Former political departments of armies and corps undertook many peripheral tasks, neglecting their primary responsibility: directing the political work of the entire army or corps.
These departments at both levels also served as temporary organs of mass political power.
However, they performed poorly in this role as well—for example, providing inadequate responses to mass petitions and failing to assist mass organizations and local political bodies in formulating comprehensive plans that could continue effectively after the Red Army’s departure.The Political Department of the First Army formulated its work program around the Red Army’s political tasks for each period, implementing them through political measures.
For instance, with the task of overthrowing the Minxi warlords and expanding the Minxi Soviet regime, the department planned to mobilize all officers and soldiers to fully understand the significance of this mission and raise their revolutionary morale.
It also organized, supervised, and inspected political training across the army, including: (1) special training for new recruits and prisoners of war; (2) specialized training for young soldiers through youth soldier schools; (3) regular training for ordinary soldiers in standard classes; (4) advanced training for junior cadres in special classes; (5) supplying materials for political education; setting daily morning and evening roll-call slogans; and delivering various assembly speeches.
Furthermore, it guided and reviewed the organization and activities of soldiers’ committees throughout the army, and oversaw propaganda efforts by: (1) providing key propaganda materials; (2) inspecting and guiding units’ propaganda content and methods; (3) urging the establishment and training of unit-level propaganda teams; and (4) organizing and reviewing disguised propaganda activities.
The department ensured that each unit’s political organs, in coordination with military authorities, enforced the Three Main Rules of Discipline and general military discipline.
It also monitored compliance with policies regarding the treatment of wounded soldiers and other Red Army regulations, such as abolishing corporal punishment and executions of deserters.
Additionally, it issued socio-economic survey forms, instructed units on practical survey techniques, and required them to compile statistics to be submitted to the army’s political department for overall analysis.
The department planned and promoted campaigns to educate and organize the masses, assisting them in establishing local political institutions like revolutionary committees and Soviets.
It further supported these bodies in forming local armed forces, including insurgent squads, Red Guards, and local Red Army units.
The department coordinated with units and local authorities to purge counter-revolutionary elements and guided the expropriation and redistribution of land by mass organizations.
It also organized leadership training courses for grassroots leaders and encouraged units to collaborate with local political bodies in carrying out community development projects such as building schools, cooperatives, and medical clinics.
Finally, it handled and responded to petitions from the masses and planned and directed the procurement of supplies for the Red Army and funds for mass work, while ensuring proper implementation of urban policies by both military and civilian entities.The Political Department of the First Corps followed a similar approach, focusing on the political tasks assigned by higher command during a given period and executing them through political means.
For example, with the goal of defeating the Minxi warlords and expanding the Minxi Soviet regime, the department aimed to inspire all corps personnel to grasp the importance of this mission and heighten their revolutionary spirit.
It organized, supervised, and inspected political training across the corps, including: (1) special training for new recruits and prisoners of war; (2) specialized training for young soldiers via youth soldier schools; (3) regular training for ordinary soldiers in standard classes; (4) advanced training for junior cadres in special classes.
The department provided training materials, established weekly morning and evening roll-call slogans when operating independently away from the main force, and arranged various assembly talks.
It also guided and reviewed the organization and activities of soldiers’ committees within the corps and oversaw propaganda efforts, such as supplying key materials, inspecting and advising on propaganda content and methods, and promoting the formation and deployment of propaganda teams.
The department ensured that all political staff, in conjunction with military authorities, upheld the Three Main Rules of Discipline and maintained good military discipline.
It monitored adherence to policies concerning the care of wounded soldiers and other Red Army regulations, such as the abolition of corporal punishment and execution of deserters.
Furthermore, it encouraged all personnel to conduct field surveys and submit statistical data for central compilation.
The department planned and facilitated mass mobilization and the formation of mass organizations, assisting in the establishment of local political bodies like revolutionary committees and Soviets.
It also supported these bodies in creating local armed forces, including insurgent groups, Red Guards, and regional Red Army units.
