxi, the military strength of the ruling class is extremely weak (compared with the rest of the country). We do not know if the Central Committee has discussed a plan to target these three places as objectives to first establish open armed-rule zones.
The ruling forces in these three areas are weak and also connected to the sea, which merits special attention. ⑨ Since we left Jinggangshan on January 14, the primary reason was that there was no financial solution.
On the 20th, we fought unfavorably against Li Wenbin’s troops in Dayu, then passed along the Guangdong border through Nanxiong into southern Jiangxi.
At Xinfeng, Anyuan, and Xunwu, we engaged pursuing forces three times, fighting while retreating each time.
On February 1, we halted for one day at Luofuzhang at the junction of Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi.
The entire route passed through areas without Party organizations and without mass support.
Five regiments of pursuing troops closely tailed us, and reactionary local militias added to their show of force—this was the most difficult period for our army.
After reaching Luofuzhang, in order to settle the wounded, to find a resting place with Party and mass support, and to rescue Jinggangshan, we decided to head for Donggu (at the junction of Ningdu, Xingguo, and Ji’an, under Ji’an County). On the 11th of the month, we arrived at Dabodi in Ningdu, where we fought Liu Shiyi’s 15th Brigade, the vanguard of the pursuing forces, and dealt them a severe defeat.
Our troops’ morale soared.
We captured over two hundred rifles and six heavy and light machine guns, and took many prisoners.
The enemy’s remnants fled in disarray toward Ganzhou.
By the time the follow-up units under Li Wenbin (three regiments) arrived, we had already moved to Donggu.
We rested in Donggu for a week, met up with the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army, and established contact with the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee (in Yudu), settling the wounded there.
When Li Wenbin (the most elite unit of the Jiangxi army) pursued us to Donggu, we decided to abandon the policy of open armed rule in fixed areas and adopt a mobile guerrilla policy (a circling policy) to counter the enemy’s relentless pursuit.
On the 15th of February, we left Donggu and passed through Yongfeng, Le’an, Guangchang, and Shicheng, later entering Rentian Market in Ningdu and Ruijin—with the rear guard only one li away.
This was the reason we left Rentian Market and headed for Tingzhou when Brigade Commander Zhang suddenly turned back, because war had broken out in Hunan, and Chiang Kai-shek’s faction needed to concentrate forces, so they recalled Zhang’s brigade.
This enabled us to deal with Guo Fengming without distraction.
On the 13th and 14th, we routed Guo’s forces twice.
Meanwhile, the First and Fourth Red Army Regiments also developed in the Xingguo and Yudu areas.
Since the Fourth Army set out from Jinggangshan, total losses have been about over two hundred rifles and six hundred personnel.
The greatest loss has been the reduction in cadres, which is most regrettable.
This period of hardship has been the greatest difficulty since the Red Army was founded.
We exerted all our energy to overcome this crisis and achieve our current success.
Internal unity remained solid (during the most difficult times, very few soldiers deserted; only a handful of cadres, such as Yuan Wencai, left the ranks), and the correctness of the Party’s leadership was also a reason for overcoming the difficulties. ⑩ The highest Party organ in the army is the Front Committee appointed by the Central Committee (due to practical needs, several people have been added beyond the list appointed by the Central Committee). The Fourth Army, apart from the part remaining on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, now has its outward-marching forces organized into three columns, totaling three thousand men and one thousand guns, with an extreme shortage of ammunition.
Due to the high frequency of battles, the loss of veteran cadres has been heavy, and combat effectiveness is not what it was before.
However, the exhausted and demoralized state that followed our departure from Jinggangshan has been recovered, and morale has been boosted.
As a result of losses in the two defeats, there is an acute shortage of officers and political workers; we urgently request that the Central Committee send personnel to supplement us, at the very least dispatching a number of military and political instructors to establish training schools here. ⑪ Over the past two years, due to severed communications, we have received only two dispatches from the Central Committee: one was a long letter from June of last year, received in Jinggangshan in October; the other was the resolutions of the Sixth National Congress (six documents covering politics, military affairs, land, political power, the peasantry, and the congress itself), received in Yongxin this January.
As for letters we have sent to the Central Committee: in August of last year, Mao Zedong sent a long letter via the Hunan Provincial Committee; last November, the Front Committee transmitted a detailed report through both the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committees.
This report recounted in detail the course of the two-year struggle along the Hunan-Jiangxi border and the Red Army’s current plans, among other matters.
We do not know whether any of these have been received. ⑫ The resolutions of the Sixth National Congress are entirely correct, and we joyfully and enthusiastically accept them.
We previously mimeographed over five hundred copies and distributed them to Party organizations along the route from Jinggangshan; now we have lithographically printed one thousand more copies for expanding organizations in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi.
However, the three resolutions on organization, propaganda, and labor are missing; we request that these be sent as a supplement immediately. ⑬ The Western Fujian Special Committee must be established quickly.
The Southern Jiangxi Special Committee is very cut off from the Jiangxi Provincial Committee but has already established close relations with the Front Committee.
The Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee, since its establishment last May, has had relatively close ties with the Hunan Provincial Committee and less contact with the Jiangxi Provincial Committee.
Among the Party organizations in southern Jiangxi, Yudu and Donggu are the best, followed by Xingguo, Xinfeng, Ningdu, Anyuan, and Xunwu; Ruijin, Huichang, and Shicheng still have no organizational structure, while Changting is in the early stages of developing one.
The best area, Yongding, is over three hundred li from us.
In order to respond to developments in Jiangxi, the Red Army cannot go to Yongding at this moment.
Comrade Ruan Shan’s Red Army troops should march to Tingzhou; this is necessary.
After we leave for Jiangxi, only then can the political power in Tingzhou be sustained and maintain close contact with us.
With Guo Fengming dead, there is no one managing Tingzhou anymore.
The central work for the eight counties should be based in Changting.
We hope the Provincial Committee will give this careful consideration. ⑭ When the Central Committee assesses our strength, it must not overestimate us.
Front Committee