On the morning of November 11, at 1:00 p.m., the meeting convened with the same attendance as before. Chairman Wang Jiaxiang announced the resumption of the session. As for the selection of the third-phase war zone, Comrade Mao has already outlined the situation: in the third phase, our enemy will likely strike from Nanfeng; under such circumstances, we can adopt a favorable strategy by luring them deep into Ningdu, Huangpi, Xiaobu, and even Shicheng before engaging. However, if the enemy advances simultaneously from Xingguo, Baisha, Shuinan, Nanfeng, with additional forces also moving from Le’an and Futian–Donggu, then the situation becomes more challenging. By the time they reach Donggu and Longgang, their main body will have concentrated along a single axis, presenting a numerically weak target. Should we anticipate an enemy thrust along two axes, we should intensify our penetration work in southern Jiangxi. If Chiang Kai-shek and Cai Tingkai join the offensive against us, this time we need not wait for them to complete their fortifications but rather strike while they are still assembling. In that case, we should establish our operational base in Yudu and decisively open up the Qifang sector, committing all three corps to defeating Chiang and Cai. Such a move would help restore the balance of power between the Nanjing and Guangdong governments. Therefore, the actions of Chiang and Cai directly influence our choice of battle area, which is precisely what requires discussion.

Peng: After suffering two successive defeats, the White Army has come to realize that encirclement is unfeasible. Consequently, this time they will concentrate their forces and advance in a pincer movement. If the enemy further reinforces its ranks and closes in more tightly, the situation will become unfavorable. Should we abandon Donggu and Longgang, yet Chiang and Cai continue to press forward from Xingguo, targeting Xingguo and Ningdu, then we should set up our main battlefield in Yudu. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s drive to assert his prestige, he will likely seek merely to rout us rather than entertain any illusions of “annihilating” the Red Army. Thus, when the enemy advances along a single line, we may allow it to penetrate deeper; but if it splits into multiple columns to encircle us, we must engage before it can close the noose.

Mao: If the enemy advances from Nanfeng, river transport is feasible only north of Guangchang. Hence, prior to August 15, their progress will be confined to Guangchang; only after the new harvest can they push further. Before July, we can focus on fundraising; in August, we need not concern ourselves with their movements. The key lies in establishing a solid soviet base area across the counties of Yu, Ruijin, Shicheng, and Tingzhou as our operational theater.

Lin: I broadly concur with the foregoing analysis. The next enemy offensive will likely proceed along three axes, though still following established routes. The central column will be reinforced, as the enemy seeks a swift resolution; our task, therefore, is to delay. As for Chiang and Cai, they are deploying troops to counter Chiang Kai-shek and assume defensive positions, making it impractical for them to leave Ganzhou and march via Ji’an. We should now accelerate our preparations in this region, keeping in mind that future operations can be launched whenever advantageous conditions arise.

Ouyang: During the first phase of the campaign, Chiang and Cai advanced extremely slowly, while the Ganzhou press was rife with anti-Chiang sentiment (as of November 19). It appeared that Chiang and Cai were somewhat resistant to Chiang Kai-shek’s commands.

Zhu: From a tactical standpoint, it remains preferable to engage Zhu Shaoliang. Our main battlefield should be centered on Yu and Longgang, supported by broad popular participation. At present, however, he is unable to mount a rapid advance.

Cai: I largely agree with the above. The enemy will inevitably concentrate its main force along the route from Nanfeng to Guangchang, with a stronger anti-Chiang element among Chiang and Cai’s troops. Regardless of the specific location chosen for the battle, securing the northern sector is essential—both to consolidate the red base area and to establish effective communication links among Xingguo, Yu, and Ningdu. In the previous engagement, numerous units were committed, yet parts of Laicun remained unconquered. This time, however, the three corps will deploy only two divisions, rendering it difficult to execute a comprehensive deployment.

Zhou: The enemy’s three offensives have invariably involved at least three axes. Accordingly, our operational base should be established in the Xingguo–Yu–Ningdu–Ruijin region.

Ouyang: In the third offensive against us, Chiang will certainly refrain from encirclement, limiting himself to one or two axes—at most—the Nanfeng route and either the Ji’an or Yongxin route. Given the heightened anti-Chiang sentiment within Chiang and Cai’s forces, their advance will be slow and halting. Those units lacking such sentiments would find themselves isolated in rear areas. Therefore, if they do not openly oppose Chiang Kai-shek, they should not retreat toward Ganzhou; otherwise, they risk being pinned down with only two divisions capable of advancing into Guangdong. In that event, the primary battlefield should be situated between Ningdu and Ruijin.

Chairman: Our deliberations thus far have been of a general nature, intended to guide preparatory work. Immediate attention must now be given to rectifying conditions in Yongfeng County. In southern Jiangxi, particularly in the northern sectors, all earthworks should be razed and brought under our control. Within the red base area, measures must be strengthened to prevent infiltration by White Army detachments and enemy spies, while hospital facilities should remain stationary for the time being.  As for the enemy massing at Nanfeng, there are signs that they may withdraw. Should they indeed evacuate Nanfeng, one division of the Third Corps should be dispatched to operate in the Liuta area north of Nanfeng. Meanwhile, the Eleventh Division should be redeployed to Xinfeng City. Overall, the Three Corps need not increase their troop strength for operations in southern Jiangxi; on the contrary, they should reduce it, since the duration of the campaign is expected to be prolonged. (The issue of the Eleventh Red Army School was briefly mentioned. The lessons learned from the second and third campaigns will be discussed at the Tingzhou Conference.)