In coordination with local authorities, the department worked to eliminate counter-revolutionary elements and guided the expropriation and redistribution of land by mass organizations.
It organized leadership training courses for grassroots leaders and urged units to collaborate with local political bodies in undertaking community development projects such as constructing schools, cooperatives, and clinics.
When handling mass petitions—especially those requiring action by the army’s political department—the department would forward them to higher authorities for resolution.
It also planned and directed the procurement of supplies for the Red Army and funds for mass work, ensuring that both military and civilian entities adhered to urban policies.
All of these activities were subject to guidance from the army’s political department while operating under its direct supervision; however, when acting independently, the corps’ political department could formulate its own plans, provided they were subsequently reported to the higher authority.The Political Commissar of a battalion was responsible for planning and overseeing political education for all battalion personnel, assisting company commanders in its implementation.
This included intensifying political education, guiding the work of the battalion’s soldiers’ committee, ensuring that troops understood directives from higher command, regularly assessing and correcting any erroneous tendencies, training and leading propaganda teams, and organizing youth soldier schools by selecting students, designating instructors and venues, and preparing teaching materials.
The commissar also oversaw special training sessions for soldiers and managed administrative matters within the battalion, ensuring that all orders from above were carried out, economic affairs were properly managed, military discipline was maintained, and conditions for soldiers were improved—including living standards, diet, recreation, and hygiene—as well as providing better medical care for the sick and wounded.
The commissar was tasked with expanding political propaganda, organizing mass organizations, convening public meetings, and directing troops and propaganda units to engage in oral, written, and disguised propaganda campaigns targeting the populace.
They were also responsible for conducting social surveys on behalf of higher authorities, organizing mass organizations, and instructing troops in methods of struggle.
During wartime, the commissar oversaw the reception and propaganda work among captured enemy soldiers and led anti-counterrevolutionary operations and fundraising efforts, investigating and apprehending landlords and other reactionary elements before reporting to superiors—though in cases where distance from higher command made immediate reporting impractical, preliminary action could be taken first.
The commissar also coordinated investigations into local notables and assisted in fundraising activities.Political Work Guidelines for the Fourth Red ArmyAt all levels, the Fourth Red Army’s political departments emphasized improving the treatment of wounded soldiers, expanding political propaganda, and organizing mass movements.
They planned and directed the convening of mass assemblies, instructing troops or propaganda teams to conduct oral, literary, and disguised propaganda campaigns whenever possible.
Officers were also tasked with submitting social survey reports to higher authorities and organizing mass organizations, guiding their methods of struggle.
During combat, they oversaw the treatment and propaganda efforts directed toward enemy prisoners.
Additionally, they led anti-counterrevolutionary campaigns and fundraising initiatives, investigating and capturing landlords and other reactionaries before handing them over to higher authorities—though in remote areas, preliminary action could be taken first before reporting.
The commissar also coordinated efforts to investigate local elites and support fundraising activities.Fourth Red Army Political Department Circular Regarding the Fujian-Western Jiangxi Special CommitteeReprints: There are three types of rich peasants in western Fujian.
The first type is semi-feudal—individuals who cultivate their own land while leasing out surplus acreage.
The second type is capitalist: they do not lease land but may even rent additional plots from others and employ hired labor.
The third type consists of early-stage rich peasants who neither lease land nor hire workers, relying solely on their own labor to farm.
Despite lacking external inputs, these farmers possess sufficient land and labor to produce a surplus of grain each year, which they either sell or lend out.
Regardless of their specific characteristics, all rich peasants exploit poor peasants primarily through usury—charging high interest rates on loans of money, grain, pigs, cattle, and oil—and through commercial sales of grain.
Moreover, some rich peasants engage in small-scale trade by opening shops and selling products, thereby exploiting the poor through commercial capital.
Although rich peasants constitute the rural bourgeoisie, their exploitation is typically marked by semi-feudal brutality.
