——. Following our great victories in the first two campaigns at Longgang and Dongshao, we have already driven back the White Army forces under Wei Ming’s command. Now, in a final bid to seize counterrevolutionary leadership and stave off the collapse of the ruling class, in order to prolong their dying regime, the enemy is launching an even more brutal offensive against the revolution. Recently reinforced, Wang Jinyu’s two divisions—one of which has already reached the Ji’an and Jishui areas—while Guo Huazong’s division remains in Gao’an; Hao Mengling is advancing toward Jishui, Hu Zuyu is stationed in Yihuang, Han Deqin in Xingan, Liu Heding in Jianning, and Luo Zhuoying in Pingxiang. These five divisions, together with the Chang and Luo divisions already based in Ji’an, are all actively preparing to move against us. The second phase of the campaign is about to begin.  However, this time we are in a far stronger position to secure victory than during the previous operations. The escalating conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang, coupled with the nationwide economic crisis that can no longer be sustained, are inexorably pushing the country toward a new round of warlord warfare—a development highly detrimental to our adversaries. On our side, we have already achieved a nationwide victory, effectively repelling the counterrevolutionary onslaught. In particular, after the Battle of Longgang, the enemy not only lost two entire divisions but also suffered a severe erosion of morale among its troops, with many soldiers increasingly leaning toward the revolutionary cause. We have not only amassed substantial quantities of firearms and ammunition but have also equipped local militias with an additional four thousand rifles. In Guangchang, Ningdu, Yongfeng, Le’an, Nanfeng, as well as in Sandu and Qibao, we have won over hundreds of thousands of new supporters, who have been organized into well-armed units. Five Red Guards armies have been formed, ten guerrilla zones demarcated, and specific procedures for coordinating local armed forces with the Red Army have been established through deliberations at the military conference held in the Soviet region. Moreover, the complete resolution of the Futian Incident has enabled the revolutionary forces on the west bank of the Gan River to regroup once again. Furthermore, we now boast a fresh, vigorous addition to our ranks—the Seventh Army, reportedly deployed in Liling and Suichuan. This unexpected development has caught the enemy off guard, severely constraining their plans to attack us. Taken together, these favorable conditions ensure that we are poised to achieve an even greater victory this time.  To guarantee this enhanced success, we must review the key lessons learned from our previous campaigns and make more thorough preparations for the upcoming operation. Beyond the general directives issued by the General Political Department regarding political propaganda and mobilization, we hereby lay out the following specific military preparations:

I. Major Shortcomings Observed Before and After the Last Campaign 1) Prior to the battle, no advance deployment was made within the anticipated operational area. Consequently, the preliminary map of Longgang was based solely on hasty on-site reconnaissance, routes were improvised at the last minute, and troop movements were likewise unplanned. Many staff departments—the General Staff Office, the Adjutant General’s Office, and the Military Region Command—failed to convene dedicated meetings to discuss and coordinate preparatory work. As a result, during combat, commanders often found themselves disoriented, scrambling to address multiple issues simultaneously, unsure of their priorities, or having dispatched all available personnel so that no one remained to carry out critical tasks. Additionally, essential supplies such as carbon paper and pencils were frequently left behind by staff officers, while medical officers neglected to bring necessary medications. 2) Insufficient logistical preparation led to situations where certain units went without food for as long as two days during the engagement. 3) During the battle, changes to higher-level operational plans were communicated in an ambiguous manner, and lower-ranking officers often failed to grasp the intent behind these directives. Command structures varied considerably: some lacked effective control over their units, others exhibited limited mobility, and still others failed to maintain a comprehensive overview of the battlefield situation. 4) Communication between superiors, subordinates, and friendly units was extremely poor, with very few reports or notifications exchanged. 5) Supply lines proved inadequate, leaving many units poorly provisioned throughout the campaign. 6) Personnel management within each unit was haphazard and unscientific, with troops flitting back and forth across the front lines or rear areas without making meaningful progress toward their objectives. 7) Post-battle pursuit operations were disorganized. Units that had pursued the retreating enemy received no clear orders from higher command and, lacking explicit instructions from the highest authorities, independently withdrew to their bivouacs—as occurred after the Battle of Dongshao. There was no systematic assignment of specialists to clean up the battlefield and direct units to perform specific tasks. 8) No efforts were made to locate and secure confidential documents, coded telegrams, specialized equipment, or technical personnel. 9) Reports detailing the enemy’s retreat route, the extent of captured spoils, and the status of unit replenishment and reorganization were submitted with egregious delays, sometimes not until long after the fighting had ceased. 10) The handling of prisoners of war and wounded soldiers following the battle was excessively slow, seriously impeding further pursuit operations. Moreover, attention to the welfare of the wounded was woefully inadequate; they often went for extended periods without proper nourishment or medical care. Without prompt access to adequate rations, soldiers struggled to regain their strength, let alone tend to horses or clean their weapons. 11) Prisoners were not assigned dedicated personnel for their care, leaving them without food throughout the day. This dissatisfaction was particularly pronounced after the Battle of Longgang.