Whether through land rent, usury, hired labor, or commercial profit-seeking, their methods are far more oppressive than those employed by landlords.
Consequently, the interests of this class fundamentally conflict with those of poor peasants and agricultural laborers.Octopus Eight Affairs.
At the outset of the revolution, despite their shared opposition to warlordism and excessive taxation, rich peasants invariably sided with landlords against poor peasants as long as the movement originated from the latter.
During periods of revolutionary fervor, some rich peasants might feign solidarity by burning their land deeds, distributing land to the poor, wearing red armbands, or even infiltrating the Communist Party in an attempt to salvage the crisis facing rural capitalism and steer it toward a capitalist future.
This represents one of the most serious issues in the rural class struggle, demanding the utmost attention from comrades.
As the struggle deepened and poor peasants consolidated their leadership, stripping rich peasants of their political influence, confiscating their land and livestock, and canceling their debts, the latter often resorted to spreading rumors and engaging in passive resistance.
When the revolution began to falter, rich peasants would vacillate, compromise, and ultimately defect entirely, joining the counter-revolutionary camp and attacking the poor.
Historically, particularly in the Eastern River region, only semi-feudal and capitalist-rich peasants were recognized as such, while early-stage rich peasants were labeled “middle peasants” and excluded from measures targeting surplus land confiscation or debt cancellation.
This oversight overlooked the fact that these early-stage rich peasants remained an exploitative class.
Although they did not collect rent or rely on hired labor, their practice of usury and opportunistic sale of surplus grain placed them on par with the other two categories.
Through these exploitative practices, they gradually accumulated capital and converged with the more established semi-feudal and capitalist-rich peasant groups.
Therefore, it is imperative that poor peasants seize not only the land and cancel the debts of semi-feudal and capitalist-rich peasants but also those of the early-stage variety.
Such actions have already been undertaken in regions where the struggle has reached a decisive stage.
Nevertheless, this issue remains unresolved within the Communist Party.
The Joint Conference has expressed a firm stance, advocating for the same resolute measures against all three types of rich peasants as previously applied to the other two.
Why adopt such a policy?
Only by confiscating their land can we address their predatory exploitation through usury and opportunistic pricing, and only by abolishing their debts can we counter their exploitative lending practices.
Both forms of exploitation are inherently semi-feudal in nature.
Only through their complete eradication can peasants achieve genuine liberation from semi-feudal relations; mere elimination of landlordism and the first two categories of rich peasants falls short.In the Yangtze and Pearl River basins, poor peasants generally comprise over 70 percent of the population, middle peasants account for roughly 10 percent, and rich peasants make up less than 10 percent.
In the rural class struggle, the main force is composed of poor peasants, with middle peasants occasionally forming alliances.
Rich peasants, by contrast, remain a highly isolated minority.
While their counter-revolutionary tendencies are undeniable, some argue that they constitute a significant portion of the population in certain southern provinces—for example, claiming that Jiangxi is predominantly composed of self-cultivating farmers, Meixian and Dapu boast large numbers of self-sufficient farmers capable of launching a land revolution, or that Fuzhou and Changting in Fujian are home to 40 percent rich peasants.
Such assertions clearly exaggerate the power of the rich peasant class, suggesting that the initial focus should be on landlords rather than rich peasants.
Beyond being objectively inaccurate and inconsistent with social realities, these claims also reflect a subjective effort to elevate the status of rich peasants within the Party and among the masses, obscuring class consciousness and undermining—or even eliminating—the Party’s anti-rich-peasant agenda.
Similarly, right-wing opportunist positions that advocate conceding to rich peasants when confronting landlords are equally dangerous.
Conversely, dismissing rich peasants as a “marginalized minority” likewise serves to dilute the Party’s commitment to combating their exploitation.
The opportunist faction led by Chen Duxiu contends that rural China has already become capitalist, with feudal exploitation existing only in residual forms.
Their conclusion naturally leads to abandoning the democratic revolution and ceasing the struggle against landlords.