II. Immediate Preparations Required 1) Mobilization: In addition to the political mobilization measures prescribed by the General Political Department, each unit should hold a formal oath-taking ceremony. Before setting out for battle, all troops must assemble for a motivational address. 2) Meetings: Various types of meetings should be convened to facilitate pre-battle preparations, discuss matters requiring attention during combat, and plan post-battle actions. This approach represents the most effective means of ensuring mission success. Accordingly, all units are instructed to promptly convene the following meetings:  At the army or division level: A) Convene a General Staff Meeting to deliberate on unit-specific operational concerns, staff duties, inter-unit communication protocols, rear-area logistics, and procedures for searching for confidential materials after the battle, as well as current training guidelines. B) Hold an Adjutant General’s Meeting to address miscellaneous wartime responsibilities, including baggage management, supply distribution, handling of unforeseen incidents at the front, and procedures for managing and transporting prisoners and spoils of war. C) Organize a Medical Conference to discuss the rescue and evacuation of wounded soldiers, the establishment of dressing stations, and methods for procuring post-battle medicines, Western medical supplies, and nursing resources. D) Call a meeting of regimental and higher-ranking officers to review past shortcomings in training and command, discuss preparations and key considerations for the upcoming campaign, and assess current training standards.  At the regimental level: A) Conduct a meeting of company commanders and deputy commanders to examine past operational deficiencies and outline preparations and precautions for the forthcoming engagement. B) Arrange a gathering of adjutants, quartermasters, and other supply officers to focus on logistical support during combat and the provision of assistance to wounded soldiers and prisoners after the battle.  At the company level: A) Hold a meeting of squad leaders and above to review past combat experiences and deliberate on pre-battle preparations and post-battle follow-up measures. B) Organize a company-wide assembly to inform all soldiers of the political objectives and significance of the current campaign, as well as the collective effort required to achieve them. 3) Training: Intensify drills according to the new training syllabus, conducting separate live-fire exercises; both army and division commanders are to participate in these sessions. Implement field-combat simulation training and organize one regimental and one divisional-level joint exercise. Every morning, standard calisthenics will include hill-climbing, pursuit maneuvers, shooting drills, and rapid assembly exercises. Recreational time will be devoted to bayonet-fighting practice and long-jump competitions. Evening roll calls will conclude with a brief military briefing. 4) Miscellaneous Support Personnel: Specialized teams responsible for carrying loads, ambulances, and nursing duties must undergo joint training to master evacuation techniques and coordinated response procedures. All personnel, regardless of unit, must be thoroughly familiar with methods for concealing themselves during marches, bivouacs, and combat—particularly when enemy aircraft are present—and must be capable of rapidly taking cover (as detailed in the First Directive of the Front Army issued in Changsha). 5) Cooks: Efforts should be made to reduce their workload and enhance their culinary skills. Soldiers must receive instruction on weapon maintenance and preservation techniques and be urged to adhere to these practices. 6) Logistics: Each unit is required to stockpile ten days’ worth of rice and funds sufficient for one month’s expenses.  All commands are directed to convene immediately upon receipt of this order, formulate detailed implementation plans for their subordinate units, and report back to headquarters for review.

Issued by Supreme Commander Zhu De and Political Commissar Mao Zedong, March 17, 1931.
oO Historical Issues and Documents Related to the Red Third Army Corps Jiangxi People’s Publishing House 1980 .2 Military Preparations Necessary to Secure Victory in the Second Campaign II I