However, if our response fails to address the essence of exploitation and instead focuses solely on its manifestations, we risk affirming that “landlords, not rich peasants, are the primary enemies,” thereby denying the fundamental similarity between the anti-rich-peasant and anti-landlord struggles as both opposing brutal semi-feudal exploitation.
Ultimately, this flawed reasoning would result in the gradual erosion and eventual abandonment of the anti-rich-peasant campaign.
By relinquishing this critical task, we would fail to mobilize the broad masses of poor peasants to complete the democratic revolution and advance toward socialism.
On the contrary, recognizing the equivalence of these two struggles as resistance to semi-feudal oppression is essential for establishing a robust anti-rich-peasant strategy, rallying the masses, and successfully completing the democratic revolution.
Only then can we dismantle Chen Duxiu’s theoretical framework and prevent him from continuing to propagate fallacious ideas about the role of rich peasants in rural society.The failure of the Hailufeng uprising, attributed to adventurism and localism, should not be seen as a failure of the anti-rich-peasant movement.
Drawing lessons from past setbacks in Hailufeng, comrades who once opposed the so-called “middle peasants” now caution against targeting early-stage rich peasants.
Similar arguments have emerged elsewhere, echoing the sentiments of comrades in the Two Lakes region during the Great Revolution, who blindly followed Tang Shengzhi and Xu Kexiang in denouncing the peasant movement as “too radical.”
Today, we recognize that the failure of the Great Revolution was not due to “excessiveness” but rather to a lack of decisive action.
The defeats in Hailufeng and other regions stemmed from adventurist and narrow-minded localist leadership, coupled with an unfavorable national political climate, rather than from insufficient anti-rich-peasant efforts.
Under such leadership, failure was inevitable regardless of whether or not rich peasants were targeted.
Furthermore, the anti-rich-peasant struggle should never be equated with reckless violence and plunder, which constitute adventurism and serve as lessons for future reference.
On the contrary, a resolute confrontation with rich peasants and the establishment of absolute peasant-led dominance in the countryside are crucial conditions for securing revolutionary victory.To obstruct the masses’ efforts to completely eradicate rich-peasant exploitation under the pretext of “keeping financial channels open”—that is, allowing rich peasants to continue lending to poor peasants—is deeply misguided.
While it is understandable that rich peasants might promote such rhetoric as a deceptive tactic, adopting this stance from the perspective of the poor peasantry is utterly foolish.
Once rural order is disrupted, all borrowing and credit transactions cease immediately.
How could there possibly be room for rich peasants to facilitate financial circulation when the very purpose of the struggle is to confiscate their land?
The experiences of all revolutionary base areas have demonstrated that the only viable way to maintain financial liquidity is for poor peasants themselves to establish credit cooperatives and Soviets, compelling rich peasants to extend low-interest loans out of compassion.
Meanwhile, rich peasants must refrain from interfering in the affairs of poor peasants and instead embrace principles such as “confiscating all land” and “abolishing all debts.”
These two slogans have become indispensable cornerstones of the land struggle across southern provinces.
Yet, while the masses universally adhere to them, the Party often lags behind, merely endorsing the actions of the masses after they have already taken effect—sometimes even consistently positioning itself as an adversary rather than a supporter.
This grave phenomenon undermines the Party’s ability to lead the land struggle in southern China.
There is no doubt that slogans like “confiscate landlord land” and “abolish usury” have been co-opted by rich peasants and opportunistically inclined party members to hinder the progress of the peasant movement.
Equally problematic is the practice of issuing statements such as “denying these slogans” or “subsequently endorsing them,” which constitutes tail-endism.
To effectively mobilize the masses, we must proactively champion these slogans rather than waiting until the struggle has already begun to offer our support.
Such a reactive approach fails to grasp the unique circumstances of the southern land struggle and results in a weak, opportunistic strategy that is ill-suited to addressing the urgent needs of tens of millions of impoverished farmers.A common viewpoint suggests that the Party should adopt different strategies toward rich peasants depending on whether an area is classified as “red” or “white”: targeting rich peasants and enforcing slogans like “confiscate all land, abolish all debts” in red zones, while maintaining the focus on landlords in white zones.
The rationale behind this approach is to temporarily neutralize rich peasants, allowing the struggle against landlords to prevail first.
However, this view is fundamentally flawed.
We must acknowledge that rich peasants—notwithstanding those mistakenly categorized as “middle peasants”—constitute a small minority compared to landlords yet wield immense power, exploiting poor peasants with the most brutal semi-feudal methods and exhibiting inherently counter-revolutionary tendencies.
Therefore, we should never blur the lines between rich peasants and other farmers, granting them opportunities to manipulate the situation.
Instead, we must expose their true nature from the outset, enabling the masses to recognize their counter-revolutionary character.
Moreover, rich peasants cannot be “neutral”; upon encountering the united front of poor peasants and agricultural laborers, they will inevitably align themselves with the landlords.
There is simply no such thing as neutrality in this context.
Any notion of neutralizing rich peasants risks impeding the proletariat’s vigorous mobilization of poor peasants and hindering efforts to forge alliances with middle peasants.
If we fail to explicitly advocate for anti-rich-peasant slogans from the outset, poor peasants will undoubtedly feel disillusioned—a reality already confirmed in Minxi and other regions.
After all, the enemies of poor peasants and agricultural laborers extend far beyond landlords; while landlord exploitation is indeed severe, rich-peasant exploitation is even more egregious.Regardless of location, two slogans must be proclaimed: “Confiscate all land” and “Abolish all debts.”
Some argue that concessions should be made to rich peasants in certain areas—for example, within counties or townships where rich peasants constitute a majority.
In such cases, decisions regarding land distribution and debt cancellation could deviate from standard procedures adopted elsewhere, allowing local Soviets to implement alternative arrangements, such as allocating land based on labor contributions or exempting small debts.
Such deviations would require review and approval by higher-level Soviets.
However, this approach carries two major risks: First, in these so-called “special areas,” the interests of poor peasants are entirely sacrificed in an attempt to appease rich peasants.
Many fail to realize that wherever rich peasants are prevalent, poor peasants are even more numerous.
By prioritizing the concerns of rich peasants over those of poor peasants, they inadvertently adopt a Nationalist Party–style strategy that the Communist Party should absolutely avoid.
Second, granting local Soviets the authority to protect rich-peasant interests—such as refusing to divide land equitably or exempting small debts—does not necessarily mean that the area truly has a “majority of rich peasants” or “self-sufficient farmers.”
Even in regions where rich peasants are scarce, as long as the local Soviet is dominated by rich peasants, they can easily manipulate public opinion to justify such demands.
Consequently, this practice effectively perpetuates the exploitation and oppression of poor peasants by rich peasants.
Therefore, across all regions of southern China, we must uniformly proclaim the slogans “Confiscate all land” and “Abolish all debts” without exception to prevent such dangers.Allocating land based on labor contribution—giving more to those with greater labor input and less to those with less—is undeniably advantageous for rich peasants.
Given that the majority of rich peasants in China still belong to the semi-feudal and early-stage categories, with few purely capitalist farms or agricultural corporations, the prospect of equitable land distribution favors rich peasants.
Unlike poor peasants, who often lack adequate resources such as draft animals, farming tools, and capital, rich peasants possess abundant labor, oxen, equipment, and capital.
This comparative advantage makes it easier for them to develop into full-fledged rich peasants.
For instance, among poor peasant families, households with multiple working members—such as a family of eight where four individuals contribute labor—are far more likely to accumulate wealth and ascend to the ranks of rich peasants than families with fewer able-bodied members.When the balance between the Red and White forces remains uncertain—that is, during periods like the present—the primary challenge lies in motivating the masses to overcome personal attachments and fulfill their duties.
In such moments, the key criterion for determining strategic priorities is mobilizing the people, rather than pursuing production.
Since the means of production—land and other resources—remain in enemy hands, or even if they have fallen into the hands of the people, they could still be reclaimed by the enemy at any time, discussions about boosting output are premature.
Those who propose production-oriented initiatives under these circumstances are essentially advancing the interests of rich peasants through opportunist tactics, as such proposals objectively serve to hinder the development of the revolutionary movement, prolong the lifespan of landlords, and ultimately lead to the revolution’s failure.As mentioned earlier, only equitable land distribution can effectively mobilize the broad masses of poor peasants during intense phases of the struggle.
This principle holds true even for production: Minxi provides a compelling example.
In Minxi, land is distributed equally among all residents, and this year’s crops have flourished remarkably, with yields expected to increase by approximately ten percent compared to previous years.
Previously, some comrades worried that the individual plots allocated to each household were too small or that those who had never tilled the land before would struggle to cultivate them, potentially leading to reduced productivity.
However, these concerns have proven unfounded; in fact, the opposite has occurred—production has increased significantly.
Why?
Because the idle workforce resulting from land scarcity in the past has now been put to productive use.
Furthermore, China’s agriculture remains largely dependent on manual labor, irrigation, and organic fertilizers.
Under landlord rule, peasants often regarded the land as belonging to others and lacked motivation to till it deeply or improve water management systems.
They were reluctant to apply fertilizer, viewing it as unnecessary or burdensome.
Consequently, vast tracts of land lay fallow, leading to widespread agricultural decline nationwide.
In contrast, Minxi’s equitable land distribution has eliminated these inefficiencies.
Peasants are now willing to engage in intensive cultivation, deploying substantial manpower to repair irrigation channels—a practice that was virtually nonexistent under landlord rule.
Without equitable distribution, it would have been impossible to mobilize such a large workforce to restore these vital infrastructure projects.
Additionally, crop residues are utilized to produce animal feed and compost, while human waste is collected and processed into fertilizer.
These measures collectively resolve longstanding problems related to soil fertility.
All of these benefits stem from equitable land allocation and the subsequent mobilization of extensive labor resources, which have contributed to the observed increase in production.For instance, those who claim a shortage of draft animals and argue that land cannot be cultivated without them overlook the fact that many farmers previously rented oxen from rich peasants.
With the confiscation of rich-peasant-owned livestock, this obstacle has been removed.
Similarly, those who cite insufficient farming tools can borrow excess implements from confiscated assets.
Even the concern that excessively small land parcels may hinder production applies primarily to large-scale corporate agriculture, which is virtually absent in China.
The predominant model remains smallholder farming, where even large landowners typically lease their property to multiple tenant farmers rather than cultivating it themselves.
Moreover, we should encourage poor peasants to embrace collective production as a step toward socialism, rather than supporting rich peasants in pursuing capitalist modes of production.During revolutionary periods, agricultural prices plummet dramatically, creating a scissors gap between producer and consumer prices.
Many rich peasants, having little incentive to cultivate their land, contribute to this imbalance by neglecting their fields.
As a result, households with limited labor capacity end up receiving larger plots than those with ample working hands, yet this does not necessarily reduce production.
In fact, individuals without significant labor capacity can still assist with certain tasks.
As for extremely imbalanced family compositions—such as nine non-working members versus one worker—these situations are relatively rare.
In such cases, the affected plot can be returned to the Soviet for reallocation, preventing it from lying fallow.
Model farms and cooperative-style collective production represent effective approaches to transitioning agriculture toward socialization.
However, in the current phase of the struggle, these models frequently encounter obstacles.
Farmers may seek funding for their Soviet projects or plan for future offspring, prompting calls to reserve public lands, forests, and surplus housing for communal use rather than dividing them entirely.
Others advocate for a “socialist bottom-up” approach, whereby all land is owned and managed by the Soviet, and farmers contribute labor under its direction.
Products are then distributed according to population needs, with any remaining surplus retained by the Soviet—positions exemplified by figures like Yuan Wencai in Jiangxi and Fu Bo Cui in Fujian, both staunch proponents of rich-peasant agendas.
These seemingly progressive stances actually conceal a cunning stratagem employed by wealthy peasants to delay land distribution during peak revolutionary momentum.
In reality, poor peasants are far more concerned with securing food for tomorrow than planning for future children.
Consequently, their primary demand is for prompt land allocation.
Reserving land for future offspring holds little practical significance in their eyes.
True socialist production requires first thoroughly dismantling feudal relationships through equitable land distribution, followed by the establishment of cooperative farming communities under the guidance of the Soviet.
Once the revolution achieves nationwide victory, the Soviet can select suitable sites to operate model farms, thereby ushering in a socialist era.
Attempting to implement such policies directly, without going through the stages of equitable distribution and cooperative organization, amounts to a petty-bourgeois fantasy that obstructs the land struggle, sabotages the success of the revolution, and ultimately negates the possibility of achieving socialism.
Traditionally, land was allocated after sowing, with the original cultivator reaping the harvest.
This approach satisfied only the rich peasants, leaving poor peasants and the unemployed dissatisfied.
Under this system, those harvesting once per year would not see another yield until the following autumn, while those harvesting twice annually would have to wait even longer.
Despite their discontent, rich peasants managed to garner support from poor peasants and the unemployed.
Offering compensation to rich peasants in exchange for their grain, however, aligns with the interests of the former, as poor peasants often lack the financial means to pay.
As the rural class struggle escalates into open insurrection, poor peasants, the unemployed, and other participants inevitably engage in a dual struggle: first against landlords, then against rich peasants.
The fight against landlords must go beyond simply leveling the playing field; it requires eradicating the accumulated grain reserves of each household and calculating the ratio of total grain holdings to the total population, thereby redistributing surplus grain equitably and free of charge.
Engaging in this struggle from a rich-peasant perspective—advocating for “opposition to absolute egalitarianism,” for example—would undermine the unity of the poor peasant movement and is therefore inappropriate.
Instead, we must champion this cause from the standpoint of poor peasants and other marginalized groups.In guerrilla warfare settings, where stable political authority may be elusive even for brief periods, resorting to “grain looting” becomes necessary.
While such actions are acceptable when targeting landlords, they are entirely justified—and should be actively supported—when directed against rich peasants.
The Red Army and local Soviets should indeed levy contributions from rich peasants.
Historically, attempts to prevent the masses from raising funds for rich peasants were dismissed as adventurist behavior, a mischaracterization rooted in a superficial understanding of the situation.Equitable land distribution achieved solely through the “take more, give less” method, as practiced in Minxi last year and enshrined in official documents stating “no equal division allowed,” ultimately benefits rich peasants more than poor ones.
By using protective mechanisms to favor smaller plots while retaining control over richer ones, rich peasants secure significant advantages, a phenomenon observed not only in Minxi but also in many other regions.
This represents a critical aspect of the land struggle that should not be overlooked.
Alongside “taking more,” we must also “retain more.”Slogans for research opposing rich peasants: Land must be distributed swiftly.Ji-„<AA*^••*-☆J:^i77f、es--*w-^n^务如,±ihi-fc、-•十.Land tax should be levied with the principle of protecting poor peasants while simultaneously strengthening ties with middle peasants and countering rich peasants.The primary objective of targeting rich peasants today is not their eradication, but rather the mobilization of poor peasants, the expansion of the revolutionary struggle, and the achievement of victory.
In reality, rich peasants do not disappear after being targeted; they possess numerous socioeconomic advantages.
Even after their land is confiscated, they remain wealthier than poor peasants, and their economic growth tends to outpace that of the latter.
Moreover, rich peasants continue to exploit poor peasants through commercial practices such as hoarding, speculation, and retail trade.
To truly eliminate rich peasants and end their exploitation of poor peasants, we must await the nationwide triumph of the democratic revolution and transition to a socialist society.
Only through the combined efforts of urban workers—providing guidance and support—and the persistent endeavors of poor peasants themselves can we successfully socialize agriculture.
It is only then that capitalist production methods employed by rich peasants will be rendered obsolete, and all farmers will attain proletarian status, marking the end of exploitation in rural areas.
This is precisely the goal that the industrial proletariat and its vanguard—the Communist Party—aim to achieve together with the peasantry.When the masses enthusiastically engage in the struggle to redistribute land, criticisms such as “utopian egalitarianism” or “petty-bourgeois fantasy” are often exploited by rich peasants and even communist party members of rich-peasant origin to distort the meaning of the movement and resist the push for equitable land distribution.
Such instances are widespread and serve as a cold shower for earnestly engaged poor peasants, inevitably leading to disappointment.
The underlying issue is not that equitable land distribution is undesirable, but rather that it signifies the absence of private property rights and the realization of a communist society.
Until these fundamental changes occur, rich-peasant exploitation will persist.
True victory for the poor comes only after equitable land distribution, when the proletariat unites the peasantry to overthrow the bourgeoisie and imperialism.
At that point, capitalism will not only continue to exploit farmers but will do so with even greater intensity, exacerbating the cruel scissors gap that leaves rural residents hungry, homeless, and deprived of basic necessities.
Despite having access to food, they face soaring prices for clothing and goods, rendering their lives increasingly unbearable.
To alleviate this suffering,•nT-l，^ -if^x .irA--w-&n^H^•合，■7-}iar^--w-^f -flPmA，J^--办m„K-^^tH-.^xpna-:.M -^^iT *lA-it：M -i，々斤。Our comrades should leverage every opportunity to inform and encourage peasants across both rural and national contexts, drawing on diverse strategies to motivate them forward, rather than holding them back by clinging to outdated views centered on rich peasants.
For example, voicing such critiques during the heat of an ongoing land redistribution struggle not only invites misinterpretation by rich peasants but also presents the masses with two competing objectives—democratic rights and socialism—which can easily confuse their understanding.
As long as the masses remain unaware of the ultimate goals beyond their immediate objectives, they are prone to becoming muddled.
If we fail to vigorously promote the attainment of current objectives while simultaneously relaxing our focus on broader aspirations, the masses may begin to harbor doubts: “Is this really good, or is that better?”
Criticizing the land redistribution process just two weeks after its completion eliminates this ambiguity.The first step toward securing victory in the land revolution is to purge the Party of rich-peasant elements.
To rally the broad masses of poor peasants, launch a decisive offensive against rich peasants, establish peasant leadership in the countryside, and ensure the success of the land revolution, it is imperative to cleanse the Party of its rich-peasant factions, particularly within rural Party organizations.
This task is of paramount importance because, historically and even today, local Party organizations—especially their leadership bodies—are rife with rich-peasant sympathizers.
Prior to the outbreak of rural class struggles, the Party dispatched intellectuals from rich-peasant and petty-aristocratic backgrounds to rural areas, where they quickly established connections with local elites.
Over time, these individuals came to dominate senior leadership positions across various branches of the Party, hindering the advancement of the revolutionary movement and preventing deeper engagement with the masses.
It was only when the Party’s higher leadership adopted anti-rich-peasant policies that these entrenched influences were challenged, allowing revolutionary ideals to resonate more effectively among the grassroots.
Purging rich-peasant elements from all levels of Party leadership is a process that nearly every local organization has undergone.
Clearly, if rich peasants—particularly those in leadership roles—are not purged…To prevent rich peasants from exerting influence within the Soviets and undermining peasant-led governance, it is essential not only to expel them from Party structures but also to actively engage in theoretical debates against them.
Both within the Party and among the masses, sustained intellectual discourse on the anti-rich-peasant position is crucial for fundamentally overcoming their ideological grip.
Only through this concerted effort can we permanently dismantle their hegemony and prevent its resurgence at any time.